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Abstract 
The Dialectic of Religion and Politics in Hamas’ Thought and Practice 
This study discusses the relationship between the religious and the political in the 
thought and practice of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas in its struggle with 
Israel as it views it. It critically investigates the thought and the religious framework 
of the movement and its mother organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. It explores the 
overlap between the religious and/or the ideological dimensions of the theory and 
practice by revealing how Hamas draws inspiration from Islam, a framework it 
describes as "religious". It analyses the ground on which Hamas’ ideological 
convictions are based, and how they developed. This is being done by attempting to 
understand the role of religion in the formulation of the convictions (i.e. ideology) of 
the Muslim Brotherhood – and therefore those of Hamas - in their comprehension of 
the conflict with Israel.   
This research has sought to fill a void in the context of studying the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Hamas by trying to explain the mechanisms of religious and political 
interaction and the role this interaction has played in shaping the ideological 
convictions of the two movements in the context of their conflict with Israel. 
Reviewing the religious reference of Hamas helps us to understand that any change in 
one of Hamas’ positions does not imply the abandonment of its religious reference, 
but rather a shift from one considerable Islamic fiqhi (jurisprudential) opinion to 
another. 
Thus, the thesis examines the accuracy of many of the Brotherhood's and 
Hamas’ positions and ideological beliefs, as well as comparing them to the other 
authentic Islamic view points. The study further highlights in detail the impact of the 
movement’s adaptation to fixed “religious” principles and their implementation 
within a set of complex situations, as presented by the current state of affairs in 
Palestine. Moreover, the research examines Hamas’ application of the Prophetic and 
Islamic historical experiments, as they relate to the current conflict with Israel from 
the movement’s point of view.  
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Introduction 
 
The Dialectic of Religion and Politics in Hamas’ Thought and Practice 
  
Since the issuance of the "Balfour Declaration" on 2 November, 1917 which promised 
the Jews "a national home" in "Palestine",1 Palestine has been a battleground of 
clashing narratives, histories, religious beliefs, and bloodshed. After the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire in the First World War and the takeover of the British forces in 
Palestine in December 1917, Great Britain began opening the doors  to Jewish 
migration. This policy was further strengthened after The Council of the League of 
Nations issued "The Palestine Mandate" on 24 July, 1922, supporting the "Balfour 
Declaration" and holding the British Mandate responsible for its implementation.2    
The Palestinians and the Arabs rejected the "Balfour Declaration", which they 
considered a disavowal of British promises made to them after they supported it 
against the Ottoman Empire. According to Sharif Hussein's correspondence in 1915 
                                                 
1 Arthur James Balfour was the British Foreign Secretary. He issued this declaration on behalf of the 
British cabinet, to what is known as the British Zionist leader, Lord Rothschild. The declaration stated 
the following:  
(Foreign Office 
November 2nd, 1917  
Dear Lord Rothschild,  
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following 
declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, 
the Cabinet.  
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country."  
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.  
Yours sincerely, 
Arthur James Balfour)  
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/The%20Bal
four%20Declaration  
2 The mandate stated that: "the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory (Great 
Britain) should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on 2 November, 
1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people".   
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp  
with the British High Commissioner Henry McMahon, Britain made a commitment to 
support the establishment of a united Arab state led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca if 
they revolted against Ottoman Empire in Greater Syria and the Arab Peninsula Areas, 
which were under the Ottoman control at that time.3 But the British Mandate 
authorities in Palestine continued to ignore the demands of the Arabs and the 
Palestinians, despite the successive revolutions carried out by the Palestinians against 
the facilitation of the Jewish immigration to Palestine and their continued acquisition 
of land.4 
With the announcement of the British Mandate authorities in April 1947 of its 
intention to withdraw from Palestine, Great Britain called for the inclusion of the 
Palestinian issue on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations. And 
on 29 November, 1947 the General Assembly issued Resolution 181, calling for the 
partitioning of Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab. Thus, the state of Israel was 
declared on 15 May, 1948. As a result of the Arab armies’ defeat in the 1948 war, 
Israel was able to dominate 78% of the land of historical Palestine, and hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians were displaced.5  
Ever since the establishment of Israel, the Palestinians have resisted the new 
state. However, the Palestinian resistance intensified after the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip after the 1967 June war. The most serious 
consequences of that war was Israel's hegemony over all of historic Palestine, 
including East Jerusalem, which encompasses the Al-Haram al-Sharif (or the Temple 
                                                 
3 Ahmad Said Nofel, Almoamara Alestemaria-Alsohuionia Ala Filsteen,[The Colonial - Zionist 
Conspiracy Against Palestine], chapter 2/part 2 in Jawad El- Hamad (Editor), Al madkhal ila alqadiya 
alfilasteeniya,[The entry to the Palestinian Question] (Amman, Jordan: Middle East Studies Center, 7th 
Edition, 2004.), pp. 194-195. 
4 Ibid., pp. 205-224. 
5 Ibid., pp. 224-227. Also, see AbdelSatar Kassem and Ghazi Rababaa, Alhoroub Alarabia 
Alesraelia,[The Arab Israeli Wars], chapter 2/part 3 in Jawad El- Hamad (Editor), Al madkhal ila 
alqadiya alfilasteeniya. Ibid.,  pp. 300-314, and Ibrahim Abu Jaber, Jawad El- Hamad, and Sameer 
Samaan, Qadiatu Alquds wa Mustaqbaloha,[The Issue of Al-Quds and its Future], chapter 3/part 4, pp. 
679-680.  
Mount, according to Jewish terminology), and the displacement of tens of thousands 
of Palestinians to the neighbouring Arab countries.  
In order to organise the Palestinian resistance efforts, dozens of Palestinian 
factions were formed with different intellectual and ideological identities. Some of 
them were Islamic, others were of a national nature, while others were of Pan-Arab or 
leftist backgrounds.. 
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was one of the first organised Arab 
movements that resisted the Jewish presence in Palestine before the establishment of 
the state of Israel, and then, after the establishment of the state. However, its 
resistance declined dramatically starting in the 1950s after its clash in Egypt with the 
regime of the former President Gamal Abdel Nasser. After that violent clash, the MB 
went through a major intellectual review that eventually resulted in the development 
of a new strategy, based on the principle of empowerment “tamkeen,” as opposed to 
the idea of liberation. These issues will be discussed in more details in chapter 1 of 
this study. In addition to a national and Pan-Arabist dimension, a religious dimension 
was strong also. This issue will be discussed in chapters 1 and 2 of this study. After 
reconciling the two dialectics of empowerment and liberation at the intellectual level, 
the MB returned to military resistance after decades of absence. This return was 
facilitated by the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in December 1987, but this time 
through a new frame, the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. This issue will be 
further discussed in chapter 1. 
According to a study conducted by Paul Scham and the author of this thesis: 
  
As the first Palestinian uprising erupted in mid-December 1987, a group of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders in the Gaza Strip met in the house of Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin, the main founder of the movement. There, they established 
Harakat al Muqawama al Islamiyya (the Islamic Resistance Movement), best 
known by its Arabic acronym “Hamas” (zeal), as a framework for the 
representation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the activities of the Intifada.6 
 
And "less than a year later, Hamas issued its charter (or covenant), which has 
continued to define the organization in Western eyes. The charter is an 
unapologetically hard-line document that vividly promises destruction to Israel."7 
However, with the passing of time and because of the difficult circumstances that 
surrounds the movement (which will be illustrated in this section and in chapters 3 
and 4), the discourse of Hamas has become much softer, though the major beliefs of 
the movement remain unchanged and it continues to refuse the recognition of the state 
of Israel. The reasons will be discussed in more detail below and in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Subject of Research and Methodology 
 
This study seeks to discuss the relationship between the religious and the political in 
the thought and practice of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas in its struggle 
with Israel as it views it. It will critically investigate the thought and the religious 
framework of the movement and the MB, its mother organization. It will explore the 
overlap between the religious and/or the ideological dimensions of the theory and 
practice by revealing how Hamas draws inspiration from Islam, a framework it 
describes as "religious". The thesis will attempt to examine the accuracy of many of 
                                                 
6  Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid. Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility. United 
States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2009, p. 4. Also, see Ziad Abu-Amr,[Hamas: A Historical 
and Political Background] Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer, 1993.), p. 10. 
7 Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid. Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility. Ibid., p. 4. 
the Brotherhood and Hamas’ positions and ideological beliefs, as well as comparing 
them to the other authentic Islamic view points. The study further highlights the 
distinction between what is political ideology or Ijtihad “innovation” (according to 
Islamic terminology), and what is purely “religious” in this context. In addition, this 
study will highlight in detail the impact of the movement’s adaptation to fixed 
“religious” principles and their implementation within a set of complex situations, as 
presented by the current state of affairs in Palestine. Finally, the research will examine 
Hamas’ application of the Prophetic and Islamic historical experiments, as they relate 
to the current conflict with Israel from the movement’s point of view.  
  
The Importance and Originality of the Research 
 
This research is important because it uncovers the unique nature of the movement as a 
distinctive aspect of new Islamic thought and shows how it  attempts to reconcile the 
two stages of liberation and empowerment “tamkeen,” as they are viewed side by side 
in the context of the Palestinian issue. This issue will be further explained in chapter 
1.  
Since its emergence, Hamas has become an important element not only in the 
Palestinian arena, but also for its effect on the regional stability of the Middle East. 
This importance stems not just from its popularity, or its military operations, but 
rather its ability to cause deep tremors in the region and to the peace process. Because 
Hamas has become an integral element in the region’s politics its views must be taken 
into consideration if there is any hope for positive change.  
There has been no single study of Hamas which has gone as far as this study to 
analyse the dynamic relationship between the religious thought that frames the 
movement, provides its ideological reference, and regulates its general political 
rhythm on the one hand, and its application on the ground, on the other. No single 
study exists that focuses, as this study does, on the interaction of  the religious 
framing of Hamas’ political ideology and the ways in which this harmonizes and 
stabilizes the interpretation of religious principles in dynamic political circumstances. 
No study has ever tried to examine the referential framework that informs Hamas’ 
positions and reflect on its relationship to Islamic understandings derived from 
original textual references or mainstream Islamic fiqh (jurisprudential) schools (we 
will explain later on in this section the meaning of mainstream Islamic fiqh 
schools). In the absence of such an examination it is not possible to understand 
Hamas’ policies or anticipate its future actions. 
One of the main features that distinguish this study from other existing studies 
is that it deals with religion's power as an independent variable in studying Hamas and 
its political discourse. It addresses some of the concerns that were raised by 
researchers in the field of religion and politics. For example, Eva Bellin inquired into 
the power of religion as an independent variable to shape events, interests, and 
identities, "and how might the study of religion answer the questions that grips so 
many students of ideas in politics. How do ideas change? And when do ideas resonate 
and become politically significant?"8 This study does that in the context of its attempt 
to understand the interaction between religion and politics in the MB's and Hamas' 
thought and practice.    
That does not mean, however, that this study undermines the other variables 
relevant in this field, most notably the political, historical, and the socio-economic, all 
of which are utilized adequately in this study but not as extensively as religion. The 
                                                 
8 Eva Bellin, Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics. World Politics, 
Volume 60, Number 2, January 2008., pp. 345-346. 
latter variables do affect Hamas and help shape its views. This study merely suggests 
that the religious referential framework of Hamas as an independent variable is absent 
from most, if not all exiting literature on Hamas and this is the main contribution of 
this thesis since other studies have discussed in detail the political, historical, and the 
socio-economic factors in shaping and understanding Hamas' statements and 
positions. In other words, the emphasis on religion in this study becomes necessary 
because it helps give meaning to many of the MB's and Hamas' positions. As Talal 
Asad notes, the religious theory is essential "for judging the validity of [others] 
cosmological utterances. But always, there must be something that exists beyond the 
observed practices, the heard utterances, the written words, and it is the function of 
religious theory to reach into, and to bring out, that background by giving them 
meaning."9      
 Many existing studies are either historical, descriptive self-reflections, based 
on experiences within the movement, or encyclopedic studies. Many, though not all, 
Israeli and Western studies are framed by a concern with terrorism. In general, 
existing literature focuses on the evolution of the movement’s statements and 
positions, either over time or in respect of changing of the political circumstances. 
Other studies have dealt with certain aspects of the movement, e.g., militaristic, 
financial or social. This thesis fills a void in the literature and the analysis here 
provides an original contribution to understanding this important movement’s ideas.  
The importance and relevance of this study will be amplified in the context of 
Hamas’ landslide victory in the Palestinian Legislative elections of January 2006, and 
its formation of the government in March of the same year. The importance of this 
study will be further enhanced after Hamas' take over of the Gaza strip in June 2007 
                                                 
9 Talal Asad "The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category" in Genealogies 
of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore, 
M: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993 [1982], p. 123.   
following violent clashes with the Palestinian Authority's (PA) forces that are loyal to 
the chairman of the PA and of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement's 
"Fatah", Mahmoud Abbas. The clashes took place over the extent of government 
jurisdiction given to Hamas and the presidency under Fatah's control. Despite the 
financial sanctions that were imposed on the Palestinian people by Israel and Western 
governments, and despite the pressure on the movement by some Palestinian factions 
and Arab and Muslim regimes to quell its hard-line positions, (such as its rejection of 
Israel’s right to exist),10 Hamas has refused to this day to abandon its convictions. Not 
even a cruel embargo on the Gaza strip in which 1.5 million Palestinians live, nor a 
massive Israeli attack on Gaza and Hamas (December 2008-Januray 2009) were 
successful in compelling the movement to give up its convictions and bow to 
international pressure.  
From one angle this study will explain where and how Hamas has drawn its 
conclusions and why it remains intransigent. And from another angle it will also 
explain the interactions between the religious and the political dimensions within 
Hamas’ thought and practice. 
Because it examines the religious reference and its interaction with the 
ideological and political convictions of Hamas, it will shed light on some of the more 
flexible statements and positions that it came to adopt after it was elected (and its 
formation of the government) and the religious framework used to support these 
                                                 
10 For example The New York Times reported from Cairo, Egypt on 1 February, 2006, that Egypt 
under the regime of the ousted President Hosni Mubarak insisted that Hamas, after it won the January 
2006 elections, must renounce violence, confirm existing agreements between Israel and the 
Palestinians, and recognize Israel if it wants to form the next Palestinian government. The New York 
Times said that "the statement, from the Egyptian intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, was the most 
forceful to emerge from the Arab world." The report quoted Suleiman as saying that Hamas should: 
"One, stop the violence. Two, it should become doctrine with them to be committed to all the 
agreements signed with Israel. Three, they have to recognize Israel." If Hamas "won't commit to these 
conditions," he said, the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, "is not obliged to ask them to form a 
government."  
"Egypt Urges Hamas to End Violence and Recognize Israel." 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/01/international/middleeast/01cnd-egypt.html?_r=0 
positions. Such a moderate tone does not point to a leadership coup or a fundamental 
shift in the ideology of Hamas as it might appear at first glance, but a revision of the 
most radical interpretations of the original Islamic texts in favour of more flexible 
ones. It is more of an intellectual evolution than a coup as will be explained in 
chapters 3, and 4. 
One of the examples that illustrates this point is Hamas’ announcements 
through its political bureau chief, Khaled Meshaal. He was quoted in an interview on 
Wednesday, 10 January, 2007 as saying that Hamas will consider a formal recognition 
of the state of Israel only if a Palestinian state has been created on 1967 borders, that 
includes Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem and Israel’s acceptance of the right 
of return.11 However, this softening in Hamas’ rhetoric does not mean that Hamas has 
abandoned its formal position that rejects such recognition. In the same interview 
Meshaal insisted that Hamas acknowledges the existence of Israel as a reality, and 
that it will not deal with it in terms of recognizing or admitting it. Yet, this interview 
was followed by a press release by Hamas (Thursday,11 January) denying that 
Meshaal mentioned any possibility of recognizing Israel if a Palestinian state is 
created.12 How and why did Hamas reach such conclusions? And why will Hamas 
never consider the form of recognition of the right of existence for the state of Israel? 
This study will try to provide some answers. 
Since its emergence in December, 1987, Hamas has made a unique 
contribution to Islamic work in general and to life in Palestine in particular. It is 
obvious that Hamas’ thought, experience, and actions, though based upon the MB, the 
mother movement, does enrich the political thought and intellectual development of 
                                                 
11 Khaled Meshaal, Interview with Reuters News Agency. Wednesday, 10 January, 2007. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1046412720070110  
12 Hamas' clarification communiqué on Thursday, 11 January, 2007. 
http://www.paltimes.net/arabic/read.php?news_id=66873 
the Brotherhood. In fact, Hamas has even bypassed the mother movement in many 
areas especially in the area of coalition-building with the secular and leftist 
Palestinian and Arab movements. Additionally, its far-reaching relationships extend 
to the Arabs-Muslims, Europeans, Russians, Chinese and other members of the 
international community.13 
In sum: the contribution of this research lies in the answers it provides to a 
number of important questions, specifically: how does Hamas apply its understanding 
through its affiliation to the MB School of Thought? What is the relationship between 
the “religious”, and the “political” dimensions of thought and practice? What are the 
patterns of interaction between the two sets of variables?  How does Hamas apply its 
ideological thought to the complex current state of affairs? Furthermore, this study 
will investigate in depth the credibility of some of Hamas’ ideological convictions as 
they are classified as “innovative” or Ijthihad.  This is also a critical analysis. Hamas 
and the Brotherhood are merely schools of thought within this flexible universe of 
innovation or Ijtihad thought, which necessarily means it is open to discussion, 
criticism, evaluation, and amendment. This is especially true if such evaluation is 
based upon the standards of “literal religious texts”, which are “absolute”, and the 
innovations, which are “flexible” and relative in nature and open to evaluation.   
 
                                                 
13 For more details about Hamas' relations with Europe and Russia see Ali Badwan, On relations 
between Hamas and Europe: 
http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/3061-on-relations-between-hamas-and-europe   
also: EU Delegation Pushes For Normal Relations With Hamas 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-4865921-503543.html 
On Hamas Russian relations see: Russia rebuffs Israeli rebuke over open relations with Hamas 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/russia-rebuffs-israeli-rebuke-over-open-relations-
with-hamas-1.290241  
On Hamas China relations, see: China urges Hamas to recognize Israel, invites al-Zahar to summit 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/china-urges-hamas-to-recognize-israel-invites-al-zahar-to-summit-
1.187878 
Approach to the Research Problem 
 
Since its putative inception on 14 December, 1987, Hamas emphasized the fact that it 
attains its intellectual understanding from the teachings of Islam. Thus, Islam itself 
provides the general framework, or the ideology that represents the intellectual 
foundation of Hamas. According to Hamas' charter “the Islamic Resistance 
Movement: The Movement's programme is Islam. From it, it draws its ideas, ways of 
thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man. It resorts to it for judgement 
in all its conduct, and it is inspired by it for guidance of its steps.”14 
For Hamas this understanding is consistent with The MB’s school of thought. 
Again, according to Hamas' charter:  
 
The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a 
universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in 
modern times. It is characterised by its deep understanding, accurate 
comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all 
aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, 
justice and judgement, the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, 
science of the occult and conversion to Islam.15 
  
Based on the preceding it is possible to conclude that Hamas declares itself 
clearly as an ideological Islamic movement. Its doctrines and beliefs are based on the 
Brotherhood’s school of thought, originally based upon the idea of “revivalism” of 
                                                 
14 Hamas’ Charter. Article 1. 18 August 1988. An English translation of Hamas’s charter is available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp 
15 Ibid., Article 2.  
Islamic discourse after the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate and the separation 
between religion and politics which occurred in the process of state formation and the 
demarcation of national territories. Thus, Hamas, like the MB, seeks reconciliation 
and harmonization between Islam and all aspects of life especially in the areas of 
politics, economics, society and culture. More aptly put: the implementation of the 
comprehensive nature of Islam in its land (i.e. were Islam is the dominant religion and 
Muslims constitute a majority in a nation or a state).  
Since Hamas is one of the embodiments of the Brotherhood’s school of 
thought it does not recognize barriers between "politics" and "religion". In addition, 
since Hamas distinguishes itself as a resistance movement against the Zionist/Jewish 
(the obvious confusion here in Hamas' terminology will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 3) colonial project, as it describes its aims in its charter and statements, there 
is a great need to discuss the ways that Hamas deals with the question of Palestine and 
its way of implementing its Islamic Brotherhood understanding through the 
Palestinian issue.  
The expression 'Brotherhood's school of thought' raises some important issues. 
As indicated, this school of thought believes in the comprehensiveness of Islam. In 
fact this belief is consistent with the mainstream Islamic jurisprudence and is not 
unique or distinguished.16 Furthermore, the Brotherhood school of thought is not a 
rigid, homogeneous, and cohesive school of thought in terms of all of its juridical 
convictions. Thus, the Brotherhood School of thought is not merely a fiqh 
(jurisprudential) Islamic school. Beyond the consensus within the school on the 
comprehensiveness of Islam, different branches of the society and even members 
                                                 
16 For more details on this subject, see: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Aldeen Wa Alsiyasa: Ta'aseel wa Rad 
Shubohat. [Religion and Politics: The Origins and the Repulsion of Doubts], (Dublin, Ireland: The 
European Council For Fatwa and Research. First Edition, 2007.) 
within the same branch differ in their adoptions of different fiqh rulings.17 And the 
overwhelming majority of them subscribe to different mainstream fiqh rulings. Thus, 
there is a variety of opinions within the Brotherhood and Hamas, but contained within 
a certain framework that always strives to maintain an Islamic legitimacy for any 
opinion or position, as explained in the different chapters of this study.   
Because the MB's school of thought is pluralistic, yet bounded, it tends to 
benefit from all of the opinions and intellectuals who function within the realm of the 
'mainstream' regardless of their affiliations within the MB. Therefore, the intellectual 
framework of the MB is not only advanced by MB thinkers, but by others who 
subscribe to the belief of the comprehensiveness of Islam.  
The last point is of great importance in this study. Hamas was not originally 
founded as an intellectual movement. It was meant initially to be a resistance 
movement on behalf of the Brotherhood.18 Hence it depended on the intellectual 
framework of the Brotherhood and other intellectuals who subscribe to the same way 
of thinking. This means that it is possible to examine the Brotherhood's and Hamas' 
ideas about the Palestinian question in the light of Islamic textual, jurisprudential, and 
historical teachings and experiences, both in order to determine their originality and 
their possible flaws.  
                                                 
17 For more details on this subject see the discussion by Kamal al-Masri on one of the websites that is 
affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt:  
Alekhtilaf Alfiqhi Enda Alikhwan Almyslmeen. [The Jurisprudential variation within the Muslim 
Brotherhood.] 
http://www.ikhwan.net/forum/showthread.php?21483-%C7%E1%C5%CE%CA%E1%C7%DD-
%C7%E1%DD%DE%E5%ED-%DA%E4%CF-%C7%E1%C5%CE%E6%C7%E4-
%C7%E1%E3%D3%E1%E3%ED%E4 
18 Hamas' sixth communiqué declared that “the Islamic Resistance Movement is the armed wing for the 
Society of the Muslim Brothers.” Hamas' communiqué #6. Issued 11 February, 1988 and was 
published in Wathaa'ek Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya Hamas. [The documents of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement Hamas], A series of the Communiqués of Hamas - First year of Intifada – 
(Hamas' Information Office. No Publisher info and no year of Publication (an approximate year: 
1989.), pp. 30-31.  
 Also, see Jeroen Gunning, Hamas In Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. (New York, U.S.A, 
Columbia University Press 2009.), pp. 16 and 264.  
Two other major and interconnected issues constitute a real challenge to this 
research and need to be explained. The first issue has to do with Hamas' charter that 
many observers refer to as the constitution of the movement. The second has to do 
with Hamas' identity as an Islamic movement (i.e. religious based), whose main 
objective is to liberate Palestine, as opposed to being a mere political national 
liberation movement. 
On the question of the charter, this was issued on 18 August, 1988, less than 
nine months after the initiation of Hamas. Andrea Nusse argues that the charter was 
"interpreted as an Islamic alternative to the political blueprints of the secular 
nationalists."19 And according to Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela "Hamas' charter is 
anchored in religious principles of holiness, divinity, and eternity, with no option for 
amendment."20 However, the view that the charter cannot be amended is not shared 
by all scholars on Hamas. Some scholars contend that Hamas no longer refers to it or 
quotes it in its contemporary declarations. Jeroen Gunning, asserts that Hamas' charter 
"neither does justice to the political thinking of Hamas' leaders (it is weak on 
specifics) nor does it adequately reflect the views of the present leadership, few of 
whom would quote it or regard it as reflecting their positions."21 Those scholars argue 
that the charter should be discounted in any study of Hamas today.22 Even some 
Hamas leaders make the same point. Ahmad Yusuf, Hamas' former deputy foreign 
minister, says that the charter was written more than two decades ago in order to 
mobilize the Palestinian people. According to him it is "a valuable historical 
document but it’s not the constitution of the movement. In fact Hamas has bypassed 
                                                 
19Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas. (Harwood Academic Publishers Imprint, 
Amsterdam 'The Netherlands', 1998.), p. 4.  
20 Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 2006 Edition.), p. 45. 
21 Jeroen Gunning, Hamas In Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
22 Azzam Tamimi, Hamas Unwritten Chapters. (London, England, Hurst & Company 2007.), pp. 147-
156.  
the charter with its contemporary political positions and stands".23 Sayyid  Abu 
Mosameh, a Hamas MP, says that "the charter signifies a historical stage that Hamas 
bypassed in its sayings and actions".24  
There is certainly evidence to suggest that the sharpness of the language of the 
charter was toned down in the early nineties and that it faded noticeably at the 
beginning of the present century.25 Nonetheless, there has never been any official 
decision by the Hamas movement to amend or nullify the charter. Though there are 
reports that Hamas has actually contemplated drafting an alternative charter that 
represents a new position for the movement,26 this new charter has not been issued 
and Hamas has never officially confirmed the report. Some Hamas leaders insist that 
there is no evidence that Hamas has abandoned its charter or any official statement by 
Hamas or any of its leaders to that effect.27 Moreover, some Hamas experts and 
intimates deny the report of the new charter and insist that the movement will never 
replace it.28   
In an Op Ed piece in the Los Angles Times, Mousa Abu Marzook, the deputy 
of the political bureau of Hamas argues that Hamas should not be solely judged by its 
charter. Abu Marzook, however, does not go to the extent of saying that the charter is 
nullified.29 However, in a press release issued on 5 May, 2009 the political bureau 
chairman of Hamas, Khaled Meshaal went further, and denied what the American 
newspaper, the New York Times attributed to him in a previous interview, namely  that 
Hamas was about to change its charter. He said in his statement, that Hamas was not 
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like others that change their charters under pressure to meet the demands of other 
parties. “This principle is not acceptable,” he said.30  
Those who contend that Hamas has outgrown its charter also point out that 
this charter was closer to an internal document reflecting the conventional 
understanding within the MB at the time. It was aimed primarily at the Arab and 
Islamic audiences. Azzam Tamimi, a leading proponent of this view, points out that 
some Hamas leaders realized early on that the language of the charter could be an 
obstacle to expanding relations outside the movement’s ideological realm, not to 
mention its international relations. Specifically, it might leave Hamas open to 
accusations of anti-Jewish sentiment. According to Tamimi, the 9/11 attacks hastened 
the necessity of revisiting the issue of the charter’s language within the movement, in 
an attempt to avert being associated with Al-Qaeda in the U.S.’s broad “global war on 
terror.” Tamimi argues that Hamas has actually commissioned a draft of a new charter 
that avoids the language of religious confrontation. However, as he explains, the 
success of Hamas in the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006 and the 
subsequent sanctions by Western and Arab states compelled Hamas to put the project 
on hold to avoid the perception that it was giving in to external pressures.31  
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Tamimi’s assertions which are corroborated by Beverley Milton-Edwards & 
Stephen Farrel are particularly important because they attribute these claims to major 
leaders in Hamas whom they interviewed.32 However, the ambiguity does not end 
there. As Tamimi himself clarifies, the current document reflects the internal 
convictions of the Brotherhood school and by extension, that of Hamas "at that 
moment of time".33 
Since Hamas has never officially disavowed its charter, and there are many 
within its high ranking leadership who still consider it as an official document of the 
movement, this study will quote the charter and use it as a primary source in its 
analysis.34 The use of the charter will show how Hamas has progressed and changed 
over time, and in some instances departed from some of the hard-line positions to 
adopt more flexible stances while maintaining a legitimate Islamic jurisprudential 
umbrella. However, some of the central positions expressed by the charter still 
represent Hamas' positions today. One main example here relates to the issue of 
Palestine as being a land of Islamic Waqf (endowment), an issue that we will discuss 
in the second, third and fourth chapters of this thesis. 
As for the question of Hamas being an Islamic movement or a national 
liberation movement, Hamas sees no discrepancy between the two. Yet, there are 
some researchers who try to minimise the role of the religious framework in Hamas' 
struggle against Israel, a point we will attempt to clarify throughout this study. Azzam 
Tamimi seems to embody this understanding.35 Other researchers such as Nusse go 
further than this by considering the question of nationalism in Hamas' thought as 
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"innovative and unorthodox move away from Islamic thought of the past."36 She 
argues that the "Palestinian fundamentalists discarded the old incompatibility between 
Islam based on ideological grounds and the Western idea of the nation-state which is 
based on territorial claims."37 Furthermore, she asserts that the "forefathers" of the 
Islamic movement, most notably al-Banna and Qutb never developed any theoretical 
basis for nationalism. While this could be true in the case of Qutb, it in no way applies 
to al-Banna. (See chapter 1 of this study). Also, her conclusion that nationalism is not 
compatible with Islam could be undermined in a way by the notion of the " jihad of 
Defence" in Islamic jurisprudence. The " jihad of Defence" requires the people of an 
invaded country themselves to fight the aggressor first before asking for support from 
the rest of the Muslim Umma (nation) if they were unable to defeat the aggressor. (For 
more details see chapter 4 of this thesis.)      
 In a document issued by Hamas titled "this is what we struggle for", Hamas 
says: "The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is a Palestinian national liberation 
movement that struggles for the liberation of Palestinian occupied lands and for the 
recognition of Palestinian legitimate rights."38 
Nevertheless, Hamas' view is that: 
 
The subject of politics within the movement does not contravene religious 
boundaries, especially if you take into consideration that for a Muslim 
Islam is a complete way of life that has a remedy for all of his political, 
                                                 
36 Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas. Ibid., p. 49. 
37 Ibid., p. 49. 
38 A memorandum prepared by Hamas' Political Bureau in the late 1990s at the request of Western 
diplomats in the Jordanian capital Amman. Published in Tamimi's Hamas Unwritten Chapters. Ibid., p. 
247. Milton-Edwards & Farrel note that, Hamas is "firmly rooted in Islam, but it has always confined 
its military activities to Israel and the occupied territories. It has also had repeated verbal disagreements 
with worldwide jihadi organisations such as al-Qaeda, which castigated its decision to enter politics, 
arguing that holy war is the only path." Beverley Milton-Edwards & Stephen Farrel, Hama: The 
Islamic Resistance Movement. Ibid., p. 13.  
moral, economic and social needs. At the same time it is a national 
liberation movement, meaning that there is no contradiction… The 
Prophet peace and blessing be upon him says whoever dies defending his 
homeland is a martyr.39 
 
For Hamas "Islam is the guiding factor for our deeds and actions in our work. 
Indeed what has been revealed (and transmitted) in the texts of the Quran and the 
authentic traditions (regarding occupation and resisting aggression) are the parameters 
we work within to liberate our land and holy sites."40 
One Hamas leader explains the dialectical relation between the religious identity 
of the movement and it being a national liberation movement as follows: "national 
liberation movements resort to their religious heritages in the process of assembly and 
mobilization on the grounds that this serves as an incentive to mobilize the resources 
of the nation and encouraging it to give and sacrifice."41  
In other words "Hamas is a Palestinian national liberation movement that adopts 
Islam as its reference. Islam is the civilizational and cultural component of all of the 
Palestinian people who lived historically on this land regardless of their religions."42 
Mishal & Sela argue that by introducing such a criteria in defining nationalism Hamas 
sought to confront the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) "secular nationalism 
with an Islamic-national concept, which needed no alteration of the PLO's original 
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goals or its strategies for achieving them, but merely their Islamization."43 Thus 
Hamas defines the "national struggle in religious terms."44           
Because Hamas does not acknowledge any contradictions between it being an 
Islamic movement with a strong religious identity and it being a national liberation 
movement, this thesis will discuss Hamas from within its own frame of reference. In 
other words, this thesis will study Hamas as Hamas presents and understands itself. 
This thesis agrees with Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Ole Wæver assertion that "one 
cannot understand a phenomenon without considering the way this very phenomenon 
is described by those confronting and practicing it."45  
They further argue that: 
 
One has to be within a religious discourse to accept the validity of it. One 
cannot enter religious discourse through the work of reason and accordingly 
judge religious beliefs as true or false. The same goes for the experience of 
religion. One cannot feel the magic of religion without being religious.46  
 
For that reason, this study will not attempt to dismiss how Hamas sees and 
presents itself, regardless of this author’s agreement or disagreement with its stated 
frame of reference. Accordingly, Hamas sees a harmonious relationship between the 
two identities it assumes (i.e. the religious identity and being a national liberation 
movement.) In its charter Hamas clarifies the issue in its understanding as follows: 
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Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 
is part of the religious creed. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or 
deeper than in the case when an enemy should tread Muslim land. 
Resisting and quelling the enemy become the individual duty of every 
Muslim, male or female. A woman can go out to fight the enemy without 
her husband's permission, and so does the slave: without his master's 
permission. 
Nothing of the sort is to be found in any other regime. This is an 
undisputed fact. If other nationalist movements are connected with 
materialistic, human or regional causes, nationalism of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement has all these elements as well as the more important 
elements that give it soul and life. It is connected to the source of spirit 
and the granter of life, hoisting in the sky of the homeland the heavenly 
banner that joins earth and heaven with a strong bond.47 
 
Research Methods 
 
This is a qualitative theoretical study, and it will adopt an analytical approach to 
examine Hamas’ intellectual and ideological convictions. The research uses a number 
of primary sources – interviews and documents - from Hamas' inception to the 
present. Secondary sources will include several previous studies. The study will focus 
on the dialectic of the religious, jurisprudential, ideological and political in Islamic 
political jurisprudence in general, while placing more emphasis on the Brotherhood 
school of thought and its political ideology, as it is the mother organization of Hamas.  
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The emphasis on the MB’s school of thought within this context is extremely 
important, since Hamas, as mentioned above, was created primarily as a liberation 
movement that did not produce its own unique intellectual base; rather it depended on 
the MB’s intellectual production in this regard. Therefore, an extensive use of the 
primary MB’s sources will be used in this research as it provides the ideological and 
intellectual framework for Hamas as well. Additionally, it will discuss Hamas’ 
comprehension, based on its MB’s affiliation, of what is religious and what is political 
and its implications on the ground.  
 This study seeks to examine the authenticity and the credibility of many of 
Hamas and the MB’s positions and convictions regarding the Palestinian issue. To do 
this it will track the roots of their ideological and political convictions and how they 
were drawn in order to compare them with the original Islamic sources. Thus, this will 
require an expansive use of, and dependence on Islamic primary sources. This will 
help verify whether the convictions and positions of the MB and Hamas can be 
defined as “literal religious texts”, or they are just mere jurisprudential, ideological, 
and political innovations within the Islamic frame work. This will be further 
illustrated in chapters 3 and 4. 
Adopting a historical framework will enable the thesis to compare and contrast 
many of Hamas’ political and ideological convictions to those similar in nature to the 
Prophetic experience and throughout the Islamic historical experiment. Thus it will 
address Hamas’ understanding of the "political" and the "religious” and its impact on 
the current state of affairs and the future course of action. To this end, the study seeks 
to investigate the mechanisms and the complexities of the relationship between the 
ideological/ political and the religious and to investigate its theoretical premises and 
their impacts on the ground. In addition, critically investigating Hamas’ adopted 
religious views, as it believes them to be, and their application in its struggle against 
Israel will be treated. Furthermore, it seeks to investigate such complex relationships 
between the ideological/ political and the religious actions and beliefs of Hamas, and 
whether the religious actually conceptualises and motivates the political actions of the 
movement. 
In that vein, this study will address the background that assisted in formulating 
Hamas’ intellectual and ideological tendencies. It will also address Hamas’ 
understanding for such complexity using a critical approach to investigate the factors 
that led to such intellectual and ideological conceptualisation. At a later stage, it will 
investigate the ways and means used, (whereby Hamas has employed such 
understanding) in its struggle against Israel on the ground as seen by Hamas’ 
instruments of struggle and liberation, by assuming that Hamas’ positions and 
convictions are rational choices within the broader Islamic framework. Furthermore, it 
will discuss the mechanism of its way of employing its religious norms and values as 
it comprehends them through analysing the dialectic relationship of the dynamic 
reality as it is lived by Hamas, with its set of beliefs, intellectual ingenuity and 
background, attached to which is a sense of “sacredness” and “holiness”.  
In addition, the study will analyse the evolution in some of Hamas’ positions 
and politics regarding many issues, and their reasoning, and whether or not such 
changes in the positions or the approaches are consistent with the religious framework 
of the movement. And it will examine whether or not such new positions have 
authentic Islamic precedents. 
In the process of conducting this study, some interviews were conducted with 
officials of, and experts on, the movement both face to face and by submitting written 
questions. The United States of America’s designation of Hamas as a terrorist 
organisation has affected direct interviews with the leaders of the movement. 
However, I was able to conduct some interviews with some leaders of Hamas through 
emails, both in the Gaza Strip and Damascus. I commissioned researchers to help with 
conducting such interviews but none were successful. Securing the interviews was not 
an easy task given the harsh laws affecting intellectual freedoms in the U.S.  
Some past interviews with some Hamas leaders used in this study were 
conducted years ago in Jordan before I relocated to the U.S. An interview with the 
leader of the MB in Jordan was conducted face to face in Amman, Jordan. Another 
interview with a Muslim Scholar was conducted face to face as well in Falls Church, 
VA, U.S.A. And another one was conducted with an expert on Hamas in London, 
U.K. More details about these interviews will be included in the bibliography. 
It is imperative here to note that the main factors that determined the identity 
of Hamas' leaders that I interviewed recently were based on four elements: 
1) The representation of some of them of the official positions of Hamas, as in 
the case of Dr. Mousa Abu Marzook, the deputy of the political bureau of the 
Movement. 
2) Some others represent, in some cases, dissenting political views from within 
the movement, vis-à-vis the official political position. This is more obvious in 
the case of Dr. Ahmad Yusuf, Hamas' former deputy foreign minister. 
3) Hence, they represent most, if not all, of the political views across the political 
spectrum within the movement. This claim can be further justified by the fact 
that this study quotes dozens of published interviews with other leaders of 
Hamas. 
4) They were the only ones who actually responded to my repeated attempts to    
secure their cooperation. 
As for my interview with the leader of the MB in Jordan, Dr. Hammam Said, 
its importance stems from the fact that he represents the MB's branch in which Hamas 
was initially under when it first came out. Many reports also indicate that Dr. Said is a 
member of the Shura (consultative) Council of Hamas.48 
Two key issues warrant treatment here. The first one has to do with the 
allocation of this study to a broad discussion of the intellectual contributions of both, 
the Egyptian Islamic thinker, the late Sayyid Qutb and the renowned Egyptian 
Muslim scholar Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi. The aim of this allocation is to contrast the 
impact of the radical intellectual contributions of Qutb on the discourse and behaviour 
of the MB and Hamas in its early years of inception, with those of al-Qaradawi that 
helped the MB and Hamas to adopt a more flexible jurisprudential, ideological, and 
political discourse. The focus on the contributions of the two men will greatly help us 
to understand the transition that took place in Hamas' discourse at the ideological 
level in relation to many of the issues that this study discusses. (See chapters 3 and 4 
in particular.) 
The ideology of Qutb was primarily the result of the repression suffered by the 
MB at the hands of Nasser's regime. Because of that bloody repression, Qutb 
developed while in prison (1954-1964) his thesis which gives priority to 
empowerment over liberation. He also considered the Muslim Umma at large to be 
living in a state that he termed Jahiliyyah (an expression traditionally used to describe 
the pre-Islamic period of ignorance.) In 1965 Nasser's regime accused him of plotting 
to overthrow the regime. He was arrested that year and executed the following year. 
(For more details see chapter 1.) 
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Moreover, Qutb’s contributions portrayed the nature of the relationship 
between Muslims and non-Muslims as a hostile relationship on the basis of belief 
rather than transgression. Qutb's ideas had an enormous influence on the MB in 
general and in Palestine in particular, mainly in Gaza starting from the mid-fifties, and 
throughout the sixties, seventies, and until the late eighties. (For more details see 
chapters 1 and 3). The MB in Palestine initially refrained from engaging with Israel in 
an armed resistance since the mid-fifties - (with the exception of a short lived 
experience under the umbrella of Fatah in northern Jordan between 1968-1970) - and 
until the creation of Hamas in late 1987. (For more details see chapter 1.) At a later 
stage, in the early years of Hamas' inception the impact of Qutb's ideas was obvious 
on the movement. Indeed, it did consider that the conflict in Palestine was a religious 
conflict between truth and falsehood, and between Islam and Judaism. (For more 
details see chapter 3.) 
By contrast, al-Qaradawi's jurisprudential and intellectual contributions  
relatively helped in moderating the contemporary discourse of the MB and Hamas. 
Al-Qaradawi is considered by the MB to be one of the most prominent intellectuals 
and jurists. Also, he is considered to be one of the most prominent Muslim scholars in 
general, highly revered, and very influential. Furthermore, his relationship with 
Hamas and his impact on the formulation of its ideological convictions are very clear 
as we will see throughout the different chapters of this study, in particular in chapters 
3 and 4. And because of the highly regarded jurisprudential opinions introduced by al-
Qaradawi and other Muslim scholars (who are close to the MB), such as the Tunisian 
scholar Rashid al-Ghannouchi, Hamas was able to secure the jurisprudential umbrella 
necessary for the transition of some of the more radical positions on the ideological 
level to other more flexible positions within the context of its struggle against Israel. 
For instance al-Qaradawi's (and other like minded Muslim scholars’) jurisprudential 
contributions helped Hamas to shift its view on the nature of the struggle in Palestine 
from a belief based to a transgression based one. Also, these jurisprudential 
contributions helped Hamas to find Islamic justification in seeking a temporary 
political solution. (for more details see chapters 3 and 4).  
No serious study of the MB and of the Islamic trend in general will be able to 
understand their ideology during the 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s without paying sufficient 
attention to the Qutb factor in shaping that ideology. The same thing applies to 
studying Hamas and the impact of Qutb's intellectual framework on it, especially in 
its early years of inception. For that reason, this study will focus on the intellectual 
and ideological contributions of Qutb relevant to this study. Also, given the lofty 
status that al-Qaradawi enjoys with the MB and Muslims in general, this study will 
give considerable space for his views, as it will show the impact these views have on 
Hamas and its contemporary ideological discourse. 
An additional point in this context is the considerable space that this study 
gives to other Muslim scholars who are affiliated with, trusted by, or close to the MB. 
This is due to their influence on the formulation of Hamas' positions, and the fact that 
they function within the mainstream of Islamic jurisprudence. (For more detail, see 
below the definition of 'Mainstream Islamic Scholars'.)  
The second issue has to do with the translation from Arabic to English. Given 
that most of the original references of this study are in Arabic, and often due to the 
lack of English translations, I have myself translated the texts used in this study. In 
the case where proper English translations were available I have used these 
translations as with the charter of Hamas in which I relied on the translation done by 
the Yale Law School. 
 Defining Crucial Terms 
 
Many terms will be repeated often in this study and need to be clarified in advance. 
Most important of these are: religion, shari'a, jurisprudence, mainstream Islamic 
jurisprudence, and ideology. In many cases, these terms will appear throughout our 
study as overlapping. However, the reason for that is that the Brotherhood, Hamas, 
and many studies that will be used in this research tend in many instances to mix the 
terms while employing them. Because the study will have to deal with these terms as 
contained in the original sources, although I recognize that there is an imbalance in 
the language settings. Therefore, this study will strive to use the right terminology 
when it is not quoting a source based on the following definitions: 
1) Religion: In Islamic terminology this means: "the submission to Allah (God) 
the Almighty and accepting it. Religion is the denomination of Islam and the 
theology of monotheism which is the religion of all the messengers from 
Adam to Noah and the Seal of the Prophets Muhammad peace be upon him."49 
In the context of our study, religion will be used primarily in reference to the 
core texts of Islam, rather than to religious practices, symbolism, rituals, etc. 
2) Shari'a: "In Islam is synonymous to religion and they have the same meaning. 
It is what Allah prescribed for His slaves of rules (laws), but these rules are 
called shari'a because of its position, obviousness, and integrity. It is called 
religion because people have to submit and worship God by it". More 
precisely it means in "the Islamic terminology: what Allah has prescribed for 
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His slaves of religion, which means various rules".50 According to other 
scholars, shari'a rulings are a matter of consensus, but if there is no confirmed 
text and an issue is disputed it enters into the realm of Islamic jurisprudence, 
not established religious law.51  
3) Fiqh (Jurisprudence): According to the Muslim Scholars it means the 
“knowledge of the shari'a operational rulings through the detailed evidence by 
inference". The Muslim scholars condition the knowledge of these rulings to 
come through consideration and Ijtihad (innovation) in the shari'a evidence. 
The provisions of belief and morality are outside the scope of fiqh, and its 
significance is limited to the operational provisions, i.e., worship and dealings. 
Also outside of its scope are the provisions that are stipulated by definitive 
texts and do not require interpretation or ijtihad.52  
4) Mainstream Islamic Jurisprudence: The body of Islamic jurisprudence, both 
contemporary and classical, is rich in diverse denominational schools and 
doctrines. The main reasons for the doctrinal and denominational diversity are 
due to a) the abstract shari'a texts, specifically most of the provisional texts in 
the Quran, can be interpreted in different ways of understanding as they can be 
projected onto reality in different ways, b) evidence considered significant by 
one school may be minimized by another. This issue is most notable in 
determining the authenticity of a tradition (hadith) of Prophet 
Muhammad. The text is analyzed and its attribution to the Prophet is debated 
for authenticity. Most Muslim scholars agree that the denominations 
and Islamic schools of jurisprudence, which function within the sphere of the 
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Shari'a texts, and that are bound by its regulations (most notably the extent of 
interpretation as permitted by the Arabic language), are all sound and 
authentic schools within the definition of mainstream Islamic jurisprudence.53 
5) Mainstream Islamic Scholars: In the classical sense it means the great Sunni 
medieval Muslim scholars who are revered by the overwhelming majority of 
contemporary Muslim scholars. Also, within the classical sense, it means the 
opinions of scholars that belong to the four Sunni Islamic jurisprudential 
schools (i.e. Hanafi, Maliki, Shaafi’i, and Hanbali). And within the 
contemporary sense it means the scholars who abide in their jurisprudential 
opinions by the rules of jurisprudence of which we discussed in the point 
above (i.e. Mainstream Islamic Jurisprudence.) One issue has to be noted here 
though. When this study engages with contemporary 'mainstream' Muslim 
scholars, it does engage most of the time with MB affiliates or scholars close 
to the MB. However, these scholars are considered the 'mainstream' in the 
field of our study (and in the field of Islamic jurisprudence in general), 
although this does not negate that there are competing voices and opinions 
whether in Palestine or elsewhere. These scholars do follow and abide by the 
rules of mainstream Islamic jurisprudence as they are very diverse in their 
opinions as well. Also, in the context of this study, the opinions of those 
contemporary scholars are not left unchallenged, rather they are being checked 
for authenticity vis-à-vis the primary Islamic sources. 
6) Ideology: This defined to mean: "the integrated assertions, theories and aims 
that constitute a sociopolitical programme" of an individual, group, or 
culture.54 
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According to Laustsen and Wæver: 
 
Religion and securitization equals ideology. Ideologies can be seen as 
attempts to legitimise a given polity and policy by the use of quasi-religious 
semantics. By overlaying a religious discourse with a political one 
(securitization) certain favoured political options are presented as the only 
ones, political actions understood as prescribed by a transcendent power and 
hence as necessary, imperative. Ideology is religion securitized.55  
 
 In the context of our study, the term ideology represents the religious, 
jurisprudential, and political opinions and convictions adopted by the MB and 
Hamas. In this sense it is not a religion or shari'a, or even jurisprudential 
reference, but rather it is the result of the interaction of all of these references 
and factors in their understanding in addition to the reality as lived by them, 
that result in the constitution of their ideology. Thus the 'political' here means 
the pragmatic behaviour of the MB and Hamas in response to different 
constraints.   
 One last point that needs to be made here, some literature of the MB and 
Hamas, especially in previous decades, tend to mix and confuse some concepts such 
as ‘Jews’ and ‘Zionists’. In many instances it seems as if the MB and Hamas have a 
problem of regulating their language.  And this is something that we will try to 
explain in the study.  
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Research Questions 
 
1- How does the Brotherhood school of thought define the “religious” and the 
“political”, and how does it translate in Hamas’ thought? And are there any 
distinctions between the “political” and the “religious” in the Brotherhood and 
Hamas' thought? 
A) How does the “religious” facilitate and influence the “political” in 
Hamas’ thought? 
B) Does Hamas’ view of the “religious” embody the untouchable 
“sacred”, or are there any other views to the religious that differ from 
the views of Hamas and their implementations? 
2- Hamas willingly admits that it is a branch of the mother organization, The 
Society of the MB, not only in terms of its organizational affiliation, but also 
by subscribing to its understanding, views, and beliefs in all aspects of life. 
Hamas refers to the Brotherhood framework of thinking as: 
"characterised by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its     
complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life."56 
Two question arise here:  
A) How do the Brotherhood school of thought and Hamas view the nature of 
the struggle in Palestine? Is it a religious one with the "Jews" or more of a 
national libration quest against an "occupier", or a combination of both? 
B)  If there is an evolution in this position, should it be considered as a 
departure from the authentic Islamic understanding or merely an adoption 
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of a more flexible Islamic understanding, but still as authentic as the 
former? 
3- As previously mentioned, Hamas asserts that Islam provides its general 
framework, or what it considers as the ideology that represents its intercultural 
foundation. It emphasizes, that it draws its guidelines from it. “From it, it 
draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and 
man. It resorts to it for judgement in all its conduct, and it is inspired by it for 
guidance of its steps.”57 
Given this, and since Hamas references all of its convictions and steps in Islam: 
A) How authentic are Hamas' ideological convictions regarding the 
Palestinian issue vis-à-vis the original Islamic sources and the Islamic 
historical experiences? 
B) What makes Palestine sacred in the Brotherhood's and Hamas' thought? 
How authentic is this understanding? And how does this notion of 
sacredness affect Hamas' view and politics towards the Palestinian issue? 
4- How does Hamas apply its ideological thought to the complex current state of 
Affairs? 
5- How does the MB school of thought, and Hamas by extension, view the 
dialectical relationship between Judaism/Zionism or Jewish/Zionist? Who is 
the "enemy" in the Brotherhood and Hamas' thought? Is it Judaism and Jews 
in general, or the ones they perceive as "aggressors" among them? And where 
does mainstream Islam stand on this issue? 
6- Do the Brotherhood and Hamas believe in peaceful solutions? If not, why? 
And if yes, what is Hamas' definition of an acceptable peaceful solution? What 
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is Hamas’ position on negotiations and does it reject them in principle? If not, 
what makes them acceptable for Hamas? Also, how do Islamic jurisprudence 
and historical experiments influence Hamas' thought in this regard?  
7- Where does Hamas, in particular, stand on the issue of peaceful settlements 
and how has its position evolved over time? How does Hamas view "interim" 
solutions and where do they stem from in Islam?        
 
Research Hypotheses 
 
This study argues the following: 
1- In understanding Hamas as an Islamic movement it is not always necessary 
that all of its statements, convictions, and positions (i.e. ideology) regarding 
the Palestinian issue represent the authentic understanding of the teachings of 
the primary Islamic sources and the Prophetic and the historical Islamic 
experiences. However, Palestine as a land, according to the primary Islamic 
sources, is considered sacred in Islam regardless of its contemporary political 
context and how it is being utilized. This distinction is important because the 
sacredness of Palestine informs many of Hamas' positions as will be explained 
in chapter 2 of this study. 
2- With the passage of time Hamas came to soften some of its rhetoric especially 
after the Palestinian Legislative Elections in January, 2006 that brought it to 
power in the Palestinian territories. However, this is not a rejection of its old 
convictions and positions, rather it is an adoption of more flexible opinions 
within the same Islamic framework of thinking, which Hamas views itself 
within. This applies in particular to its stand on the issue of peaceful solutions, 
the issue of recognition of Israel’s existence, and the entity of the "enemy". 
This thesis agrees with Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger's 
observation that "among scholars working in the field of religious studies it is 
generally accepted that the great world religions encompass a multitude of 
sources and traditions."58 They further assert that: 
 
These sources and traditions have emerged in particular historical 
constellations and reflect the spirit of their times. Consequently, religious 
communities in general and religious authorities in particular are challenged to 
apply the received depositum fidei to new social and political circumstances. 
In this never ending process of rereading and rearranging the canon of 
respected traditions, gaps ‘between professed belief and operative belief’ are 
unavoidable. Some traditions gain importance in a given historical situation 
while others are pushed into the collective subconsciousness of a religious 
community.59 
 
Yet, this does not mean that there are no other redlines in this context that 
Hamas cannot cross according to the Islamic teachings, such as the recognition of 
the right of the state of Israel to exist, but not the existence itself, which might be 
considered. (All of these issues will be discussed in more details in the upcoming 
chapters.)  
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3- Hamas, as part of the MB School of thought, takes into consideration its 
comprehensive understanding of Islam and the denial of the distinctions 
between the “religious” and the “political”. 
4-  Hamas views and practises the “political” as an integral part of the “religious” 
and its actions are facilitated by its religious convictions (i.e. ideology) and all 
efforts of flexibility shown by Hamas are confined to the “ideological-political 
context.” 
5- Some of the ideas and principles adopted by Hamas within the “religious” 
realm are themselves mere “dynamic political” calculations even by Prophetic 
practice and Islamic historical experience which Hamas is inspired by such as 
the concepts of hudna (truce) and negotiations with the “enemy”. This will be 
further explained in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Literature on Hamas 
 
There are several serious and distinguished research projects and studies written on 
the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. Some of these studies chose to study 
Hamas’ evolution and thought. Others study its practice and project of liberation. 
Some studies adopt both approaches simultaneously. Notably absent is a study that 
examines the intellectual, ideological and referential structures of Hamas and their 
impact on its practical system and political behaviour. There is no single work that 
has attempted to examine the Islamic referential principles that frame Hamas’ 
positions and convictions and their accuracy vis-à-vis the authentic and the primary 
Islamic understanding and experience. 
The initial investigation found that some of these studies are confined to the 
study of Hamas’ intellectual and ideological reference as set forth by “the Charter of 
the Principles.” Furthermore, they rely heavily on the theoretical contributions made 
by some of Hamas’ leadership. Some of these principles were reflected in its stances 
with regard to the instruments of liberation and political participation or the rejection 
of the peace process. However, these studies refrained from penetrating their analyses 
of the essence of such sets of thought and ideas, and how such thought was 
formulated.  Moreover, these studies lack the ability to comprehend the 
comprehensive framework of Hamas as an Islamic movement representing an 
embodiment of  scholarly and innovative Islamic thought.  
As stated above, there were several studies that dealt with the issue through 
different approaches and from different angles. However, there are nine important 
studies so far that cover six of the most significant categories. The first category: is 
the one that attempts to provide a comprehensive scholarly understanding of Hamas, 
its evolution, its thought, and practice. The second category: is the one that attempts 
to provide a comprehensive scholarly understanding of Hamas, its evolution, its 
thought, and practice but through fieldwork study and interviews. This approach 
places more emphasis on the socio-economic, historical, political and ideological 
contexts that affected and still effect Hamas' positions. The third category: is a 
descriptive and historical one, which tackles the issue of the evolution and the 
development of the movement throughout its different stages. The fourth category: is 
the one that seeks to study Hamas, its ideology, and its positions. It relies on Hamas' 
charter and some other publications, such as its leaflets and journals, which are 
presumed to be associated with Hamas (i.e. the study of the text). The fifth category: 
is the one that provides a personal experience within the movement that explains in 
part the course of the decision making process within the movement, and how it came 
to develop its organizational structure throughout the different periods and how it 
developed some of its ideological convictions. The sixth category: deals with the 
perception of some of the Israeli and western academicians and writers of the 
movement as being a terrorist organization. This category fails in general to see the 
other aspects and denominations of Hamas, such as its social work and its pragmatic 
political behaviour. One of my goals here is to provide a brief review of the six 
categories.  
 
The first category: 
 
The most distinguished two studies that were conducted on Hamas within this 
category are: 
1-Hamas: Political Thought and Practice by Khaled Hroub, Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, Washington, DC, 1996.60 
2-A study in the Political Ideology of the Islamic Resistance Movement (1987-1996). 
This is an edited study by Jawad El-Hamad and Eyad al-Bargothi. This study was 
accomplished by several contributors, who are experts on the subject, and was 
published by the Middle East Studies Center in Amman, Jordan, 1996. 
What is obvious about these two studies is the sense of seriousness, the depth 
of the analysis and the interconnectedness between the introductions and the 
conclusions. Besides that, is their reliance on primary sources and interviews of the 
leadership of Hamas, most of which have never been published before. However, 
neither study analyzed the backgrounds of Hamas’ thought and ideology, the factors 
that led to the formation of such convictions, their status within the “Islamic” Ijtihad 
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(innovation), and the mechanisms and processes of applying such conviction in the 
field. 
The first study that was done by Hroub is by far considered the most 
authoritative contribution on the subject. This study basically focuses on the political 
thought of Hamas including the theoretical and the practical aspects of such thought. 
The study follows a developmental approach that seeks to analyze the process of 
Hamas’ political-theoretical development since its inception. Despite the 
comprehensiveness of this study, it stops short of analyzing the intellectual 
foundations of Hamas’ thought and/or its relationship to the MB. It discusses the 
convictions of Hamas and its ideological beliefs as opposed to its political path. What 
is primarily missing is the methodology and referential frame that lies in the Islamic 
religion, as Hamas comprehends it that led to such positions and beliefs.  Besides, it 
does not address and examine the accuracy of the religious principles as 
comprehended by Hamas upon which it built its current political and ideological 
views and their application. Thus it neglects the examination of the mechanisms that 
Hamas employs to facilitate the dynamic political within the constant religious.  
The second study that was edited by El-Hamad and al-Bargothi is considered 
to be the second authoritative study on the subject. This study examines Hamas from 
different angles such as the political, historical, intellectual, and the level of its 
relationship with different players in addition to its dealing with the regional and 
international frameworks. 
As with the first study we also find this one unable to address the background 
to understand Hamas and its complex understanding of the religious and the political, 
and the application of such constant and flexible variables upon a changing 
environment. i.e., we do not find in the previous two studies, despite their 
comprehensiveness and importance a discussion of the patterns of interaction between 
the religious and the ideological and the political from Hamas’ perspective. In 
addition to that they lack the investigation of the mechanisms of Hamas’ self 
formation of its referential (i.e. framework) background and their inability to 
investigate the application of such understating on the reality which is described as 
“complex”.  
 
The second category: 
 
The most prominent study in this category is: Hama in Politics: Democracy, Religion, 
Violence, by Jeroen Gunning, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2009.) 
This study relies on scores of filed interviews conducted by the author with 
many Hamas leaders and ordinary members, both in the Gaza Strip and in the West 
Bank and abroad. In addition, he also interviewed many Hamas opponents and local 
analysts. During the study's period, the author lived in Gaza city for nine months in 
1998. Indeed, Dr. Gunning's work is an impressive and a serious political analysis 
study.  
The study focuses on the role of democracy, religion, and violence in the 
political thought and practice of Hamas. Through these three parameters and their 
interaction within Hamas, Gunning tries to understand Hamas as it understands itself, 
however, without being limited to this understanding. Gunning argues that Hamas is 
the product of a socio-economic, historical, political and ideological changing 
environment. He further stresses that although Hamas' political behavior is pragmatic 
and "confined by necessity and opportunity, its practice is nevertheless self-
consciously informed by political theory." (p. 55).   
Gunning criticises two of the primary approaches in studying Hamas, which 
are according to him, 'terrorism' studies and 'Islamism' studies. He argues that their 
conceptual framework and methodology are insufficient for understanding the 
complexity of Hamas. He believes that these two approaches rely too much on 
secondary sources and they give little attention to field study and interviews. And 
while he criticises studying Hamas from the standpoint of terrorism, violence, and the 
inability to change, he seems to share the view of those who criticise the studies of 
Islamism as "overly textual" and "insufficiently sociological". (p. 5) 
However, Gunning's study does not take into account a central issue that it 
itself confirms, and that is that Hamas is not a movement of philosophers. Yet it treats 
the statements of Hamas' leaders and activists, obtained through the interviews as 
evidence of the intellectual framework of reference for the movement without paying 
attention to the broader framework of reference of the MB and Islamic trend which 
informs its positions and convictions. 
"Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence", covers Hamas' roots in 
the MB before its creation in late 1987, and until the 2006 elections and Hamas' 
takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007. The study also discusses the intellectual and 
political diversity within the leadership of Hamas and the impact of the internal and 
external leaderships of the movement on the formulation of its positions. It also 
covers Hamas' positions on issues such as democracy and the peace process, as it 
discusses the issue of hudna and its backgrounds within the ideological and political 
framework of Hamas. The most important aspect of this study is its extensive 
discussion of Hamas' political theory. 
In his study, Gunning discusses the tensions within Hamas between "freedom 
and morality, popular will and revelation, representative and religious authority" (p. 
63) and the impact of these tensions on Hamas' formulation of its political positions. 
Gunning concludes that Hamas does separate practically between the realms of 
religion and politics, an assertion that contradicts one of the main hypotheses of this 
study. The findings of Gunning, are due in part to the fact that his study does not take 
into account – as this thesis claims to do - the unique nature of the Islamic religion 
and the profound role it plays in shaping its followers comprehension of their 
surroundings. Indeed, Gunning's work does emphasize the importance of religion in 
understanding and studying Hamas and how it is being comprehended by the 
movement and its leadership, as it criticises the attempts to impose the Western 
concept of religion on the comprehensive Islamic conceptualisation of it. 
Nevertheless, in his overall analysis he appears to marginalise the role of 
religion, its uniqueness, and its comprehensive nature in the Islamic context. Take for 
example, his arguments on issues such as peace, the economy and human rights in 
studying Hamas. For the author these issues are more of 'secular' issues rather than 
'religious' (pp. 117-118.) The same issue appears in his consideration of some types of 
educations and professions as 'seculars' (p.163.) Moreover, in discussing Hamas' 
elections manifesto of 2006, he considers issues such as "housing, health, agricultural 
policy, improving education and scientific research …" as 'secular' issues that are "not 
ostensibly influenced by religion" (p. 167.) One of the claims of this thesis is that 
religion in Islam does encompass all of these issues and the mere fact that they do not 
belong to the literal definition and field of religious studies does not put them out of 
the religious realm in the Islamic context of comprehending the role and scope of 
religion. (for further discussion of this issue see the conclusion of this study.) 
One of the most remarkable features of Gunning's work is his efforts to 
provide the political, economical, and the social contexts for some of Hamas' Political 
positions and evolution. This research agrees with most of the contextualisation that 
he introduces in this regard. However, what this study seeks to contribute in the 
context of this discussion is to understand the frame of reference that such issues and 
debates function within. This study assumes that it is impossible for Hamas, on the 
ideological level, to go against a strictly religious text if it existed, such as the issue of 
the sacredness of the land of Palestine (see chapter 2), or the recognition of the right 
of Israel to exist (not the recognition itself) (see chapter 4.) As for how to deal with 
the political consequences of these issues in a flexible manner there is a vast 
jurisprudential framework that provides a cover for Hamas' ideology to be more 
flexible, and for its politics to be more realistic, without waiving or compromising its 
intellectual or religious principles and convictions. (See chapters 3 and 4). 
Nevertheless, the work of Gunning remains outstanding in terms of the depth 
of its analysis and the impressive discussion that it introduces in regards to the 
interactions between religion, public opinion, popular mandate, as well as the 
political, economical, and the social contexts and their impact on the formulation of 
Hamas' positions. 
 
The third category: 
 
The most important studies in this category are:  
1-Hamas Unwritten Chapters, by Azzam Tamimi, (Hurst & Company, London, 
2007.) 
2-Hama: The Islamic Resistance Movement, by Beverley Milton-Edwards & Stephen 
Farrel, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010.) 
3-The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, by Shaul Mishal & 
Avraham Sela, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2006 Edition.)  
 Tamimi's book is the best study that has been published so far about the 
historical and intellectual emergence and development of Hamas.   
 This study traces the roots of the movement in the mother organization of the 
MB in Egypt, and the presence and activities of its Palestinian branch on the 
Palestinian scene, in the West Bank and most notably in the Gaza Strip. It discusses 
the different stages of developments (i.e. the establishment of the institutions, the 
relief and social work, the Islamic student blocks at the universities, and the early 
attempts to start a military resistance in the occupied territories in the early ‘80s) that 
the MB in Palestine went through until the formation of Hamas with the embarkation 
of the first Intifada in late 1987.  
From one angle what is unique about this study is the fact that it uncovers for 
the first time in the public domain some information about the decision making 
process within the Palestinian MB branch to move towards the military resistance. 
The author explains that this decision was a collective one, which had been in process 
since the early ‘80s when the organization of the Brotherhood in Greater Syria 
established the “Committee for Palestine” in 1983. Furthermore, this study reveals, 
that the decision to form Hamas was a coordinated one between the MB’s Palestinian 
leadership in the Gaza strip and the Palestinian leadership abroad, especially those 
who were residing in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, in addition to other figures 
who lived in the west, such as Dr. Musa Abu Marzook, who was living at that time in 
the United States, and who became the first announced head of the political bureau of 
the movement.   
The second angle that distinguishes this study is its revelation of a well-
guarded secret within the Palestinian Islamists, or at least a discussion that was not 
known to the public until recently. This is the issue of the charter of Hamas. The book 
affirms that Hamas has contemplated a new charter that will replace the one that 
exists now. What stopped these efforts were Hamas’ victory in the Legislative 
Elections in January 2006 and its formation of the Palestinian government afterward, 
followed thereafter by the blocking of aid by the West and Israel to the Palestinians.  
According to the author, Hamas has postponed the efforts of drafting a new 
charter to deflect the assumption that it had bowed down to international pressure. 
The new charter, Dr. Tamimi contends, will define Hamas as a liberation movement 
struggling against a colonial project. It will negate any religious tone when speaking 
about the conflict with the Jews and the conspiracy by them to fight Islam, and will 
instead trace the roots of the issue to the Jewish problem within Europe, which 
compelled the two parties (the European and the Jews) to solve this problem at the 
Palestinians expense. However, Tamimi emphasizes that the contemplated new 
charter, like the one that exists now, will never recognize the right of Israel to exist as 
a Jewish state, rather will accept the Jews that were not brought by means of war and 
occupation to live as equal citizens under a Palestinian state. 
The third aspect that makes this study unique is its discussion of the roots of 
the concept of hudna in the Prophetic and the Islamic historical experience. Despite 
the importance of the second and the third angles of this study, which relates directly 
to my research, they are buried within the historical developments and the events that 
the movement witnessed throughout its different stages. The issue of the accuracy of 
some of the statements of Hamas’ charter, e.g. the religious nature of the struggle with 
the Jews, and the status of the Palestinian land as being a land of Waqf  and the issue 
of hudna, though they were discussed in Tamimi’s book they were not discussed in an 
extensive way. Dr. Tamimi tends to make statements based on his Islamic knowledge. 
While this study shares some of his conclusions it delves into their underpinnings.. He 
makes the conclusions for his readers after a brief discussion without explaining 
adequately how he reached them within Islamic jurisprudence methodology, and how 
he decided that some of Hamas’ convictions as they are stated in its charter are not 
accurate if taken into examination within Islamic jurisprudence. This might be 
because the main goal of his research was to bring to light new information about the 
establishment and the events the movement went through, as the title of his book 
“Hamas unwritten Chapters” suggests. 
The second study by Milton-Edwards & Farrel treats the historical and 
intellectual evolution of Hamas through its various stages. The work is based in part 
on a significant amount of personal interviews with Hamas leaders, experts on the 
movement. It also depends on testimonies from witnesses who lived through some of 
the key events in the history of the movement.   
The book briefly traces the historical and intellectual roots of Hamas in the 
MB and their role in the Palestinian arena under the British Mandate. It also describes 
the impact of the experience of the Syrian fighter and theologian, Sheikh Izz ad-Din 
al-Qassam, (who fought the British forces in Palestine from the early 1930s – 1935), 
on Hamas. Decades after he was killed Hamas was launched and its military wing was 
named after him. Milton-Edwards & Farrel also discuss briefly the MB's presence and 
influence in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank after the 1948 war and the creation of 
Israel. After the war, the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian administration, while the 
West Bank was under the control of the Hashemite regime in Jordan. They also 
discuss the situation and the activities of the MB in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
after they were occupied by Israel in June 1967, and up to the formation of Hamas 
and its involvement in the first Palestinian intifada. The study attempts to understand 
the reasons behind Hamas' opposition to the peace process between the PLO and 
Israel, as it seeks to understand the reasons behind its rejection of the 1993 Oslo 
accords. 
Furthermore, the study explains the strained relationship between Hamas and 
the PA since 1994, and it discusses the outbreak of the second Palestinian uprising in 
September 2000. The study also covers the participation of Hamas in the Palestinian 
legislative elections in 2006 and the reasons behind it after it boycotted them in 1996. 
The work also addresses the Hamas formation of government and the dispute with 
Fatah and President Mahmoud Abbas up to Hamas' control of the Gaza Strip in June 
2007 and the subsequent Israeli attack on Hamas controlled Gaza (December 2008-
Januray 2009). 
The study also briefly touches on matters of prime concern to this research, 
such as the issue of hudna and the debate within Hamas about the role of the charter, 
and the role of religion in the formation of the MB's and Hamas' thought and 
awareness. However, Milton-Edwards & Farrel's discussion of these issues do not 
suffice from the perspective of this thesis to understand the intellectual referential 
framework of Hamas vis-à-vis these issues. As in the case of Tamimi's study, Milton-
Edwards & Farrel did not intend to study the intellectual framework of reference for 
Hamas as their emphasis was different.  
The third study is an Israeli study authored by Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela. 
The study discusses the circumstances that led to the formulation of Hamas and the 
factors that paved the way for its ascension. It also discusses the factors that 
contributed to the formulation of its intellectual and religious convictions throughout 
the various stages that it experienced. Furthermore, it tracks the intellectual and the 
historical roots of Hamas within the MB and the different stages that their work in 
Palestine went through, whether under the British Mandate, or under the 
administrations of Jordan and Egypt in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or at a later 
stage under the Israeli occupation, leading to the establishment of Hamas and the 
Palestinian Authority. The study seeks to explain the impact of each of these stages on 
the flexibility and policies of Hamas after it was established. The study is based on 
primary sources, "mostly unpublished documents such as flyers, leaflets, and Hamas' 
internal position papers, as well as material from the Palestinian, Islamic, Arabic, and 
Israeli press." (p. 5.) 
The study also illustrates the complex and difficult conditions faced by Hamas 
since its inception and its tireless attempts to harmonize between its rigid ideology 
and a changing reality and the mechanisms utilized to achieve a balance. Moreover, it 
discusses the pattern that governed the relationship between Hamas and the PLO, 
Hamas and Fatah, and Hamas and the PA. It also tries to explain the pattern of 
interactions between Hamas' "inside" leadership and the "outside" leadership and the 
impact of that on Hamas' rigidity or flexibility in its different stages of existence. 
Mishal's & Sela's work also covers Hamas' positions vis-à-vis the peace process and 
the Oslo Accords (1993), as well as the Palestinians legislative and presidential 
elections in 1996, and its attempts to harmonize between political pragmatism dictated 
by the facts on the ground, and the principled positions dictated by its ideology. 
Because the first edition of the study was published in 2000 (i.e. before the 2006 
Palestinian elections), the second edition of the study in 2006 includes a preface that 
covers the victory of Hamas in the legislative elections that year. 
The study also includes discussions on issues such as nationalism and truce in 
the thought and practice of Hamas, and it provides some political contextualisation to 
them, as it touches on the religious dimensions of both issues in the thought of 
Hamas. However, and despite the importance of the political contextualisation for 
Hamas' patterns of adjustments between the principle and reality, it does not go far 
enough to discuss the religious framework in which these adjustments take place, as 
this thesis does. Indeed, the emphasis of Mishal's & Sela's work is different from this 
one. 
 
The fourth category:  
 
The most prominent study in this category is: Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of 
Hamas, by Andrea Nusse, (Harwood Academic Publishers Imprint, Amsterdam 'The 
Netherlands', 1998.) 
This study relies to some extent on Hamas' charter and its leaflets. However, it 
relies more on a journal called "Filastin al-Muslima" (the Muslim Palestine) which 
was published in London since the early 80s. Nusse insists that this journal is linked 
to Hamas and thus she seeks to understand Hamas' religious and political convictions 
and positions through reports and articles published in this journal. 
Nusse's study covers several topics. The introduction discusses the 
development of Islamic thought in the 20th century which she believes began in the 
second half of the 19th century influenced by the Western expansion in the Arab-
Muslim world. The study argues that the MB was initially founded by Imam Hasan 
al-Banna in Egypt in 1928 as an educational and reformist movement. It then 
"developed a political dimension calling for an Islamic reform of state and 
government." (pp. 12-13.) Also, it discusses the impact of Qutb on the thought of the 
MB and his role in reintroducing the concept of jihad. Further, it discusses the 
historical and economical reasons that led to the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising 
in December 1987. In Nusse's opinion, the intifada served as a gateway for the 
Palestinian MB to enter into the political arena and to become a force on the ground 
competing with other secular forces that are organized under the umbrella of the PLO. 
The first part of the study "The Basic Themes in the Thought of Hamas" 
devotes several chapters to Hamas' problematic comprehension of the issue of Israel, 
Zionism and Jews. It also discusses the goal of Hamas, which the study defines as an 
"Islamic Palestinian State". Nusse's book also discusses Hamas' international, Arab 
and Palestinian relations politically with the PLO, or religiously with the Palestinian 
Christians and the concept of "Dhimma" (i.e. the Jewish and the Christians minorities 
who live under Islamic rule.) (See chapter 3 of this study for more details on the 
subject of "Dhimma".) Moreover, it discusses Hamas' implementation of its vision 
and convictions, especially through jihad in dealing with Israel. 
Of concern to this thesis in the first part of Nusse's book are the issues 
pertaining to Hamas' understanding of Israel, Zionism and Jews, the concept of the 
Islamic state and the issue of Palestinian land as a land of Waqf, as well as Hamas' 
concepts of jihad and dhimma. 
The first chapter in the first part of the book discusses Hamas' comprehension 
of Israel, Zionism, and Jews. According to Nusse, Hamas believes that the Jewish 
state is a global Jewish conspiracy as well as an expression of the global influence of 
the Jews. (pp. 29-32.) In this chapter Nusse attempts to explain the reasons for the 
confusion between Judaism and Zionism in Islamist ideology. She also tries to trace 
the historical and religious reasons that contributed to the formulation of the negative 
perception and mistrust by the Islamists, including Hamas, of the Jews. 
Chapter two discusses what Nusse describes as Hamas' goal which is an 
"Islamic Palestinian State". In this chapter Nusse's work reaches conclusions that the 
findings of this thesis disagree with. Nusse asserts that the use of Waqf to describe the 
land of Palestine is a recent development, and that the sacredness of the land of 
Palestine emerged recently. According to her argument, the Quran only blessed the 
towns of Mecca and Medina in modern day Saudi Arabia (p. 48.) Thus she believes 
that the sacredness of Palestine in the ideology of the Islamists today, and in particular 
in Hamas, was influenced by Judaism, "in which the notions of the sacred territory 
and the promised land are prominent." (pp. 48-49.) From a meticulous and careful 
reading of the primary Islamic sources this thesis disagrees with such assertions. (See 
chapter 2 of this thesis.) She also discusses in this chapter the concept of nationalism 
between Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, as well as Hamas' comprehension of the 
same concept. 
In the sixth chapter of the first part Nusse uses a selective and limited reading 
of Islamic jurisprudence and concludes that Sunni mainstream Muslim jurists all 
agree "with almost no exception" that jihad is "a collective rather than individual 
obligation" when Muslim land is occupied. (p. 72.)  This assertion is contrary to the 
findings of this study. (See chapter 4.) In the ninth chapter she discusses the concept 
of "Dhimma" without expansion on it in Islamic jurisprudence. (See Chapter 3 of this 
thesis.) 
The second part of the book "Application of General World View to Specific 
Political Events" discusses through several chapters issues such as Hamas' stand on 
the peace process and the Oslo Accords and the political, economical and religious 
reasons for its rejection of them. It also discusses the issue of hudna and its 
background in the thought of Hamas. Moreover, it discusses the political justifications 
that have prevented Hamas from participating in the first Palestinian legislative 
elections in 1996. 
Despite the importance of some of Nusse's arguments, in the opinion of this 
thesis the book lacks sufficient depth to understand Hamas' ideological convictions 
and it often reaches erroneous conclusions. This is due in part, in the opinion of this 
thesis, to the fact that Nusse sought to confine her work to "the purely ideological side 
of the phenomenon" (p. 3). However, in her attempt to understand this ideology she 
relied on a very limited number of "certain Arabic language publications" (p. 3) that 
by no means can sufficiently cover Hamas' jurisprudential and intellectual frame of 
reference. Neither the charter, nor Filastin al-Muslima journal, assuming that it is in 
fact an "unofficial organ of Hamas" as Nusse insists (p. 4), provide the sufficient 
depth by themselves to understand the complexity of Hamas' ideology. Moreover, it is 
unrealistic to consider every article or report published in Filastin al-Muslima as 
actually expressing the stands of Hamas, especially when it comes to ideology. 
This thesis argues that Hamas' ideology is the result of complex interactions 
and adaptations between the religious and the jurisprudential sphere on one hand, and 
the difficult political, social and economical realities that Hamas finds itself in on the 
other hand. Thus Hamas' flexibility in some situations is not due, as Nusse argues to 
"the techniques of elaborating a position on the basis of a certain supposedly fixed 
religious principles and the procedure of departing from them when necessary." (p. 4.) 
Rather it is due to the flexible and vast nature of Islamic jurisprudence that allows 
Hamas to move from one interpretation or position to another without abandoning its 
religious reference or rebelling against it. This study seeks first to understand the 
religious and the jurisprudential background that impacts Hamas' formulation of its 
ideological convictions, and then to understand the way the religious and the political 
interact within Hamas and its mechanisms. 
 
The fifth category:  
 
There are not very many books that provide a personal experience within the 
movement. This might be in part because of the secret nature of the organization. 
However, there is one prominent book in this category that we can mention here and 
that is the book that was authored by Emad al-Falujy, a former leader within the 
organization in the Gaza strip before he was forced out late in 1995. The fallout was 
due to a disagreement between him and the movement about how to deal with the 
Palestinian Authority in the aftermath of its establishment in the West Bank and the 
Gaza strip in late 1994. Al-Falujy became a minister in the cabinet of the late 
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, and before that he was elected for the Palestinian 
Legislative Council in 1996. Al-Falujy authored “Darbu Al-Ashwaak: Hamas.. Al-
Iintifada.. Al-Sulta” or “The Pathway of Thorns: Hamas.. The Uprising.. And the 
Authority." (Dar Al-Shuruq for publication and distribution, Ramallah, 2002.) 
In his book Al-Falujy speaks about Hamas since the day it was initiated. He 
details its activities, its apparatuses, and the crackdowns by the Israeli authorities on 
it. He goes to discus the relationship between Hamas and the other Palestinian 
factions and the (PLO), and in a later stage with the Palestinian Authority (PA). He 
discusses Hamas’ position on the peace process, and the clashes that took place 
between Hamas and Fatah, and the tension between Hamas and the PA. He also 
details his disagreement with his own movement over how to deal with the Oslo 
accords that were signed between Israel and the PLO in which it allowed the birth of 
the first Palestinian Authority in most parts of the Gaza Strip and some parts of the 
West Bank. This disagreement will result at the end in his exclusion from the 
movement. 
In his book al-Falujy does not touch much on the ideological convictions of 
Hamas, rather he sometimes discusses the political wisdom of some of its positions 
that had led him to differ with it until he was ejected from it. Yet, al-Falujy’s 
testimony is still very important since it provides an internal account of many of the 
discussions and debates that took place within the movement vis-à-vis different events 
at stages. 
 
The sixth category:  
 
Many Israeli and Western contributions on the subject introduce the movement as a 
terrorist organization. However, there are some objective studies in this category as 
mentioned before.  
The most recent and significant study that introduces Hamas as a terrorist 
organization written by the American author Matthew Levitt, is fairly typical of the 
genre. In his book, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, U.S.A, 2006), Levitt argues against those who 
say that Hamas shouldn’t be only looked at from the angle of its military operations, 
whereas it has other wings and aspects, such as the social work, the charitable work, 
and the political work. Levitt believes that these wings or fronts of Hamas are all 
connected, and that the mosques, schools, orphanages, summer camps, and the sports 
leagues that are run or sponsored by Hamas are all integral parts of its over all path of 
“terror”. Moreover, Levitt does not shy away from admitting that he obtained most of 
his information from intelligence services in the U.S, Israel, Canada, and elsewhere. 
For Levitt every aspect of Hamas is a recruiting tool for “terror”. He also accuses 
Islamic charity organizations in the U.S. and Europe of being economic tools of 
financing Hamas’ “terror”. Levitt’s work exemplifies the general trend of the Israeli 
and the Western model, notably the American, in introducing Hamas as nothing but a 
terrorist organization. It is mostly written from an intelligence and incitement 
viewpoint.        
Therefore, as previously mentioned, this study is explanatory rather than 
dismissive.  It seems to understand the movement, not to condemn it. It will try to 
explain and reveal how Hamas draws many of its conclusions from its referential 
Islamic framework. It will also attempt to examine the accuracy of many of Hamas’ 
positions and ideological beliefs as opposed to the other understandings of the 
authentic Islamic point of view based on the different interpretations of the scripture, 
the Prophetic, and the Islamic historical experiments. This will be based on the 
assumption that there is a difference between what is merely political Ideology or 
Ijthihad according to the Islamic terminology and what is purely “religious” in this 
context. Through productive engagement, the research seeks to reveal the spaces that 
might exist for dialogue, an essential part of the Palestinian peace process. 
 
Structure of Research 
 
In our endeavor to discuss all the themes that we mentioned earlier, we will divide 
this study into four chapters. The first chapter will cover "Hamas' Historical and 
Intellectual Roots in the Muslim Brotherhood". While the second chapter will cover 
"Palestine in Islam and Hamas' Thought".  
Chapters 1 and 2 will help us to understand the factors that contribute to the 
formation and development of the thought of Hamas with regard to its concepts and 
perceptions about the conflict with Israel. The interaction of the two realities: 1) the 
fact that Hamas belongs to the MB's school of thought which espouses the 
comprehensiveness of Islam; and 2) the sanctity of Palestine in Islam, both comprise 
the intellectual ground from which the thoughts of Hamas' stem. This interaction 
between the two variables provide us with the nature of the logical argumentation, or 
the formal system of reasoning and thought of Hamas (dialectic)61 that helped 
compose its positions as will be discussed in the 3rd and 4th chapters.  
Chapters 3 and 4 will discuss The Dialectic of the Religious and the Political 
in Hamas’ Approach to the Conflict, and The Dialectic of the Religious and the 
Political in Approaching "Israel" and the Final Status Solution of the conflict as 
Hamas perceive them. The two chapters will help us to understand the applications 
and forms of the interaction and the overlapping of the religious and the political in 
the thought of the MB and Hamas. Moreover, these two chapters will help clarify the 
mechanism through which this interaction between the religious and the political in 
the MB's and Hamas' thought take place in the context of a very complex reality. As it 
will better illustrate the quest of the two organizations to regulate any conflict 
between the principle and reality. 
For that the structure of the research will be in its general outlines as follows: 
 
Introduction: Subject of Research and Methodology 
Section One: Subject of the Study and Defining the Problem 
Section Two: Defining Crucial Terms 
Section Three: The Research Question and its Importance 
Section Four: Methodology 
Section Five: Previous Studies 
                                                 
61 Those two definitions of "dialectic" are taking from: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/dialectic 
 Chapter One: Hamas' Historical and Intellectual Roots in the Muslim Brotherhood 
Section One: The Religious and the Political in the Brotherhood's Thought 
Section Two: Palestine in the Consciousness of the Muslim Brotherhood 
Section Three: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Issue of Palestine 
Section Four: The Collision Between the Two Dialectics: “Empowerment” and 
“Liberation”    
Section Five: The Philosophical Foundation of the Two Dialectics  
Section Six: After Fatah and the 1967 Defeat to the Founding of Hamas 
 
In this chapter I will discuss in brief the nature of the Ideology of the Brotherhood and 
the comprehension within its intellectual thought of what is religious and what is 
political from an Islamic standpoint? Where it is derived from? And how authentic is 
its understanding vis-à-vis the original Islamic teachings? Also, I will trace the roots 
of the Hamas movement within the society of the MB. Hamas emerged from the 
womb of the MB, and it’s a continuation of the Palestinian MB branch. Not only will 
the historical roots be discussed here, but the intellectual and the organizational as 
well. In this chapter I will explain how the idea of Hamas came to develop within the 
Palestinian MB’s branch, both on the intellectual and organizational levels. This 
chapter will trace the MB’s interest in Palestine and the way they view it as well. This 
chapter is very important since the MB’s Islamic school of thought represents the 
ideological framework for Hamas. Since its inception Hamas did not worry much 
about producing an intellectual presence since it depended on the intellectual 
production of the MB’s school of thought. So in order to understand many of Hamas’ 
convictions we have to first understand the MB’s connection to Hamas.    
 Chapter Two: Palestine in Islam and Hamas' Thought                       
Section One: Palestine in Islam 
Section Two: The Implications of Palestine as Being a Land of Waqf (Endowment)  
Section Three: The Identity of the Islamic Nation and the Right to Palestine 
Section Four: Palestine as the Central Issue to the Muslim Umma 
Section Five: The "libration" of Palestine and the Restoration of the Islamic Caliphate  
 
In this chapter I will discuss the position of the land of Palestine in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Does it really have a unique position Waqf (endowment) in Islam? And 
is it sacred in Islam? If yes, why? I will also discuss the MB's and Hamas' 
interpretation of such a status if it exists. In addition, this part will explore how 
Hamas views the role of "liberated Palestine" in the process of reestablishing the 
Islamic Khilafa (i.e. Caliphate). Moreover, this part will investigate whether Islam 
views "Occupied Palestine" as a more important issue than any other Islamic occupied 
land? The questions here are; is it only because it is Palestine or does Islam not accept 
any occupation of the Muslim lands? And within the Islamic jurisprudence does it 
really matter if the occupier is a Jew or even a Muslim given the assumption that there 
is an aggression?  
 
Chapter Three: Hamas’ Approach to the Conflict 
Section One: The Nature of the Conflict 
Section Two: Muslim-Jewish Relations: Between the Theological and the Political  
Section Three: The Struggle as Defined by The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas 
Section Four: The Approach of the “Other Aggressor” Between Zionism and 
Judaism  
        
This chapter will discuss historical Muslim-Jewish relations and the Islamic 
jurisprudential comprehension of it. It will further discuss the MB's and Hamas’ view 
of the conflict, whether it is based on religious or political grounds. If it is religious, 
this part will try to identify to what exactly the religious dimensions apply. Does it 
apply to the identity of the “occupier” and his religion or does it apply to the 
“aggressor” with disregard to his religion? This will help us in positioning Hamas’ 
view of the conflict and whether it bases its animosity towards Israel on its Jewish 
identity or what Hamas views as its aggression on the Palestinian land and its people 
or both? 
 
Chapter Four: The Religious and the Political in Approaching "Israel" 
Section One: The General Islamic Jurisprudential Concept of War and Peace  
Section Two: Peace and Hudna in Islamic Jurisprudence 
Section Three: Hamas’ Evolving Position on the Peaceful Solutions  
Section Four: Between the Interim and the Historical Solution 
Section Five: Would the MB and Hamas Ever Recognize Israel? 
 
This chapter will investigate the MB's and Hamas’ view of the nature of the solution.  
Does Hamas believe in settlements and permanent peaceful solutions that do not 
secure the "liberation" of the entire historical Palestine? Hamas’ official position 
provides us with a big no. Why? Here we will inject the Quranic perceived teachings, 
Prophetic and Islamic experience in such situations, and Islamic jurisprudential 
discussions. How did the Prophet and historical Islamic experience deal with such 
matters? Is there room in the Islamic context to recognize the existence of the 
“aggressor”? Does the MB's and Hamas’ view go accordingly with the Prophetic and 
the Islamic experience? The study will also try to explore Hamas’ view of its offer of 
the “truce” with the state of Israel rather than the recognition of the right of its 
existence. The authenticity of such a position within an Islamic context will be 
examined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Hamas' Historical and Intellectual Roots in the Muslim Brotherhood 
 
Since its formation in late 1987, the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas” has 
consistently emphasized its association with the MB. As early as 1988, during the first 
Palestinian Intifada, an uprising that broke out the previous December, the 
Movement’s sixth communiqué declared “the Islamic Resistance Movement is the 
armed wing for the Society of the Muslim Brothers.”62 Hamas strove to assert this 
relationship on numerous occasions, most notably in its charter. The second article of 
the charter states that “the Islamic Resistance Movement is a branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood chapter in Palestine.”63 
In spite of the conscious effort by Hamas to associate itself with the broad 
current of Palestinian resistance, the characteristics, ideology, and political discourse 
of Hamas reflect its organizational roots and historic ties to the MB.64 As such, 
understanding the organizational, ideological and historical background of Hamas 
requires a discussion of the MB in Egypt and its relationship with the issue of 
Palestine. Without this context, it would be difficult to trace the appearance of Hamas 
in late 1987 and the speed with which it formed structures that enabled it to emerge as 
a main player in the Palestinian arena. Furthermore, this discussion will assist us in 
understanding the ideological positions of Hamas and their developments. 
The roots of the MB in the Palestinian arena predate the establishment of the 
state of Israel on 15 May, 1948. Palestine held an important position in the MB’s 
thought from the time it was formed in 1928 in Isma‘iliyyah by Hasan al-Banna. One 
study argues that “it is no secret that the MB was among the first political movements 
                                                 
62 Hamas' communiqué #6. 11 February, 1988. Ibid. Also, see Jeroen Gunning, Hamas In Politics: 
Democracy, Religion, Violence. Ibid., p. 26.  
63 Hamas' charter. Ibid., Article 2. 
64 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. (English Edition: Washington D.C, U.S.A: 
The Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000.),  pp. 11-12. 
in the Arab homeland that evinced a great concern for the Palestinian issue.”65 
According to the researcher Ibrahim Al Bayoumi Ghanim, under al-Banna’s 
leadership, the MB demonstrated a deep commitment to assist the liberation 
movements in their resistance against Western colonialism in the Muslim world, 
devoting particular attention to the Palestinian issue.66 And as Gunning notes that 
from its inception the MB "had shown concern for the fate of Palestine."67 
This chapter will attempt to understand the historical and intellectual 
background that prompted the idea of Hamas as a vehicle for the MB to reenter the 
field of the Palestinian armed struggle. This reentry during the 1980s came after 
decades of the MB's absence from armed resistance against Israel, after it clashed 
with Nasser's regime in Egypt during the 1950s. Before that, the MB had taken a 
leading role under the leadership of its founder Hasan al-Banna. The ferocity of 
Nasser's regime in dealing with the MB, led to the evolution of a current of thought 
within the MB that prioritised the idea of empowerment and the establishment of the 
Islamic state over liberation. This discourse continued to dominate in the MB during 
most of the 1950s and throughout the 60s and 70s. However, during the 1980s, and 
due to multiple factors, the Palestinian branch of the MB developed a new position 
that combined empowerment and liberation, and this led to the creation of Hamas.  
All of these issues will be discussed here in four main sections. The first 
section will trace the roots of the relationship between the MB and the issue of 
Palestine. As was pointed out earlier, the MB was one of the first groups organized in 
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67 Jeroen Gunning, Hamas In Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. Ibid., p. 26.  
the Arab world to get involved in the Palestinian issue and was the first Arab group to 
carry arms and fight against the Jewish settlers before the creation of the state of 
Israel, and after the creation of the state itself in May, 1948.  This discussion will be 
organized under three main headings: 1) The Early Period: before the 1948 war. 2) 
The Muslim Brotherhood and the War of 1948. 3) The Palestinian Brotherhood after 
the Defeat of 1948.  
This section will help us understand the historical and organizational 
background that enabled Hamas to be launched so quickly and the considerable 
strength it gained within the Palestinian society. Indeed, right after its announcement 
Hamas came to compete directly for domination with the Palestinian factions. This 
would not have happened had it not utilized the MB's historical struggle against Israel 
and had it not converted all of the MB's institutions and infrastructure in the 
Palestinian occupied territories to serve its objectives. 
The second and third sections will discuss the context which led to the decline 
in the MB's engagement in the resistance activity in the Palestinian arena. This 
occurred because of its bloody clash with the regime of the former Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. As was noted earlier, the severe repression suffered by the MB 
at the hands of Nasser's regime, led to the emergence of a new thesis within the MB 
that called for priority to be given to empowerment over liberation. The MB thinker, 
Sayyid Qutb, was the most prominent figure within the MB ranks to present this new 
intellectual discourse. His thesis called for a long term programme of training, and 
education to prepare the MB's members, based on a return to pure Islam as a prelude 
to a process of state building that would provide solutions to problems and challenges, 
including jihad. This new intellectual approach, however, led to a split within the 
Palestinian MB organization, in which its young elements insisted on continuing 
resistance. Their insistence on resistance and the rejection of the Palestinian MB 
organization, sparked the first clash between the two goals, empowerment and 
liberation. This eventually led to the birth of the Fatah movement from within the 
womb of the Palestinian MB and the split between the two.   
The fourth section will discuss the context and the factors that led the MB to 
find a way of transcending the contradiction between empowerment and liberation, 
and to reconcile these goals, as was the case during al-Banna's period. Hamas, was the 
framework in which this reconciliation process took place. 
However, before entering into the analysis there is a need to provide a quick 
review of two issues. The first one is the religious and the political in the MB's 
thought. The importance of this review is that it will help us to understand the overlap 
between the religious and the political in the discourse of Hamas and its approach to 
the conflict with Israel. The mother organization of Hamas (i.e. the MB) sees no 
contradiction between the religious and the political. Hamas believes the same. And 
the second issue is the status of Palestine in the consciousness of the MB that 
prompted them to give it priority. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the 
upcoming chapter, "Palestine in Islam and Hamas' Thought."  
 
The Religious and the Political in the Brotherhood's Thought 
 
The Society of the MB emerged at the end of the 1920s as a revivalist movement 
espousing the notion that Islam is a comprehensive way of life and system of 
governance. The MB believes, as al-Banna puts it: 
 
Islam is an all embracing concept regulating every aspect of life, prescribing 
for every one it concerns a solid and rigorous order. It does not stand helpless 
before life’s problems, nor the steps that must be taken to reform mankind. 
Some people mistakenly understand that Islam is restricted to religious 
practices or spiritual exercises. Thus they limit their understanding to these 
narrow lines.68  
Al-Banna further notes that: 
 
Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life. It is a 
nation and homeland or a government and a state. It is conduct and power or 
mercy and justice. It is a culture and a legal system or knowledge and 
jurisprudence. It is material and wealth or gain and prosperity. It is jihad and a 
call or army and a cause. And finally, it is true belief and correct worship.69  
 
And as was mentioned in the introduction of this study, the notion of the comprehensiveness of 
Islam is not an understanding unique to the MB. Rather, it has been the dominant notion in mainstream 
Islam since Prophet Muhammad founded the state of Medina. This issue will be further discussed in the 
conclusion of this study. Also, it is important here to reiterate what we pointed out earlier in the 
introduction of this study, that the notion of the comprehensiveness of Islam in the mind of the MB is 
linked with the philosophical discourse rather than jurisprudence. Indeed the MB is not a school of 
jurisprudence, and not even a homogeneous intellectual school when it comes to details and secondary 
issues. It serves primarily as a regulatory framework for different trends concurring on a minimum of 
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fiqh convictions, but they all agree on the notion of the comprehensiveness of Islam and the need to 
apply it in all walks of life.70 
Thus, the researcher will find within the ranks of the MB Salafi and Sufi 
currents for example, and followers of different schools of Islamic jurisprudence.71 
However, it must be emphasized here that the vast majority of them, if not all, remain 
always within the sphere of mainstream Islamic jurisprudence, a notion that we 
explained in the introduction of this study. All of the different currents within the MB 
always strive to maintain an Islamic legitimacy for any opinion or position, as 
explained in the different chapters of this study.   
There remains an important issue that needs to be mentioned here. The notion 
of the comprehensiveness of Islam in the MB's thinking is linked to governance and 
the establishment of the Islamic state, which will help to realize the unity of the 
Islamic nation.72 According to al-Banna "governance is considered in our books of 
jurisprudence as part of beliefs and fundamentals of the faith, and not from the 
jurisprudential and secondary issue. Indeed that Islam is a rule and implementation, as 
it is a legislation and education, as it is law and judiciary, neither can be separated 
from the other."73 This is an issue that we are going to discuss in more details in this 
chapter and the next.  
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 Palestine in the Consciousness of the Muslim Brotherhood 
 
Within the context of Islam’s comprehensive nature and the unity of the Islamic 
nation, the MB believes that authority should come from one state, the Islamic state. 
Thus, Palestine holds an important place in the MB’s vision. In fact, the MB treated 
the issue of Palestine as the primary issue facing Muslims.74 “Palestine occupies in 
our souls a sacred spiritual place above the simple nationalistic feeling. The breeze of 
blessed Jerusalem blows upon us, the blessings of the Prophets, and the birthplace of 
Christ, peace be upon him. All of that enlivens the soul and nourishes the spirit.”75 
Likewise, al-Banna perceived the issue of Palestine as “an issue of the Islamic world 
altogether. So, it is a measure of its nobility and a reflection of its awe and power.”76 
It was not difficult for the MB to establish this concern for Palestine on solid religious 
grounds, or a ground which any Muslim could identify with. The MB worked to 
crystallize these values and mobilize support for them. In the Muslim imagination, 
Palestine represents the land of the Prophets, the first of the two Qiblahs (direction to 
which Muslims turn to in prayer), the second of the two mosques, and the third of the 
three sanctuaries. It houses Al-Aqsa Mosque, to which Muhammad traveled in his 
Night Journey.77  
 Yet religious reasons alone did not guide the MB’s stance on the issue of 
Palestine. Political and strategic considerations also contributed to the group’s 
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analysis. The MB believed that Egypt was the country closest to “the danger of the 
Zionist attack.”78 
Some researchers contend that the MB’s expansion into Palestine was a 
natural development stemming from the concern for the Palestinian issue within the 
mother movement in Egypt. In fact, the first expansion of the organization outside of 
Egypt was motivated by this concern.79 Much of the literature on the MB attempted to 
explore and understand the decision of the Egyptian monarchy to dissolve the MB in 
December 1948, followed shortly by the assassination of its General Guide, Hasan al-
Banna on 12 February, 1949. These events are thought to have resulted in a large part 
from the MB’s position on Palestine and the impressive support their volunteers gave 
in the 1948 war for Palestine. Those gains motivated Western powers, led by Britain, 
France and America, to direct the Sa‘di government under the leadership of An-
Nuqrashi Basha, to move against the MB.80 
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continued: “The Egyptian and Arab governments failed in a devastating way in resolving the issues of 
Palestine and Sudan. And the government has complete knowledge that the MB knows the internal 
affairs and the causes of this failure. The MB feels that they will be severe  reckoning with them. So, it 
wanted to precede them to that and cover that failure with this procedure perchance they expected that 
the MB will revolt in Egypt or the volunteers in Palestine would rebel, so then the government will 
hold them responsible for the consequences that will follow suite.” See: Hasan al-Banna, Watha’ik Min 
Altareekh: Akhir Makataba Al Imam Alshaheed Qubayla Ightiyala: Qadiyatuna. [Documents from 
History: The Last Writings of the Martyred Imam Before His Assassination: Our Case], (First Edition. 
No Publisher Info.), p. 40.  
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Issue of Palestine 
 
As was mentioned earlier, the concern for Palestine within the MB and their 
relationship with it started just a few years after the establishment of the MB in 1924. 
This concern has developed in a number of different stages since then. We will 
attempt here to delineate the three initial major stages which it went through. 
 
1) The Early Period: Before the 1948 War 
 
An article by al-Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Supreme Mufti of Jerusalem and the head 
of the Highest Islamic Council in Palestine eulogizes al-Banna on the second 
anniversary of his assassination, in 1951. It recalls that al-Banna’s concern for the 
issue of Palestine dated back to 1927, when he wrote a letter to al-Husseini.81 Within 
months after founding the MB, al-Banna publicized the young organization’s 
commitment to the cause of Palestine.  
In a January 1929 article in Al-Fatih magazine, under the title “Jihad and its 
Status in Islam,” al-Banna points to the growing Zionist threat in Palestine saying: 
“The Jews are realizing their desires before the heedlessness of the Muslims.”82 
However, the MB’s practical relationship with Palestine did not develop until 1935, 
when al-Banna sent two delegates to propagandise the MB and its mission there. They 
were his brother Abdur Rahman As-Sa’ati and Muhammad As‘ad al-Hakeem. The 
exiled Tunisian leader Abdul Azeez Ath-Tha’aalabi also accompanied them on this 
trip. The delegation met with the Mufti of Jerusalem and the Head of the Highest 
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Islamic Council, Sheikh Amin al-Husseini whose relationship with the MB deepened 
from that time.83 The MB’s support for a revered symbol of Palestinian resistance is 
often used as proof of the MB’s early commitment to Palestine. “The Muslim 
Brotherhood was in strong communication with ‘Izz Ad-Deen al-Qassam and would 
supply him with aid and support.”84 And when the great Palestinian revolution broke 
out in the middle of April, 1936, the MB became one of the first and most prominent 
popular associations that hastened to adopt the Palestinian cause, speaking out about it 
on both grass roots85 and official levels, in addition to sending some of its members to 
participate under al-Qassam in the revolt against the British.86 
Al-Banna and the MB were not satisfied with these efforts, however. Rather, 
they drew attention to two problems that became prominent during the revolt. First, 
was the increasing level of Jewish immigration into Palestine and, second the 
annexation of Palestinian land by the Jews. Al-Banna and the MB warned of these 
dangers for the future of Palestine.87 His fears were soon realised. On 29 November, 
1947 a plan to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states was adopted by 
the General Assembly of United Nations. Al-Banna announced the MB’s rejection of 
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this project.88 The MB’s early policy toward the Palestinian issue contributed to a 
large extent to a high level of support the MB gained with the ranks of the Palestinian 
people. 
 
The Establishment and Development 
 
The active role that the MB played in Palestine contributed to its ability to expand and 
spread within Palestinian society. Among the means the MB used to publicize its 
activities was their daily paper, distributed in Palestine. Along with the callers whom 
the MB sent to the mosques of Palestine, these publications figured prominently. 
Their conversations and speeches were inevitably political in nature. The researcher 
Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout asserts that “when the MB felt that their ideological call had 
spread, and when the Palestinian political movement began to exhibit some of its 
general characteristics, the MB decided to declare its existence officially and unveil 
branches in Palestine.”89  
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89 Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat Wal-Mo’assasat Al-Siyasiya Fi Filastin 1917-1948. [The 
Political Leadership and Institutions in Palestine, 1917-1948], (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute of Palestine 
Studies. First Edition, 1981.), p. 503. 
There is some difficulty in determining the actual date of the inauguration of 
the MB in forming branches in Palestine. Some studies indicate that the organization 
launched its work by way of the religious societies that did not carry the name though 
they imitated the direction of its work. And the first of these banners were 
“Jam’iyyatul Makaaram” in Jerusalem in 1943.90 Other studies indicate that the first 
of these branches was in the city of Gaza and its leader was al-Haj Thaafir Ash-
Shawaa’. And this branch was established approximately after the end of World War 
II,91 which means in late 1945 or the beginning of 1946. Yet, other studies indicate 
that the first of the branches of the MB opened on 5 May, 1946, in Jerusalem. The 
announcement met with much fanfare as Abdul Mu’izz Abdus Sattaar, the official 
delegate of the MB, spoke on behalf of the General Guide, Hasan al-Banna.92 This 
last account is likely the most accurate since the announcement was accompanied by 
an official celebration attended by a Brotherhood representative from Egypt. It was 
also attended by a number of known Palestinian leaders, including the leader of the 
Arab Party and an official from the Higher Arab Committee in Palestine.93 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that there was an established presence for the MB 
in Palestine before the branch was established in Jerusalem. The Palestinian MB sent 
delegates to the fifth conference of the Muslim Brotherhood held in Aleppo, Syria in 
1944. The conference is notable for the decision requiring the various associations 
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established by the MB in different countries to be consolidated under the name of “the 
Muslim Brotherhood.”94 
No sooner had the Second World War ended than the chapters of the MB 
began to spread across Palestinian cities.95 It appears that the Palestinian MB did not 
have an independent organization, as was the case with the Syrian branch. Rather, 
there would be coordination with the Egyptian branch until 1948.96  
By November, 1947 the membership ranged between twelve and twenty 
thousand members in almost twenty different chapters.97 Several factors contributed 
to the quick success of the MB in Palestine. Foremost among them, According to the 
researcher Hussein Abu al-Namel, is “the prevailing public religious atmosphere in 
Palestine during what exceeded more than thirty years. This atmosphere was 
enhanced and nourished by the unity of the two political and religious leaderships in 
Palestine represented in al-Haj Amin al-Husseini who occupied the position of the 
Mufti in addition to the leadership of the nationalist movement.”98 
With the Arab rejection of the 1947 partition plan, the MB joined the 
mobilization of forces and al-Banna committed ten thousand volunteers from the MB 
as war became more likely. 
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2) The Muslim Brotherhood and the War of 1948 
 
The MB’s preparations for the war took several forms. Al-Banna’s visit to Gaza on 21 
March, 1948, approximately two months before the war, represented the deep 
commitment of the MB to the cause of Palestine. According to MB members who 
witnessed al-Banna’s visit, he brought volunteers from the MB equipped with modern 
weapons.99 The researcher Mohsen Saleh argues that because the Arab governments 
decided not to confront the Jewish military formations in Palestine until the British 
army evacuated, “the burden of war with the Jews, over the period that exceeded six 
months was placed on the backs of the Palestinian people and a limited number of 
volunteers.”100 Many of the squadrons of the MB arrived on the field of battle before 
war broke out. Milton-Edwards & Farrel confirm the leading role that the MB played 
in this context. "Mujahidin from Egypt began to arrive in Gaza in the early months of 
1948 to fight with the Palestinians in the war as a serious attempt to support the 
Palestinian issue."101 
After the recruitment of volunteers and the completion of training, al-Banna 
ordered the branches of the MB to prepare for war in October 1947. The first 
squadron went into the field on the twentieth of that month,102 approximately six 
months before the outbreak of the war. 
The involvement of the MB was not limited to the Egyptian branch. It also 
involved the participation of squadrons from Syria, Jordan, Iraq,103 and Palestine. The 
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latter served under the Egyptian MB branch and even surpassed them in numbers. 
According to Kamil Ash-Shareef, one of the leaders of the Egyptian MB in the war, in 
the southern areas alone, the number of fighters from the Egyptian MB under his 
leadership was two hundred, while the number of Palestinian fighters was 
approximately eight hundred.104 The researcher Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout, contends 
that, “the earnest and heroic role the Brotherhood played in the battle is what made a 
special and distinct role for them in the Palestinian struggle, especially since the 
Brotherhood sent some of their leaders to lead the fight.”105  
Many of the MB writings recount in detail the role they played in this war. 
They distinguished themselves in guerrilla warfare and the official Arab forces sought 
their help in operations to break their encirclement, attack Jewish settlements and cut 
off transportation and provisions to the Zionist militias.106 These efforts of the MB in 
the war of 1948 compelled some scholars to confirm that there was “consensus on the 
heroic role played by the volunteers of the Brotherhood in the war of Palestine.”107  
Two weeks later, Arabs were forced to accept a truce by their vanquished 
regimes. For its part, the MB opposed any talk of a truce. Brotherhood volunteers in 
the war for Palestine engaged in guerilla fighting, partly at the request of the Egyptian 
army which found itself surrounded after the truce to which the Israeli forces did not 
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adhere.108 There were parallel events taking place within the domestic Egyptian 
political scene, most notably the mounting tension in the relationship between the MB 
and the Egyptian government under the leadership of Prime Minister An-Nuqrashi. It 
became increasingly clear that the government was moving towards disbanding the 
MB. The MB insisted that the real reasons behind the banning of the MB were 
concealed by foreign pressure, (British to be exact), to strike at the MB.109  
According to Richard P. Mitchell: 
 
On the night of the 8th (December, 1948)… while Banna and many of the 
members waited in the headquarters for the outcome, the radios broadcast the 
order of the ministry of the interior dissolving the Society of the Muslim 
Brothers throughout the length and breadth of Egypt. Police immediately 
surrounded the headquarters and arrested everyone in it except Hasan al-
Banna. The wealth of the Society was placed in the hands of a special agent of 
the ministry of the interior to be disbursed for welfare and social services on 
the order of the ministry of social affairs.110  
 
Barely twenty days passed after the decision to disband the MB in Egypt 
before some elements of the Special Apparatus attached to the MB assassinated An-
Nuqrashi on 28 December. Shortly thereafter, Ibrahim Abdul Hadi, the close friend of 
An-Nuqrashi and the Royal Administrative Head became the Prime Minister and the 
leader of the As-Sa’adi party also. His appointment ushered in a new period of 
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governmental repression. Tensions were raised with the MB as Abdul Hadi arrested 
and supervised the torture of thousands of its members except al-Banna. Although al-
Banna condemned the assassination of An-Nuqrashi, the Sa’adiyyah government 
under the leadership of Abdul Hadi ordered his assassination in revenge for the killing 
of An-Nuqrashi.111 On 12 February, 1949 al-Banna received an anonymous summons 
to the General Center of the Muslim Youth where he was shot while attempting to 
take a taxi. He died later in a nearby hospital.112 
On hearing of the dissolution of the MB, the Egyptian Brothers volunteering 
in Palestine became alarmed. Fearing a confrontation with the state, al-Banna had 
directly intervened before he was assassinated. In a letter to the members in Palestine, 
he wrote, “the volunteers have no business in the events going on in Egypt. As long as 
there is one Jew still fighting in Palestine, their purpose there is not finished.” In 
concluding the letter, he advised them to stay calm and maintain good relations with 
their brothers and colleagues among the officers of the Egyptian army and its 
soldiers.113 
When the MB was dissolved in Egypt in 1949, the branches of the MB in 
Gaza, which was under the administrative control of Egypt, were forced to close their 
doors. Its leaders once again started working under the cover of  “Jam’iyyah At-
Tawheed”, an organization that the MB took as a front for their secret activities at that 
time.114 However, the decision to dissolve the MB in Egypt lasted less than two years, 
following which it won a petition before the Council of State against the Wafd 
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government. The decision of the court on 17 September, 1951, restored the legal 
status of the MB.115 With the revocation of the dissolution of the MB, the 
Brotherhood resumed its public activities in Egypt and Gaza.  
 
3) The Palestinian Brotherhood after the Defeat of 1948 
 
The Arab defeat in 1948 and the establishment of the state of Israel resulted in a 
redrawing of the political map.  
The Islamic intellectual and writer Mustafa Al Tahan says that: 
 
Palestine, with its known historical boundaries during the British mandate, 
disappeared. A new entity, demographically and politically, was 
established on 78 percent of historical Palestine, while the remaining area 
was distributed between two administrations, led by Jordan in the West 
Bank and Egypt in the Gaza Strip. Due to these developments, the 
Palestinian Brotherhood was no longer united as one organizational body. 
The MB of the West Bank became a part of the organization based in 
Jordan and the MB of Gaza depended on the organization in Egypt.116 
 
Another consequence of this divide was the lack of coordination between both 
groups and a divergence in their leadership and work styles. While the MB in the 
Strip was dedicated to revolutionary military action, the MB in the West Bank took an 
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educational and political orientation.117 The effects of this distinction continued until 
the founding of Hamas: like the MB of Gaza, it was too motivated by ideas of armed 
struggle. This idea was subsequently transferred to the West Bank, the most peaceful 
front of the MB at that time. Through Hamas, the Brotherhood in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip united the Palestinian Brotherhood’s organizational framework. 
 
A) The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank: 
 
Although the MB had formed more than twenty branches in Palestine, after the defeat 
of 1948 and the establishment of Israel, several branches of the Brotherhood active in 
cities that became part of the state of Israel, like Haifa and Jaffa, were forced to close 
their doors permanently. Many of the membership reemerged in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip.118  
In accordance with the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan in 1950, the 
population of the West Bank became its citizens.119 Consequently, the MB in Jordan 
absorbed its counterparts in the West Bank.120 In contrast to the situation in Jordan, 
where the MB was characterized as a having “a good amount” of mutual 
understanding with the Hashemite regime, the Egyptian MB reached a state of violent 
confrontation with the revolutionary government of Gamal Abdel Nasser.121 In 
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contrast with other movements and political parties, the MB was permitted to work in 
Jordan. Their work was public and supported by the authorities, though they were 
required to seek official approval before engaging in any activity.122 
The Jordanian regime hoped to use the Brotherhood as a bulwark against the 
rising tide of leftist and pan-Arab forces. In particular, after the success of the Free 
Officers Revolution in Egypt in 1952 and the emergence of Abdel Nasser as the 
symbol of Arab unity, the traditional Arab regimes such as that in Jordan needed 
popular allies to counter the threat. The Brotherhood fulfilled this important role, and 
did not object to it especially after its bloody collision with Nasser's regime in 1954. 
The fears of the Jordanian Brotherhood of being subjugated to a repression like the 
one that it sister organization in Egypt was going through were fed by the 
announcement of the Jordanian Hashemite regime of the foiling of a coup attempt in 
1957 supported by the Nasser regime. The MB gave their support to the King in the 
confrontation that occurred between him and his prime minister, An-Nablisi, at a time 
when the other parties, the communists, Ba’athists, nationalists, leftists and the 
Nasirists, gave their support to An-Nablisi.123 
In the 60s and up to the early 70s, the fears of the regime became stronger as 
detachments of leftist and nationalist Palestinian resistance groups used Jordan as a 
base to launch attacks on Israel and formed an authority parallel to that of the palace 
in Jordan. A bloody clash between the two occurred in September 1970 in which the 
resistance was crushed. The MB was present in these events. The success of groups 
subservient to Nasser to change the structure, form and nature of the political system 
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in Jordan meant their repression, if not complete destruction, as had occurred to their 
brothers in Egypt. The MB responded by lending its support to the Hashemite regime. 
In return, the regime did not stop their public work. At that time, King Hussein would 
meet with them, listen to many of their requests and even implement some of them. 
He even donated to their causes during his visits to their general office. This 
understanding meant that Jordan became a haven for the Brotherhood Societies driven 
out by hostile regimes, a fate that befell the Syrian Brothers in the early eighties.124 
This mutually beneficial relationship did not mean that there were no tensions 
between the two parties. Indeed the controller general (i.e. the leader) of the MB was 
forced to flee to Damascus in 1955 to escape arrest. Soon after, he was actually 
arrested for the first of several times. Likewise, at the beginning of the 50s the 
government refused to give permits to a number of branches of the MB in the West 
Bank, though it licensed them later on.125 In spite of these challenges, the MB did not 
resort to illegal actions in pursuit of its goals. 
On the military front, the MB of the West Bank made no noteworthy gains 
until 1968. However, according to Jordanian security documents dating to the 50s, the 
state expressed concerns about MB scouts with weapons training. These scout teams 
came from cities across Jordan and the West Bank. In 1956, the Brotherhood 
smuggled weapons by way of Sinai. Following the Suez Crisis of 1956, the 
Brotherhood chapter in Hebron reached an agreement with the local commander of 
the Jordanian army to receive weapons training from the military. Likewise, the 
Brotherhood supported the position of the National Guard in the cities of the West 
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Bank treating it as the front line in the war against Israel. They provided financial and 
logistical support.126 
 
B) The Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip:   
 
The situation of the MB in the Gaza Strip was affected by the Egyptian Government’s 
decision to ban the MB in December, 1948. It was compelled to cease its public work 
and go underground. There was no official presence in Gaza until the prohibition was 
lifted in Egypt in December 1951, though some contend that the MB remained the 
primary political force in the Gaza Strip until 1955.127  
The Free Officers Revolution in Egypt on 23 July, 1952, signaled a major 
turning point in the work of the MB in Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The Brotherhood 
was permitted to work without restrictions, once again. Many even believed that the 
MB was the party of the state.128 Building on this belief, membership in the MB 
spread in the Gaza Strip hoping to achieve favour with the new military government. 
Branches were opened again, as the good relationship between the revolutionary 
government and the MB remained for the first year and a half.129 The MB used it to 
strengthen its presence in the Strip, while the revolutionary government helped the 
movement strengthen its presence among the citizens of the Strip, permitting the 
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Brotherhood to send missions from Egypt. These missions served to strengthen the 
bond between the organizations in Egypt and the Gaza Strip.130  
Another contributing factor to the strengthening of the Brotherhood in Gaza 
was the material aid collected by Egyptian government to help the people of the Strip 
in what was known as “the Train of Mercy.” The Brotherhood was given the 
responsibility of distributing this aid, providing opportunities to connect with people 
and earn their trust. The opening of Egyptian universities to students from the Strip 
afforded another opportunity for a new generation to encounter first-hand the MB’s 
message.131 However, this era of Brotherhood activities in the Gaza Strip witnessed a 
setback from which it would not recover for decades to come. With rising tensions 
between the Brotherhood and the revolutionary government, the MB was officially 
outlawed on 13 January, 1954.132 Following a brief reprieve, an assassination attempt 
(26 October, 1954) on President Gamal Abdel Nasser led to the final ban against the 
MB, resulting in thousands of its members being imprisoned.133 
The MB in Gaza was also banned by the Egyptian authorities, though it was 
the biggest organization with respect to numbers and mass appeal.134 In the context of 
this new reality, the MB was transformed from “the party of the authority” to one of 
renegades. These new developments directly contributed to the contraction of the 
number of those associated with the organization and adversely affected its size and 
development.135  
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In spite of the ban, the mid-50s was a period of political activity for the MB 
and other Palestinian groups, especially the communists.136 In addition, it undertook 
military action across the border of the Strip to disrupt Israeli civilian and military 
life, transportation and water and electrical lines. The objective was to draw the 
Revolutionary Council in Egypt into a military clash with Israel, an encounter that the 
Egyptian regime wanted to avoid according to Gazan members of the Brotherhood 
who witnessed these events.137 
The most prominent actions of the Gazan Brotherhood after the ban was its 
participation in demonstrations and protests in alliance with the communists and 
Ba’athists, causing the failure of the Sinai project for the settlement of Palestinian 
refugees. This plan, agreed upon by the Egyptian government and the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency was seen as a means to neutralize the Palestinian issue.138 
After the first occupation of the Gaza Strip by Israel in 1956, the MB began to restore 
the organization’s ranks and developed the idea of orchestrating armed resistance 
against the occupying forces.139  
With the evacuation of Israel from the Gaza Strip in 1957, the 
internationalization of the Strip began. The MB insisted on the return of the Egyptian 
Administration. With its return in 1957 the MB became the subject to other 
campaigns by the Egyptian government. As Abdel Nasser emerged as an Arab hero 
after the “Tripartite Aggression” launched by Britain, France and Israel against Egypt 
in 1956, the MB found that maintaining opposition to his government was 
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increasingly difficult. It became generally discredited among the people, limiting its 
effectiveness, size and activities until after the defeat of 1967, which greatly 
diminished the appeal of Abdel Nasser with the Arabs generally and among the 
Palestinians in particular. The MB in the Gaza Strip was subject to constant 
surveillance and restrictions until this time. As was mentioned before, any friction 
between the group in Egypt and the Revolutionary Council would reflect negatively 
on the Brotherhood in Gaza during that period. They were exposed to campaigns of 
arrests, the most violent of which was in 1965, when the Egyptian authorities 
announced that they had uncovered a coup attempt arranged by the Brotherhood.140 
One of the symbols of the MB, Sayyid Qutb, whose ideas would have a clear effect on 
the future direction of the MB, was executed as a result. 
Perhaps it is necessary here to point out that the MB in the Gaza Strip formed 
in the period “from 1954 to 1956… two secret groups to practise armed action. The 
first was the group “Youth of Revenge” and among the most prominent of its 
members was Salah Khalaf, later a co-founder of Fatah, and the other was the 
“Squadron of Truth,” which included Khalil al-Wazir, also a co-founder of Fatah. 
This group was the first to stage military action inside Israel.”141 The importance of 
these developments is that they form the nucleus for the formation of the “Fatah” 
movement, from which military resistance to the occupation extended beyond the 
religious and ideological realm and put aside the animosity of Nasser for the MB.142 
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The Emergence of “Fatah” out of the Palestinian Brothers: 
The Confrontation Between Empowerment and Liberation  
 
In 1954, the bloody conflict between the MB and the Free Officers in Egypt turned 
the MB, with its Egyptian and Palestinian components, from the party of the 
authority, as it was perceived, to an outlaw organization preoccupied with self-
preservation in the face of a repressive campaign by the Nasser regime. 
The repression of the MB continued, including in the Gaza Strip. Popular 
support increased for the MB at the height of these campaigns, as it was seen to 
represent the interests of the people as in its successful challenge to the Sinai 
resettlement plan of 1955. It also played a pivotal role in causing the failure of the 
internationalization of the Gaza Strip in 1957. The great strike suffered by the MB 
across the Arab world occurred at the height of Nasser’s popularity, following his 
"heroic", as perceived by the Arab masses, confrontation against the “Tripartite 
Aggression” in 1956.143 
As was mentioned earlier, Abdel Nasser’s defiance in the face of this alliance 
and his refusal to submit to the demands of the powers made him a symbol in the 
Arab street. As such, any opposition to him was seen as a stance against the symbol of 
Arab defiance. As the leading opposition movement to the Egyptian regime, the MB 
found itself before a popular opposition to which it was unaccustomed. Nasser 
succeeded in exposing the Brothers before the masses in a series of announcements 
about foiled plots and threatened coups against his government. As a consequence, the 
MB faced growing unpopularity, even in places of traditional influence. The 
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movement in the Gaza Strip saw its withdrawal from the public sphere as its only 
option to escape continued repression and popular sentiment against it.144 
All of these factors resulted in a severe ideological shock in the thought of the 
MB. Palestinian discussions centered on the two dialectics of empowerment and 
liberation. It was the perceived contradiction between these concepts that led to the 
first split in the MB organization in the Gaza Strip, from which the Palestinian 
National Liberation Movement, “Fatah” emerged with an ideological foundation 
based on the priority of liberation, not empowerment, the traditional MB framework 
at the time.  
To understand this ideological shock and the central concepts related to it, one 
must explore a major idea espoused by the Brotherhood since its inception. The MB 
placed the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate as its primary aim. The founder of the 
MB, Hasan al-Banna, was among those to call for the idea of “the Islamic League” at 
a time when other influential powers called for “the Egyptian League.” A number of 
researchers see that the establishment of the MB four years after the announcement of 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate was, in itself, a reaction to the fall of the 
Islamic state, although the MB did not succeed in restoring the seat of Islamic 
authority, or even realize the goal of the “Islamic League.”145 However, that did not 
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prevent it from moving effectively within a host of other issues, Palestine among 
them. al-Banna did not condition what he believed as the importance of the liberation 
of Palestine on the restoration of the Islamic state. Therefore, the MB under his 
leadership did not hesitate from supporting the issue in the media, in charitable 
activities or in the political sphere, under the pretext of the absence of the Islamic 
state. More interesting, once the MB sent volunteer forces to the frontlines, it did not 
cease these efforts even after the dissolution of the MB in late 1948 and the 
assassination of Hasan al-Banna, in early 1949. 
Therefore, the MB’s efforts to change Egyptian reality in particular, and the 
Arab and Islamic reality in general (i.e. the restoration of the Islamic state and life), 
did not prevent it from participating in more immediate issues and events. Al-Banna 
embodied this philosophy of reconciliation, serving as the regulator between the 
aspirations of the Brotherhood and its interaction with reality as it is. Palestine was 
one of those areas that embodied the policy of reconciliation between the two 
concepts of empowerment and liberation. It is this balance that allowed the 
Brotherhood then to become the most popular political current in Palestine (1947-
1955), which led to its expansion organizationally, especially after participating in 
fighting operations that mobilized Palestinian youth.  
This reconciliation between the two dialectics disintegrated later on, creating a 
bitter conflict that caused organizational contraction and a retreat from public work in 
favour of underground activity. This underground activity was aimed at protecting the 
MB from government repression during the Nasser regime. The period of repression 
under the Nasser regime lasted from 1954-1970. Since the liberation of Palestine was 
one of the most obvious areas in which the concepts of empowerment and liberation 
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met, the withdrawal of the MB from public life reduced liberation to a slogan, and one 
that was perceived by the new MB to be impossible to realize. Priority was given to 
the social, cultural, and political work of reforming the longstanding Arab and Islamic 
structures, restoring the Islamic state as a condition for liberation. The revision of the 
MB’s priorities caused widespread outcry, mainly in the Gaza Strip. Many of the 
student and youth elements that had continued their membership in the MB after the 
security campaign of the Nasser regime did so because they saw the MB as a vehicle 
for the liberation of Palestine. Now they concluded that a search for a new framework 
was needed for the liberation of Palestine. The tension between the MB and the 
regime of Nasser created a dilemma for them: “how is it possible to work within the 
organizational framework of the Brotherhood while it is subjected to prohibition of its 
political activities and its members are on the run?”146  
Abdullah Abu A‘azah - one of the leaders of the MB in Gaza from the late 50s 
to 1972 - points to the nature of the dispute that raged within the ranks of the 
Brotherhood as a result of this questioning of the MB: 
 
Are we not Palestinians? Of course! Are we not Islamists? Of course! Is it not 
our duty to work for the liberation of Palestine? Of course! Doesn’t Islam 
require jihad of us in order to realize this goal? Of course! Then why don’t we 
carry out our duty? Why does the Brotherhood refrain from establishing the 
duty of jihad? And whom is it that we wait to liberate Palestine for us? If we 
waited for action from the Arab nations, or from the international 
organizations, or the big nations, is it possible they would do something for us 
that would return us to our nation? By no means! Then what are we waiting 
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for? How long do we languish? And until when and because of what reason 
does the leadership of the Brotherhood stand as spectator?147  
 
These questions formed the ideological foundations of the Fatah movement. 
Acknowledgement of these legitimate grievances led to a search for a framework to 
resume the struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Since the MB was driven out and 
lost the support of the masses, the solution was hidden in the creation of a substitute 
framework that the MB would adopt along with their organization “such that it would 
not carry the Islamic colour in its appearance and slogans, rather it would carry the 
slogan of liberation of Palestine by armed struggle. And the new organization would 
have the responsibility of preparation for this struggle and begin with its application 
when the needed equipment was ample.”148 Those who thought of a new organization 
made it a prerequisite that the call would come from outside the MB: any ties with 
previous organizations should be severed, and they should refrain from identifying 
with any belief or partisan ideology or any particular Arab government, and instead 
concentrate solely on the Palestinian issue.149 
These ideas and conceptions were drafted in a memorandum presented to the 
MB in Gaza in July, 1957 by Khaleel al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), who later became a 
prominent Fatah leader. The leadership of the MB ignored the memorandum, but 
three years later reached a decision not to adopt it, only after it had lost a large 
number of its active elements.150  
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Some researchers argue that the opposition of the leadership of the MB in 
Gaza to the Fatah project stemmed from their view that the establishment of an 
alternative framework to the MB reflected the inability to bear the burden of 
underground work. At the same time, the supporters of the idea of a new national 
organization saw the wave of national liberation as a progressive concept. It was the 
prevailing emotion in the Arab world, inspired by the experiences of Algeria, Cuba 
and Vietnam.151 
Looking at the available sources that recorded the dispute about Fatah within 
the ranks of the MB, it is difficult to accept the notion that the Brotherhood opposed 
the idea of a new organization only because they saw it as a sign of weakness. This 
means that the shift in the MB’s approach (i.e. to give priority to empowerment over 
liberation) not only reflected abstract ideological calculations but also a 
responsiveness to political developments on the ground, as the MB perceived them. 
Moreover, the position of the MB to reject the creation of a new national liberation 
organization owed something to the political reasoning that members adopted at that 
time. Most scholars of this period depend on Abdullah Abu A’azah’s book With the 
Islamic Movement in the Arab States to examine the MB's thinking. Written by one of 
the MB leaders in Gaza at the time, it is considered the most authoritative reference 
for this stage of the MB's history. Some studies drawing from Abu A’azah’s book 
contend that the MB sought to justify its opposition to the new project. However, 
these studies fail to address the events that caused these developments as it was set 
forth in the same book.152 The conclusion in Abu A’azah’s book states that it is 
appropriate:  
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(f)or the Brotherhood to increase its efforts in aiding their call and lifting the 
status of their movement because when the movement of the Brotherhood 
achieves victory, it is the one that will liberate Palestine. And when the 
Brotherhood takes its talents for liberation, the Palestinians will not be the 
only ones to take on this mission. Rather, the Islamic nation will share with 
them in all of its regions. This participation will not be in the form of 
cooperation and aid, but rather it will be in the form of carrying out the blessed 
duty on every Muslim in rescuing the First of the Two Qiblahs, purifying the 
Land of the Night Journey and Ascension from the filth of the criminal 
Zionists, lifting the injustice from the Muslim Palestinian people and 
uprooting the crouching Zionist danger in the heart of the Islamic world lying 
in ambush for the Islamic people, all of them.153  
 
This conclusion is based on a MB memorandum mentioned in Abu A’azah’s 
book refuting the arguments and justifications of the advocates of the idea of the new 
organization. The memorandum was critical of the advocates of the new organization 
for making no commitment to the Islamic character of the struggle on the basis that 
whoever joins this organization must leave his ideological affiliations behind. This is 
what motivated the MB to request assurances that the followers of the other trends 
would give up their previous associations if the MB gave up its affiliation in the new 
organization. 
In any case, in its memorandum, the MB considered the suggestions by the 
authors of the new idea to be based on many unrealistic notions that would not lead to 
the desired goal of liberation. Likewise, they saw in it an opening for a confrontation 
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for which they were not prepared. The Brotherhood believed that embarking on a 
battle of that sort, without sound preparation, might lead to Israel’s occupation of the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank, further complicating the objective of liberation.154 The 
memorandum points to a number of obstacles faced by the new organization. First, 
the Arab regimes would not agree to be drawn into a military confrontation with 
Israel. Therefore, any Palestinian resistance occurring from the neighbouring Arab 
states would inevitably entangle Arab armies whose regimes feared Israeli reprisal. 
Additionally, the Brotherhood feared that the Palestinian resistance would be 
transformed into a political tool in the hands of different Arab regimes to fulfill their 
own objectives in relation to neighbouring states.  
Secondly, the objections represented a rejection of the comparison between 
the Palestinian situation and the Algerian experience. Algeria was a case of traditional 
colonization, while the Palestinian situation was a colony of settlements. Another 
major difference was that the Algerian resistance was based within Algeria, a wide 
geographical field with a difficult physical terrain, while the geographically small 
Palestine required that resistance be staged from outside the country, leading to the 
possibility of Israeli occupation of neighbouring states. Based on the view expressed 
in the memorandum it was not possible to confront Israel without mobilizing the 
capabilities of the whole Islamic nation for that cause.155 
The 1960 memorandum opposing the Fatah project, resolved the dispute 
inside the Palestinian organization in the Palestinian territories, namely in the Gaza 
strip. It was reinforced in 1961 in a statement by the Palestinian MB organisation: 
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“the Brotherhood has no animosity for Fatah, does not oppose or fight it, but it is not 
convinced of its plan and does not cooperate with it.”156 The dispute continued, 
however, to spark heated debates among the members of the Palestinian MB in the 
Gulf states. By the same token, it created confusion in the Arab MB organizations, 
some of which embraced Fatah as a MB organization, because some of its leaders 
were known to have been active Palestinian Brothers. It took more years to settle the 
dispute, which was achieved gradually between the years of 1965-1969.157  
As pointed out earlier, the MB position on the establishment of Fatah was built 
on a political and analytical basis. However, this does not invalidate the claim that 
there was an ideological departure that began to crystallize within the MB’s 
framework. This new ideological discourse argued that it was not possible to discuss 
liberation until a change in the social, cultural and political structure in the Arab 
world was realized. In other words, the project of liberation was conditional upon the 
accomplishment of the desired stage of empowerment. Obviously, this new departure 
in Brotherhood thought ran counter to the position it took under its first guide, Hasan 
al-Banna. Al-Banna did not neglect the stage of liberation as we previously illustrated, 
in order to wait for the success of the process of empowerment that might or might 
not come. Instead, this new ideological departure from al-Banna's methodology gave 
a back seat to the Palestinian issue, while the nationalist and leftist groups carried the 
mantel of liberation, gradually assuming the place traditionally occupied by the MB. 
One study argues that “the Brotherhood retreated from the public field and traded its 
leadership of the masses for engrossment in things pertinent to organization and 
education, calling to supporters, polishing them religiously and in manner of 
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comportment, hoping to prepare them to become the required generation for 
liberation.”158 
After the Islamic trend had carried the Palestinian struggle from the 20s to the 
mid-50s, it appeared that there was a rise in the “Palestinization” of the Palestinian 
issue lead by secular and leftists trends. This would become the dominant current in 
Palestinian politics from the early 60s to the early 80s. According to the researcher 
Khaled Hroub, the result of the unyielding MB position to the establishment of Fatah 
was that:  
 
The real separation between the Palestinian rifle and the Islamic 
movement began. The distinction between the two lines increased as 
Fatah pursued its national project of liberation. It embodied the 
characteristics of the Palestinian identity through nationalizing the 
military, in addition to the dismissal of slogans that placed the burden of 
liberation on the Arab regimes and considered military practice the 
practical entrance to plunge the Arab armies into the battle.159  
 
The Philosophical Foundation of the Two Dialectics:  
Empowerment and Liberation and its Palestinian Implications  
 
It was previously pointed out that the nature of the struggle with the Zionist project in 
Palestine was not a point of sharp dispute until the mid-50s. The prevailing 
ideological trend among the Arab masses was Islamic in nature, and it sought 
inspiration from the legacy of Palestinian resistance based on Islamic principles. In 
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addition, from the late 20s to the late 40s, the national leadership was embodied in the 
person of the Mufti al-Haj Amin al-Husseini, the most prominent religious personality 
in Palestine. It was not long before the MB’s stance left a strong impression among 
the Palestinian resistance. According to one study “Palestinian combative and national 
awareness in the early stages did not live in its initial phase, a detachment prior to the 
contradiction between the three constituent factors: nationalism, Arabism and Islam. 
Its leaders did not feel the need to draw parallels to cause reconciliation (between 
them).”160 
Furthermore, according to the chief of the political bureau of Hamas, Khaled 
Meshaal, the Arab people had not distinguished between nationalism and Islamism in 
their anti-colonial revolts in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Rather, 
nationalism was synonymous with Islamism, as was clearly on display in the 
Palestinian arena.161 This distinction began with the establishment of Fatah and the 
conscious split from the MB (approximately between 1957-1960) by its founders, 
most of whom came from the MB. So, according to the study edited by Jawad El-
Hamad and Eyad al-Bargothi, “the establishment of the Fatah movement, with what it 
represented of secular Palestinian nationalism, is considered the first stage in the split 
between nationalism and Islamism” in the Palestinian arena.162 
The brutal security apparatus employed by the Nasser regime against the MB 
not only turned the masses against it by way of calculated media campaigns, it also 
played a decisive role in the development of what Brotherhood literature calls Fikr Al 
Mihna “the hardship ideology”. This laid the groundwork for the withdrawal of the 
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MB from public work in favour of the grand project of empowerment and, in the case 
of Palestine, eventual liberation. According to the description of this stage by a 
Palestinian Islamist writer and a Hamas senior leader, “the results of the campaign 
that Abdel Nasser launched throughout two decades (1954-1970) was that religion 
became strange among us and the caller for the return to Islam faced condemnation 
and accusations of backwardness, conspiracy and acting as an agent.”163  
The Egyptian Islamist and MB’s thinker, Sayyid Qutb most prominently 
expressed this view (the priority of empowerment) from the mid-50s and his central 
role resulted in his eventual execution, having been found guilty of forming a 
revolutionary organization bent on overthrowing the regime. Brotherhood sources 
point out that the decision to execute him was taken after the publication of his 
controversial book, Ma‘alim Fi al-Tariq (Milestones), which presents a 
comprehensive theory for the restoration of the Islamic mission.164 Milestones was 
born out of the oppressive circumstances faced by the Islamic movement. Thousands 
of Brotherhood members were imprisoned and tortured during this period. Many 
leaders were executed and Qutb himself was imprisoned and tortured from 1954 until 
May 1964. It was not long before he was detained again on 9 August, 1965 and 
executed the following year on 29 August, 1966.165 
During Qutb’s first incarceration, his thinking was redirected toward the 
“realization of the superiority of Allah over the hardship (in which the MB suffered 
under the Nasser regime), perseverance on the path of calling to Him and giving it a 
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new effusion.”166 His thought began to crystallize in the ideas upon which he built 
Milestones. Some scholars believe that these ideas date to an earlier period, as signs of 
them could be found in his Quranic commentary Fi Thilal al-Quran (In the Shade of 
the Quran), whose third revised edition was published in 1961.167 It is essential to 
explore these new ideas put forward by Qutb which weighed on the question of the 
Brotherhood’s withdrawal from the social sphere to focus on the organizational 
sphere, and the implications of this new thought on the MB’s role in the Palestinian 
struggle.  
Qutb argues in Milestones that the world lives in a state of Jahiliyyah, a term 
traditionally used to describe the pre-Islamic period of ignorance. He elaborates on 
this concept, stating that the most prominent characteristic of this Jahiliyyah is 
represented in the transgression upon the sovereignty of Allah (Hakimiyyat Allah) on 
earth, and upon the exclusive characteristics of divinity and sovereignty. According to 
Qutb, sovereignty has been wrongly attributed to man, and some have become lords 
over others.168 He goes further when he announces that the “Islamic nation” no longer 
exists, since the end of the Shari'a’s application.169 He concludes by stating: 
 
We are also surrounded by Jahiliyyah today, which is of the same nature as it 
was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole 
environment, peoples’ beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws, is 
Jahiliyyah, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, 
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Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of 
Jahiliyyah!170  
 
Building on that, Qutb rejects any compromise between the Islamic banner 
and any other, whether nationalist, socialist or humanist. According to his view, Islam 
does not accept compromise or dilution: it is either Jahiliyyah or Islam.171 Since the 
whole world lives in Jahiliyyah, Qutb sees that the solution comes from a genuine 
Islamic Revival. But how is this Islamic revival to occur? 
Here Qutb relies on the first Islamic call. He contends, according to the 
Islamic thinker, Muneer Shafeeq, that it is necessary to organize a group of people to 
acknowledge the servitude to Allah alone, and who reject legislation from any other 
source than Allah.172 To achieve this stage, Qutb argues that it is necessary: 
 
(In) the way of the Islamic movement that in the early stages of our training 
and education we should remove ourselves from all the influences of the 
Jahiliyya in which we live and from which derive benefits. We must return to 
that pure source from which those people derived their guidance, the sources 
which is free from any mixing or pollution (the Quran). We must return to it to 
derive from it our concepts of the nature of the universe, the nature of human 
existence, and the relationship of these two with the perfect, the real being, 
God most high. From it we must also derive our concepts of life, our 
principles of government, politics, economics and all other aspects of life.173  
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Qutb requires a stage of long-term preparation for the emergence of this 
vanguard. He calls it “constructing faith.”174 It is to be followed by a stage of state 
building that will provide solutions to the problems and challenges,175 among them 
the issue of jihad.176 It is possible to conclude that Sayyid Qutb seeks to defer every 
goal of the Islamic movement until the restoration of divine sovereignty (i.e. 
sovereignty of Allah on earth.)  
Qutb’s ideas incited widespread confusion in the ranks of the MB because 
some perceived in them a charge of disbelief against fellow Muslims on the basis that 
they are “people of Jahiliyya”.177 In addition, they appeared to directly conflict with 
the ideas of the MB’s founder, Hasan al-Banna.178 As Nusse notes, Qutb "does not 
limit Jahiliyya to the time of pagan ignorance reigning on the Arabian peninsula 
before the arrival of Muhammad, but interprets it as a situation which occurs at any 
time when God's programme and laws are neglected by society and rulers."179 
Several years later after the publication of Milestones, the General Guide 
Hasan al-Hudaibi attempted from his prison cell to settle the matter by writing his 
book Dua La Qudah (Preachers not Judges). Authored and distributed among the 
imprisoned Brothers in 1969 (though it was not published until 1977), al-Hudaibi 
argues that the term sovereignty (Al- Hakimiyya) is not mentioned in any Quranic 
verse or Prophetic Tradition and has no basis in juristic rulings. As such, it is only an 
expression of general meanings, used by those who wish to draw attention to its 
importance. Al-Hudaibi disagrees with Qutb’s conclusion that “the state is from the 
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principles of belief.” Rather, he acknowledges that the non-existence of this state does 
not diminish the Islamic nature of the nation or the correctness of its Islam. Likewise, 
al-Hudaibi resolved the question of whether the Brotherhood is “a group of Muslims” 
or “the group of Muslims” in favour of the first understanding.180 However, even 
though he presented the official opinion of the MB, in opposition to the theory put 
forward by Qutb, he was not able to prevent the intellectual split with those who 
supported Qutb’s views.  
In any case, the ideas of Sayyid Qutb formed the basis of “the hardship 
ideology”, or what the Brotherhood literature designates as the dialectic 
“empowerment” first. According to him, as was indicated earlier, this dialectic begins 
with the preparation of an Islamic vanguard that does not accept compromise or truce 
with any other belief or ideology. The contrast with Hasan al-Banna's work is stark. 
He believed, according to the Muslim scholar and MB figure Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
Islam to be present and established, as one nation that spans the globe, not as Qutb, 
that preparation necessarily requires in-depth training and education. Though 
inevitably there will be neglectful Muslims, the fundamentals of faith remain in place, 
though it may be in need of revival. This is the true mission of the Islamic call.181 As 
opposed, according to al-Qaradawi, Qutb believed: 
 
That Islam’s existence had been discontinued on earth, as there was no 
Muslim nation, no Muslim society, nor any individual Muslims. This is not 
because they had apostatized, but rather because they had not originally 
entered into Islam. Entrance into Islam requires the testimony that “there is 
none worthy of worship except Allah” which entails the assignment of 
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sovereignty to Allah, Most High. But they do not utter the testimony with that 
meaning.182  
 
Qutb’s treatise clashed with al-Banna’s ideas in another respect. Al-Banna, as 
was illustrated earlier, did not defer some of the MB’s goals to later stages 
(empowerment then liberation) as Qutb argued. Additionally, Qutb moved beyond al-
Banna in presenting Muslims with a choice between Islam or Jahiliyya. On the other 
hand, al-Banna believed in a “conditional compromise” between the three axes of 
Islamism, patriotism and nationalism.183 
Returning to the implications of the unprecedented “hardship ideology” for the 
Brotherhood, the Palestinian MB’s thought, most notably in the Gaza Strip, was 
affected and influenced to a large extent by this line of thought (i.e. the theory of 
empowerment first). On this basis, the stage of liberation was deferred until the 
preparation of the needed Islamic generation “because the movement of the 
Brotherhood, when it is victorious, is the one who will liberate Palestine. When the 
Brotherhood prepares for liberation, the Palestinians will not be alone in undertaking 
this mission, rather the Islamic nation in all its regions will share this with them.”184 
With Fatah’s split from the MB, as a result of this new stance, a conflict arose over 
the notions of the Islamic and the patriotic in the occupied Palestinian territories.185 
                                                 
182 Ibid. 
183 Hasan al-Banna, Majmoo’at Rasa’il Al Imam Alshaheed Hasan al-Banna. The Letter of Our  
Message. Ibid., pp. 17-21.  
Given al-Banna’s comprehensive and multi-tiered understanding, the MB participated in the 
Palestinian war and worked for its cause under the banner of the Arab League. Furthermore, despite the 
disputes they worked under the Egyptian state and its successive governments. Also, they worked in 
alliance with trends and parties that had ideologies opposed to theirs. As a result of this open minded 
thinking, the MB participated in the actions of resistance in the Suez Canal in 1951 despite their tense 
relationship at that time with the Egyptian government. 
184 Abdallah Abu A’azah, Ma’ Alharaka Alislamiya Filaqtar Al’arabia. Ibid., p. 86. 
185 Mohammad Emara and Hani Suleiman, Alharaka Wa Alwatania, Part tow, chapter 3 in Dirasa Fil 
Fikr Alsiyasi Liharakat Almuqawama Alislamiya (Hamas) 1987-1996. Jawad El-Hamad and Eyad al-
Bargothi (Editors). Ibid., p.163.  
 A Hamas leader clarifies the discussion that took place during this period 
which led to Fatah’s split. He defines the choice as being one out of two possible 
paths: 
  
To initiate guerilla fighting operations against the Jews as the Palestinian 
organizations did, and the reality is the reality, and use the same youth who 
were raised in the shade of these regimes and ideas that are far removed from 
Islam, and with this there will be an extension to all that happened in the past 
and repetition of its mistakes … or to start a process of a comprehensive 
revival of the nation in order to revive Islam in its souls, and only after this 
emergence would there be an embarkation toward liberation.186  
 
 The MB chose the latter stance while Fatah chose the first. Perhaps one of the 
most instructive points about the influence of Qutb’s thought on the Palestinian MB is 
the Brotherhood’s refusal to work with other Palestinian forces. That led to the 
accusation of “the Islamist in regards to their stance on the Palestinian issue. The 
absence of the MB from the battle against the Israeli occupation in the West bank and 
Gaza until the early 80s, put its patriotism under scrutiny.”187 Whether the new 
Brotherhood position expressed ideological agreement with Qutb’s thesis of non-
cooperation between “the Muslim group” and other groups or whether it developed as 
a result of the severity of Nasser’s campaign against them, the result was the same. 
From the late 50s to the late 80s, the Palestinian MB gave priority to empowerment 
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over liberation and did not cling to the logic of compromise between the two, 
embodied by the MB during al-Banna’s life, and after his death up to the mid-50s. 
Another noteworthy issue is the distinction between the MB as it existed in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where the new ideological line was far more 
prominent in the Gaza Strip, because of its proximity to Egypt and experience of 
repression. The effects of this appeared in the stage that followed, which saw the 
participation of MB elements in military operations embarking from north Jordan 
under the shadow of the Fatah in 1968-1970. These actions were widely supported by 
the MB in other Arab states, especially Jordan, while the MB of Gaza strongly 
opposed it.188 
 
After Fatah and the 1967 Defeat to the Founding of Hamas 
  
The early 60s to the defeat of June 1967, represented the low point for the MB in 
Palestine. According to Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the founder of Hamas, the 
Brotherhood lost more of its cadre during that period than any other. Abdel Nasser’s 
propaganda campaign was a major cause for their loss of popularity. Youth 
movements wishing to work for Palestine, even if they were religious, often had no 
choice but to join other Palestinian trends, especially Fatah.189 
Until the June 1967 war, there was no prominent nationalist Brotherhood 
activity in the 60s.190 According to Yassin, the beginnings of organized Palestinian 
MB work occurred only after the defeat of the Arabs in the war and Israel’s 
consequent occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Sinai and the Golan Heights 
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of Syria.191 This defeat, known in the Arab political dictionary as the Naksah 
(setback) resulted in several changes within the MB in general, and the Palestinian 
MB in particular. Both the West Bank and Gaza Strip came out from Jordanian and 
Egyptian administration, respectively. Thus, they were "re-united under one sovereign 
power", (i.e. Israel).192 This had a particular impact on the MB of Gaza which was rid 
of Nasser’s campaign. Likewise, the Naksah was a defeat of the Arab regimes, “in 
which the regional picture was shaken to some extent, especially with respect to the 
absolute Nasserist domination, with its discourse and slogans, on the political front of 
the Palestinian issue.”193 
Despite the fact that this defeat released the MB from the repression of 
Nasser’s security apparatus, and to a certain extent, his propaganda campaign, it 
confronted the Palestinian MB with a new challenge. It found itself under Israeli 
occupation, leading to the resumption of the debate within its ranks about the 
priorities of empowerment and liberation. The difficulties for the MB increased as 
nationalist and leftist groups filled the void that resulted from the official Arab defeat 
and these movements advanced their leadership in the resistance against the 
occupation. At the head of these Palestinian resistance groups was Fatah, which had 
only recently split from the MB.194 
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In this atmosphere, some MB organizations around the Arab world began to 
favour increased involvement in the resistance. The subject of the resistance 
operations became a dominant discussion in Brotherhood meetings and conferences 
around the Arab world. Usually the discussion was about the necessity of establishing 
training camps for the MB in Jordan for the purpose of engaging in resistance 
operations. The most prominent advocates of this idea were the MB organizations in 
Jordan (including the MB's members from the West Bank who were part of the 
Jordanian organization), Sudan, Kuwait and expatriate Egyptians, while the 
Palestinian organization (namely in Gaza) strongly opposed it. The Palestinian 
organization based its opposition on the same ideas with which it opposed the 
founding of Fatah years earlier.195 The Brotherhood ultimately founded four bases for 
resistance operations under the umbrella of Fatah in northern Jordan. They called 
these the “Sheik bases.”196 Aside from the use of its name, Fatah itself had no role in 
their administration.197  
The Brotherhood “Sheik bases” shared in resistance operations along the 
Jordanian-Palestinian border in the period 1968-1970. According to Brotherhood 
sources who participated in these events, volunteers came from several Arab states 
and performed well in military operations across the border.198 This experience was 
cut short in September 1970 with the confrontation between the Jordanian military 
and the Palestinian resistance. The MB preferred to stay neutral, wishing to avoid 
participation in the shedding of Muslim blood, and also because of the uncertainty 
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about fighting against the Jordanian army and the absence of an Islamic banner.199 
“Despite the brief and modest nature of this episode, it left an imprint on the 
subsequent literature on the contribution of the Islamists to the Palestinian cause.”200  
The result of the defeat of Palestinian resistance groups in Jordan in what 
came to be known as Black September was their expulsion from Jordan to Lebanon, 
effectively ending the role of the Jordanian MB in the resistance. Subsequently, the 
voices supporting empowerment first returned to direct the Palestinian MB. This 
change in direction resulted in the near complete absence of the MB from the 
Palestinian national resistance in the 70s. However, it also led to the establishment of 
a strong organizational base and broad popularity for the MB. It appealed mainly to 
students in schools and universities. The number of educated members of the MB 
increased tremendously.201 
The early 70s witnessed the first surge in enrollment of Palestinian youth into 
universities, especially in Egypt. Abdel Nasser died on 28 September, 1970 and his 
vice President and member of the Revolutionary Council, Anwar Sadat, assumed the 
presidency, soon confronting the Nasserist legacy and its socialist supporters. This 
motivated him to free the incarcerated Brotherhood and open the arena of public work 
to them, including Egyptian universities, where they confronted Nasser supporters. 
This new atmosphere provided the Palestinian youth with an opportunity to reconnect 
with the MB in Egypt. This section of students played a big role in spreading 
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religiosity and regaining acceptance for the Brotherhood message in the occupied 
Palestinian territories.202 
Hamas commentators describe three stages in the ideological development of 
the Palestinian MB leading to the formation of Hamas:203 
 
1) Building Mosques (1967 to 1975). In this period the Islamic movement was 
concerned to influence the new generation, assembling, shaping, directing it by 
planting the seeds of Islamic thought deeply in their souls.204 The Palestinian MB 
dedicated itself toward the theory of social change. The MB believed “that social 
change will lead to political change, and it is necessary to cause this change so that 
the MB will mature toward a comprehensive resistance to the occupation. Any 
movement that will resist the occupation is not possible without the availability of a 
firm ground and appropriate atmosphere.”205 
 
2) Building Islamic Foundations (1976-1981).206 This stage is distinguished by the 
appearance of Islamic Societies, youth and sports clubs, charitable committees, 
libraries, and student unions in the universities.207 The Palestinian Brotherhood sought 
to expand the movement’s base and its horizons. During this stage Islamic student 
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blocs appeared in Palestinian universities, competing with Palestinian nationalists in 
student elections in the universities and institutes. 
The movement in the Gaza Strip also established “the Islamic Assembly” to 
represent the most important centres of social activity.208 The stage of institution-
building reached its height with the establishment of the Islamic University in Gaza in 
1978. It came into existence after a bitter battle with nationalist factions and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization about the identity of the university and the means of 
its administration.209 
The importance of this stage was apparent after the Palestinian Intifada was 
launched in December 1987 when Hamas was founded.210 These institutions of the 
Islamic movement covered numerous fields and specialties, such as health and 
teaching establishments and children's kindergartens. They were distinguished both 
because they were inexpensive for citizens and by the good character of those who ran 
them. In comparison to many of the other establishments then operating, which 
emphasized the factional affiliations and tried to profit from their constituents. 211 
 
3) Preparing for Confrontation (1981-1987). During this stage the apparatus 
necessary for moving into the mode of resistance were put in place. This period saw 
the MB take to the streets and transform the movement into a political force. In this 
                                                 
208 Ziad Abu-Amr, Hamas: A Historical and Political Background. Ibid., Ibid., p. 7. 
209 Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. Ibid., p. 
24. 
210 Personal Interview with Muhammad Nazzal. Ibid. According to Nazzal, the wide foundational 
network established by the Palestinian MB shared in firming up the pillars of Hamas since its inception 
and earned additional supporters for it. 
211 Ali Al Jarbawi, Hamas Madkhala Alikhwan Almuslimeen Ila Alshareeya Al Siyasiya. [Hamas: The 
Entrance of the Muslim Brotherhood into Political Legitimacy.] (Beirut, Lebanon: The Magazine of 
Palestine studies, Issue 13, Winter, 1993.), p.71. Also, see Jeroen Gunning, Hamas In Politics: 
Democracy, Religion, Violence. Ibid., p. 45.  
period, the preliminary preparations began for armed struggle against the 
occupation.212 
Khaled Meshaal, head of the political bureau of Hamas, indicates that a 
meeting was held outside the Palestinian territories in 1983 that included a number of 
Brotherhood leaders from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Diaspora to discuss the 
manner in which to build the coming project. According to Meshaal, this meeting was 
the first to bring together the internal and external leadership of the nascent Hamas 
movement to define its objectives. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and other prominent leaders 
from Gaza did not participate in this meeting because of their inability to travel under 
the Israeli occupation. At the meeting it was agreed that the MB inside the occupied 
Palestinian territories would lead the actual resistance, while the leadership outside 
would play a political, financial, and public relations role.213 
The MB inside the occupied Palestinian lands did not delay in implementing 
its part. Signs of the new Brotherhood direction were manifested in civilian 
confrontation with the occupation. Of that, according to Muhammad Nazzal, who is a 
member of the political bureau of Hamas:  
 
The sparking of the uprisings of the mosques in the years 1982 and 1983 that 
were represented in huge demonstrations that began from the mosques and 
announced their anger following specific events like the intrusion into the al-
Aqsa Mosque. Then again in 1985 and 1986 after the decision of the 
movement in the summer of 1985 to depend on the policy of inciting the 
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masses, arranging the appropriate opportunity and seizing it to implement the 
operation of mass uprising to reject the occupation.214  
 
This new direction within the MB was demonstrated by the formation of two 
apparatuses, military and security, in 1983. The military unit was named 
Almujahidoona Alfilastiniyoun (the Palestinian Fighters), and it was under the 
leadership of Sheikh Salah Shahadah, who would later become a leader of the military 
wing of Hamas, “the ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.” The security apparatus was 
under the banner of Munathamat Majd (the Organization of Glory) under the 
leadership of both Yahya As-Sinwar and Muhammad Shiratihah. Sheikh Ahmad 
Yassin became the head of this new organization which would later become known as 
Hamas.215  
The most prominent expression of this new direction was on 15 June, 1984, 
when Israeli authorities arrested a number of Brotherhood leaders in the Gaza Strip, 
including Yassin, Shahadah and Sharatihah and accused them of “establishing a 
religious organization whose objective was attacking the state of Israel by using force 
and violence and establishing an Islamic state upon its collapse; conspiracy to buy 
weapons and means of fighting by way of intention to use them to realize their goals, 
and possessing weapons without a license.”216  
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They were only released after a prisoner exchange operation between the 
Israeli authorities and the Popular Front under the leadership of Ahmad Jibreel in 
1985. 
Israel’s campaign to destroy the new Brotherhood before it took off did not 
affect the decision to raise tensions with the occupation, taken by the MB in 1983. It 
reaffirmed it in the summer of 1985. Indeed, the MB followed up these efforts, 
participating in the demonstrations of 1986 out of Bir Zeit University, and clashed 
with Israeli security forces leading to the first two deaths among the MB’s followers. 
Some Hamas leaders consider years 1985 and 1986 to be “an initiation to the plan of 
confrontation, and that the beginning of the eighties to 1987 as the period of secret 
preparation and the involvement of the Palestinian youth through the students blocs 
and the mosques in the Islamic movement for confronting the occupation.”217 
 
Factors in the Transformation of Palestinian Brotherhood Thought 
  
The stage at the end of the 70s to the end of 1987, the year in which the first 
Palestinian Intifada began and in which Hamas was born, was marked by a number of 
variables and factors that helped shape the Palestinian MB’s thought and its move 
towards the national struggle. Some of these were internal and related to the 
developing discussion within the Islamic movement and the increasing influence not 
just in the Palestinian streets, but also in Arab and Islamic areas. Others were external 
but they affected the thought of the Palestinian MB and its directions. These factors 
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both contributed to the hastening of the Palestinian MB toward national action and the 
plunge into the armed struggle against the Israeli occupation through “Hamas.” 
It was previously stated that the Palestinian MB succeeded in the 70s in 
restoring its organizational framework and rebuilding its popular base. The year 1979 
was decisive in increasing the size and influence of the Islamic current, not only in 
Palestine, but also in Arab and Islamic streets. That year witnessed two important 
events that contributed to the development of the Palestinian Brotherhood. The first 
was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the second was the Islamic revolution in 
Iran under the leadership of Khomeini, who overthrew the regime of the Shah, one of 
the most important allies of America in the Middle East. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan represented a rare opportunity for the United States to give the Soviets 
“an Islamic Vietnam.” The Islamic and Arab states allied with the United States, 
especially Saudi Arabia, facilitated the path for zealous Muslim youth to fight the 
Soviets. The stories and sacrifices of these Muslim youth inspired the determination 
of others who had not participated in this struggle. But its most important aspect was 
the renewed confidence of the Islamic current in their ability to lead a struggle under 
an Islamic banner, by way of “jihad.”218 The Palestinian Islamic field took inspiration 
from these events and learned their lessons. The Islamic movement in general, and the 
Palestinian movement especially, benefited from the weakening of the Left in the 
region.219 The Arab left’s support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused them 
to lose a lot of sympathy with the people. 
As for the Islamic revolution in Iran, in spite of its Shi’i nature, its antagonism 
towards America and Israel, revived the hope of the Palestinians and especially the 
Islamists among them, about the possibility of gaining a strong ally in their battle with 
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Israel. Likewise, the overthrow of an important American ally and the establishment 
of an Islamic state gave the Islamic movement new hope about the possibility of 
restoring the Islamic state. Palestinian symbolism appeared in the revolution in the 
closing of the American and Israeli embassies in Tehran, increasing Palestinian 
popular support for the revolution in Iran.220  
These two factors accompanied an increase in the influence and effect of the 
MB in the Arab states, especially in Egypt, Jordan and some of the Gulf states, such 
as Kuwait, in which a large Palestinian community resided. In the later years after the 
founding of Hamas, many Palestinian activists in Kuwait who led the Palestinian 
student activism in its universities became prominent leaders of Hamas.221 The Arab 
Brotherhood organizations shared in supporting the Palestinian organization, 
providing financial and other support for its activities.  
The events of 1979 reopened the debate about the priorities of the Islamic 
movement within the Palestinian MB for a third time vis-à-vis the two dialectics of 
empowerment and liberation.  These discussions began among some students in 
Egyptian universities who were deeply affected by the Islamic revolution in Iran. 
Prominent among them was Fathi al-Shiqaqi, who later became the founder of the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). He authored a book in 1979 under the title Al-
Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative. These youth criticized the non-
confrontational strategy toward the Israeli occupation adopted by the MB at the time 
and tried to push it in a new direction. What also contributed to strengthening their 
convictions were their interactions with Egyptian Islamic groups that believed in 
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violence. These groups soon announced their separation from the MB and founded 
PIJ in 1980.222 
Some researchers see that the evolution of the PIJ and its adoption of Islam as 
an ideological badge, like the MB, “made that movement a strong competitor to the 
Brotherhood on the spiritual field in the first degree, and from here it was on the 
Muslim Brotherhood to take jihad steps to limit the command of the spotlight on the 
competitor movement Islamic Jihad.”223 The founding of Islamic Jihad challenged the 
Brotherhood, causing its zealous elements to initiate internal discussions about their 
priorities and if working for social change precedes working for liberation of 
Palestine.224 
The number of youth in the ranks of the MB at the time was significant and 
their enthusiasm for resistance was high. Moreover, that period witnessed a rise in 
Israeli suppression of Palestinians. By emphasizing education and the necessity of 
social change, the youth of the MB found themselves the subject of ridicule from the 
national factions because of their absence from the field of nationalist activities 
against the occupation. What added to their sentiment of frustration is the increasing 
respect and popularity that the youth of the PIJ were gaining as a result of their 
adopting the line of resistance.225 As was mentioned before, those PIJ youth were just 
recently in the ranks of the MB.  
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These are the developments that led to demands from within the ranks of the 
MB to move toward working for liberation. The demands of the youth translated into 
resistance in 1979 and the early 80s with the Brotherhood's first experience of military 
action through Usrat Al Jihad  (family of jihad), which was composed of Palestinians 
with Israeli citizenship under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah Nimr Darweesh. 
Upon being discovered by the Israelis in 1981, its members were incarcerated and 
charged with possession of weapons, forming an organization hostile to Israel and 
carrying out a number of military operations.226  
Another factor contributed to the hastening of the MB toward national 
resistance: the writings of Islamic thinkers who criticized deferring the jihad in 
Palestine to an unknown future in which certain ideals had been realized. They 
concluded that: 
 
The statement that the liberation of Palestine will come to pass through 
Islamic societies is correct, but it is not correct alone. The statement that the 
revival of Islamic societies will come to pass with the Palestinian issue is also 
correct, but not by itself. What is more correct, as the plans for jihad develop, 
is that both sides go necessarily and actually through the other, not with a 
theoretical choice alone.227 
 
These arguments were accompanied by major developments in the conflict, 
including the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the expulsion of the Palestinian 
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resistance, and the departure of the remaining Palestinian militant factions from the 
arena of direct military action with Israel through neighboring Arab countries. At the 
same time, following its defeat in Lebanon, the PLO headed down the path of political 
action and negotiations with Israel on the basis of international resolutions. The 
Islamists decisively condemned this route, because they believed it granted a degree 
of legitimacy to Israel. Adding to this gloomy picture is the fact that “the decreasing 
Arab interest in the Palestinian cause was evident at the 1986 Arab summit in 
Amman. Within Palestine, the increasing socioeconomic and political pressures 
caused by the conditions of the Israeli occupation were tremendous and pushed the 
situation to the boiling point.”228    
 Hamas confirms that all of the preceding factors pushed the announcement of 
its inception from within the womb of the Palestinian MB. Whereas: 
 
It was necessary for a Palestinian Islamic jihad project, its characteristics 
beginning in the "family of jihad" in 1981 and the group of Sheikh Ahmad 
Yassin in 1983 and others. And with the end of 1987 the circumstances had 
ripened sufficiently for completing the new project for liberating Palestine, 
established on a new basis. So, it was the Islamic Resistance Movement, 
Hamas, that the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine had a fundamental role in 
founding.229 
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The interplay of these factors, absorbed and articulated within the Palestinian 
Brotherhood, set the stage for them to enter into national resistance. All the conditions 
were right for a move toward the following stage, which was realized on 8 December, 
1987, the day in which the Palestinian Intifada exploded, coinciding with the birth of 
Hamas.230 According to Hamas' narrative, two major conditions allowed the smooth 
transformation in the MB from a missionary, social, and educational organization to 
the resistance movement, Hamas.231 Those two conditions were: 1) The completion, 
in the mid-80s, of the Brotherhood's apparatuses (i.e. military, security, and youth.. 
etc) necessary for confronting the Israeli occupation.232 2) The completion of the 
theoretical foundation concerning the priorities of the Palestinian Brotherhood. These 
had "developed years earlier a formula that harmonizes the two priorities: 
(empowerment and liberation) and tries to remove any contradiction between them or 
putting one before the other. This formula espoused the possibility and the necessity 
of undertaking efforts for the realization of both in an accompanying form and not 
delaying either until the other is established.”233   
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From the Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas 
 
The tension between the Palestinians and the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip 
began to rise in mid-1987. The atmosphere seemed to head toward inevitable 
confrontation.   
In May 1987 six members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad succeeded in 
escaping from the central Gaza prison. They hastened to form a military cell in the 
Gaza Strip that carried out a number of successful operations against Israeli forces, 
provoking their anger and leading them to launch an unprecedented search campaign 
for the fugitives. On 1 October, they succeeded when an Israeli military ambush killed 
four of the six men. With this event the “public anger was ready to boil over, 
particularly after the Israeli army stormed the campus of the Islamic University in 
Gaza, where thousands of students had gathered for a prayer service for the four. The 
Israeli troops opened fire, wounding dozens of students.”234 On 6 December, a PIJ 
member killed an Israeli settler in the main square of Gaza city.235 The Israeli 
response was swift. Only two days later, on 8 December, a Jewish truck driver ran 
over Palestinian workers in Gaza on their way home from work, killing four and 
injuring nine others.  
This incident ignited the Palestinian Intifada, leading to immediate angry 
protests that evening after three of the four victims were buried. In Jibaliya camp in 
the Gaza Strip, protesters made their way to an Israeli army station. Protestors clashed 
with soldiers who responded with gunfire, wounding a large number. Less than a 
week later, Palestinian popular demonstrations confronting Israeli occupation forces 
had spread to all cities, villages and camps of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
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Though it must be acknowledged that other factions, such as the PLO and PIJ 
have differing narratives crediting their movements with the launch of the Intifada, 
and that some believe it to have been the product of spontaneous mass action, what 
concerns us in these events is the official Hamas narrative regarding the chain of 
events that led to the Intifada.236 This period is critical to understanding the 
movement’s evolution from the MB to Hamas.  
According to this narrative, on the evening of the day following the truck 
incident, the MB’s administrative office in Gaza met and discussed the necessity to 
utilize this incident to mobilize national religious sentiments among the Palestinians 
and direct them toward action against the Israeli occupation.237 The meeting was held 
in the house of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and was attended by six other leading members 
of the MB: Ibrahim al-Yazzouri, a pharmacist from Gaza, Muhammad Sham’ah, a 
teacher from the Al-Shati’I camp, Abdul Fattah Dukhan, principal of a school in Al-
Nusirat camp, Abdul Aziz Ar-Rantisi, a physician from Khan Yunis, Isa al-Nashar, an 
engineer from Rafah, and Salah Shahadah, an Islamic University in Gaza employee 
from Bait Hanoun.238  
That gathering is considered by Hamas the founding meeting of the 
movement.239 In that meeting, the first announcement of the movement was drafted 
and the first announcement of the Intifada was decided, according to Hamas 
literatures. According to Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, he personally dictated the language 
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of that announcement at the meeting.240 It was distributed within the Gaza Strip on 14 
December and in the West Bank the following day. It designated the name “Intifada” 
to describe the mass demonstrations241 and was issued in the name of “the Islamic 
Resistance Movement” without the word “Hamas” present in the document. At the 
time, the movement had not arrived at the abbreviated name that would later become 
famous. According to Meshaal, a month after these initial deliberations between the 
internal and external leadership of the movement, they came to agree on the name of 
“Hamas,” an acronym for Harakat al-Mukawama al-Islamiya “The Islamic 
Resistance Movement.”242 Hamas in Arabic also means “zeal” or “religious passion.” 
Immediately after that first meeting, the MB’s religious, social, and security 
institutions were incorporated into the newly born movement.243 It was also decided 
at the meeting that the group in Gaza should coordinate with Sheikh Jameel Hamami 
in Jerusalem to form a Hamas organization in the West Bank and to join the 
Intifada.244 
Hamas represented the framework that would reconcile the two dialectics that 
had caused such a divergence within the Brotherhood: empowerment and liberation. 
Indeed, Hamas became the vehicle of the MB in Palestine to regain whatever popular 
and political legitimacy had been lost. With its immediate engagement of the 
Palestinian national resistance, the MB succeeded, through Hamas, to restore to the 
MB a status in Palestine it had enjoyed under its founder, Hasan al-Banna, and a few 
years after his assassination as was illustrated earlier.  
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It is noteworthy that Hamas would outgrow its parent organization, a result of 
its not making membership conditional on prior or current membership in the MB. 
The strict conditions that the MB enforced on its members were loosened for 
membership in Hamas.245 According to Nazzal, as a result, Hamas became a “mass 
organizational framework wider than that of the MB, which maintained its special 
characteristics and dimensions with organizing and recruiting individuals.”246  
Despite the fact that Hamas gradually replaced the Brotherhood, the role of the 
MB remained evident in the outlook of Hamas, which continues to be Brotherhood in 
character, because its core members were trained by the MB, and the main leadership 
comes from its ranks.247 In time, Hamas took on a role larger than that of a 
Brotherhood wing dedicated to resistance in the occupied territories. It developed as a 
far-reaching foundational movement whose institutions extended beyond the military 
into the realms of charitable, educational, academic and social action. 
The parent organization learned valuable lessons about how to deal with the 
emergence of Hamas from its experience with Fatah in the late 50s, which it opposed 
and therefore allowed to get out from under its influence. Fatah’s split from the MB 
proved to be a test to the Islamic movement, as it polarized the active youth at the 
time. An important question arises concerning the nature of the differences between 
the experience of the Palestinian MB with Fatah and Hamas. What factors led to the 
rejection of the first project and adoption of the second? 
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It is possible here to note a number of important differences between the two 
experiences. First, in the Palestinian Brotherhood experience with Fatah, the leaders 
reached their decision from a position of weakness and sagging in their ranks. 
Nasser’s brutal campaign made self-preservation the priority above all and at the 
expense of patriotic issues. This, in turn, led to the restlessness of the youth who 
wanted to pursue the course of resistance, one of the reasons they had joined the MB 
in the first place. In the case of Hamas, the internal discussions and external 
circumstances that led to its founding arose from a position of strength, the result of 
the MB restoring its organizational and popular base in the 70s. Only then did the 
internal discussions give serious consideration for the necessity of the MB to reenter 
national resistance. 
Second, as was previously mentioned, the founders of Fatah saw the necessity 
of their organization’s independence from the MB, so as not to carry the burden of the 
MB’s differences with the Nasser regime. At the same time, the MB insisted that any 
organization come through the MB and with its approval. In the case of Hamas, it was 
agreed that Hamas would exist within the MB framework, bearing the consequences 
of the resistance against the Israeli occupation. Third, the decision to form Fatah 
emerged from a movement of zealous Brotherhood youth without the agreement of 
the leadership, while in the case of Hamas the decision to found a new organization 
was made by the MB leadership directly. Fourth, since the idea of Fatah appeared in 
the minds of its founders, the concern was with the nationalist cause of resistance, 
without paying much attention to educational and social change. In other words, Fatah 
gave precedence to liberation over empowerment, a notion the MB rejected at the 
time. As for Hamas, its formulation came to find a compromise between the two 
arguments as it maintained the MB’s educational and social work while fighting Israel 
at the same time. 
As for the case of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, whose leadership came from 
the MB, it appears that the dispute was limited to the timing of national resistance 
work. The PIJ hastened the conflict, because of what its leaders saw as the rising tide 
of leftist and nationalist factions in this field. By contrast, the Brotherhood leadership 
believed the time had not yet come for resistance, lead to the split of the PIJ from the 
MB, while preserving the Islamic reference points. Some Hamas leaders justify the 
MB’s stance of not being swept away by the action-oriented position of the PIJ 
saying:  
 
The Islamic movement believed in the liberation of Palestine and realized the 
danger of the Zionist project. And it considered the project that it was striving 
to build to be huge and requiring time to ripen. It didn’t want to get involved 
in a limited experience of sacrificial action. It had a comprehensive and 
strategic view. The Zionist project that takes Palestine as a base for it 
represents a danger to the Islamic and Arab nation.248  
 
In concluding this chapter, an important issue that should be addressed is the 
suggestion by some scholars that there was a role played by the Israeli authorities in 
strengthening the role of the Islamic current in the occupied Palestinian lands. This 
suggestion is on the grounds of the initial assumption by the Israelis in the 70s that the 
MB did not believe in armed resistance at the time. According to these scholars, this 
Israeli contribution was apparent in its turning a blind eye to the activities of the MB 
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and providing the space for it to move among the Palestinian masses with relative 
freedom, forming clubs and foundations in the hope that it would compete with the 
nationalist Palestinian factions, especially the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
which led the struggle against the occupation. This view holds that the Israeli strategy 
backfired. The MB transformed from the sphere of missionary, organizational and 
social work into the realm of national resistance by joining the Intifada and benefiting 
from the strong organizational and foundational base that it built under the Israeli 
disregard for its activities.249 Indeed, there are those who see that the increasing 
influence of the rightwing Likud in Israeli politics during this period helped increase 
the strength of the Palestinian Islamic trend.250 
In refuting the Israeli role in strengthening the Islamic movement some Hamas 
leaders respond that the Palestinians, with all of their parties and factions, had a 
limited margin allowed by the Israeli authorities for establishing clubs and 
foundations. The foundations established by the MB were civilian in character and did 
not have a military component that the occupation would oppose.251 However, this did 
not mean that Israel did not disregard the growth of the Islamic current, hoping that 
the different Palestinian ideological trends would turn their attention toward each 
other, thereby weakening all of them. This view is supported by Sheikh Ahmad 
Yassin himself.252 As for the argument that the rise of the Israeli right coincided and 
possibly aided the growth of the Islamic movement in Palestine, this does not have 
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much traction. One can note here that Hamas gained more strength in the Palestinian 
occupied territories while the Labour Party governed Israel from 1992-1996.  It would 
be more accurate to observe the rise of political Islam across the entire region, 
whether in Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf, or Iran and Afghanistan. The Palestinian scene 
was not far removed from the developments in these areas. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the formation and emergence of Hamas historically and 
intellectually. Such a background is necessary to understand, first, the level of 
popularity, swift widespread, and organizational discipline that Hamas enjoyed in the 
Palestinian arena after a short period of its inception. Secondly, and most importantly, 
it is necessary to understand the formation of Hamas' ideological convictions. As 
previously stated, Hamas was not intended primarily as an ideological framework, but 
as a resistant movement based on the intellectual and ideological treatise of the MB. 
Without understanding the historical and intellectual background of the emergence of 
Hamas and its development, it would be difficult for us to understand the ideological 
convictions of Hamas vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue and its comprehension of the 
conflict on the "land of Palestine." Furthermore, this background is important in this 
context, because positioning Hamas in the MB's historical and ideological sphere will 
help us in understanding the progress in Hamas' thinking and its limitations, as will be 
evident in the coming chapters. 
The next chapter will discuss the position of the land of Palestine in the 
Islamic faith and jurisprudence. It will delineate its unique statues in Islam, the extent 
of this status, and where does it derive from. It will also discuss the MB's and Hamas' 
comprehension of the this status and how they interpret it ideologically, and how it 
effects their political discourse.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Palestine in Islam and Hamas' Thought 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed the status of Palestine through the perception of 
the MB and the historical stages that their relationship with it went through. Also, we 
discussed the intellectual debate that took place within the ranks of the MB after it 
clashed with the regime of the former Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. We 
examined the emergence, as a result of that clash, of the two dialectics (i.e." 
empowerment" and "liberation") in their thought and the impacts of that on the 
Palestinian branch of the MB. Also, we noted in that chapter the intellectual and the 
practical factors that led to the formation of Hamas and the mechanism for that. This 
chapter will discuss the special status of Palestine in Islam, where it drives from, and 
how the MB and Hamas comprehend it. Furthermore, this chapter will explain how 
this special status of Palestine impacted the MB's and Hamas' positions in relation to 
the conflict, as they see it. 
In order to understand the religious and ideological backdrop of Hamas’ 
politics, including its refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist, one must explore 
the material and spiritual value that Palestine holds in traditional Islamic thought, in 
the MB school in general, and in Hamas in particular. Hamas emphasizes that 
Palestine “is a religious problem, and should be dealt with on this basis.”253 The 
religious character has a number of dimensions. “Palestine is an Islamic land which 
has the first of the two Qiblahs (direction of Muslim prayers), the third of the holy 
sanctuaries, and the point of departure for Muhammad 's midnight journey (to the 
                                                 
253 Hamas' charter. Ibid., Article 15. This position is still a defining factor for Hamas. For example 
Hamas' prime minister in Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, said in a recent statement that "Palestine is a creed and 
religion, not dust."   
http://alwatan.kuwait.tt/articledetails.aspx?Id=171692 
heavens).”254 Moreover, “Palestine contains Islamic holy sites. There is al-Aqsa 
(Farthest) Mosque, which is bound to the great Mosque in Mecca in an inseparable 
bond as long as heaven and earth speak of Isra` (Muhammad’s midnight journey to 
Jerusalem from Mecca) and Mi'raj (Muhammed's ascension to the seven heavens from 
Jerusalem.)”255 Finally, the land of Palestine, in the view of Hamas, which is in 
accord with the MB ideology on the issue, “is an Islamic Waqf  (endowment) 
consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, 
should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up.”256  So, on the 
basis of these beliefs, Hamas’ firmly-rooted conviction is that: “Abusing any part of 
Palestine is abuse directed against part of the religion”257 itself. 
Before analysing the ideology of Hamas and its view of Palestine “the land 
and the symbol” it is appropriate for us to present a brief survey of the status of 
Palestine within Islam itself. Such a presentation will assist us in setting the backdrop 
for the ideological convictions of Hamas and allows for a comparative approach with 
respect to its views and the general Islamic understanding (as was presented in the 
Quran, the traditions of Prophet Muhammad, and other Islamic primary sources). 
Likewise, it will allow us to delineate the extent of the accuracy of some of the 
statements and stances that Hamas takes. For instance, the claim that the land of 
Palestine is an Islamic endowment can be better explored through traditional Islamic 
thought on the question, than in isolation. This conviction is of particular significance, 
as it translates into the prohibition against recognizing the right of Israel to exist, and 
consequently, the rejection of any possibility for the permanent existence of Israel on 
                                                 
254 Hamas' charter. Ibid., Article 14. 
255 Ibid., Article 15. 
256 Ibid., Article 11. Again, Ismail Haniyeh and other Hamas senior leaders continue to emphasis the 
same stand on this issue. See Haniyeh's statement: "Palestine is a land of Islamic waqef." 
 http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/312267 
257 Hamas' charter. Ibid., Article 13. Also, see Ismail Haniyeh's previous statements. 
any piece of Palestinian land. (We will be discussing these issues in more details in 
chapter 4). 
 Additionally, this approach will help clarify an important issue presented in 
this context: the centrality of the Palestine question over all other issues facing the 
Islamic nation in the contemporary period. On this, the movement of Hamas, the 
Society of the MB and contemporary Islamic thought as a whole are agreed.  
The discussion of Palestine is followed by two further sections. The first will 
discuss the status and the value of Palestine in Islam, specifically, in the first and 
second sources of legislation in Islam (i.e. Quran and the Prophetic traditions), and in 
Islamic jurisprudence, both classical and the contemporary. The second will try to 
delineate how the MB and Hamas comprehend this sacredness and the special status 
of Palestine, and how they formulate their comprehension of the issue ideologically 
based on the religious teachings and the jurisprudential discussions on the topic.  
The first section is organized under two broad headings, namely: The Status of 
Palestine Religiously and Spiritually in Islam and for Muslims. This section has six 
fields:  
1) The Land of the First Qiblah. 2) Jerusalem: the Cradle of the Second of the Two 
Mosques, the Third of the Three Sanctuaries. 3) The Land of the Night Journey and 
Ascension. 4) Palestine, Land of Prophecy and Blessings. 5) Palestine: The Land of 
the Gathering and the Spreading Out. 6) Palestine: The Land of Guarding the Frontier 
and Jihad. 
The second heading,  The Identity of the Islamic Nation: Inheritors of the 
Prophets and the Right to Palestine has four fields:1) The Issue of "Imama". 2) The 
"The Justly Balanced Nation". 3) “the Witnessing Nation”. 4) "The Best Nation".  
The second section of the chapter, which looks at the MB and Hamas 
understanding of Palestine has three main fields: 1) Palestine: The Land of Islamic 
Endowment. 2) Palestine: The Central Issue of the Muslim Ummah. 3) Jerusalem: The 
Capital of the Islamic Caliphate.  
 
Palestine in Islam 
 
Palestine, and especially Jerusalem occupies a lofty status in Islam and the Islamic 
consciousness. This status derives from the importance given to it by the two primary 
sources of legislation in Islam: the Quran and the Prophetic traditions. Indeed, one is 
hard-pressed to find a single Islamic academic reference that suggests any kind of 
doubt concerning the sacredness of Palestine and its importance in the Islamic 
treatise.  
The status of Palestine is not derived from faith or its spiritual dimensions 
alone. There are other dimensions. An extensive reading of the texts of the Quran and 
the Prophetic traditions shows that Palestine is bound with the identity formation of 
the Islamic Ummah (nation). The Quran emphasizes three characteristics that are 
specific to the Islamic nation, given to it on the basis of its adherence to the "true 
religion", as Muslims believe. They are characteristics described as “the justly 
balanced”, “witnessing” and “excellence”. These three characteristics are directly 
linked to the traditions about Palestine. 
The issues of Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular are to be 
examined in the context of the Quran and the Prophetic traditions, which define the 
Islamic nation and describe its place among other nations. The section that follows 
will explore this definition in greater detail. However, an important intervening issue 
deserves mention here. A lack of knowledge of Islamic theology makes any 
understanding of the sacredness of Palestine to Muslims difficult to appreciate, 
especially since Quranic and Prophetic references to the sacredness of the Al-Aqsa 
mosque occur without direct mention of Palestine. For example, the Quran indicates 
in the clearest text the degree of importance appointed to the Al-Aqsa mosque in 
Islam in the saying: “Glory to (Allah) Who did take His servant for a Journey by night 
from the Sacred Mosque to the Farthest Mosque, whose precincts We did bless.”258 
 Classical and contemporary Muslim scholars maintain that the blessing cited 
in the Quran is not reserved for the Al-Aqsa mosque alone. Rather, it is a central point 
from which this blessing extends to the entire land of Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria) 
that today includes: Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.259 Some scholars say that 
in addition to this region, the blessed Bilad al-sham also include parts of Iraq, Egypt 
and the northern Arabian Peninsula.260 Muslim scholars and Quranic interpreters rely 
on a number of verses and traditions in their explanations.261 
  Palestine, therefore, in the Islamic view, is the centre of sacredness, and this 
follows from the blessing: “whose precincts We did bless”. And the extent of this 
sacredness extends to all of the area situated between the Nile and the Euphrates, or, 
                                                 
258 The Holy Quran, English translation of the Meanings and Commentary, Surat Al-Israa, chapter 17, 
verse 1,  (Almadina Almunawara, Saudi Arabia: King Fahd Holy Qur-an Printing Complex. Revised & 
Edited by The Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance. No Edition number or year 
of Publishing.), p. 774. 
259 “The area referred to in the verse as the surroundings which have been blessed is, for the Muslims, 
Bilad al-Sham, a region which in its entirety has been continuously endowed with blessings from 
Allah.’ For more details: Ibrahim al-Ali, Alard Almuqadasa bain almadi wal hadir wal mustaqbal.  
[The sacred land between the past, present and the future], (London, England: The Muslim Palestine. 
Second Edition, 1998.), p. 17. 
260 Hatem Bazian, Jerusalem in Islamic Consciousness, A Textual Survey of Muslims Claims and Rights 
to the Sacred City, (No information’s are provided on the publishing and the publisher, 2006. U.S.A.), 
pp. 47. 
261 For more details: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Alquds Qadiyatu Kul Muslim. [Jerusalem is the issue of every 
Muslim], (Aljeeza, Egypt: The Arab Media Center. First Edition, 2002.), p. 12. Also, Abi Abdillah 
Alhakim Alnaisiburi, Almustadraku Ala Alsahihain. [The Redress on the Two Corrects] (Beirut, 
Lebanon: Dar Almaarifa, volume 2, No year of publishing.), p. 229. And: Muhammad Nassir Aldin 
Alalbani, Silsilat alhadith alsahiha. [The Series of the Correct Traditions]. (Riyad, Saudi Arabia: 
Maktabat Almaarif lilnashri wal tawzee’, volume 4, 1995.), p. 539.  
at least, all of the area of Greater Syria, as the Prophetic hadiths (traditions) 
emphasize and confirm. Ancient and contemporary Muslim scholars are in complete 
agreement about that; there has never been any dispute between them that all of the 
land of Greater Syria is blessed, and that Palestine is the centre of this blessing and 
sacredness.262 
 
The Status of Palestine Religiously and Spiritually in Islam and for Muslims 
 
To recognize the status of Palestine in Islam, religiously, spiritually, and historically 
we are required to refer back to the fundamental Islamic sources. These focus on the 
following issues: Palestine’s relationship with Jerusalem, the first Qiblah, the second 
of two mosques and the third of three sanctuaries, the land of the Night Journey and 
Ascension. Likewise, the sources identify Palestine as the land of Prophethood and 
blessing, the land of gathering for the Day of Reckoning, and, finally, is the land of 
the frontier and Jihad.   
 
1)  The Land of the First Qiblah 
 
The first reason that Muslims give for the sacredness of Palestine is the fact that 
Jerusalem is the first Qiblah in Islam. The Prophet and his early followers prayed in 
its direction before and after the migration from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD. Three 
years earlier in 619, the five daily prayers were made obligatory for Muslims during 
the Prophet’s Night Journey and Ascension. “They continued to pray in its direction 
                                                 
262 AbdulRahman Bin Muhammad Bin Alqasem, (Editor and Organizer) Majmoo’u fatawa Shiek al 
Islam Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah. [The collection of legal opinions of the prominent Muslim scholar 
Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah] (Almadina Almunawara, Saudi Arabia: King Fahd Holy Qur-an Printing 
Complex, volume 27, 1995.), pp. 43-44. Also, Ibrahim al-Ali, Alard Almuqadasa bain almadi wal 
hadir wal mustaqbal. Ibid., p. 26. 
while in Mecca and for sixteen months after their migration to Al-Madina (i.e. 
Medina) until the Quran commanded them to turn to the Ka’abah, or The Sacred 
Mosque.”263 
The Quran indicates that the decision to change the Qiblah was not without its 
detractors. Attacks on Islam and its Prophet were especially prominent among Jewish 
tribes of Medina who were also praying towards Jerusalem at the time.264  
Some Muslim scholars explain the change of the Qiblah from Jerusalem to Mecca as 
being further evidence that Islam is a continuation of the religion of Abraham, who 
took the Ka’abah in Mecca as his Qiblah. Likewise, the change of the Qiblah is 
evidence that “divine revelation was transferred from the sons of Ishaq (Isaac) bin 
Abraham to the sons of Isma’il ((Ishmael) bin Abraham”.265 In any case, there are 
other dimensions tied to this issue connected with the identity of the Islamic nation 
and its description, which we will discuss later on in this chapter.   
 
 
                                                 
263 The Quran states: “So from whencesoever thou startest forth, turn thy face in the direction of the 
Sacred Mosque; and wheresoever ye are, turn your face thither.” Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Alquds Qadiyatu 
Kul Muslim. Ibid., p. 8.  
264 The Quran transmits the event and its response to those who cast doubt and to those it described as 
fools in the following: “The Fools among the people will say: "What hath turned them from the Qibla 
to which they were used?" Say: To Allah belong East and West: He guideth whom He will to a Way 
that is straight. Thus have We made of you an Ummat justly balanced, that ye might be witnesses over 
the nations, and the Messenger a witness over yourselves; and we appointed the Qibla to which thou 
wast used, only to test those who followed the Messenger from those who would turn on their heels 
(from the Faith). Indeed it was (a change) momentous, except to those guided by Allah. And never 
would Allah make your faith of no effect. For Allah is to all people most surely full of Kindness, Most 
Merciful. We see the turning of thy face (for guidance) to the heavens: now shall We turn thee to a 
Qibla that shall please thee. Turn then thy face in the direction of the Sacred Mosque: wherever ye are, 
turn your faces in that direction. The people of the Book know well that that is the truth from their 
Lord, nor is Allah unmindful of what they do.” The Holy Quran. Ibid., Surat Al-Baqarah, chapter 2, 
verses 142-144., pp. 56-57.  
Also, see the commentary of Al Imam Alhafith Emad Aldin Abu Alfida Ismail Ibn Kathir, Tafseer Al 
Quran Al Athim. [The explanation of the Great Quran] (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Dar Taiba for 
Publications and Distribution, volume 1, 2nd Edition, 1999.), pp. 452-454.  
265 Muhammad Uthman Shbair. Baitul Maqdis wa ma Hawla.  [Jerusalem and its Surroundings], 
(Kuwait, Kuwait: Al falah Library. First Edition, 1978.), p. 62. 
2)  Jerusalem: the Cradle of the Second of the Two Mosques, the Third of the 
Three Sanctuaries 
 
The second reason for the sanctity of Palestine is that in Jerusalem is the site of the 
second of the first two mosques built in Islam and the third of the Sacred Sanctuaries. 
It has long been considered the third of the Great Cities in Islam after Mecca and 
Medina.266 Also according to Muslim belief, its importance comes as a result of its 
being the resting place of the third of the Sanctuaries that God honored, with the 
Blessed Farthest Mosque that God blessed all around it. This is confirmed by the 
Prophetic tradition which states, “Journey is not made except to three mosques: the 
Sacred Mosque, the Farthest Mosque and this Mosque of mine.”267 
This tradition not only emphasizes the virtue of these three mosques in Islam 
over all others, but also limits the sanctity in Islam to these three places alone. Indeed, 
“the tradition came in the form of limitation, that these sites are not comparable to 
other mosques.”268 On this, the eminent medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah confirms 
that it is not permissible to change any one of these three mosques from its 
location.269 The Prophetic tradition also raised the virtue of the Farthest Mosque by 
                                                 
266 In the tradition narrated by Abu Dharr, and transmitted by al-Bukhari in his Saheeh in the chapter 
“Traditions of the Prophets”: that Abu Dharr, may Allah be pleased with him, asked the Messenger of 
Allah, peace be upon him, which mosque was situated on earth first. He said: “The Sacred Mosque.” 
He said: “I said: ‘then which?’ He said: “The Farthest Mosque.” I said: “How much time was between 
them?” He said: “Forty years, then wherever prayer overtakes you after its period, the virtue is in that 
place.” Sahih al-Bukhari. [The Corrections of al-Bukhari] (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Almaa’rifa, No year 
of Publishing, volume 6.), p. 407. 
267 Sahih Muslim. [The Corrections of Muslim], (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Alqalam, volume 9 and 10. First 
Edition, 1987.), p. 177. 
268  Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Alquds Qadiyatu Kul Muslim. Ibid., p.11.  
269 AbdulRahman Bin Muhammad Bin Alqasem, Majmoo’u fatawa Shiek al Islam Ahmad Ibn 
Taymiyyah. Ibid., p. 353. 
assigning prayers there a reward equivalent to five hundred prayers in any mosque 
other than the Sacred and Prophet’s Mosques in Mecca and Al-Madina.270  
 
3)  The Land of the Night Journey and Ascension 
 
The importance of Jerusalem in Islam increased tremendously because of its 
association with one of the miracles of the Prophet Muhammad, the event of Al-Isra 
and Al-Miraj, or the Night Journey and the Ascension. In the journey, the Prophet 
Muhammad traveled from Mecca to Jerusalem, specifically, the Farthest Mosque in a 
single night. The Ascension, the journey from the earth to the heavens, occurred in 
Jerusalem. Upon reaching the highest heaven, according to Muslim belief, God 
prepared for Prophet Muhammad an achievement never before reached by any 
human. This journey from Mecca to Jerusalem to the heavens occurred in one night 
during the eleventh or twelfth year of the Prophet’s mission.271 
These events carry the most striking evidence of the sanctity of Palestine for 
Muslims. The Quran references them directly. It was during his ascension to heaven 
from the Dome of the Rock that the Prophet received the obligation of prayer from 
God, which would initially be directed toward Jerusalem. 
                                                 
270 The tradition was narrated by Abu Ad-Dardaa’ from the Messenger, there came therein: “Prayer in 
the Sacred Mosque is favoured over other places by one hundred thousand prayers, and in my Mosque 
by one thousand prayers, and in the Mosque of Jerusalem by five hundred prayers.” Narrated in Sahih 
Al-Tabarani. This tradition was mentioned in Shbair. Baitul Maqdis wa ma Hawla. Ibid., p. 80. 
The renowned cotemporary scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi is of the opinion that: “When Islam made the 
Farthest Mosque the third of the Great Mosques in Islam, and therein added Jerusalem to the two great 
Islamic cities: Mecca and Al-Madina, it intended to affirm an important principle; that it came to build, 
not to destroy, to complete, not to tear down. Jerusalem was the land of Prophethood and the Muslims 
are the most worthy people concerning the Prophets of Allah and His Messengers as the Messenger, 
peace be upon him, said: “We are more deserving of Moses than you.” Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Alquds 
Qadiyatu Kul Muslim. Ibid., p.12.  
271 Ibrahim al-Ali, Alard Almuqadasa bain almadi wal hadir wal mustaqbal. Ibid., pp. 83-91. Also, see: 
Ali Muhammad Al Salabi. Asahul kalam fi sirati Khair al anam: Al seerah al nabawiya. [The Most 
Accurate Accounts of the Story of the Best of People: The Story of the Prophet] Volume 1, (Shariqa, 
UAE. Maktabat Al Sahaba. First Edition, 2001.), pp. 378-384.  
Perhaps the strongest religious link of Muslims to the land of Palestine is the 
view that Muslims are the inheritors of the previous messages. As the final Prophet, 
Muhammad and the Islamic nation took on the leadership role of previous Abrahamic 
faiths and with that came the rights to Al-Aqsa mosque, Jerusalem, and Palestine as a 
whole. 
 The Prophetic biography states that when he was taken by night from the 
Sacred Mosque to the Farthest Mosque on a creature known as the Buraaq, and in the 
company of the angle Gabriel, he led the other Prophets in prayer. 271 F272 Muslim scholars 
contend that this event was a symbolic divine announcement that the Farthest Mosque 
had become a mosque for the Muslims, connected to the Sacred Mosque in a 
permanent sacred bond.272 F273 “The Sanctified House in Jerusalem is the place of origin 
of the Prophets from Abraham al-Khalil, peace be upon him, and for this reason they 
were all gathered together for him there. He led them in prayer in their own home. 
This indicated that he is the Great Imam and the leader put ahead of them.”273F274  
The symbolic aspects of the event of the Night Journey and Ascension are 
significant in their impact on Islamic opposition to Jewish claims to Palestine. The 
contemporary MB and Muslim scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi holds the view that the 
culmination of the night journey in the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem was a: 
 
Divine plan and for a Godly wisdom, that the final Messenger would meet 
with the messengers and pray with them as imam (leader). And in this was 
declared the transfer of religious leadership for the world from the 
children of Israel to a new nation, a new messenger and a new book: an 
                                                 
272 Ibn Qayim Aljawziya, Zad Almi’ad fi hadiyi khair al ibad. [Translation to English is not Possible] 
(Beirut, Lebanon: Alrisala Foundation, volume 3, 10th Edition, 1985.), p. 34. 
273 Muhammad Uthman Shbair. Baitul Maqdis wa ma Hawla. Ibid., p. 63.  
274 Ibn Kathir, Tafseer Al Quran Al Athim. Ibid. Volume 5. p. 5.  
international nation, an international messenger and an international 
book.275  
 
Moreover, because the Night Journey occurred between the Sacred Mosque in 
Mecca and Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, the symbiotic nature of the two holy sites 
in which each became identified with the sacredness of the other, reinforced the 
symbol of Jerusalem’s holiness. A central tenet of most believing Muslims is that any 
violation of the Farthest Mosque is tantamount to a violation of the Sacred Mosque 
itself. Otherwise why “did not the Messenger ascend directly from the Sacred Mosque 
to the heavens? This indicates to us that going through this sacred station, passing by 
Al-Aqsa mosque in the land God blessed for the whole world, was intentional.”276 
We will return to this central event, as it is commonly used in arguments put 
forward by Hamas and the MB intellectually as evidence of the identity of the Islamic 
nation, and its place among the nations and the position of its message among the 
other messages. It explains to a large extent why the MB and Hamas refuse to 
recognize Israel's right to exist on the land of Palestine. 
 
4) Palestine, Land of Prophecy and Blessings 
 
The importance of Palestine to Muslims also extends to the universal aspects of Islam, 
for it is the site where previous messages came down to many of the messengers of 
God and even contains the resting places for many Prophets. Therein the scriptures 
                                                 
275  Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Alquds Qadiyatu Kul Muslim. Ibid., p.9. He also quotes the verse: “We sent 
thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures.” And “Blessed is He Who sent down the Criterion to His 
servant, that it may be an admonition to all creatures.” This Islamic understanding will be discussed in 
this chapter.  
276 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Al Isra wal Miraaj: Qiyada Jadida Lilalam. [The night journey and the 
ascending to the seven heavens a new leadership for the world] 
(http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/history/1422/10/article32.shtml) 
were revealed to many Prophets, including David, Solomon, Zakariyah (Zechariah), 
John, and Jesus. They lived and thrived there. Other Prophets lived there as well; 
among them: Ibrahim (Abraham), Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph.277  
Because Muslims believe that all Prophets and messengers before the Prophet 
Muhammad, were sent with one message, it follows that this understanding of the 
Islamic faith enhances, once again, the inheritance of this message to Muslims as a 
nation. Within this framework, Palestine becomes a part of what the Islamic nation 
inherited on the basis that it is the nation that follows the “true religion” brought by 
the Prophets and messengers, including the Prophets of the children of Israel. The 
Quran states that the Prophets and messengers came with a particular message for a 
particular time and place, while the Prophet Muhammad’s mission was universal and 
meant for eternity.278 The primacy of Palestine as a land of Islam is built to a degree 
on this divine claim. 
 
5)  Palestine: The Land of the Gathering and the Spreading Out 
 
Palestine is also viewed by Muslims as having a central role in the ultimate reckoning 
of humankind. A Prophetic tradition says: “Al-Sham (Greater Syria) is the land of the 
Gathering and the Spreading Out.”279 A more specific tradition singles out the holy 
                                                 
277 Abu Alfaraj AbdulRahman Ali Bin AlJawzi, Fada’il Al Quds, [The virtues of Jerusalem]. (Beirut, 
Lebanon:  Dar Almaa’rifa, 1980.), p. 97 
278 This was reflected in the verses: “They say: "Become Jews or Christians if ye would be guided (to 
salvation)." Say thou: "Nay! (I would rather) the Religion of Ibrahim, the True, and he joined not Gods 
with Allah." Say ye: "We believe in Allah, and the revelation given to us, and to Ibrahim, Isma'il, 
Ishaq, Ya'qub, and the Tribes, and that given to Musa and 'Isa, and that given to (all) Prophets from 
their Lord: we make no difference between one and another of them: and we bow to Allah (in Islam)." 
So if they believe as ye believe, they are indeed on the right path; but if they turn back, it is they who 
are in schism; but Allah will suffice thee as against them, and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Knowing.” 
The Holy Quran. Ibid., Surat Al-Baqarah, chapter 2, verses 135-137, p. 54. 
279 Musnad Al Imam Ahmad Bin Hanbal. [Translation to English is not Possible] 
 Edited and Organized by Ahmad AbdulRahman al-Banna. (Cairo, Egypt: Daru Alshihab, volume 23 – 
24. No printing year.), p. 289. 
city of Jerusalem in particular: “O Prophet of Allah, give us verdict concerning 
Jerusalem,” he said. “The land of the Gathering and Spreading Out.”280 
According to Muslim scholars, when the resurrection takes place, people will 
be driven to Jerusalem for their reckoning and settling of affairs. From there, they will 
be taken to either Paradise or to Hell.281 Based on that claim, one scholar sums this 
idea up by writing, “when Allah chose Greater Syria, Palestine and Jerusalem to be 
the land to which the people will be gathered, He knew it was one of the best lands, 
for it enjoys a lofty status of nobility and virtue and for that reason it deserves to be 
the land of the Gathering and Spreading Out.”282  
 
6) Palestine: The Land of Guarding the Frontier and Jihad 
 
The final reason for the importance of Palestine in Islam to be discussed in this 
chapter is its role as a frontier to be guarded by Muslims as an Islamic land. Many 
Muslim scholars maintain that Greater Syria, generally, and Palestine in particular are 
on the frontlines of the jihad, or struggle against Islam’s enemies, to be guarded until 
the Day of Resurrection. They use as evidence of this a number of Quranic verses and 
Prophetic Traditions. The Quranic verses on the Night Journey make reference to the 
continuous state of jihad in Palestine and the surrounding area. The Quran states: 
 
And We gave (clear) warning to the Children of Israel in the Book, that 
twice would they do mischief on the earth and be elated with mighty 
                                                 
280 Sunanu Al Hafith Abi Abdillah Muhammad Bin Yazid Alkaswini Ibn Maja. [Translation to English is 
not Possible], (Riyad, Saudi Arabia: The Arab Saudi printing company, volume 1. Second Edition, 
1984.), p. 257. 
281Abi Abdillah Muhammad bin Shohab ildeen Ahmad bin Ali Alminhaji Alsiyooti, Ithaf Alakhsa 
bifida’il al Aqsa.. [Translation to English is not Possible], (Cairo, Egypt: The general assembly for book 
in Cairo. First Edition, 1977.), p. 107.  
282  Ibrahim al-Ali, Alard Almuqadasa bain almadi wal hadir wal mustaqbal. Ibid., pp.39-40.  
arrogance (and twice would they be punished)! When the first of the 
warnings came to pass, We sent against you Our servants given to terrible 
warfare. They entered the very inmost parts of your homes; and it was a 
warning (completely) fulfilled. Then did We grant you the Return as 
against them: We gave you increase in resources and sons, and made you 
the more numerous in man-power. If ye did well, ye did well for 
yourselves; if ye did evil, (ye did it) against yourselves. So when the 
second of the warnings came to pass, (We permitted your enemies) to 
disfigure your faces, and to enter the Mosque as they had entered it 
before, and to visit with destruction all that fell into their power.283 
 
The verses here speak of two struggles in the land of Palestine. Though 
Quranic scholars differ about the facts of these two struggles and the time of their 
occurrence, they agree that the return of the children of Israel to their corruption 
requires another battle in which they are defeated.284 This is an issue that we will 
discuss in more detail in the next chapter. As for the Prophetic traditions, several are 
used in support of the placement of Palestine at the frontier of the Islamic nation. The 
most prominent reports include the saying: “The people of Greater Syria, their wives, 
children, descendants, male and female slaves, until the end of the (Arab) Peninsula 
are guarding the frontier in the cause of Allah. Whoever occupies one of its cities, he 
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is guarding the frontier and whoever occupies one of its ports, he is in jihad.”285 A 
more specific one that is frequently cited states: “There will not cease to be a group 
from my nation on the truth, victorious, overpowering their enemy, they will not be 
harmed by whoever confronts them except what afflicts them of persecution, until the 
command of Allah comes while they are on that.” They said: “And where are they O 
Messenger of Allah?”  He said: “in Jerusalem and around Jerusalem.”286 
From these traditions some of the scholars deduced that Greater Syria, aside 
from being blessed and Islamic according to faith, is also the guardian land of the 
frontier since it was first conquered at the hands of the companions of Prophet 
Muhammad. In addition, Palestine and the area around it is the land of living 
continuous jihad throughout the ages because “it is the field of struggle, strife and war 
with them (the enemies of Muslims) as well as the land of decision, settling the battle 
between truth and falsehood and between the Muslims and their enemies.”287 On this 
basis many of the scholars believe that God favoured it over “the other pieces of land 
and countries.”288 
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In fact, the reason for making this point prominent in this context is that it was a major justification in 
the ideology of Hamas in its early stages for refusing a peaceful solution and negotiations with Israel. 
Hamas saw itself as part of the continuation of guarding the frontier and jihad in the “blessed piece of 
land” in Greater Syria, and specifically, Palestine, realizing what it sees as the promise of God and the 
promise of His Messenger. “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through jihad. 
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Palestinian people know better than to consent to having their future, rights and fate toyed with. As in 
said in the honorable Hadith: 
"The people of Greater Syria are Allah's lash in His land. He wreaks His vengeance through them 
against whomsoever He wishes among His slaves. It is unthinkable that those who are double-faced 
among them should prosper over the faithful. They will certainly die out of grief and desperation."” 
Hamas' charter. Ibid., Article 13. This, in the understanding of the Islamists, is the jihad methodology 
that Islam encourages and the Messenger Muhammad depended on at “the beginning of Islam. So, 
there were campaigns of discipline led by the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, to the 
settlements of the Jews in the Arabian Peninsula and their gatherings in Bani Qainuqaa’ (the tribe of 
Qainuqaa’), Bani An-Nadeer (the tribe of An-Nadeer), Khaibar, and Bani Quraithah (the tribe of 
 The Identity of the Islamic Nation: Inheritors of the Prophets and the Right to 
Palestine 
 
It has previously been pointed out that the importance of Palestine in Islam, goes 
beyond the dimensions of worship, faith and spiritualism. It is also connected to the 
identity of the Islamic nation and its conviction that its religion is the true and final 
religion, and that Muhammad is the final Prophet and the foremost of the messengers 
without exception. As such, Muhammad and his nation are the inheritors and the 
carriers of the final message brought by the Prophets and messengers after their 
people, including the Jews and Christians, strayed from their guidance and corrupted 
their revealed texts. 
This relationship represents the foremost Islamic claim to Palestine. It should 
be noted here that this religious justification of Muslim ownership of Palestine does 
not negate the existence of other ethnic and historical explanations for the right of the 
Arabs and Palestinians to Palestine. However, this historical and demographic 
reasoning does not represent in itself a Muslim claim to Palestine. The issue is far 
more complex. 
As the Torah indicates and the Quran also states, the children of Israel were 
promised the land of Palestine by God and were victorious, after the death of Moses 
in the battle with the original inhabitants.289 The Quran tells of the Prophet Moses 
addressing his people, the children of Israel who fled from Egypt after the drowning 
of Pharaoh: “O my people! enter the holy land which Allah hath assigned unto you, 
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and turn not back ignominiously, for then will ye be overthrown, to your own 
ruin.”290 But, according to the Islamic scripture, the children of Israel refused the call 
of their Prophet Moses out of fear of the power of the inhabitants of Palestine at that 
time. They were punished by God and forced to wander the desert of Sinai for forty 
years.291 
A close examination of this historical period from an Islamic perspective 
shows that the children of Israel were the believers, supported by God, and that the 
Canaanites, Palestine’s original inhabitants, were on the side of “disbelief.”292  
This framework begs the question: how do Muslims interact with such clear 
Quranic directives regarding “the land that God prescribed for the children of Israel,” 
and that the children of Israel were the favoured believing nation: “O Children of 
Israel! Call to mind the (special) favour which I bestowed upon you, and that I 
preferred you to all others (for My Message)”?293 The Night Journey and Ascension 
are relevant here, and will be discussed later in this section, following a more detailed 
explanation of the significance. 
The Quran is also direct in its affirmation that the Jews and Christians 
corrupted the messages brought by their Prophets.294 On this basis, Muslim scholars 
conclude that Jews and Christians who rejected the message of Muhammad are not 
the true followers of Abraham, Moses and Jesus, but rather that Muslims are the true 
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followers of those messengers. Therefore, Muslims become the true inheritors for 
these Prophets, and in this particular context, the inheritors of that group of the 
“children of Israel” who entered Palestine. But there remains the question: how did 
the Muslims arrive at this understanding? 
The three divinely revealed religious traditions are united in their belief that 
Abraham is the father of the Prophets. However, they disagree about the nature of his 
message. What concerns this discussion is the Islamic interpretation of Abraham and 
his progeny. Quranic verses are useful to this discussion, as they form the basis of the 
Muslim belief that the message of the original Prophets was passed down through 
Muhammad, making his followers the inheritors of the original message. These verses 
deal with the nature of Abraham’s faith: “Ibrahim (Abraham) was not a Jew nor yet a 
Christian; but he was true in Faith, and bowed his will to Allah's (which is Islam), and 
he joined not gods with Allah.”295 Other verses relate to the universality of Islam’s 
message, which predates the Prophet’s arrival, once again giving Muslims claims to 
the body of religious traditions. “The religion before Allah is Islam (submission to 
His Will): nor did the people of the Book dissent there from except through envy of 
each other.”296  
From the preceding verses it becomes clear to us the extent to which the Quran 
repeatedly states the universality of Islam, subsuming other Abrahamic faiths in its 
message (i.e. reaffirming the notion that Islam is the original message of all of the 
Prophets.) In fact, the Quran engages the Jews and the Christians on the faith of 
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Abraham, declaring him neither a Jew nor a Christian, in addition to other Biblical 
Prophets, such as Noah, Jacob, Joseph, David, Solomon, Moses and Jesus. In effect, it 
states that all of them were in the fold of Islam. This specifically relates to the 
understanding of inheritance by Muslims, in which: 
 
The thing considered in the realm of religion and faith is the religious 
relationship, not the relative relationship and faith-based inheritance and 
clientage, not blood-related inheritance. For that reason, blood 
relationship does not require that the people of this relation inherit faith. 
So, whoever inherits faith must be on the religion of the Prophet who is 
inherited. Therefore, the Muslims are the true inheritors of all the Prophets 
including the Prophets of the children of Israel because they are on the 
religion of all of these Prophets … and that is the religion of Islam.297  
 
This statement highlights the understanding of inheritance with the Muslims as 
something passed on spiritually, not physically. The Quran confirms this with its 
statement: “Without doubt, among men, the nearest of kin to Ibrahim, are those who 
follow him, as are also this Prophet and those who believe".298 The intent of the words 
“this Prophet” is Muhammad, and “those who believe” are the Muslims. The Prophet 
Muhammad confirms that interpretation in the previously cited Quranic verses 
addressing the Jews of Medina when he saw them fasting the Day of ‘Aashouraa.’ 
That holiday was celebrated as the day God rescued Moses and the Israelites from 
Pharaoh, so Moses practised fasting on that day. The Prophet is reported to have said 
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to them: “We have more of a right to Moses than you.” The narrator of this tradition, 
Ibn ‘Abbas confirms: “The Messenger of Allah fasted it and he ordered its fasting.”299 
From the interpretations of these Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions 
Muslims derive their right in Palestine and the inheritance of its Prophets, including 
those of the children of Israel who entered into Palestine.300 For that reason we find 
among Muslim scholars a contention that the Islamic history of Palestine does not 
begin with Omar Bin al-Khattaab’s entry in 636 AD, but instead with God’s creation 
of the universe, since the first man, Adam, and all other Prophets were within the fold 
of Islam. Therefore, the entire earth was the land of Islam. All of humanity was one 
nation worshipping God, only to then go astray, creating the need for God to send 
messengers beginning with Noah. Abraham was one of his descendants sent to lead 
Palestine and its people on the right path. “Since that remote date, Palestine became 
the property of Islam, the right of Islam, entrusted to the Islamic nation. The one 
Islamic nation in which all Prophethood is gathered for all time until the Hour 
comes."301 
The rights of the believing servants are affirmed in Quranic verse: 
 
Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous 
deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them in the land, inheritance (of 
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power), as He granted it to those before them; that He will establish in 
authority their religion, the one which He has chosen for them; and that 
He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of 
security and peace: `They will worship Me (alone) and not associate aught 
with Me.' If any do reject Faith after this, they are rebellious and 
wicked.302  
 
It further states: “Before this We wrote in the Psalms, after the Message (given 
to Musa): ‘My servants, the righteous, shall inherit the earth’.”303 
  If we apply this Quranic decree on the rightful claim of a generation of the 
Israelites to Palestine, it would be on the basis of their adherence to the "true religion" 
at that time. The Quran Says: “O Children of Israel! Call to mind the (special) favour 
which I bestowed upon you, and that I preferred you to all others (for My 
Message).”304 
It also states: “We did aforetime grant to the Children of Israel the Book, the 
Power of Command, and Prophethood; We gave them, for Sustenance, things good 
and pure; and We favoured them above the nations.”305 But again, because the 
children of Israel (like the Christians), strayed from the "true religion" and rejected 
what their Prophets brought forth, they were no longer considered the offspring of that 
generation of Israelites whom God favoured over the world, according to the Quranic 
expression. The Quran says: “The Jews call 'Uzair a son of Allah, and the Christians 
call Al-Masih the son of Allah. That is a saying from their mouth; (in this) they but 
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imitate what the Unbelievers of old used to say. Allah's curse be on them: how they 
are deluded away from the Truth!”306  
The Quran goes even further in its affirmation of Muhammad’s mission as a 
chance for them to return to the essence of the messages brought by their Prophets 
and rejoining the community of the faithful after a long period of corruption. The 
Quran says: 
 
O People of the Book! there hath come to you Our Messenger, revealing 
to you much that ye used to hide in the Book, and passing over much (that 
is now unnecessary): There hath come to you from Allah a (new) light and 
a perspicuous Book. Wherewith Allah guideth all who seek His good 
pleasure to ways of peace and safety, and leadeth them out of darkness, by 
His Will, unto the light, guideth them to a Path that is Straight.307  
 
The preceding section clarified the concept of inheritance in Islam and the 
relationship of Muslims to the prior messages, Prophets and nations. In addition, it 
explored how this concept was extended to Muslim inheritance of Palestine and as 
such, the rejection of Jewish claims to the land. This methodology provides here 
another line of argument. The supplication of Abraham in the Quran describes his 
request for God to allow his nation to inherit the Imama (leadership). But according to 
the Quran, God excludes the unjust among them: “And remember that Ibrahim was 
tried by his Lord with certain commands, which he fulfilled. He said: ‘I will make 
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thee an Imam to the Nations.’ He pleaded: ‘And also (Imams) from my offspring!’ He 
answered: ‘But My Promise is not within the reach of evil-doers.’”308  
The question begs itself: who is meant by the unjust among the offspring of 
Abraham? In his capacity as an Islamic Scholar, Sayyid Qutb, writes on this verse in 
his renowned Quranic exegesis "In the Shade of the Quran":  
 
The response came to him (Abraham) from his Lord who examined him 
and chose him, establishing the great principle that we saw previously… 
that the Imama is, for he who deserves it by actions and beliefs, 
uprightness and faith, and it is not the inheritance of lineages. Nearness is 
not the close ties of flesh and blood, rather it is the close ties of religion 
and conviction, and the claims of blood, race, and nationality are nothing 
but the claims of the Days of Ignorance which is fundamentally opposed 
to true faith. The Imama that is prohibited to the unjust comprises all 
definitions of leadership: the Imama of the message, the Imama of the 
Caliphate, the Imama of prayer. Therefore, justice, with all of its 
meanings, is the basis for deserving this Imama in any of its forms. 
Whoever acted unjustly in any shade of injustice, stripped himself of any 
right of Imama in all of its meanings. This is what was said to Abraham, 
peace be upon him. This covenant is unambiguous. It is decisive in 
removing the Israelites from the Imama because they were unjust, 
disobedient and rebelled against the order of Allah. They were corrupted 
from the faith of the forefather Abraham.309  
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This interpretation is in accordance with the Quranic verse: “Both the Jews 
and the Christians say: ‘We are sons of Allah, and His beloved.’ Say: ‘Why then doth 
He punish you for your sins?’ Nay, ye are but men, of the men He hath created: He 
forgiveth whom He pleaseth, and He punisheth whom He pleaseth.”310 But, where is 
the event of the Night Journey and Ascension classified with all of this and what is its 
connection? 
 
1) The Issue of "Imama" 
 
The Night Journey and Ascension of the Prophet Muhammad, which occurred before 
his migration to Medina, was described previously. Likewise, it was previously 
indicated that Muslims have cited this event to attest to their right to Palestine and 
how this journey firmly rooted their conviction that the Prophet Muhammad was the 
inheritor of previously revealed divine messages. What concerns us here is the 
Prophet Muhammad’s leading all other Prophets in prayer at the Al-Aqsa mosque. In 
addition, we will discuss a related aspect that concerns the identity and status of the 
Islamic nation and its relationship to the Al-Aqsa mosque, Jerusalem and Palestine.  
There are many narrated traditions on the Imama of the Prophet Muhammad 
of the previous Prophets in prayer. We will concentrate on two of them. A narration 
of Ibn ‘Abbas states: “The night the Prophet, peace be upon him, went on his Journey 
and entered Paradise… when he entered the Al-Aqsa mosque he stood to pray. He 
turned and turned again, and he saw all of the Prophets praying with him.”311 The 
narration by At-Tabari transmits from Anas Ibn Malik, states: “He traveled until he 
(the angel Gabriel) brought him to Al-Aqsa mosque. He prayed therein as imam with 
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the Prophets and messengers.” Some scholars take both narrations together to 
strengthen the contention that “he prayed with the Prophets in the Al-Aqsa mosque. 
Whether he prayed with them before his ascension or after it, the important thing is 
that the prayer in the Al-Aqsa mosque is affirmed by the majority of the 
companions.”312 But how was the issue of the Imama applied and understood in 
Islam? 
Here we find the Muslim scholars are in virtual agreement that the Imama of 
the Prophet Muhammad of the other Prophets was symbolic of his status as the “Great 
Imam and Leader of Precedence.”313 In their view, it is evidence of the virtue of the 
Prophet Muhammad over the other Prophets. It is evidence that the divine messages 
all maintain the same objectives and principles. It further attests that the message of 
Islam abrogates all the previously legislated religions and that the call of Islam is 
universal, sent down to guide all of humanity. In addition, it indicates that the light of 
Islam must shine from the Al-Aqsa mosque across the world.314  
This points to another important element in support of the concept of the 
inheritance of the Islamic nation. The Imama of the Prophet Muhammad of the other 
Prophets is viewed as a realization of a previous covenant they made with God. The 
Quran clarifies this covenant with its statement  
 
Behold! Allah took the Covenant of the Prophets, saying: "I give you a Book 
and Wisdom; then comes to you a Messenger, confirming what is with you; do 
you believe him and render him help." Allah said: ‘Do ye agree, and take this 
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my Covenant as binding on you?’ They said: ‘We agree.’ He said: ‘Then bear 
witness, and I am with you among the witnesses.’315  
 
This covenant is understood in the Muslim consciousness to mean according 
to Qutb, “The People of the Book were required to believe in the final messenger and 
to help him. But, they did not fulfill the covenant Allah made with them and with their 
early messengers.”316 We find support for this meaning in verses stating that Islam is 
the essence of all previous messages and that it is the religion that all of the previous 
Prophets preached. It forms the covenant of God with His Prophets. On this basis, it is 
the only religion that God will accept from His votaries. 
 After its clarification of the covenant between God and His prophets the 
Quran continues: 
 
If any turn back after this, they are perverted transgressors. Do they seek 
for other than the religion of Allah? While all creatures in the heavens and 
on earth have, willing or unwilling, bowed to His Will (accepted Islam), 
and to Him shall they all be brought back. Say: ‘We believe in Allah, and 
in what has been revealed to us and what was revealed to Ibrahim, Isma'il 
(Ishmael), Ishaq (Isaac), Ya'qub (Jacob), and the Tribes, and in (the 
Books) given to Musa (Moses), 'Isa (Jesus), and the Prophets, from their 
Lord: we make no distinction between one and another among them, and 
to Allah do we bow our will (in Islam).’ If anyone desires a religion other 
than Islam (submission to Allah), never will it be accepted of him; and in 
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the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual 
good).317 
 
Returning to the covenant once again, Muslims contend that it was realized by 
way of the Imama of the Prophet of the other Prophets in the Al-Aqsa mosque by way 
of the Night Journey and Ascension. It confirms the “extension of the right of Islam in 
Palestine and links to the larger land of Islam, including Mecca, in a bond first 
established by the migration of Abraham, peace be upon him.”318 This is connected to 
the question of the Imama and its application on the question of Islam’s inheritance of 
what preceded it. The emerging question is about its relevance to the question of the 
identity of the Islamic nation and its definition of itself and its status among the other 
nations? 
A close and meticulous examination of the Quranic texts finds that Islam gives 
its followers three characteristics that distinguish them from followers of other faiths. 
These characteristics are guaranteed to any Muslim, without regard to race, ethnicity, 
or language, so long as they believe in Islam, and adhere to its teachings.319 The three 
characteristics are: “the justly balanced Ummah,” “the witnessing nation,” and “the 
best nation.” But how are these titles connected to the Muslim claim to Palestine? 
We find that the first and second characteristics are mentioned in the context 
of the discussion of the Farthest Mosque, while the third characteristic is mentioned in 
the context of the “struggle” between the Islamic nation and the children of Israel, as 
many Muslim scholars see it. Of the first two characteristics, The Quran says:  
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 The Fools among the people will say: "What hath turned them from the 
Qiblah to which they were used?" Say: To Allah belong East and West: 
He guideth whom He will to a Way that is straight. Thus have We made 
of you an Ummat justly balanced, that ye might be witnesses over the 
nations, and the Messenger a witness over yourselves; and we appointed 
the Qiblah to which thou wast used, only to test those who followed the 
Messenger from those who would turn on their heels (from the Faith). 
Indeed it was (a change) momentous, except to those guided by Allah. 
And never would Allah make your faith of no effect. For Allah is to all 
people most surely full of Kindness, Most Merciful. We see the turning of 
thy face (for guidance) to the heavens: now shall We turn thee to a Qiblah 
that shall please thee. Turn then thy face in the direction of the Sacred 
Mosque: wherever ye are, turn your faces in that direction. The people of 
the Book know well that that is the truth from their Lord, nor is Allah 
unmindful of what they do.320 
 
What concerns us here is the understanding of the two characteristics of the 
“Justly Balanced” and “Witnessing” and their connection with the first Qiblah, 
Jerusalem and Palestine as a whole to understand this bond. It is appropriate to define 
these two characteristics in the present context. 
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2) "The Justly Balanced Nation"  
 
The characteristic of the justly balanced Ummah means here, according to Muslim 
scholars, the best and most excellent of nations.321 Another meaning can be deduced 
from the context of the previous verses. It is connected, once again, to the issue of the 
inheritance of Islam and the Muslims of previous nations and religions. The context is 
set by the reality of the Abrahamic message and those who are the most deserving to 
claim relationship to him. It then extends to the fact that Abraham and his son Isma’il 
raised the foundations of the Ka’abah in Mecca. Their religion was Islam and they 
were the ones who asked God to send Muhammad, as a messenger and Prophet. The 
text proceeds to confirm that the religion of Abraham was Islam. Moreover, the Quran 
is quite clear in stating that the sons of Abraham were Muslims as well. In addition, it 
indicates that the children of Jacob announced their holding fast to the religion of 
Islam and belief in it. And within this very same context the Quran emphasizes, what 
was mentioned before, that Abraham was neither a Christian nor a Jew. Islam firmly 
roots Muslims as the true followers of the Prophets and messengers and have the most 
right to them of all people.322 
 
From the context of these verses, the justly balanced Ummah here means 
that the Islamic nation is the nation that follows “the true religion” 
brought by all previous messengers, without regard to ethnicities, 
languages or peoples to whom they were sent. Therefore, they are the 
most deserving people to inherit them, as they do not distinguish between 
one and another in their faith. In this context, the discussion concerning 
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the change of the first Qiblah, Jerusalem, to Mecca serves as additional 
proof that the leadership transferred to this religion and its nation. It is 
consistent with the tradition of those Prophets that came before them. 
Redirecting them to pray toward the Ka’abah at a later stage is a return to 
the Qiblah of the father of all the Prophets, Abraham.323  
 
Based on this understanding, if the first Qiblah (Jerusalem) disappeared from 
the belief of the Muslims, this would automatically mean a corresponding loss of the 
characteristic of the justly balanced Ummah that is strongly bound to it on the basis of 
the understanding of the Islamic inheritance of what came before. 
 
3) “The Witnessing Nation” 
 
The second characteristic, “the witnessing nation,” also relates to the event of the 
Night Journey and Ascension. By conducting the prayer as an imam of all previous 
Prophets and messengers at the Furthest Mosque in Jerusalem, the Prophet 
Muhammad became, according to Muslim belief, a witness over all the Prophets and 
messengers before him and over all mankind, while his nation became a witness over 
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other nations. By praying behind Prophet Muhammad, the other Prophets fulfilled 
their covenant with God. According to this theory, it is the Muslim nation that carries 
the true message and the essence of the pure belief that the Prophets and messengers 
brought them.324 
  
4) "The Best Nation" 
 
As for the third characteristic, it occurs in the chapter of the Quran titled “The Family 
of ‘Imran.” These verses support the contention that Muslims are the best among all 
nations. “Ye are the best of Peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, 
forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah. If only the People of the Book had 
Faith, it were best for them: among them are some who have Faith, but most of them 
are perverted transgressors.”325 
 Muslim scholars agree that the excellence of the Islamic nation is 
underwritten by its virtue and good order and prohibition of vice and evil. As long as 
they do that, they will be the best of nations on the basis "that they (the Muslims) are 
the best of nations and the most beneficial of people to humanity.”326 However, it is 
appropriate to note here that this characteristic, like the two previous ones, is not 
detached from the inheritance of Islam either from those previous Prophets and 
messengers, or the earlier nations who followed them. Moreover, we find that this 
characteristic is tied to an aspect of the struggle that took practical form between the 
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Muslims and some of the Jews in one of the stages of the life of the Prophet 
Muhammad, according to Muslim beliefs. This issue will be further discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter. 
As for the context of inheritance that this characteristic brings, it begins with 
the issue of the covenant, and the belief that Islam is the only suitable religion for the 
worship of God. These are the two affairs that were discussed previously. The verses 
arrive at the fact that Abraham was in the fold of Islam. “Say: "Allah speaketh the 
Truth: follow the religion of Ibrahim, the sane in faith; he was not of the Pagans."”327 
The text continues to confirm that the Ka’abah was the first mosque built on 
earth for worship and notes Abraham’s relationship to this landmark. “The first House 
appointed for men was that at Bakka (Mecca); full of blessing and of guidance for all 
kinds of beings: In it are Signs manifest; the Station of Ibrahim; whoever enters it 
attains security.”328  
In his Quranic exegesis, the Muslim and MB Scholar, Sayyid Qutb sees that 
this verse represents a return to the subject of changing the Qiblah from Jerusalem to 
Mecca, because of which the Jews faulted the Muslims, transferring the issue, once 
again, to the question of inheritance. Qutb writes:  
 
Then, it responds thusly to their objections to changing the Qiblah- that 
subject which took up a broad field in the chapter of “The Cow” (i.e. 
chapter 2 in the Quran) before. It becomes clear to them that the Ka’abah 
(i.e. the sacred house for Muslims in Mecca) is the House of Abraham and 
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the first House placed for mankind for worship on the earth. So, objecting 
to it is unheard of from those who claim the inheritance of Abraham!329  
 
The verses go on to criticize the Jews and the Christians for their disbelief.330 
And they conclude in the realm of the understanding of “inheritance” with a warning 
to the Muslims about following the People of the Book on the basis that it is the path 
to disbelief.331 The text concludes with the acknowledgement of the “excellence” of 
the Islamic nation on the basis of commanding virtue and good and prohibiting evil. 
This is defined by Qutb as: 
 
To assume the responsibilities of the excellent nation with all of what is 
behind these responsibilities of hardship, and with all of what is in their 
path of harsh consequences…  It is opposition to evil, encouraging good 
and protecting the society from the factors of corruption… And all of this 
causes exhaustion and difficulties, but it is thusly necessary for the 
establishment of the righteous society and its protection and for the 
realization of the picture that Allah loves see in the life of humanity.332 
 
However, this characteristic is also tied to the discussion about the Jews, who 
Muslims believe will be defeated every time they bring God’s wrath upon them due to 
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disbelief or disobedience.333 It is important to point out here that the Quran 
distinguishes between two groups of the people of the Book. The first is the group that 
disbelieved and disobeyed, while the second is the group of believers whom the 
Quran exempts from its reproach and praises and purifies them.  
 
Not all of them are alike: of the People of the Book are a portion that 
stand (for the right); they rehearse the Signs of Allah all night long, and 
they prostrate themselves in adoration. They believe in Allah and the Last 
Day; they enjoin what is right, and forbid what is wrong; and they hasten 
(in emulation) in (all) good works: they are in the ranks of the righteous. 
Of the good that they do, nothing will be rejected of them; for Allah 
knoweth well those that do right.334  
 
The importance of this Quranic distinction will become clear in the next 
chapter, when we arrive at the nature of the struggle in Palestine and the identity of 
the “enemy,” as Hamas understands it.  
The extensive discussion of the status of Palestine in traditional Islamic 
discourse is essential not only as a backdrop for contemporary interpretations of its 
status in the geopolitical context, but also to clarify common misconceptions that exist 
in the West concerning the place of Palestine in Islamic belief. For example Nusse 
argues that no territory in Islam "was ever considered to be of a more central or sacred 
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nature than another."335 According to her argument only Mecca and Medina were 
mentioned in the Quran and that the notion of sacred territory is limited to their 
surroundings.336 Based on this analogy she concludes by saying that "the Al-Aqsa 
mosque is venerated as a holy Muslim place, but the idea that the specific territory of 
Palestine is holy only emerged more recently."337 She further asserts that the notion of 
the sacredness of Palestine in the ideology of Hamas was influenced by two notions in 
Judaism: the sacred territory and the Promised Land.338 Such arguments and 
assertions are refuted by the meticulous and extensive discussion of the primary 
Islamic sources that we laid out previously. 
These misconceptions are reflected in the inability of most Western 
commentators to understand the perspective from which the MB and the Hamas 
movement articulate their refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist in the land of 
Palestine. The contextualisation provided by this thesis here is not conducted as an 
attempt to support the position adopted by the MB and Hamas, only to clarify the 
scriptural sources which sustain it.  
The sanctity of Palestine in Islam, which became prominent in the life of the 
Messenger Muhammad, has remained so through contemporary times. Whether it is 
because Jerusalem was the only city whose keys were personally possessed by the 
second  of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (Omar Bin al-Khattaab), or because the 
great Islamic hero Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi  made such tremendous efforts to liberate 
Jerusalem from the hands of the Crusaders, the history of Islam has a rich store of 
references, symbols and stories  to inspire a modern revivalist movement. Indeed, the 
Muslim nation, since the time of the Messenger, has regarded Jerusalem as a noble 
                                                 
335 Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas. Ibid., p. 48. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
sanctuary, a blessed house and an honoured sacred place. It journeyed to it after its 
opening, entered into Ihram (state of ritual consecration) from it for Hajj and Umrah, 
and visited it in search of prayer and blessing, and it surrounded it with religious 
oversight.339  
The significance of the preceding presentation is represented by its 
embodiment of the ideological and theological background that governs the positions 
of the MB and Hamas, their views, approaches, and the implications of the issue. 
Furthermore, this background is a fundamental element in specifying and identifying 
the “transgressor,” according to Hamas, and the most useful of ways to deal with it. It 
remains for us here to clarify how these theological and jurisprudential convictions 
are translated ideologically and politically in the language of Hamas and its 
justifications. In other words, how do these convictions find their expression in the 
logic of Hamas? 
 
Palestine in Hamas' Thought 
 
The sacredness of Palestine in Islam, and the Muslims comprehension of the 
dimensions and implications of this sacredness, found its way to the ideological 
philosophy of the MB and Hamas. This ideology expressed itself into three main 
areas: 1) Palestine: The Land of Islamic Endowment. 2) Palestine: The Central Issue 
of the Muslim Ummah. 3) Jerusalem: The Capital of the Islamic Caliphate 
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1) Palestine: The Land of Islamic Endowment 
 
The position of Palestine in the thought of the MB and Hamas does not depart from 
the Islamic sacredness of Palestine previously described. According to Hasan al-
Banna “Palestine occupies in our souls a sacred spiritual place above the simple 
nationalistic meaning, the breeze of the Blessed Jerusalem blows upon us, the 
blessings of the Prophets and Truthful, and the birthplace of Christ, upon him be 
peace. And all of that enlivens the souls and nourishes the spirits.”340 Hasan al-Banna 
also looked at the issue of Palestine on the basis that it was “an issue of the Islamic 
world altogether. So, it is a measure of their nobility and a scale of their awe and 
power.”341 As with all Muslims, Palestine, in the view of the MB and Hamas, is the 
location of the Farthest Mosque, the first Qiblah for the Muslims and the third of the 
Noble Sanctuaries that God increased the reward of prayer therein. Likewise, it is the 
Land of the Night Journey and Ascension where the Prophet led the messengers and 
Prophets together in prayer. It is the land that God singled out for a number of the 
Prophets, and therein many of the companions and their followers resided and are 
buried.342 
All of these beliefs are translated by the MB and Hamas in a number of forms 
possessing an ideological political philosophy that espouses the religious and 
legislative dimensions of the Palestinian case. The first of these religious ideological 
expressions is their consideration of the land of Palestine as an Islamic land of Waqf 
(endowment) for the generations of Muslims. According to the MB:  
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 Palestine is a part of the Islamic ideology and its land is an Islamic trust 
for all of the generations of Muslims, past, present and future, up to the 
Day of Resurrection. It is not permissible to anyone, whoever he might be, 
to give up not even a very small part of it. Therefore, it is not the property 
of the Palestinians or the Arabs alone; rather it is the property of all the 
Muslims. And it is on all Muslims everywhere to share practically in 
giving wealth and blood in its defense. 342F343   
 
This point is presented in full in the eleventh article of the charter of the 
Hamas movement:  
 
The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an 
Islamic Waqf on the Muslim generations till the day of Resurrection. It is 
not allowed to give up any part of it. No Arab state or all the Arab states, 
no king nor leader, or kings or leaders, nor organization, Palestinian or 
Arab, have such authority because the land of Palestine in an Islamic 
Trust (endowment) upon all Muslim generations until the Day of 
Resurrection. And who has the true spokesmanship for all the Muslim 
generations until the Day of Resurrection? 343F344 
 
The MB and Hamas justify such beliefs with the statement “This is the law 
governing the land of Palestine in the Shari'a (Islamic law) and the same goes for any 
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land the Muslim have conquered because during the times of (Islamic) conquests, the 
Muslims consecrated these lands to Muslim generations until the Day of 
Judgment.”345 The argument is based on a historical precedence during the early 
Islamic state, under the second Rightly Guided Caliph:  
 
When the leaders of the Islamic armies conquered Syria and Iraq, they 
wrote to the Caliph Omar bin al-Khattaab, asking for his advice 
concerning the conquered land—whether they should divide it among the 
soldiers, or leave it to its owners. After consultations and discussions 
between the Caliph and companions of the Prophet, Allah bless him and 
grant him salvation, it was decided that the land should be left with its 
owners who could benefit by its fruit. As for the real ownership of the 
land and the land itself, it should be consecrated for Muslim generations 
until Judgment Day. Those who are on the land, are there only to benefit 
from its fruit. This Waqf remains as long as earth and heaven remain. Any 
procedure in contradiction to the Shari'a, where Palestine is concerned, is 
null and void.346 
 
It is clear from the preceding segment that the objective of including it in the 
charter of the movement, and which, continues to be repeated in the statements of its 
leaders,347 is to enhance and assert continuity with an Islamic logic. The logic is used 
by the MB and Hamas to maintain a prohibition against giving up Palestine in whole 
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or part. Indeed this has coincided with the PLO's inclination in the late 80s of the last 
century to seek peaceful solutions to the conflict with Israel. According to Mishal & 
Sela "whereas the PLO perceived the conflict with Israel in national-secular and 
realistic terms, Hamas regarded any possibility of a political settlement based on 
compromise as a violation of Palestine's status as an Islamic endowment (waqf)."348 
The authors further note that "Hamas maintained that the peace process intended to 
legitimize the 'Zionist entity' and clear the way to further usurpation of the Muslim 
and Arab wealth by the foreign invaders."349 Hamas affirms this reading in its early 
years of inception. In a letter to the Palestinian National Council (PNC) on 12 
November 1988 it asserts that: 
 
First: the land of Palestine is an Islamic sacred land. It is an integral part of the 
greater Arab and Islamic world.  Second: Palestine is one unit and indivisible 
from the sea to the river. It belongs to the generations of Muslims until the Day 
of Resurrection. It is not permissible to give it up or to give up any part of it. No 
Arab country or all Arab states, no organization or organizations have such 
authority, no matter how long it takes.349F350 
 
However, this legal-based justification requires further explanation of the 
concept of Islamic endowment as it has come to be used by Hamas. The root of the 
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term waqf, in the Arabic language, is defined as “to hold, set aside or to dedicate for 
charitable purposes.” An endowment of an estate, according to Arabic linguists, is 
detaining it from the possession of the donor and maintaining it for some designated 
expenditures.351 
In Islamic conventional fiqh (jurisprudence) and thought, waqf, has several meanings. 
What follows are the definitions by the four legal schools of Sunni Islam:  
1. Hanafi School: “Holding a piece of property on the ruling it is the property of 
the donor and to give in charity the benefits derived there from to the poor, 
while the property remains.”  
2. Maliki School: “Giving the benefit of something for the period of time of its 
existence while it remains the property of the donor even if only by 
presumption.”  
3. Shaafi’i School: Imam An-Nawawi defined it with his statement, “Holding 
wealth having the possibility of benefiting from it while the property 
remains, by preventing the free disposal by the donor or other than him in 
his oversight, and it is spent in the way of good seeking closeness to Allah, 
Most High.”  
4. Hanbali School: “The owner detains the source of his wealth that gives benefit 
while it remains, for a period of time, for the purpose of righteousness.”352 
These definitions suggest that the endowment remains in the possession of the 
donor but the benefits that accrue from it go toward charitable good to be determined 
by the donor, whether it is for a determined period of time or not. For the MB and 
Hamas, Palestine is an Islamic endowment, and importantly, one without a 
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timeframe.353 How accurate is this Islamic legal opinion and how did the MB and 
Hamas arrive at it? Once again, the matter requires us to return to the sources of 
Islamic jurisprudence and history. 
 
A) The Origins of the Endowment of Palestine 
 
The sources of Islamic history tell of the advance of the Muslim armies under the 
command of Abu ‘Ubaidah ‘Amir bin al-Jarraah toward Jerusalem during the rule of 
the second Caliph Omar Bin al-Khattaab. Though they had already inflicted 
consecutive defeats against the Romans in Greater Syria and laid siege around 
Palestine, conquering Jerusalem was difficult for the Muslims. The Romans refrained 
from sending military reinforcements to the besieged inhabitants of the city. 
After four months of siege, the people of Jerusalem despaired of receiving 
military reinforcements to help them against the Muslims. Likewise, the Muslim army 
laying siege to the city began to be affected by the winter cold and rain. Historical 
sources relate that the patriarch of the city, Sacrutees, addressed the leader of the 
Islamic armies, Abu ‘Ubaidah, and informed him that he will not surrender the keys to 
the city to anyone except the Muslim Caliph, explaining that they find in their holy 
books the descriptions of the one who conquers their city in the person of Omar. Upon 
receiving word from his general, the Caliph traveled to Jerusalem where the patriarch 
surrendered the keys of the city to him. Omar entered the city from the gate that the 
Prophet Muhammad entered during his Night Journey and prayed in the place of the 
Farthest Mosque. Then he and his army washed it and removed the garbage from it. 
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This “opening” of Jerusalem took place in the sixteenth year (637 A.D.) after the 
migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina.354  
After the Muslims emerged victorious, Omar sought to divide Palestine among 
the Muslims. As the Muslim scholar Abi Obaid Allah narrates in his book Al-Amwaal, 
he came to Al-Jaabiyyah in Greater Syria, where Mu’aadh bin Jabal, one of the 
companions of the Messenger and one of the leaders of the Islamic conquering army, 
said to him: 
 
By Allah, then it will be what you hate. If you divide the land today a 
large portion will come to the hands of the people (the conquerors) then 
they will perish and it will go to one man and woman (as in feudal 
estates), then there will come after them another generation of Muslims 
and they will not find anything. So consider a matter that will encompass 
the first of them and the last of them. So, Omar took the opinion of 
Mu’aadh.”355  
 
Books of Islamic jurisprudence suggest that this opinion was not unanimous 
among the companions of the Messenger. For example, the companion of the 
Messenger Muhammad Bilaal bin Rabaah, who participated in the conquest of 
Greater Syria and Jerusalem, opposed this opinion.356 Ibn Az-Zubair, an elder 
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companion of the Prophet, took the same position after the Muslim conquest of Egypt. 
Ibn Az-Zubair demanded the commander of the army ‘Amr Ibn al-‘Aas divide the 
land, but Ibn al-’Aas refused after consulting Omar.357 A distinguishing feature of this 
discussion is that it presents the fiqhi Islamic opinion upon which the supporters of 
division rely, an issue that will be clarified later. 
The majority of the scholars, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, are of the opinion 
that the first three Caliphs, Abu Bakr, Omar, and ‘Uthman, conquered Arab, Roman 
and Persian land, but none of them divided captured territories among the victorious 
armies. Rather, they made the land acquired for the Muslims in the context of the 
Quranic verse: “What Allah has bestowed on His Messenger (and taken away) from 
the people of the townships, belongs to Allah, to His Messenger”358 They did not ask 
for the permission of the actual soldiers, though many of them requested land 
distribution, just as Bilaal requested from Omar in Greater Syria, and Ibn Az-Zubair 
in Egypt.359 
What caused the difference in opinions between the companions in dividing 
the conquered lands and on what grounds did each party make its contention?  
Islamic jurisprudence divides conquered land into two categories. First, land 
whose conquest occurred peacefully, in which leaders negotiated a peace treaty 
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without fighting. In those instances, possession of the land remains with them along 
with a determined kharaaj (land tax) from it. This kharaaj takes the ruling of the 
jizyah (tribute). If the owners of the land accept Islam it will be dropped and they may 
sell it, give it away or pawn it because it is their property.360 As for the second type, it 
is land conquered by force, and its people removed from it by the sword. These lands 
are not divided among the fighters, but become an endowment for the Muslims as a 
whole and a determined kharaaj is levied on it and taken from it every year. It 
remains in the hands of its owners as long as they pay a kharaaj, “whether they are 
Muslims or non-Muslim citizens. And its kharaaj is not dropped by its owners 
becoming Muslim or if it is transferred to a Muslim because he is in the status of 
leasing it.”361 
The companions did not disagree regarding the land conquered peacefully. 
The difference of opinion occurred in the ruling of land conquered by force. This 
disagreement appeared after the conquest of Greater Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Persia. 
The party that saw the necessity of division among the companions, and later scholars 
who supported them, argued on the basis of the actions of the Prophet Muhammad 
when he divided Khaibar, conquered in the seventh year after the Migration (629 
A.D.) 
 After that war the Messenger divided half of the land between the Muslims 
and he endowed half for his allotted portions and needs (i.e. the state).362 As for the 
party of companions that disagreed with distribution, they argued that dividing the 
conquered land would create feudal estates among the soldiers who participated in the 
conquest and deny other Muslims who did not participate in the battle, in addition to 
future generations, from benefit. For that reason, they allowed division of the movable 
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spoils among the fighters and kept the land itself as an endowment for all Muslims. 
This jurisprudential difference between the companions on the basis of shari’a would 
only be resolved by a decisive act of the Caliph, in this case represented by Omar Bin 
al-Khattaab. Nevertheless, this did not end all discussion on this important legal 
matter. To the contrary, early Muslim scholars would return to this question in later 
times.  
Early Muslim scholars addressing this question adopt one of three fiqhi 
(jurisprudential) opinions: 
1. The majority opinion: The Caliph may choose between distributing the land 
among the soldiers or establishing it as an endowment for all Muslims. They 
add that if the leader sees the best interest in making it part of the spoils he 
may divide it between the soldiers, as the Prophet did at Khaibar. But if he 
sees it fit not to divide it, this is permissible, as the Prophet did not divide 
Mecca though he conquered it by force. These opinions also note that the first 
three Caliphs did not divide lands conquered by force among the victors.363 
2. The second opinion: Some scholars argue that the land conquered by force 
becomes an endowment by seizure, according to the agreement of the 
companions. The supporters of this opinion argue that the division of the 
Prophet Muhammad in Khaibar was at the beginning of Islam’s spread in 
Arabia, when the needs of the community were more severe. As such the 
Prophet took the best interests of the community into account. According to 
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this argument, the best interests after that early period became endowment of 
the land, making it obligatory on future Muslim leaders.364 
3. The third opinion: Imam Ash- Shaafi’i and another group of early Muslim 
scholars contend that distribution of the land conquered by force is a legal 
obligation (i.e. shari’a).365 It is so because of the precedence set by the 
Prophet and his action is more suitable than the action of others. This is also 
tied with the Quranic verse: “And know that out of all the booty that ye may 
acquire (in war), a fifth share is assigned to Allah, and to the Messenger.”366 
According to the supporters of this view, this verse provides that four-fifths of 
the spoils go to the fighters.367 Ash-Shaafi’i allows one exception: in the event 
that the soldiers give their consent to the ruler, then he has the right to make it 
an endowment.368 Ash-Shaafi’i responded to those who disagreed with him by 
saying that Mecca was conquered by force and the Prophet Muhammad did 
not divide it, by asserting that Mecca was not conquered by force, but rather 
by a non-aggression pact.  This opinion was opposed by a majority of 
scholars.369 In fact, they opposed the very notion that Omar sought the 
pleasure of the fighters in the conquest of Greater Syria, Iraq, Egypt and 
Persia. They claim that he declared them endowments without any desire on 
the part of the soldiers.370 
Upon reviewing the three opinions, the great Imams have given more weight 
to the opinion of the majority. “The opinion of the majority is the more just and most 
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resembles the Book, the Sunnah (i.e. the saying, practices, and silent approvals of the 
Prophet), and Shari’a principles. And there are those who said: We give the Imam a 
choice between two affairs: a choice of opinion and best interest, not a choice of 
passion and desire.”371 The renowned Muslim scholar Ibn Qudamah emphasizes this 
in Al-Mughni: “We do not know that anything that was conquered by force was 
divided among the Muslims, except Khaibar.”372  
Returning to the subject of Palestine, Muslim scholars are in agreement that 
the land of Greater Syria, including Palestine, was conquered by force. Although they 
disagreed about the priority of its endowment for all of the Muslims and their 
generations, or the necessity of dividing it among the soldiers, all of them agreed that 
the decision of the Caliph to make it an endowment was carried out and accepted by 
the companions, whether Omar sought their pleasure or not. Nor was the decision 
ever reversed or rescinded. This means that it continues to the present day. 
  Based on that, the majority of the companions and Muslim scholars are of the 
opinion that it is impermissible to buy, sell, give away, or inherit this endowed 
land.373 In fact, that same opinion was stated by Omar Bin al-Khattaab, with his 
words: “It is not to be sold, or given away or inherited.”374 The Muslim scholar al-
Auzaa’iy affirms that “the agreement of Omar and his companions concerning the 
conquered endowed lands for the generations of Muslims to come is not to be sold or 
inherited.”375  
The above detailed discussion of the origins of the endowment of Palestine in 
Islamic primarily sources and the early historical Islamic experience refutes Nusse's 
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claim that the waqf of Palestine is a recent development in Islamic thought.376 
Irregardless, it does not negate the case that MB and Hamas have emphasized this 
jurisprudential issue in their contemporary discourse as a counterweight argument to 
the Jewish notion of the "Promised Land." 
    
B) Methodological Notes on the Issue of Endowment 
 
From the preceding juristic and historical study we conclude that the belief of Hamas 
and the MB which espouses that the land of Palestine is an Islamic endowment is in 
accord with the legal positions of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad and the 
early scholars. However, there are several methodological notes that should be 
discussed here: 
1. The first relates to the juristic foundation of the question of the endowment 
of Palestine in the view of Hamas and the MB. At a time when they affirm 
that “this is its ruling in the Islamic Shari’a” it also becomes clear to us 
from the discussion of the previous dispute between the companions and 
scholars that this question is a fiqhi (jurisprudential) and ijtihaad 
(innovation), not a determined legal issue. Though there was a majority 
opinion, there was no consensus therein. Cases in which there is no 
confirmed text are disputed and enter into the realm of Islamic 
jurisprudence, not established religious law.377 Given that the dispute 
occurred on this issue between the companions and early scholars, it is not 
from the core of the Shari’a but from the case of jurisprudence that are 
periodically taken and rejected. However, it is imperative to note here that 
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endowment as a concept is a Shari’a issue, but its understanding and its 
application is what is within the realm of fiqh.   
2. Having said that, and in spite of the fact that this question is juristic in 
nature, this does not mean that the issue of the endowment of Palestine is 
open to review from a juristic methodological perspective. This is due to 
the fact that the soldiers who fought in the conquest died while they were 
bound by the decision of the Caliph Omar. Whether they were pleased 
with it or not, that it is an endowed land on all the Muslims and their 
generations. Therefore, as say the majority of the companions and Muslim 
scholars, it is not permissible to sell it, give it away or to give it up. 
3. The reason for the land of Palestine being an Islamic endowment land goes 
back to the fact that it was conquered by force and the victors agreed to 
accept the decision of the Caliph to make it an endowment for all Muslims 
and future generations. Therefore, the logic of endowment does not go 
back to the sacred dimensions of Palestine in Islam that were previously 
detailed. 
4. The methodological nature of the majority argument on the issue of 
endowment of lands conquered by force means that every land conquered 
by force is an Islamic endowment. Therefore, there is no relevance, in this 
context, to the identity of the occupier, in this case as “Jewish.” So, as long 
as an occupation has occurred in any Islamic lands conquered by force, the 
identity of the occupier, whether Jewish or Christian, and whether that 
land is Palestine or some other territory, becomes irrelevant. As explained 
earlier what qualifies land to be an endowed land in Islamic fiqih is one 
that is taken forcibly from non Muslims.    
The previous methodological points help to clarify how Islamic jurisprudence 
approaches the question and engages it. The importance of these notes is that they aid 
us in understanding the background from which Hamas, the MB, and the majority of 
Muslims in general embark in their dealing with the issue of Palestine.  Understanding 
this issue will also aid us in understanding to a large extent the positions of Hamas in 
rejecting recognition of Israel and its right to exist. However, it is important to note 
here that this thesis agrees with Gunning's observation that: 
 
While religion influences the way Hamas conceptualises itself, the conflict, 
and its enemy, it does so usually in conjunction with other narratives. The 
waqf argument, for instance, is reinforced by arguments invoking the notion of 
inalienable human rights and justice which are similarly influential in 
precluding compromise.378 
 
Gunning’s point is insightful and quite accurate. What this thesis brings home 
in this context is that the Islamic juristic issues inform and explain to a large extent 
the seemingly immovable stances of the movement. This does not mean, however, 
that there are no Palestinians and Arabs who do not see any possibility of negotiating 
with Israel and dividing the land. This is something to be discussed in the fourth 
chapter. What we seek to explain here is how Hamas, the MB and the Islamists 
understand the issue by examining its accuracy within the framework of Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
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2) Palestine: The Central Issue of the Muslim Ummah 
 
In addition to its place as an Islamic endowment, a second aspect of the professed 
political philosophy of Hamas and the MB - that is inspired by the spiritual and legal 
dimensions of the Palestinian cause - is its place as the central issue of the Islamic 
nation. In other words, the issue’s significance is not limited to the Palestinian people 
or dependant on their capability for liberation. Rather, it is the issue of every Muslim. 
We will explore what makes Palestine unique and how these groups make that 
distinction in their arguments.  
The answer to this question can be found in the literature of the MB and 
Hamas and the works of scholars who are close to them. The thing to note here is that 
the foundational logic to the understanding of “the justly balanced Ummah” brings 
with it all of the previous meanings that we presented. Palestine is central, firstly, 
because of the sacred and religious symbolism it represents in the Shari’a and Islamic 
consciousness. It is also central because the struggle therein is a comprehensive 
struggle with the "Jewish project” / "Zionist Project" (i.e. as an occupier) supported 
by the West (we will discuss the apparent confusion here in determining the identity 
of the enemy in chapter 3) . It is a religious struggle and a struggle for existence, not a 
struggle of boundaries (this issue will also be further discussed in chapter 3). Finally, 
Palestine represents the central issue of the Muslim nation because its liberation 
means the establishment of the Islamic state, the capital of its Caliphate being 
Jerusalem. This is an issue to which we will return in a separate section within this 
chapter. 
The literature of the Muslim MB points out that “the Palestinian issue is a 
central issue because of its special characteristic, being the blessed land and the land 
of the Night Journey and Ascension. Working for its liberation is an obligation on 
every Muslim.”379 This understanding of the MB, as it was articulated by its 
Jordanian branch, underwrites 5 central commitments in its approach: 
1) Palestine is an Islamic endowment; none of the Palestinians or others have the 
right of giving up any part of it or all of it. To do so is a betrayal to God, the 
Messenger, and the nation. 
2) The responsibility of liberating Palestine falls on all Muslims and Arab nobles. 
3) The Islamic solution to resolving the Palestinian issue is jihad and it is 
obligatory on the rulers to prepare the nation for that. 
4) The struggle with the Jews and their backers, especially America, is a religious 
and civilizational struggle for existence, not a struggle over borders. (In 
chapter 3 we will discuss the review that the MB and Hamas have undergone 
in relation to this issue). 
5) All Muslims must support the mujaahideen in Palestine morally and materially 
for the continuation of their Blessed Intifada.380 
The same position is offered by a Muslim thinker close to the MB who writes:  
 
The Western project was able to anchor the Zionist entity as a dagger in 
the heart of the Islamic and Arab nation, aiming thereby for division and 
frustrating all projects for its revival no matter what its ideological color. 
The issue of this struggle with the intruding entity became the central 
issue for this nation. The nation plunged with it into an existential 
challenge, the mission of all whom an entity foreign to it invades. 
Confronting it is unavoidable until it is driven away and the body is 
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healed from it. So it resumes its tasks or fails in that imagining the 
possibility of living together with it taking its course to become nothing 
and destruction.381 
 
Some commentators allied to the MB’s ideology critique those who do not see 
in Palestine the central issue of the nation, specifically those who argue that the 
priority is the establishment of the Islamic state and the destruction of the un-Islamic 
regimes. This line of thought suggests that only at that time will it be possible to go 
forth to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine, embarking from the newly liberated Arab 
capitals. 381F382 According to those in the MB who see in Palestine the central issue of the 
Islamic nation, the sacred and religious dimensions of Palestine make it an issue out 
of the ordinary. “It is not the issue of a land that is occupied, rather, it is the issue of 
sacred places that have become impure and honor that has been sullied. It is not 
permitted to bargain it or to accept any compromises.”382F383 
How does Hamas approach the understanding of “the central issue”? 
Hamas’ thought is not at all far from the previous foundations of that 
understanding of the MB, but rather is largely in accord with it. According to Hamas' 
charter:  
 
(t)he question of the liberation of Palestine is bound to three circles: the 
Palestinian circle, the Arab circle and the Islamic circle. Each of these 
circles has its role in the struggle against Zionism. Each has its duties, and 
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it is a horrible error and a sign of deep ignorance to overlook any of these 
circles. Palestine is an Islamic land that has the first of the two Qiblahs, 
the third of the holy sanctuaries, and the point of departure for 
Muhammad's midnight journey to the seven heavens… The day the 
problem is dealt with on this basis, is when the three circles mobilize their 
capabilities, the present state of affairs will change and the day of 
liberation will come.384  
 
On that basis, Hamas cautions against withdrawing from the central nature of 
the Palestinian issue. Moreover, Hamas considers, in the context of its ideological 
political view, that:  
 
World Zionism, together with imperialistic powers, attempt through a 
preconceived plan and intelligent strategy to remove one Arab state after 
another from the circle of struggle against Zionism in order to have it 
finally face the Palestinian people alone. The Islamic Resistance 
Movement calls on Arab and Islamic nations to persevere and prevent the 
success of this horrendous plan, and to warn the people of the danger 
emanating from leaving the circle of struggle against Zionism. Today it is 
Palestine, tomorrow it will be one country or another. The Zionist plan is 
limitless. After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to 
the Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, 
they will aspire to further expansion, and so on.385 
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And for that reason Hamas views that “leaving the circle of struggle with 
Zionism is high treason, and cursed be he who does so.”386 In emphasizing the 
understanding of the central nature of the Palestinian issue for the Islamic nation, 
Hamas argues that its role and the role of the Palestinian people in the realm of this 
struggle is nothing but a vanguard for the Islamic body as a whole in a larger struggle 
with the Jews and the West.  
 
The Islamic Resistance Movement considers itself to be the spearhead of 
the circle of struggle with world Zionism and a step on the road. The 
Movement adds its efforts to the efforts of all those who are active in the 
Palestinian arena. Arab and Islamic Peoples should augment further steps 
on their part; Islamic groups all over the Arab world should do the same, 
since they are all the best-equipped for the future role in the fight with the 
warmongering Jews.387 
 
This approach to the Palestinian issue, in light of its Islamic sacredness and 
religious symbolism, would undoubtedly make it the most central issue facing the 
Muslim world today. The problem here may not appear in the term “central” by itself, 
given the status of Palestine in Islam. Rather it is in the implications that result from it 
as the MB and Hamas believe, especially in relation to statements such as that the 
struggle is a religious and existential struggle, not one of boundaries, and from 
limiting the means to deal with the Israeli occupation by “jihad”. These issues will be 
discussed in the coming chapters that examine their accuracy from an Islamic point of 
view, through the juristic and historical sources. Likewise, this discussion will aid us 
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in tracing the tremendous change in the thinking of Hamas regarding the application 
of its convictions on the ground. Despite the fact that Hamas continues to preserve a 
rigid ideological position, in its latter history it has managed to develop a more 
pragmatic political platform without revising its sacred certainties. However, it 
addresses the world today with the contemporary language, by attempting to develop 
temporary and creative solutions. These developments and their mechanisms will be 
discussed in the coming two chapters.  
 
3) Jerusalem: The Capital of the Islamic Caliphate 
 
The third political position that reflects the religious dimensions of the Palestinian 
issue as represented by Hamas and the MB, is the conviction that Jerusalem will be 
the capital of the awaited Islamic Caliphate. 
There is no doubt that the issue of the Islamic Caliphate occupies a status of 
great importance in the Islamic consciousness. The discussion recalls memories of 
dignity, power and strength. The Caliphate reminds Muslims of the honorable past, a 
time when the Islamic state was the greatest power on earth, the time when the land of 
Islam was united, submitting to the authority of one state. In the consciousness of 
Muslims, the calamities, partitions, and occupations did not occur until the Islamic 
state became weak, before ultimately succumbing to collapse with the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1924. It is notable that the Society of the Muslim Brothers 
embraced the idea of establishing the Islamic state in its original mission in 1928. It is 
the measure by which the unity of the Islamic nation will be realized. It made this 
notion the organization’s highest objective. The group was, since its origin, possessed 
with the anxiety of the fall of the Caliphate, which it considered the fall of “all that is 
sacred in Islam itself."388  
It had not been four years since the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in March 
1924, when al-Banna announced the formation of the Society of the MB. Since its 
founding, the organization did not disconnect the concept of the Islamic Caliphate 
from its thought. 
The researcher Ahmad Musalili, argues that:  
 
The Caliphate, from the perspective of the Islamists, such as Hasan al-
Banna, was the symbol of Islamic unity. Many of the affairs of faith and 
worldly life are dependent on this symbol. So the Caliphate is not just 
something mentioned in the books of belief and fundamentals of the faith. 
For this reason, Hasan al-Banna says it is the obligation of every Muslim 
to think about the Caliphate, not just since its elimination, but also since 
the diversion from its path.389  
 
On this basis, al-Banna was among those affected by the call for the Islamic 
League after the fall of the Caliphate, given that it was a political league founded on 
the understanding of Islamic brotherhood. This was as opposed to those calling for 
Egyptian nationalism, such as the Egyptian League, or those who stressed the 
Pharaonic nature of Egypt after the fall of the Ottoman state and Egypt’s 
independence. Indeed, some consider the formation of the MB a direct and immediate 
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response to “the overthrow of the Caliphate and the advance of secularism.”390 
Indeed, al-Banna left no doubt that restoring the Caliphate is at “the head of the 
curriculums” of the MB.391 The weakening of the Caliphate and the concomitant dire 
developments in the Palestinian arena had a tremendous impact on him. So did the 
refusal of the Egyptian government to recognise the Palestinian cause.392 These issues 
re-doubled his efforts to establish  the Islamic League as a first step on the path to the 
Islamic state. 
This same position is echoed by Hamas. Its professed belief is that the 
liberation of Palestine, is merely the first step in the establishment of an Islamic state. 
“As for the objectives, they are: fighting against falseness; defeating and vanquishing 
it so that justice could prevail, homelands be retrieved, and from its mosques the voice 
of the mu'ezzin (the caller for prayer) would emerge, declaring the establishment of 
the Islamic state, so that all would return to their rightful places.”393 The same notion 
is conveyed in the view that Hamas “strives to raise the banner of Allah over every 
inch of Palestine.”394   
 Some Islamic thinkers within the MB’s school of thought or close to it believe 
that the liberation of Palestine and “the destruction of Israel means the removal of the 
insurmountable obstacle that stood between the arrival of Islam to the position of 
decision, the apparatuses of government and the centers of leadership in the Islamic 
world.”395 On what historical and religious precedent do the MB and Hamas rely, in 
their assertion that the liberation of Palestine means the establishment of the Caliphate 
with Jerusalem as its capital? 
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 To begin, it is appropriate to note here that many contemporary Muslim 
scholars believe in the return to the Islamic Caliphate to rule the Muslim world until 
the end of human history. As proof, they cite the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad:  
 
Prophethood will be among you as long as Allah wills it to be, then He 
will raise it when He wants to raise it. Then, there will be an unjust 
kingdom as long as Allah wants it to be. Then He will raise it when He 
wills to raise it. Then, there will be a kingdom of coercion as long as 
Allah wills it to be. Then, he will raise it when He wants to raise it. Then, 
there will be a Caliphate on the model of Prophethood. Then, he remained 
silent.396 
 
The Muslim scholar Ibrahim al-Ali contends that these stages have been 
realized in the life of the Islamic nation, beginning with the stage of Muhammad’s 
Prophethood and continuing with the stage of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs. 
According to this interpretation of history, the stage of the unjust kingdom followed, 
beginning with the Umayyad Caliphate and ending with the fall of the Ottoman 
Caliphate in 1924. Finally, the last stage of the coercive kingdom started with the fall 
of the Ottoman Caliphate and continues to the modern day. This period will continue 
until it is succeeded by the Caliphate once again. This will last until the Day of 
Judgment on the basis that the Prophetic tradition did not indicate another stage to 
follow.397 Where does Palestine fall in this equation? 
 The final Caliphate will be situated in Jerusalem, according to some scholarly 
interpretations. As proof, they cite the Prophetic tradition narrated by a companion: 
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“The Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, put his hand on my head, then said: ‘O 
Ibn Hawaalah, when you see the Caliphate situated in the Holy Land, earthquakes, 
trials and great matters will be near. And the Hour on that day will be nearer to the 
people than this hand of mine to your head’.”398 
 On this basis some contemporary scholars believe that this Caliphate must rid 
the world of “the so-called Jewish state standing on the land of Palestine and this 
Caliphate will be established in Jerusalem.”399 This interpretation is alluded to by 
Hamas in its literature as pointed out previously. Moreover, most Muslims believe 
that God will send Jesus, son of Mary at the end of time, that he will return to 
Jerusalem and fight with the Muslims and their Caliphate against the Anti-Christ, and 
his supporters among the Jews and will be victorious over them.400 In other words, 
liberated Palestine is a condition for the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in the 
understanding of Hamas and the Islamists. It is the means by which to retrieve the 
status of the Muslim nation attained through the Islamic state and its historical power. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter sought to broaden the understanding of the status that Muslims assign to 
Palestine. Moreover, it examined the statements of Hamas and analyzed their 
accuracy with regard to the movement’s Islam-based approach to Palestine. By 
exploring this status, it is possible for us to understand many of the ideological 
stances of Hamas that are connected to this struggle, such as its continued insistence, 
even after its victory in the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, to refuse to 
recognize Israel and the previous agreements that were reached with it through the 
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Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Despite the placement of an international 
embargo on its government and other external pressures on it to recognize Israel and 
past agreements, Hamas continues to refuse to recognize Israel. This continued 
behaviour, even as it translated into policy following the formation of a Hamas-led 
Palestinian national government in March 2006, is difficult to understand unless we 
consider the religious, jurisprudential, and the ideological background from which it 
is formed. In other words, from the perspective of Hamas, the recognition of Israel is 
tantamount to the abandonment of basic Islamic principles and the denunciation of the 
Quran and the Prophetic Traditions themselves. 
However, his does not negate the fact that Hamas takes the Fatah and the 
PLO's experience into consideration. After more than 21 years of negotiations (since 
October 1991) the Palestinians have yet to achieve a state of their own despite the 
acceptance of the PLO (September 1993) of the right of Israel to exist on more than 
78% of historical Palestine.401 Add to that, that one of Hamas' main sources of 
strength in the Palestinian arena is that it claims to speak for the border Palestinian 
self envisioned rights, such as the right of return to the "their" homeland, which is 
Israel today.   
 In fact some of Hamas' top leaders intensified the use of Islamic 
terminologies, such as the land of waqf since the movement took over Gaza from the 
forces loyal to President Abbas and Fatah in June 2007.402 This can be understood in 
three contexts: 1) As a devotion from those leaders to the ideological convictions that 
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they all espouse; 2) As a tool of contrast in their competition with Fatah, the PA, and 
the PLO in what they view as their failed policies after two decades of seeking peace 
with Israel; and 3) Indeed that the intensified use of Islamic terminology by some 
Hamas top leaders comes after violent escalations and clashes with Israel.403    
The next chapter will discuss the historical Muslim-Jewish relations and the 
Islamic jurisprudential comprehension of it. It will discuss the MB's and Hamas’ view 
of the conflict, and whether it is based on religious or political grounds. It will further 
discuss the identity of the "enemy" and whether  he is being defined based on 
religious grounds "Jewish" or political grounds as an “occupier” under the banner of 
the "Zionist Project". It will also track how the thought of the MB and Hamas 
developed in this regard, its mechanisms, and why. This will help us in positioning 
Hamas’ view of the conflict and whether it bases its animosity towards Israel on its 
Jewish identity or what Hamas views as its aggression on the Palestinian land and its 
people or both. 
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Chapter 3: Hamas’ Approach to the Conflict 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed the unique status of Palestine as its held by 
traditional Islamic thought and the MB school in general, and Hamas, in particular. 
We also explained the religious character of the issue of Palestine, its roots, how it 
translated ideologically and politically in the discourse of the MB and Hamas, and 
how it impacted, or could impact on their positions and convictions.  
This chapter will discuss Muslim-Jewish relations in history and the way in 
which Islamic jurisprudential has understood them. It will further discuss the MB's 
and Hamas’ view of the Palestine conflict, and show the religious grounds to this 
politics. It will consider how the religious dimensions of Hamas’ understanding 
applies, looking specifically at ideas of “occupation” and “aggression”. This will help 
position Hamas’ view of the conflict and clarify the basis of its animosity towards 
Israel. 
There is no more complex issue in the study of Hamas’ ideology than that of 
defining the struggle in Palestine. The question is whether this struggle is of a 
religious nature, against an eternal opponent described in divine texts or one of 
national liberation against a modern colonialist project. The ambiguity extends to the 
determination of the “enemy.” Is he a religious Jew or a Zionist colonist? This 
complexity is not unique to Hamas. Indeed, it is also found in the discourse of the MB 
as well as the general Islamic thought. Entering into this discussion is akin to crossing 
a minefield.   
As was previously discussed, Islamic thought interacts with Palestine at a 
deeply religious level. Moreover, the issue occupies a lofty status in Islamic thought. 
On the basis of the status of Palestine in the Islamic context, the insertion of a foreign 
occupation in “the land of Islam”, as the Muslims view it, poses a major dilemma as 
will be further explained in the coming chapter. The complexity of the issue is 
compounded within Islamic thought because the identity of the occupier is one that 
carries significant historical weight. Why should it matter that Palestine is occupied 
by the Jewish people? The reason according to this view lies in a legacy of religious 
and historical animosity between Muslims and Jews that dates to the mission of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Many contemporary Islamic interpretations are of the opinion 
that the Quran and the Prophetic traditions both put forward decisive evidence of a 
future clash between Muslims and Jews that will result in a Muslim victory. 
According to this view, the historical struggle between Islam and Judaism, which has 
continued in the contemporary setting, will be decided in the land of Palestine. 
Supporters of this view go beyond the interpretation of the issue as one of occupation 
and resistance, to the belief in an eternal struggle between truth and falsehood, an 
existential battle between two religions. Palestine, in this context, is merely the 
battleground, not the cause of the battle. This view will be further discussed later on 
in this chapter.  
This argument is not accepted by many past and present Muslim scholars. 
There are some who consider that the conflict with Israel does not arise from its 
identity as a Jewish state, and that it is simply a product of what they see as its 
transgression against the land of Islam. Although these scholars deny that the struggle 
with Israel is due to its Jewish identity, they nonetheless affirm that the liberation of 
Palestine is an Islamic obligation under the Shari'a. Such a transgression against the 
Islamic nation demands all efforts towards its removal, up to and including the use of 
force. The matter becomes more urgent since Palestine is a sacred land, in contrast to 
the “corrupted”404 religious claims of the occupying party. This is an issue that we 
discussed in the previous chapter, and will be explored in more detail in this chapter.  
The views of the MB and Hamas waver between these two approaches. We find 
in their literature arguments which give considerable weight to the notion that the 
battle in Palestine is religious: a civilizational contest between Islam and Judaism. 
Likewise, we find in that same literature claims that give more weight to the second 
view, that it is a struggle against an occupation to remove the injustice inflicted on the 
Palestinian people (national liberation). Adding to the complexity is the demand by 
Israel, with the support of the United States, that the Palestinians recognize it as a 
“Jewish state,” thereby aggravating the ideological and civilizational hue in defining 
this struggle.405 
The complexity of Hamas' position has been simplified in some research. In some 
cases Hamas’ definition of the struggle is understood in purely religious and 
ideological terms, while in others it is seen as a national liberation movement without 
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religious and historical dimensions.406 The latter view neglects the deeply rooted 
Islamic character of the movement that Hamas itself affirms and that shapes its views 
and stands. “The Islamic Resistance Movement: The Movement's programme is 
Islam. From it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, 
life and man. It resorts to it for judgement in all its conduct, and it is inspired by it for 
guidance of its steps.”407 
In its declarations, Hamas creates more ambiguity. In particular, its charter 
introduces contradictory positions regarding the nature of this struggle and the 
identity of the enemy. It speaks of “Our struggle against the Jews”408 on the one hand, 
and the movement as “the spearhead of the circle of struggle with world Zionism”409 
on the other.   
It is imperative here to recall the methodological point discussed earlier in the 
thesis about the status of the charter and, specifically, the work of Azzam Tamimi, 
who suggests that the charter is a historical document of little value to the study of 
Hamas' contemporary political positions. In the context of this chapter, Tamimi's 
work has a particular significance.  
According to him, some Hamas leaders realized early on that the language of the 
charter allowed critics to argue that movement had an anti-Jewish character and it was 
for this reason that they wanted to replace it.410 However, what we will show in this 
chapter is that Tamimi’s reading neglects a very important idea. The position of 
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Hamas exists, or existed, in a context of an overriding Islamic ideology that does not 
differentiate between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a colonial ideology. There 
is a strong tendency, as a result, that defines the struggle within the corresponding 
religious, ideological and civilizational context. One of the aspects that distinguishes 
this study from others, like Tamimi's, is that it takes into account the broader Islamic 
juristic sphere in which many of the MB's and Hamas' positions were formulated 
within. So, the process of formulation was not based on a "selective" reading of the 
Quranic and Prophetic traditions that deal with the Jews, but rather was a part of a 
mainstream Islamic juristic trend. This will be further discussed in this chapter.  
On this basis, statements such as “Jewish occupation” or “Jewish aggression” 
have a greater ability to awaken the Islamic emotions than statements like “Zionist 
occupation” or “Zionist aggression.” As one Hamas' leader puts it: 
 
National liberation movements, resort to their religious hereditary in the 
process of mobilizing and energizing their nations and to encourage them 
to give and to make sacrifices. For our part, there is no doubt, that we try 
to employ the stages that witnessed historical conflicts with the Jews to 
serve this phase of our resistance to the Zionist project, and to provide us 
with a solid ground to fight it and win against it.411  
 
The Quran and the Prophetic traditions are replete with statements casting the Jews in 
a critical light and reproaching them as a result of the early friction between them and 
the early Muslim community. Of course, there is no mention of Zionism in these 
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texts, as it had not yet taken form. So the issue of the theological nature of the 
struggle dates back to the prevailing and not necessarily the accurate, (as will be 
explained in this chapter) religious and historical memory that governs the Muslims' 
comprehension in this context. For example, the Quran points to the animosity of the 
Jews towards the Muslims. “Strongest among men in enmity to the Believers wilt 
thou find the Jews and Pagans”.412 Ibn Kathir, one of the most famous Muslim 
commentators of the Quran, presents a highly regarded opinion – given his 
preeminent status by Muslims as an authority in the field of explaining the Quran - of 
this verse: 
   
And that is for no reason except that the disbelief of the Jews is a disbelief of 
stubbornness and denial, being startled at the truth, contempt for the people, and 
belittling the bearers of knowledge. Therefore, they slew many of the Prophets to 
the extent that they tried killing the Messenger of Allah (i.e. Muhammad) more 
than once and they poisoned him, cast spells on him and gathered the forces of 
their allies from the polytheists against, consecutive curses of Allah be upon them 
to the Day of Resurrection.413 
 
This Quranic text is the basis of the modern Islamic consciousness, and in this 
context, it is not considered historical, but rather eternal. Therefore, the understanding 
of Hamas, at least in one point of its history, is but a natural extension of the 
prevailing understanding among Muslims. 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, it is not sufficient to take a selective 
approach to the declarations of Hamas’ leaders, whose statements support both 
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framing mechanisms to the conflict. The picture is far more complex. The difficulties 
are not the result of Hamas’ concepts, but rather its historical and juristic foundation. 
The resulting ambiguity in the understanding of Hamas and the Islamic current in 
general is nothing more than a reflection of the ambiguity within the historic and 
juristic interpretations. Thus, the matter is bigger than Hamas, as the difficulties 
actually extend beyond the movement to the ongoing arguments within Islamic 
thought in general. It is because of these competing views that we find some Hamas 
leaders who speak about the struggle as a national liberation movement and another 
current that continues to speak within the religious and Shari'a vocabularies.  
One point needs to be made clear here though, and that is that Hamas had never 
called officially, at any point of its existence, for the annihilation of the Jewish 
people, in Palestine or elsewhere. The charter itself distinguishes between hostility 
towards the state of Israel, that Hamas explicitly calls for bringing it down as a form 
of transgression and between the Jewish people as followers of a religion. Though this 
does not negate, that some Jews, according to Hamas' point of view, are transgressors 
by supporting and living in the state of Israel (i.e. occupied Palestine). This issue will 
be further discussed in this chapter.      
We will attempt to clarify these issues in this chapter through three sections. The 
first section will engage in a brief historical review of the Muslim-Jewish relations 
from the perspective of Muslim historiography. These Islamic texts are by no means 
the only sources available on the subject, but they are the ones that serve to inform the 
Islamic perspective.   
Such a review, which includes the Quranic references in the subject, the 
Prophetic traditions, and the Prophetic experience with the Jews and how they were 
understood by Muslim jurists and how and why they disagreed about them, will help 
us understand the divergent positions intellectually and chronologically within the 
MB and Hamas on the subject. Each view has a traditional Islamic jurisprudential 
support, which paved the way for Hamas to shift officially from one position to 
another within the system of the Islamic sphere. (i.e. without the need to rebel against 
it). This will be further explained in this chapter. 
This section is organized under three broad headings, namely: 1) The Non-
Violent Conflict: From Prophethood to the Migration. 2) Before the Violent Conflict: 
From Migration to Confrontation. 3) The Violent Conflict: Military Clash and the 
Defeat of the Jews by the Muslims.   
The second section will discuss how the Islamic jurisprudence understood and 
comprehended this early interaction between Islam/ Judaism and Muslim/ Jews. This 
will be illustrated through the two juristic readings: 1) 'The Theological Approach', 
that engaged Judaism and the Jews on a theological level. According to this view, 
Judaism is a "corrupted" religion first because of the process of alternation that it went 
through in history, and second because of the Jews rejection of Muhammad's 
Prophethood. This reading was the dominant reading when Jews lived (peacefully to a 
large extent) as the subject of the Islamic state. Within this reading scholars expressed 
different degrees of animosity towards the Jews, whether as a result of their religion 
or their transgression, as will be explained later on.  2) 'The Political Approach', 
which became dominant in the Islamic juristic discussion after the creation of the state 
of Israel on the land of Palestine. This reading sought to reread and to reinterpret the 
Quranic texts, the Prophetic traditions, and the early interaction between Islam and 
Judaism in light of the Palestinian question.     
The third section will delineate how previous readings affected the MB's and 
Hamas' comprehension of the struggle in two stages. It will also consider how they 
were able to move from one position to another based on changing political 
circumstances and the mechanisms by which this was accomplished. The first stage is 
'The Traditional View: A Battle Among Faiths'. The second stage is: 'The 
Contemporary View: Transgression Based Conflict'.   
 
Muslim-Jewish Relations in the Early Islamic Period 
 
The friction between Muslims and Jews dates back to the early years of Islam, even 
before the migration of the Prophet Muhammad to Medina. It is appropriate to stress 
here that the friction that preceded the stage of migration and the establishment of the 
Islamic state therein, was a non-violent conflict that lasted until the first confrontation 
between the two parties soon after the migration that opened the period of violent 
conflict. 
 
The Non-Violent Conflict: From Prophethood to the Migration  
 
Biographers of the Prophet Muhammad assert that the Jews of Arabia threatened his 
life from birth through childhood. There are even accounts of some Jewish leaders 
seeking him out during his childhood in order to kill him.413F414   
Some Muslims came to believe that the Jews of Arabia rejected Muhammad’s 
Prophethood because they had hoped the line of Prophets would continue through the 
lineage of the Israelites. Some Muslim historians, say that the migration of some of 
the Jewish tribes from Greater Syria to Yathrib (pre-Islamic Medina) was precipitated 
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by an interpretation of Hebrew scripture that foretold of a Prophet who would be sent 
from the Arabian Peninsula, to migrate to a city with many date palms, among other 
descriptions. Many believed this place to be Medina and proceeded to settle there 
while others settled in its outskirts.415  
According to Islamic sources, Jewish scholars at the time of Muhammad’s 
early Prophethood in Mecca attempted to test his authenticity by posing a series of 
theological questions that would challenge his claims. But Muslims believe that the 
responses were revealed by God and caused those plans to fail.416 A contemporary 
biographer writes of this event, “The attempt by the polytheist camp along with the 
Jews was in accord with their shared goals for bringing an end to the call of Islam.”417 
Indeed, some early Muslim scholars believe that the Jewish elders at the time knew 
the genuine nature of Prophet Muhammad and they informed the people of Mecca of 
that. As proof, these scholars point to the verse that came down in the Meccan period: 
“Is it not a Sign to them that the Learned of the Children of Israel knew it (as 
true)?”418  The exegesis of the Quran commentator, Tabari supports this view.419  
An important question that emerges in this period is why the portions of the 
Quran revealed in Mecca make mention of the Children of Israel despite their 
complete absence from Mecca? The answer to that question varies with historical 
context. Early Quranic commentators dealt with these verses in the context in which 
they occurred. In some instances, they informed the Prophet that he was not the first 
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to be rejected by his people. In others, they affirmed that the Children of Israel strayed 
from the truth brought by their Prophets. Nonetheless, we find some contemporary 
Muslim scholars writing from the perspective of the contemporary setting, laying the 
groundwork for the concept of the eternal struggle between Islam and Judaism that 
began during the Meccan period.420  
In spite of these sharp positions, we find that the Quran deals with the 
Children of Israel more objectively and peacefully in the Meccan period.421 However, 
the majority of these verses are found in the first part of the chapter of the Night 
Journey—the chapter that contains the clearest reference to the sanctity of Palestine. 
Contemporary scholars use many of the ideas that emphasize the complexity of the 
struggle between Islam and Judaism around their contemporary interaction in 
Palestine. That continuity is found in these verses: 
 
And We gave (clear) warning to the Children of Israel in the Book, that twice 
would they do mischief on the earth and be elated with mighty arrogance (and 
twice would they be punished)!” 
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When the first of the warnings came to pass, We sent against you Our servants 
given to terrible warfare. They entered the very inmost parts of your homes; 
and it was a warning (completely) fulfilled. 
Then did We grant you the Return as against them: We gave you increase in 
resources and sons, and made you the more numerous in man-power.  
If ye did well, ye did well for yourselves; if ye did evil, (ye did it) against 
yourselves. So when the second of the warnings came to pass, (We permitted 
your enemies) to disfigure your faces, and to enter your Temple as they had 
entered it before, and to visit with destruction all that fell into their power. 
It may be that your Lord may (yet) show Mercy unto you; but if ye revert (to 
your sins) We shall revert (to Our punishments): and We have made Hell a 
prison for those who reject (all Faith).422 
 
A survey of some of the opinions of the early exegetes shows that none of 
them put these verses in the realm of “political commentary” as some of the 
contemporary scholars have done. There is no doubt that this is the result of the 
difference in the times of commentaries and the change in the historical realities. We 
find that the great early commentators agreed that the two instances of spreading 
corruption, to which the verses refer, occurred in past history, centuries before 
Muhammad’s mission.422F423  
Because they did not take into consideration the complexity of the theological 
struggle between Muslims and Jews, these commentaries have not convinced 
contemporary scholars who have striven to develop a new reading. The Egyptian 
scholar and MB leader, Abdus Sattaar Fathullah Sa’eed, for instance, disputes the 
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traditional interpretations of these verses and identifies “the Book” mentioned in the 
verse as the Quran, rather than the Torah, as the early commentators thought.. On this 
reading, these verses become a foretelling of the future, not a recounting of the 
past.424 Therefore, the “second corruption’ refers to contemporary events.425 
Salah al-Khaalidi, a Jordanian MB leader of Palestinian origin, develops this 
approach. He employs the rules of the Arabic language and the linguistic structure of 
the verses to arrive at the same meaning reached by Sa’eed. Al-Khaalidi reads the 
words “Our servants” as to apply solely to the Muslims. As evidence, he cites their 
occurrence in other contexts in the Quran. Likewise, he argues that the conflict will be 
between the Jews and that same nation, supported by the prediction of a people who 
will be victorious over the Children of Israel, then will be defeated by them, before 
ultimately fulfilling the final promise and becoming victorious over them again. He 
identified this people as Muslims, who defeated the Jews during the Prophet’s time, 
and were subsequently defeated by them with the establishment of Israel. Al-Khaalidi 
believes that God’s will has been realized in gathering all of the Jews in the area of 
Palestine in preparation for the decisive stage represented in their defeat once again at 
the hands of the Muslims. He sees this as the realization of verses that occur later in 
the same chapter:  
 
And We said thereafter to the Children of Israel, ‘Dwell securely in the land 
(of promise)’: but when the second of the warnings came to pass, We gathered 
you together in a mingled crowd.” This is in accord with his interpretation of 
the verse: “Behold! thy Lord did declare that He would send against them, to 
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the Day of Judgment, those who would afflict them with grievous penalty. Thy 
Lord is quick in retribution.426 
  
The Muslim scholar and Jordanian MB leader of Palestinian origin, 
Muhammad Abu Faaris is of the opinion that the Meccan verses give descriptions of 
the Children of Israel to provide Muslims with the true character of Jews in 
preparation for their future dealings. He considered the logic of the Quran here 
suggests, “dealings of the Muslims with the Jews must be with insight and knowledge 
so that they don’t fall into their blasphemy, cunning, and deception or get burned by 
the fire of the treachery and corruption nor be corrupted by them.”427 
This period lasted for thirteen years in the Meccan era and will come to an end 
with the immigration of the Prophet and his companions to Yathrib where a new 
phase of relationship and a direct interaction between the two parties will start.   
 
Before the Violent Conflict: From Migration to Confrontation 
 
Following the period of persecution of the early Muslim community in Mecca, the 
Prophet departed the town of his birth in search of a place in which he would have the 
necessary protection to deliver his message in safety and security. He was able to 
convince a visiting delegation from the tribe of Al-Khazraj in Yathrib to accept his 
message and to promise to assist him if he requested it. It was not long before the 
companions of the Prophet and then Muhammad himself migrated to Yathrib. The 
city became known as “Al-Madina Al-Munawwara” (The Illuminated City) or 
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Medina. From this moment, the Medina period in the history of Islam began. This 
period witnessed the formation of the nucleus of the first Islamic state and the 
beginning of the conflict with the Jewish tribes.428 
When he took control of affairs in Medina, the Prophet hastened to issue a 
document (i.e. constitution) governing the relations between the people of the city, its 
population of Muslims, Jews and polytheists. Perhaps the most relevant item in this 
document to the discussion at hand is that it considered the Jews of Medina citizens of 
the Islamic state. It states: “And whoever follows us from the Jews, they shall have 
aid and assistance, will not be wronged nor will there be any aid to their enemies 
against them.” Remarkably this document considered the Jews, with all their tribes 
and subdivisions, “a nation with the believers”.429 That document clearly delineated 
the duties of the Muslims and the Jews in Medina. Likewise it acknowledged the 
principle of freedom of belief, religious practice and worship for the two groups. It 
required the Muslims to defend the Jews of Medina. It also obliged the Jews to share 
in the defense of Medina with the Muslims if it became the target of an enemy attack, 
and to share in the war.430 The language of the document was clear that whoever 
violated one of its clauses carried the responsibility for their actions.431  
It is worth mentioning here that the preceding facts present an important 
challenge to some Muslim scholars who argue that the basis of Muslim animosity 
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toward the Jews is in their beliefs, not their actions. This logic is not supported by the 
constitution, which displayed Muhammad’s attempt to establish a cohesive, united 
community in Medina.  The natural extension of this argument would be for the 
Prophet to have made war with the Jewish tribes of Medina, since the Meccan verses 
of the Quran were critical of the Jews at times. Instead, we find that Muhammad 
clearly delineates in the document that the basis of any conflict would be 
transgression not belief and that transgression and transgression alone would require 
retribution: “except he who does wrong and sins, he only destroys himself and his 
household.”432 This distinction will assist us to understand the juristic debate over the 
basis of the animosity of the Muslims towards the Jews and whether it is based on 
belief or transgression as will be further discussed in this chapter.  
The biographies of the Prophet are replete with examples of the animosity 
displayed by the Jews of Medina in the early period following the Migration. These 
are described to some extent as incidents of envy, given Muhammad’s success in 
Medina and the refusal of the Jewish leaders to believe in his message. They are also 
described as a conspiracy by the Jewish tribes, due to their scorn of the new religion, 
by inciting partisanship and doubt. There are many instances in which they posed 
questions intended to denounce his Prophethood and expose him as a fraud before his 
followers. The recorded biography of the Prophet deals with these events in great 
detail. They confirm the animosity harboured by Jewish leaders for Islam, its Prophet 
and the Muslims, even providing evidence of alliances made with the enemies of the 
Muslims. Therefore, they acted toward the nullification of the agreement that 
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organized relations between them, which eventually resulted in military clashes in 
stages.433  
Quranic verses that date to the Medinan period chronicles some of these early 
encounters, often casting them in a critical light.434 Once again, however, 
contemporary Muslim scholars extend the Quran’s historical description of the Jews 
of Medina to the contemporary context. They insist that, “the speech of the Quran 
here is all-inclusive. It has a wider range than the Jews of the peninsula and those who 
were contemporary to its revelation.”435 It is the passionate Islamic ideological current 
today that leans to the view that the struggle in Palestine is an eternal battle between 
the faiths. Nevertheless, after the tensions between the parties reached their limit, the 
ground was set for a violent clash between the Muslims and Jews of Medina.  
 
The Violent Conflict: Military Clash and the Defeat of the Jews by the Muslims 
 
In spite of what Muslims perceived as strong animosity from the Jews of Medina, the 
confrontation generally remained limited to the spheres of heated debates over 
theology. The relationship did not reach the stage of military conflict until after what 
Muslims considered a direct violation of the clause of the covenant that governed 
relations between them. 
The major military clashes that occurred between the Muslims and the Jewish 
Medina are represented by four events: 
 
1) The tribe of Qainuqaa’ (Year Two after the Migration)  
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2) The tribe of An-Nadeer (Year Four after the Migration)  
3) The tribe of Quraithah (Year Five after the Migration) 
4) The raid of Khaibar (Year Seven after the Migration)  
 
This chronology is significant for a number of reasons. Perhaps most 
importantly, it is evidence that the Prophet did not hold all of the Jewish tribes 
accountable for the offences committed by one of them. This supports the view that 
the conflict is based on transgression, not differences of belief. When some of the 
tribes violated a clause of the constitution that governed relations between the two 
parties, he did not use it as grounds for a campaign against all of Jews. But how did 
the military collision start and why? 
The tribe of Qainuqaa’ was the first of the Jewish factions in Medina to 
confront the Muslims after they broke the covenant, according to the Islamic 
sources.436 This conflict occurred on account of a transgression against a Muslim 
woman and the killing of a Muslim man.437 Their penalty after the defeat at the hands 
of the Muslims was the tribe’s expulsion from Medina.438 Hardly two years passed 
before the second collision. This time it was with the Jewish tribe of An-Nadeer. 
Islamic sources present two reasons for the clash. The first involves a violation of the 
covenant that required them not to give refuge to the enemy of the Muslims. They 
received some of the leaders of Quraish439 and exposed them some of the weaknesses 
in the military defenses of Medina.440 As for the second reason, it is reported as 
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assassination attempt against the Prophet Muhammad.441 Their punishment too, was 
to leave Medina.442 
The third confrontation was far more violent than the previous ones. It 
occurred when the tribe of Quraithah, according to Islamic sources, broke the 
covenant with the Messenger in the Battle of the Confederates, not only by 
abandoning their obligations to defend Medina, but also aiding the invading armies.443 
Once the external enemies were defeated, the Quraithah were forced to face the 
Muslims alone.444 Their punishment, justified in the traditional texts by the severity of 
the offense, was that the tribesmen were killed, their wealth divided and their women 
and children taken as prisoners.445  
By effectively dealing with the tribe of Quraithah, the Jewish presence in 
Medina had become negligible, with the exception of a few individuals who were 
granted safety and freedom.446 
The final military conflict involved the Jews of Khaibar, a city close to 
Medina. Sources affirm that the cause for the raid led by the Prophet in the seventh 
year after Migration was their giving refuge to the leaders of An-Nadeer, whom the 
Messenger had previously expelled from Medina. The An-Nadeer, together with 
support from the Jews of Khaibar, played a central role in mobilizing Quraish against 
the Muslims in the Battle of the Confederates, and made their wealth available to the 
advancing armies. In addition, they exploited their relations with the tribe of 
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Quraithah in order to help the Confederates. Thus, Khaibar became a great danger to 
the Muslims and their young state.447  
After the Muslim army laid siege to them, the Jews of Khaibar offered to 
surrender and vacate the cotu. The Messenger agreed to that but then allowed them to 
remain on the condition that they would improve the land and cultivate it.448 With the 
defeat of the Jews of Khaibar the Jews of the villages surrounding Khaibar, like 
Fadak, Taymaa’ and Waadi Al-Quraa, hastened to make peace with the Messenger 
who allowed them to remain on their lands in exchange for a payment given to the 
Muslims.  
With the end of the battle of Khaibar in the early Islamic period, the stage of 
military clashes would cease to characterize Muslim-Jewish relations until the 
establishment of the state of Israel in the middle of the twentieth century. However, 
this idea of cessation assumes that the conflict in Palestine is solely a religious one. 
Yet, although this period signaled the end of Muslim-Jewish military clashes, the 
ideological and the religious conflict remained intense during the intervening periods. 
A new factor in the thinking of the Muslims would shape their consciousness towards 
Judaism. Muslims developed a deep distrust of Jewish communities, believing them 
to be behind conspiracies and intrigues of some of the most important events in the 
history of Islam.449 
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 Muslim-Jewish Relations: Between the Theological and the Political 
 
The result of these initial interactions and the subsequent co-existence of Muslims and 
Jews within a Muslim state had two main components. The first, which was 
predominant before the rise of the Palestinian cause takes a juristic and theological 
approach to Muslim-Jewish relations. As for the second, it is represented by the 
political commentaries stemming from the contemporary conflict in Palestine. The 
following discussion defines and contrasts these approaches. 
 
1) The Theological Approach: 
 
As we previously indicated, Muslims believe that Judaism, although a message 
revealed by God to the many Prophets, was corrupted with time; and that when given 
the opportunity to correct their faith through the mission of Muhammad, their leaders 
rejected him, despite knowing with certainty that he was a Messenger of God. 
Arrogance and envy prevented them from accepting him. In addition to several 
Quranic verses from the Medina period, some Muslim scholars point to traditions by 
the Prophet Muhammad that all conclude that the Jews knew with certainty that he 
was the final Prophet about whom their religious texts foretold.450  
                                                                                                                                            
of the Muslims regard the Jews as being behind many of the tribulations and calamities that have 
afflicted and still afflict the Muslim nation today, such as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924.  
For more details see: Ibn Kathir, Al bidaya wal nihaya. Ibid., Volume 3- 4, volume 4., pp.207-210. 
Also see: Ibn Alatheer, Alkamel fi Altareekh, [The Complete in History], volume 4. (Cairo, Egypt. 
Idaret Altiba'a Almuneeriya. 1st Edition, 1938.) pp.340-50. Also, Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The 
Ideology of Hamas. Ibid., pp. 29-37 and 158. 
450 For example, the Quran points to this reality, as the Muslims see it, in a clear text saying: “The 
people of the Book know this as they know their own sons; but some of them conceal the truth which 
they themselves know.” The Holy Quran. Ibid., Surat Al-Baqarah, chapter 2, verse 146. Ibid., p. 60.  
On the basis of these factors, early and medieval Islamic scholars developed an 
Islamic jurisprudence. For instance, in his commentary of the Quran, the great scholar 
Ibn Hazm interprets the following verses: “Say: "O People of the Book! Ye have no 
ground to stand upon unless ye stand fast by the Law, the Gospel, and all the 
revelation that has come to you from your Lord.”451 He stresses that “There is no way 
for them to establish it because of abrogation of what they omitted from it, except by 
believing in Muhammad. Only then will they be establishing the Torah and the 
Bible.”452 Similarly, the Muslim scholar al-Sharistaani wrote: “Know that the Torah 
comprises evidence showing that the Shari'a of our Prophet Muhammad is true and 
the one who brought their Shari'a (Moses) is truthful despite their corrupting, 
changing and modifying it whether it was a corruption in writing and copying or in 
the commentary and interpretation.”453  As for Ibn Taymiyyah, his view is: “The 
origin of the disbelief of the Jews is the lack of action according to knowledge … that 
is: that the origin of the disbelief of the Jews is from the aspect of absence of acting 
on the basis of knowledge, so they know the truth and they don’t follow it, whether 
practically, or in words or deeds.” 454 
Islamic jurisprudence does not stop at the limits of its theological origins. Rather, 
we find the early scholars deriving ideas from this base drawing on two grounds. The 
first is that Islam, as the religion of the creator, chosen for all mankind, was intended 
to supersede all other religions and creeds. The second states that Islam is the final 
religion of God inheriting all that preceded it of divine messages. It is on the basis of 
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these assumptions that substantial scholarship has been devoted to the question of the 
relationship between Muslims and other faith communities (The Jews and Christians). 
While we do not find disagreement among the scholars in opposing and fighting the 
Arab polytheists until they accept Islam, there are differences in their treatment of 
those verses and Prophetic traditions about Jews and Christians.  
The Quran and the Prophetic traditions have placed special procedures for dealing 
with these other communities. It is possible to marry with them, eat their food, and 
Muslims are expected to debate them only with the best of manners.455 The real 
question that emerges is: what are the appropriate means by which to interact with 
them in the context of peace or war? 
Here the Islamic jurisprudence falls into two broad currents. The first considers 
the relationship as one of continuous war because of their corrupt beliefs and refusal 
to accept Islam. The second opinion considers the relationship as one of peace and 
that war is only to be waged in the event of transgression.456  
Those who support each of these views point to a number of Quranic verses 
and Prophetic traditions. What concerns us here is how each of these positions is 
justified. Supporters of the first opinion cite the verses in the chapter of Al-Taubah 
concerning violent confrontation, believing that they abrogate all previous verses in 
other chapters that contain freedom of worship for all.457 Those who maintain the 
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457 The Holy Quran, Surat At-Tauba. Ibid., chapter 5. Verse 29 states: "Fight those who believe not in 
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second view reject the notion of abrogation, citing a lack of evidence.458 They insist 
that the Quran is clear in many places that the only just cause for warfare is to repel 
aggression, not initiate it.459   
In spite of their disagreements on this issue, the two parties come together on 
the principle that Jewish and Christian communities are legally required to pay the 
Jizya (i.e. poll tax) to the Muslim authorities.460 Jizya in Islam, as it was applied 
historically, is: 
 
 An amount of wealth paid by whoever is capable of fighting among the 
Jews and Christians (non-Muslim subjects) in the land of the Muslims in 
exchange for their protection. Exempted from it are the aged men, women, 
children, the aged and the disabled as well as those who fight in the ranks 
of the Muslims. The Muslims are required to pay Zakat that is taken from 
the wealthy and given to the poor and needy.461  
 
The contemporary juristic Debate  
 
These historical data are particularly relevant because the juristic debate on this issue 
– the fundamental disagreement over whether to confront non-Muslims on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                            
Messenger, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, from among the People of the Book, until they pay 
the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued." Ibid, pp. 506-07. For more details 
about this opinion see: Imam Al Shafi'i, Alom. [The Mother], (Beirut, Lebanon: Darul Al qutub 
Al'ilmila. 1st Edition, 1993.) Volume 4, pp.240-53. Also see: Ibn Ahmad Ibn Qudamah. (Al Mughni). 
Ibid., Volume 10, pp. 379-383.  
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461 Almawsoua'a Alfiqhiyia, [the Fiqh Encyclopedia], (Kuwait, Kuwait, The Ministry of Endowments 
and Islamic Affairs, volume 15. 2nd Edition, 1986.), p. 149. 
their faith or to develop peaceful relations – is still live.462 The prominent MB thinker 
Sayyid Qutb, for instance, argues in defence of the notion that the battle of the 
Muslims with others is a theological one: 
 
The battle between the Muslim nation and its enemies, before everything, 
is a battle of this belief. And even when its enemies want to overcome it 
on earth, in production, economics, and raw material, they try to 
overcome it in belief and ideology because they know from long 
experience that they will not achieve anything they want while the 
Ummah is holding fast to its faith and beliefs.463  
 
On this basis, he deduces that “the battle between Islam and the Jews is still 
ongoing and will continue because the Jews will not accept anything but the 
destruction of this religion.”464 Two prominent MB leaders, however, disagree with 
this opinion. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian scholar who presently lives in Qatar 
considers this confrontational attitude:  
 
A claim built on short-sightedness and narrow horizons in the appraisal of the 
events of the (Prophet’s) biography, a view of it from a narrow angle, lacking 
consideration of all the dimensions. They lack a contextual understanding of 
the causes of the battles and the accompanying circumstances that illuminate 
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the way for the researcher who seeks the truth and who is not partisan to an 
opinion and refuses to be drawn away from it.465 
 
Al-Qaradawi also rejects the notion that hostile relations between Muslims and 
Jews today are based on belief. Rather, they are built on transgression. Faisal al-
Mawlawi, leader of the Lebanese MB, arrives at the following conclusion after 
examining claims from the opposing side: “from this point of departure, we see that 
what is attributed to the majority of jurists is understood in this age other than what 
they intended in their eras. Rather, we say that the principle (of peaceful relations) is 
considered the fundamental view of Islam for human relations, and is in accord with 
the intent of our jurists in their eras."466  
Though the early Muslim scholars disagreed about what constituted a just 
conflict with other religions, they all agreed that defending against aggression (even if 
it comes from Muslims) an obligation on every Muslim.467 This universally held 
opinion foreshadows the legal justification for the resistance against Israel’s 
occupation of Palestine by the MB, Hamas, and Muslims in general. The relevance of 
this point will be made much clearer in the next chapter.  
It is worth noting here that this juristic dispute that occurred historically within 
the ranks of Muslim scholars did not prevent Christians and Jews from living in 
general peace under Islamic rule. It is well documented, for example, that when the 
                                                 
465 http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/contemporary/2003/07/article04e.shtml 
466 http://www.mawlawi.net/Kutub.asp?cid=111&cc=aaa 
467 They deduce this opinion from the Quranic verse in Surat Al-Hujurat, chapter 49, verse 9. Ibid, 
p. 1590. The verse states: "If two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace 
between them: but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye (all) 
against the one that transgresses until it complies with the Command of Allah; but if it complies, then 
make peace between them with justice, and be fair: for Allah loves those who are fair (and just)."     
Muslims of Andalusia were defeated by the Spain’s reconquista, the Jews of Islamic 
Spain found refuge in the Islamic states of North Africa and other parts of the Muslim 
world.468   
  This well-established historical precedent is particularly relevant to Hamas, 
which has never advocated the extermination of the Jews in Palestine, but rather 
advocates a return to the era of peaceful coexistence, albeit within the framework of 
an Islamic state. This is based on Hamas' belief that Islam is the only religion that 
guarantees religious and political freedom.469 
 
2) The Political Approach:  
 
As opposed to the juristic theological–based approach to the issue of relations with 
the People of the Book, the contemporary political reading is put forward in the 
discussion on Palestine. Whereas the former approach addresses the issue in a 
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theoretical frame, (since the interaction with religious minorities was within an 
Islamic state), the latter approach, according to its advocates, is more tangible, 
because the contemporary political reality is one of Jewish transgression against 
Muslims, as this approach argues.  
In the preceding discussion, we addressed many of the political applications 
presented by the advocates of the juristic interpretation of the historical nature of 
Muslim-Jewish relations. One of the most central arguments in this regard refers to 
the “two corruptions” by the children of Israel mentioned in the Quran. Traditional 
and contemporary commentaries on this issue have differed, with the contemporary 
commentaries applied to the Palestinian case today. This reading will be examined in 
further detail below, as it presents the ideological backdrop for the Islamists, 
including the ideological basis for Hamas during one period in its history. 
Proponents of the political approach consider the struggle to be an eternal one 
between truth and falsehood. Husam An-Nasir, author of one of the early texts 
articulating the views of Hamas, crystallizes this notion. He writes that the battle “for 
the liberation of Palestine is not a battle of a year or two, and it is not a battle of an 
occupied homeland or usurped land only. Likewise it is not limited in time and place, 
but rather it is a battle of the civilizational and historic struggle.”470 Based on his 
premise, the Islamic project seeks to return the struggle to its roots as an all-
encompassing Islamic struggle.471 He concludes that Palestine, since it was conquered 
by the second caliph, has taken centre stage in the eternal struggle between truth and 
falsehood. It symbolizes “the real picture of the continuous battle between truth and 
its supporters of the Muslims and falsehood and its various supporters, and at their 
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head are the Jews.”472  Based on this analysis the holders of this ideology criticize 
those who paint the issue as though it were “an issue of national dignity or a struggle 
over interests, or over the rights of a people, or over land and dirt, or other than that of 
false slogans whose effects do not go beyond the eardrum.”473   
Sayyid Qutb affirms this interpretation, arguing that the battle between 
Muslims and Jews will continue into the future: 
  
(b)ecause the Jews will not be satisfied with anything other than the 
destruction of this religion. And when they are defeated by Islam, they will 
fight it with conspiracies, intrigue, inciting their agents in darkness. As for 
today, the battle has increased in voracity and focus after they came from 
every direction and announced that they established the state of Israel. Indeed 
their desires for Jerusalem were far removed, but today they are only footsteps 
away. Their desires will not be restrained except if Islam subdues them.474  
 
Thus, according to this reading, the battle between the Muslims and the Jews 
will take place in Palestine, not on it. That is because it is but a way station in the 
eternal battle between truth and falsehood. 474F475 
The contemporary Muslim scholar Abdul Fattah Idris presents one of the 
clearest opinions of a conflict based on fundamental differences of belief, not 
transgression. He argues that: 
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The claim that the war with the Jews is a war of usurpation of land is a false 
claim that has no foundation in soundness. Rather, the reality confirms that our 
war with the Jews is a theological war of the first degree. And that is because 
their religion dictates to them, as they say, to establish the Promised Land, 
which no one should inhabit but the Jews. Realizing what the rulings of this 
religion dictate, they usurped the land, drove people out, judaized the holy 
lands, took the lives of people, and more. For that, we fight them not just to 
retrieve the land, but rather on account of the beliefs that they hold and have 
taken root in their minds generation after generation. So, fighting them from a 
theological aspect is a type of fighting the disbelievers, and fighting the 
disbelievers is obligatory on every responsible Muslim in all the regions of the 
world.476 
 
There are scholars, however, who oppose this understanding. Al-Qaradawi, for 
instance, frames the struggle as one over land (i.e. transgression), not belief. He says: 
  
The struggle between us and the Jews is a struggle over land, not on account 
of their Jewishness. Because they are People of the Book, it is permissible to 
eat their food and marry their women… and the Jews lived as the 
responsibility of the Muslims for long centuries. But since the Jews had 
designs on our land, the land of Palestine, land of the Night Journey and 
Ascension, land of the Farthest Mosque, and since they planned to establish a 
state on the remains of the farthest mosque, the battle began between us and 
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them. 
 
But the position of al-Qaradawi remains in agreement with the general 
outlines of the political approach when it comes to some of the religious aspects of the 
struggle, though on different grounds (i.e. transgression not faith). He adds:  
 
But this does not mean that it is not a religious struggle or an ideological one. 
There is a defect in this issue. Negating that it is not a struggle of beliefs does 
not negate that it is a religious and ideological struggle, because we are a 
religious nation and the Jews are a religious nation, so our struggle on earth is 
mixed with religion. The Muslim, when he defends a land, he is not just 
defending dirt, he is defending the land of Islam, the abode of Islam.477  
 
This opinion of al-Qaradawi is addressed in greater detail during the 
discussion of Hamas’ position on the issue, where the debate surrounding the two 
opposing opinions found its way into Hamas' thought. This extension of the juristic 
argument helped transform the Islamic movement's thought from a purely theological 
basis to the point where Hamas presents itself as a national liberation movement. It 
allowed Hamas to present itself as fighting transgression, occupation and 
colonization, though it remains within its Islamic context, which considers resisting 
transgression a Shari'a matter with its own jurisprudence. 
The most prominent arguments supporting the political approach rely on 
several Prophetic traditions concerning an impending clash between Muslims and 
Jews. These traditions are believed to have stumped early scholars because of the 
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absence of certain facts that are observable on the ground today, at least in the eyes of 
some contemporary scholars. Among these traditions is one that predicts an end-time 
scenario of confrontation between Muslims and Jews. Several variations exist, but a 
primary one says: “the Hour will not be established until you fight the Jews until the 
stone behind which is a Jew will say: O Muslim this is a Jew behind me, kill him.”478  
Such traditions are employed to denote the inevitability of confrontation 
between Muslims and Jews, emphasising that it is the Jews who will initiate hostilities 
with the Muslims. A tradition reports that “Jews will fight you and you will dominate 
them.”479 Given contemporary political conditions, Palestine is the logical setting for 
such an event. Building on the language of these traditions, some scholars strengthen 
the theological dimension of the conflict, addressing the issue to all adherent 
Muslims. According to them, there is a certain degree of inevitability that stems from 
these traditions. They leave no doubt that a confrontation will take place and that the 
destiny of the Jews is defeat at the hands of the Muslims. Just as the Prophetic 
prediction that the Jews will dominate Palestine has come to pass, so too will the 
foretelling of their defeat.480 The conduct of the enemy is frequently used as a rallying 
cry for the Muslims. With regard to Zionism, al-Qaradawi argues that the Jews: 
  
Took the matter seriously with no slacking therein. They planned, determined, 
agreed and executed, deriving their power from the teachings of the Torah and 
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the rulings of the Talmud. As for us, Islam continues to be remote from our 
battle with them. In addition, many of us continue to want it as a nationalistic 
battle, no place for religion therein and having no relationship with it. They 
gather under the banner of Judaism and we do not gather under the banner of 
Islam, they respect the Sabbath and we do not respect Al-Jumu’ah, they 
assemble with the name of Moses and we do not assemble with the name of 
Muhammad! It is necessary that we speak frankly to ourselves: if we want to 
realize the promised battle of victory then we must change what is the matter 
with ourselves so that Allah will change what is wrong with us. We must fight 
them with the likes of what they fight us with. 480F481 
 
Having detailed the main interpretations of Muslim-Jewish relations as 
developed by the early scholars and the traditionalists, it is possible to address more 
accurately the interpretation of the MB and Hamas. Though they largely adhere to the 
standard juristic and political interpretations, Hamas’ thought in particular has 
developed within the political field, from framing the conflict in theological terms to a 
new, more politically attuned definition.  
 
The Struggle as Defined by The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas  
 
Given the previous discussion of the legacy of Muslim-Jewish relations and their 
effect on contemporary politics, it is something of a surprise that the MB has 
historically, at an early stage, treated the Palestinian cause as an issue of national 
liberation from a foreign colonialist project. According to this early reasoning, the 
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conflict was not religious in character or directed against the Jews in particular. As 
was previously mentioned, al-Qaradawi is one of this view’s most prominent 
proponents. Though, once again, according to this view, this does not negate the 
issue’s religious dimension, which is based on the sanctity of Palestine, its status as an 
occupied Muslim land. In addition, as al-Qaradawi argues, both Jews and Muslims are 
religious nations, however, the animosity of Muslims towards them is not based on 
their faith but rather on their transgression and occupation of Palestine in the name of 
their religion.  
Hasan al-Banna presented the most prominent expression of this initial 
understanding. The literature of the MB highlights the testimony of al-Banna before 
the “British-American Investigative Committee” on March 5th, 1946. In that 
testimony, al-Banna affirms that the dispute of the Muslims with the Jews is not 
religious in nature, as the Quran encourages dealing with them in honesty and peace, 
and Islam is a way of life for humanity before it is for a nation. Al-Banna concluded 
that the MB was opposed to the immigration of Jews to Palestine because of its 
political and economic dangers “and it is our right that Palestine should be Arabic.”482 
However, this was consistent with the view of the sanctity of Palestine and the 
necessity of its liberation from Zionist occupation, since “Palestine is not the cause of 
a geographical homeland in itself, but it is the cause of Islam.”483 The demand of the 
MB during the period of the British Mandate over Palestine was represented in 
“stopping the Jewish immigration and complete independence (for Palestine) on the 
basis of an honorable agreement. This agreement should guarantee the rights of the 
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Arabs and deals with the Jews therein as a minority in all the cities.”483 F484 
According to al-Banna, the People of the Book enjoy “what the Muslims enjoy 
of rights and obligations on the condition that they do not conspire to destroy the 
unity of the Muslims.”484F485 For, al-Banna hostilities are rooted in transgression, not 
belief. 485F486 This understanding is in accord with the juristic presentation that we 
previously presented which espouses that the relations between the Muslims and 
others are based on peace, not war. 
The relatively moderate view of al-Banna, however, would not dominate the 
MB ideology, which changed with the developments on the ground in Palestine. The 
establishment of Israel as a state altered the balance of power and with it the terms 
under which Muslims and Jews interacted for the first time in history. It was 
accompanied by the spilling of Arab blood and the driving out of Palestinians. These 
events brought the historical and theological dimensions to the discussion. In other 
words, they precipitated a return to the concept of “the comprehensive struggle.” 
After 1948, MB ideology drew on Islamic religious principles to place the Jews in a 
special status. “So, the Muslim Brotherhood believes that the struggle between the 
Muslims and the Jews is a struggle that has a special nature that separates it from 
other international struggles. It does not see a peaceful means of solving it because it 
is a continuation of the conflict between Islam and Judaism since the establishment of 
the first Islamic state in the age of the Messenger.”486F487 Some of the most prominent 
figures of the MB were convinced that “every Zionist is a Jew, and events have 
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confirmed that every Jew is a Zionist. That reality became as clear as the sun in the 
bright day and there is no denying it.”488 As Nusse notes, the Islamists did not 
distinguish between Israelis, Zionists and Jews. Rather "they use (used) theses terms 
alternately and synonymously in their texts."489   
Since 1948 and especially with the introduction of Qutb’s writings this 
framework crystallized. This trend remained dominant within MB thought for 
decades, until the emergence of a strong Islamic juristic trend that opposed these ideas 
and attempted a return to its roots, represented in the view of al-Banna.  
 
The Traditional View: A Battle Among Faiths 
 
As an extension of the MB’s ideological school, Hamas was not immune from the 
juristic controversy over the nature of the conflict. Nevertheless, Hamas' early 
treatment of the question differed from that of the MB. If the MB began with the 
premise that transgression, not belief, was the basis for hostilities, Hamas questioned 
that notion. Having been established during the late eighties, Hamas emerged at the 
height of the internal debate within the MB over the grounds for hostilities and its 
justification. 
Due to this internal debate at the time Hamas' charter would reflect the 
ambiguity, confusion, and sometimes the contradictions in its views on the issue 
during the early years of its establishment. At the outset it speaks of “the Zionist war,” 
while also addressing Jews in general. The dominant language in the document, 
however, is religious in nature, supported with the previously cited verses and 
traditions. The charter also promotes the concept of the “Comprehensive Battle.” It 
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makes references to the notion that the frontlines of this struggle extend beyond 
military confrontation, to the fields of arts, politics and media.490 The Hamas leader 
Ibrahim Maqadma, insists on that very idea in his description of the struggle as “a 
civilizational struggle with every meaning of the word and with what the word 
civilization implies of spiritual, cultural, social, economical, military and political 
meanings.”491 The charter adopts the juristic view that says that the struggle in 
Palestine, in reality, is a struggle between truth and falsehood. “As for the objectives: 
They are the fighting against the false, defeating it and vanquishing it so that justice 
could prevail, homelands be retrieved (to their owners) and from its mosques would 
the voice of the mu'azen (calls for prayer) emerge declaring the establishment of the 
state of Islam, so that people and things would return each to their right places.”492   
However, in the midst of this wavering and ambiguity the charter indicates in 
one of its articles that Hamas does not engage in hostilities on the basis of beliefs, but 
rather on the basis of actions. Indeed, this article negates the prevalent belief that 
Hamas seeks to extinguish the Jewish people, a frequently leveled accusation that is 
not endorsed by the charter of Hamas or any of its declarations. The group does 
discuss bringing an end to “Israel,” which, to Palestinians, represents an imperialistic 
idea and an occupying state. It is not representative of Judaism as a whole or the 
Jewish people: 
  
The Islamic Resistance Movement is a humanistic movement. It takes care of 
human rights and is guided by Islamic tolerance when dealing with the 
followers of other religions. It does not antagonize anyone of them except if it 
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is antagonized by it or stands in its way to hamper its moves and waste its 
efforts.  
Under the wing of Islam, it is possible for the followers of the three religions - 
Islam, Christianity and Judaism - to coexist in peace and quiet with each other. 
Peace and quiet would not be possible except under the wing of Islam. Past 
and present history are the best witness to that.  
It is the duty of the followers of other religions to stop disputing the 
sovereignty of Islam in this region, because the day these followers should 
take over there will be nothing but carnage, displacement and terror. Everyone 
of them is at variance with his fellow-religionists, not to speak about followers 
of other religionists. Past and present history are full of examples to prove this 
fact… 
Islam confers upon everyone his legitimate rights. Islam prevents the incursion 
on other people's rights.493  
 
The charter further affirms Hamas' opposition to political initiatives, peace 
plans and international conferences that require relinquishing parts of historical 
Palestine and are but “ways of setting the infidels in the land of the Muslims as 
arbitrators.”494 The essence of Hamas’ struggle, therefore, is the land not the belief, at 
least according to this article. "Jihad, as it set forth in the Hamas charter, is designed 
to prevent the infidels from ruling over the land of Islam. Thus, the issue is not jihad 
against the infidels per se.”495  
Based on these two articles, Hamas’ ideology emerges from the juristic view 
that places the source of hostilities with the Jews in their transgressions. In fact, the 
                                                 
493 Ibid., Article 31.  
494 Ibid., Article 13. 
495 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Ibid., p. 44.   
logic of these two articles remained central to the scholars who believe that minorities 
in Islamic areas must submit to the rule of Islam. The founder of Hamas, Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin says as much in many of his pronouncements.496 In spite of the 
importance of these two articles, they are contradicted by some other overriding 
articles and statements of Hamas leaders that emphasize the religious nature of the 
conflict. Thus these two articles did not represent the official position within Hamas 
in its early years of existence. A close document to Hamas intended to introduce the 
group expresses this traditional position in no uncertain terms. It states that Hamas: 
 
(c)onsiders its struggle with the Jews in Palestine a natural extension of the 
struggle between truth and falsehood since the beginning of creation. It 
believes it is a link in the path of Jewish conspiracy and corruption… against 
Islam and its civilization in particular… Based on that it does not see that the 
battle in Palestine with the Jewish enemy is limited to Palestine, limited in 
terms of its objective or boundaries, or limited in extent in this decade only 
and with this generation alone. It believes that the battle with the Jews in 
Palestine is the centre of the battle between the Islamic nation and the Jewish 
enemy... it is an ideological battle with civilizational dimensions.497 
 
Hamas affirms this view in a letter to the fifth meeting of the Islamic 
jurisprudence Assembly held in Kuwait on October 12th, 1988. “The Jewish presence 
in the Islamic land of Palestine does not threaten only Palestine, or only the 
Palestinian people, rather it threatens the Islamic and Arabic nation altogether. It 
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threatens its religion, its beliefs and its civilization. It will not stop at a boundary, 
rather it will continue in its untiring efforts to infiltrate the Islamic nation and smash 
the pillars of its existence aiming to establish its civilization on the demolition of 
Islamic civilization.”498 
The religious aspect of the struggle remained central to Hamas’ frame in its 
early years. The struggle, according to an early Hamas leader “is from an Islamic 
Quranic point of view … Whether we wanted it or not, it is an ideological and 
religious struggle … Neither the Islamist nor the Arabs will undertake a battle and be 
victorious unless their guiding principle is Islam in response to disbelief.”499 Another 
early document considers the "Jewish occupation" of Palestine “the practical 
application of the Jewish Torah concept that urges the relocation of the Jews from the 
various lands into the Promised Land … And the state of the Zionist entity was 
established in the heart of our blessed land and it has not been absent from its mind 
for a second that its long range goal is the establishment of Hebrew civilization on the 
ruins of the Islamic civilization.”500 
Indeed, early Hamas documents make frequent use of traditional juristic 
interpretations for what is essentially a contemporary political issue. In 1988, during 
the annual celebration of the Night Journey and Ascension, the movement announced 
its support for the contemporary political interpretation of the struggle and the concept 
of the “two corruptions” and its relation to the reality of the contemporary cause of 
Palestine. The case of the two is defined as “corruption of governing and authority in 
the Blessed Land. What corruption is greater than this tyranny and assumption of 
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authority? They are murderers of even their Prophets, so how will they be kind or 
merciful to us?”501 In a declaration issued in 1990, Hamas deems the second 
corruption as the contemporary situation in Palestine.502  
The use of religious language in Hamas’ declarations also appears more 
frequently following clashes between Palestinians and Israelis.503 For example, in 
October 1990 more than twenty Palestinians were killed in Jerusalem when resisting 
an attempt by Jewish extremists to invade the Al-Aqsa Mosque and install the 
foundation stone for the Jewish temple. Hamas announced with clarity then that “the 
Battle of Al-Aqsa Mosque underscores that our battle with the Zionists is a battle 
between Islam and Judaism.” Moreover, “it is a battle between truth and 
falsehood.”504 Another example is the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre in Hebron. On the 
25th of February 1994 a Jewish settler entered the mosque, which was guarded by 
Israeli soldiers, and killed 29 Palestinian worshipers who were at the morning prayers 
at the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. For Hamas "the massacre was an 
expression of the deep hatred of Islam and Muslims" by the Jews.505 This massacre 
confirmed Hamas' dominant view back then of the Jews as "treacherous  ... full of 
hatred directed against Muslims."506 
Early Hamas ideology goes further in its early period by declaring its support 
for the two political and juristic readings of the struggle in Palestine. The charter 
extends the blame placed on Jews to many of the calamities that have befallen 
civilizations past and present. Indeed, "the Jewish conspiracy" is not against Islam 
                                                 
501 Hamas' communiqué #10. Issued 12 March,1988. Ibid,. 40. 
502 Hamas' communiqué #53. Issued 14 February, 1990. Wathaa'ek Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya 
Hamas. Third year of Intifada. Ibid.,  p. 27. 
503 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Ibid., pp. 44-45.   
504 Hamas' communiqué #66. Issued 31 October, 1990. Wathaa'ek Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya 
Hamas. Third year of Intifada. Ibid.,  p. 83. 
505 A Hamas statement that was published in "Filastin al-Muslima". [the Muslim Palestine Journal]. 
April, 1994, p. 25. Quoted in Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas. Ibid., p. 157. 
506 Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas. Ibid., pp. 157-158. 
alone, but against all of humanity. These aims, which have been around for ages, have 
been consolidated: 
 
For a long time, the enemies have been planning, skillfully and with precision, 
for the achievement of what they have attained. They took into consideration 
the causes affecting the current of events. They strived to amass great and 
substantive material wealth which they devoted to the realisation of their 
dream. With their money, they took control of the world media, news 
agencies, the press, publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and others. With 
their money they stirred revolutions in various parts of the world with the 
purpose of achieving their interests and reaping the fruit therein. They were 
behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the 
revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they 
formed secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions and 
others in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies 
and achieving Zionist interests. With their money they were able to control 
imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries in order 
to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there.  
You may speak as much as you want about regional and world wars. They 
were behind World War I, when they were able to destroy the Islamic 
Caliphate, making financial gains and controlling resources. They obtained the 
Balfour Declaration, formed the League of Nations through which they could 
rule the world. They were behind World War II, through which they made 
huge financial gains by trading in armaments, and paved the way for the 
establishment of their state. It was they who instigated the replacement of the 
League of Nations with the United Nations and the Security Council to enable 
them to rule the world through them. There is no war going on anywhere, 
without having their finger in it.507 
  
In those early years of its existence, Hamas seemingly had no boundaries in its 
adoption of political juristic interpretations of the struggle in Palestine. So the conflict 
was not simply between Muslims and Jews. Rather, it was between Muslims and the 
“Crusader” West, the “Communist” East, and Zionist “Judaism who are the people of 
falsehood.” According to the charter, “The imperialistic forces in the Capitalist West 
and Communist East, support the enemy with all their might, in money and in men. 
These forces take turns in doing that. The day Islam appears, the forces of infidelity 
would unite to challenge it, for the infidels are of one nation.”508 In these early 
declarations the "Crusader" West refers especially to the United States and 
“Communist” East to Russia, both of whom, according to Hamas, provide Israel with 
supplies and population.509 
Perceiving the circle of enemies to be very expansive in its early years, Hamas 
called for a broad Islamic alliance to confront them. “The question of the liberation of 
Palestine is bound to three circles: the Palestinian circle, the Arab circle and the 
Islamic circle. Each of these circles has its role in the struggle against Zionism. Each 
has its duties, and it is a horrible mistake and a sign of deep ignorance to overlook any 
of these circles. Palestine is an Islamic land.”510 Hamas also warns of the success of 
"World Zionism, together with imperialistic powers, (which) try through a studied 
plan and an intelligent strategy to remove one Arab state after another from the circle 
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of struggle against Zionism, in order to have it finally face the Palestinian people only 
… Today it is Palestine, tomorrow it will be one country or another.”511  
The preceding quotes clearly demonstrate that, in its early years, Hamas 
adopted the political juristic approach. Within its charter and declarations, it aimed to 
position itself as the vanguard of the committed Muslims who will liberate 
Palestine.512 A revisionist perspective has emerged in recent years, however. A new 
group of scholars argue that Hamas was not completely beholden to the belief in the 
religious nature of the conflict. Utilizing other documents and pronouncements by the 
leaders and prominent figures of Hamas, they offer an alternative interpretation of the 
movement’s approach.  
Khaled Hroub, for instance, argues that despite the dominance of the primary 
documents of the early period, the religious language often reflects “occasions when 
an emotional response and escalating tension may have overpowered calm, theoretical 
reflection.”513 He adds that the literature of Hamas and the pronouncements of its 
most prominent figures, with time, were increasingly focused on the essence of the 
occupation and driving it out, transforming the cause to one of national liberation 
seeking freedom from foreign occupation. According to this analysis, hostilities are 
based on transgression, not belief.514 
Another scholar takes this argument a step further. In his critique of the Hamas 
charter’s treatment of the Jews throughout history, Azzam Tamimi contends that 
religious sources are dealt with haphazardly and selectively. Quranic verses and 
Prophetic traditions critical of the Jews relate to particular historical moments and are 
not intended for universal application. Tamimi further contends that the reason the 
                                                 
511 Ibid., Article 32. 
512 See the introduction of Hamas charter, Also see Article 32. Ibid. 
513 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Ibid., pp. 44-45.  
514 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
term “Jews” is employed by the average Palestinian when referring to Israelis is not 
out of ideological commitment. Rather, the term “Zionist” is reserved for the highly 
educated, not the mainstream populace. Thus, the term “Jews” used by Palestinians to 
refer to the Israelis is not intended to make a religious statement or broad racial 
categorization on the order of European anti-Semitism. On this basis, Tamimi 
emphasizes what was previously argued: this charter was imposed on Hamas without 
careful study or critical thought. For this reason, it is seldom mentioned in current 
pronouncements by the movement.515 
  We previously alluded to early indications that Hamas perceived the conflict 
as one of combating transgression, not a clash of faiths. Nonetheless, examples of this 
were overshadowed by the general tendency to cite strict juristic principles in support 
of a rigid political ideology. Perhaps a difference between this study and other studies 
on this subject, including those of Hroub and Tamimi, is that it deals with the issue 
within its broader Islamic juristic sphere. Doing so allows us to contend that Hamas’ 
early thought was in accord with the prevailing traditional Islamic viewpoint.516 
Tamimi, on the other hand, argues that the early Hamas texts make use of “selective 
Islamic reading” of Quranic verses and Prophetic Traditions that deal with the Jews. 
A detailed study of the traditional juristic scholarship has demonstrated that Hamas’ 
view was in line with the prevailing Islamic ideological trend until recent times, 
regardless of the accuracy of that interpretation. 
The significance of traditional views of Muslim-Jewish relations and the role 
of Islamic jurisprudence has been made clear. The contemporary discourse within the 
Islamic movement did not arise out of political expediency, but is deeply rooted in the 
body of Islamic jurisprudence. Only upon understanding the basis for the early Hamas 
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ideology can we accurately examine the transformations that were to take place over 
time in its development. The claim of this study is that the change that occurred in the 
understanding of Hamas in this regard, took place from within the Islamic juristic 
schools in addition to it being a development in the political discourse of Hamas, and 
this is what we will discuss next. 
 
The Contemporary View: Transgression Based Conflict 
 
 As Hamas grew over time, with the accumulation of experience and the expansion of 
its regional and international relations, it realized that it was not possible to strengthen 
its political positions, relations and alliances without revisiting its ideology. The 
leadership of the movement was aware that the sharp ideology expressed in its early 
years adversely affected its political initiatives and was an obstacle in its way to 
expand outside of its ideological sphere. Gunning suggests another factor that 
compelled Hamas to revisit its sharp ideology. For him there are tensions in Hamas' 
ideology between "freedom and morality, popular will and revelation, representative 
and religious authority. Central to many of these is the tension between free will and 
divine design."516F517 He concludes that "this tension is embodied at the very heart of 
Hamas' political theory in the form of a dual contract: one between the people and 
their representatives (safeguarding free will), and one between the people and God 
(safeguarding divine design)."517F518 Thus Hamas is in a constant struggle to strike a 
balance between the free will of people and the obligation to God as it views the 
dichotomy.  
By the mid-nineties, Hamas began to review many of its ideological positions 
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and to present itself as a national liberation movement confronting a foreign 
occupation supported by a western colonial project. But a transformed discourse was 
not an easy affair. Hamas is, after all, an Islamic movement, and its strength lies in its 
ideological message. Any serious tampering with this “blessed” ideology would mean 
its end, at least in terms of popularity. As will be demonstrated, this change in the 
political discourse of Hamas from the hard ideological language to a language that 
gives a political meaning for “liberation” would not have occurred were it not for an 
Islamic juristic position supporting and preparing the way for this change. The 
political developments that confronted Hamas were not sufficient by themselves to 
change the tone of the discourse. There had to be an Islamic juristic justification for 
the change in the vocabulary of the discourse, and that is precisely what the 
movement utilized.  
In the preceding presentation of the Islamic juristic opinions associated with 
the controversy over the basis of hostilities, we described a strong juristic current that 
confirms that the basis of hostilities is transgression not belief. The central point of 
this current presented Hamas with justification to review the sharp ideological belief 
expressed in its charter, declarations and pronouncements. The important position that 
concerns us here is one expressed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi. The importance of this 
opinion is that it represents the same position of Hamas today, in juristic language. 
Al-Qaradawi, whose position was previously outlined, considers the 
relationship between Muslims and Jews as a struggle over land, not religion. Yet, in 
his opinion, this does not negate the religious nature of the struggle, for several 
reasons. The first and most important is the blessed status of Palestine in Islam. 
Secondly, the Jews justify the occupation of Palestine on religious grounds, causing 
the Muslims to respond in kind. Thirdly, Muslims are required by their faith to defend 
the land of Islam, and Palestine has a special status in Islam. According to al-
Qaradawi: 
 
Therefore, we reject whoever wants to eject religion from this battle. My 
statement should not be understood as if I want to eject the religious and the 
theological aspects from the issue. This is betrayal. I do not want that and it is 
not appropriate to understand my statement in this way. I only want to say to 
some of the people, how do you understand the verse (“Strongest among men 
in enmity to the Believers wilt thou find the Jews and Pagans;”). This was 
with respect to the situation in the days of the Messenger. After that, the Jews 
entered into the responsibility and care of the Muslims and lived among them 
in security and they did not find a place of refuge except the realm of the 
Muslims. They used to live among the Muslims in the best manner of people 
of wealth and influence. There was no struggle between them and us except a 
cultural one at times. 
 
Al-Qaradawi further clarifies his position by saying: “I only speak on the 
religious aspect as a Muslim, The Jew, like the Christian, is from the People of the 
Book, even in this age, with his transgressions. I do not change the facts on account of 
the transgression. At one point in time, Christians were more severe in their actions 
against us than the Jews (in the days of the Crusades)519, and the Jews were with the 
Muslims at that time. It is better to give everyone his due.” Al-Qaradawi sums up by 
saying: “the struggle is continuous and jihad is obligatory until the truth is retrieved 
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and the land is returned to its rightful owners.”520  
Al-Qaradawi's view became to a large extent the official position of Hamas in 
the mid-nineties, though it was not immediately infused into its political discourse. It 
translated into softer political language and careful selection of vocabulary. 
According to Azzam Tamimi, another factor affecting the political discourse of 
Hamas is observable in the effort made by some Arab intellectuals, like the late 
Egyptian thinker Abdul Wahhab al-Missiri, in exploring and defining the concept of 
Zionism and its historical development, concluding that it is an extension of the 
Western colonialist project.520F521 Thus, the discourse of Hamas gradually shifted towards 
the language of a national liberation movement confronting a foreign colonial project. 
The influence of al-Qaradawi and al-Missiri can be seen in an internal 
document of Hamas dealing with the movement’s take on the controversy 
surrounding Judaism and Zionism. Portions of this document were previously 
published in a 1996 study in which the researcher participated. In it, Hamas offers its 
interpretation of the development of Zionism and the participation of the sixteenth 
century Protestant reform movement led by Martin Luther in the manifestation of 
Zionism among non-Jews, even before it appeared among Jews themselves. This 
concept saw the rise of a movement among Christians who believed in the necessity 
of the Jewish return to Palestine before the Jews themselves thought about it. This 
background would be significant in promoting future Western support for a Jewish 
presence in Palestine, where: 
  
The European colonial and political interests met and parted company with the 
Zionist movement. Therefore, the West found that it was in its interest to 
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embrace the Zionist project because it served its interests in the area of the 
Middle East. And the Zionists found that their alliance with the European 
colonialist policy was a service to their idea, so, they served the Europeans for 
their own interest. From here, they achieved the Balfour Declaration as a point 
of embarkation to apply the Zionist idea in Palestine. 521F522 
 
This shift toward a political interpretation did not diminish the religious angle 
in Hamas’ position on the Zionist project. Once again, al-Qaradawi's juristic argument 
and his emphasis on the religiously sanctioned right to confront transgression are 
pertinent. “Judaism is a religion and Zionism is a project and tool with which to 
realize Jewish ambitions and prophecies. The bond between them is natural … The 
Zionist movement represents the broadest legitimacy with the Jews as an expression 
of Jewish ambition in the world … Zionism is a colonialist settler occupation project 
deriving support on religious grounds that has various political and strategic 
ambitions.”522F523 Hamas' discourse here, however, does not deal with Judaism from the 
perspective of an eternal struggle with Islam, as was the case in its previous ideology. 
“The religious dimension of the Jews does not mean religiosity… Rather, this 
dimension represents the historical dimension and the spiritual incentive that 
establishes the idea and represents the motive of embarkation.”523F524 Nonetheless, 
according to Hamas’ view, the Jewish religion represents one of the foundations of 
Zionism. The Jewish religious scriptures “wherein the Jews consider that they have a 
right in Palestine, and that Palestine is the Promised Land. The Jews must gather 
together, in the end, in Palestine and establish their state there, and that the Jews are 
the chosen people of God … From here the Jews work to realize the Talmudic and 
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Torah prophesies.”525 Based on this, the theological dimension is one of the most 
important foundations in the Zionist thinking. This does not mean that the Zionist 
movement is a religious movement. Rather, it is more secular, but the religious 
dimension served the Zionist project in the beginning. Palestine occupies an important 
place in the thinking of the Zionist movement according to the understanding of 
Hamas: 
 
The Zionists see Palestine as representing the Promised Land and the place 
where the Zionist state will be established, and they do not accept any 
alternative to Palestine. It is known that the British offered Uganda to the Jews 
to be a state for them but they rejected the idea because the issue is not one of 
searching for a homeland for the Jews with the unrestricted meaning of 
homeland… Rather this homeland is restricted by an ancient historical and 
religious view to be considered in this homeland, Palestine, the Promised 
Land. Therefore, the view toward Palestine is not geographical, but rather 
derives from a religious dimension fundamentally, and in the strategic aspect 
of Palestine, secondly. There is no meaning to this movement without 
Palestine.526  
 
Hamas concludes that: 
   
Inside occupied Palestine, there is no measure to the statement that inside the 
society, one is a Zionist and another is a Jew. This society stands on 
transgression, and it is a combatant society with all of its parties, with its 
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women and men. The organized army and approximately twice it or three 
times it represents a national guard that can be mobilized in a short time and at 
time of war to enter into direct service. The Jews who came from outside came 
for the service and nourishment of the Zionist project. Therefore, we consider 
the Jewish society, in its totality, combatants, and that the Jews who move to 
Palestine are tied to the oppression of their state. With that, we in Hamas have 
a clear stance in not fighting civilians, children and women as long as they are 
not armed because our fight is directed towards the military and military 
settlers who oppress our people.527 
 
This document demonstrates the degree to which Hamas transformed its 
approach to the question of Judaism and Zionism. The basis of hostilities became 
transgression, not belief. Once again, this underscores the importance of our 
discussion of the previous scholarly opinions on this issue. Indeed, some early Hamas 
documents point out that it does not fight the Jews for their beliefs. This is due in part, 
as was pointed out earlier, to the ambiguity in Hamas' position from the start that 
could have stemmed from the debate that took place at certain stages in the mother 
organization (i.e. the MB). In a 1990 interview with Hamas leaders conducted with 
the journal 'The Muslim Palestine', one sees an affirmation of this meaning. The 
leadership was quoted as saying Hamas "does not adopt belligerent positions against 
anyone on the basis of his creed or ideology. Hamas does adopt a belligerent position, 
however, once that creed or ideology is translated into aggressive or destructive 
actions against our umma and nation.”528 Because these early views were not fixed, 
however, they have been frequently overlooked. During this period, Hamas would at 
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once express its views in rigid religious language, while at other times it would speak 
in a pragmatic political tone. It was only during the mid-nineties that real change in 
the form of a revised position would occur. Hamas would take a firm stand that the 
conflict with Israel was based solely on its violations and the antiquated religious 
rhetoric disappeared from the official discourse of Hamas. The new view would 
distinguish between Judaism and Zionism and direct hostilities toward the Zionist 
movement with its character as an oppressor, not for the subject of its beliefs.529 
Hamas continued to develop this new methodology in its thought. Following a 
series of attacks carried out in Israel in response to the assassination of a leader in 
1996, an international conference was held with American leadership in the Egyptian 
city of Sharm El-Sheikh under the banner of “Opposing Terrorism.” Hamas hastened 
to send a memorandum to those gathered in Sharm El-Sheikh to clarify its position. 
The most important feature of that memorandum is that Hamas avoided all religious 
references in an attempt to define itself as a national liberation movement within the 
bounds of international laws and covenants. Hamas: “is considered a part of the 
national liberation movement for the Palestinian people, striving to realize its national 
rights guaranteed by international law; first and foremost, the right to self 
determination, the establishment of its own independent state and the right of all 
refugees to return to their homeland.”530 As such, “Hamas, with its political and 
military wings, is a resistance and national liberation movement against occupiers 
whom they consider in the position of transgressors against the foundations of 
contemporary international law. Therefore, the armed actions of the al-Qassam 
Brigade are considered defensive actions with the exception of some unintended 
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civilian casualties.”531 
The memorandum proclaimed that the Israeli presence in its various forms in 
the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip is an occupying presence, according to 
successive United Nations resolutions and the official positions of the international 
community since 1967. In that same vein, Hamas affirmed its right to resist the 
“Zionist occupation,” citing those same international bodies and laws. 531F532 By this 
statement, the resistance of Hamas was the direct result of the occupation, not a cause 
for it.532F533  
In addition, the discourse of Hamas expanded its concept of citizenship to 
include Jews and Christians under Islamic rule. According to Khaled Meshaal, the 
head of the political bureau: 
  
In the shade of the fourteen centuries since the rise of the Arabic Islamic state, 
the rights of Christians, Jews and others were protected. They lived just as the 
ethnic minorities in the nation lived, with security for themselves, their wealth 
and their rights. Since democracy is rule of the majority…it demands the 
expression of the reality. But this applies to the Jew who is a part of the Arabic 
region and its history, and not the occupying and transgressing Zionist Jew… 
Contemporary scholars in Islamic thought have discussed the term Ahl Al-
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Dhimma534 in a new form, which is citizenship. The people of one homeland, 
whether they are Muslims, Christians or Jews, have the right of citizenship, 
and the Islamic Arabic history is witness to that. Evidence of this is the fact 
that the so-called “Jewish problem” appeared only in Europe, as a result of the 
injustice practised against the Jews. As for the problem between the Jews and 
us, it happened only after they occupied our land and oppressed us.535 
 
These pronouncements by Meshaal are undoubtedly very significant. They 
demonstrate a clear departure from the political juristic interpretation of the struggle 
as well as the traditional Islamic juristic school that considers Jews and Christians Ahl 
Al-Dhimma.536 Once again, however, these changes in the thinking of Hamas did not 
come about without juristic support from the Islamic tradition. These ideas are 
common among a number of prominent contemporary Muslim thinkers. In addition to 
those previously mentioned, there is the Tunisian thinker Rashid al-Ghannouchi, who 
composed a book about freedoms in the Islamic state. There is also the Egyptian 
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intellectual thinker Fahmi Huwaidi who authored a book entitled Citizens, Not 
Dhimmis. 537 
As for Hamas’ concept of the parties to the conflict, in contrast to its earlier 
proclamations, the new discourse has gone beyond mere generalities. Hamas has 
realized that it is not wise to expand the sphere of adversaries and it is more 
appropriate for the movement to work to decrease these adversaries and keep aside 
the largest number of them.538 For example, it was no longer useful for Hamas to 
speak of the Jewish conspiracy to found the United Nations at a time when it was 
compelled to deal with it and its resolutions. Likewise, the sharpness of the ideology 
diminished as Hamas adopted a policy of political pragmatism. Russia, which at one 
time was a strong base of communist support for Zionism in the view of Hamas, has 
today become a state that has relations with Hamas to the point where an important 
delegation of leaders visited Moscow after the success of Hamas in the Palestinian 
legislative elections in early 2006. This visit took place in spite of the fact that Jewish 
immigration from Russia to Israel continues. With this “move, the discourse of Hamas 
began to distinguish between the main enemy, Israel, and the powers allied with it, 
like the United States, Great Britain, and the Security Council that is controlled by 
those powers, thereby decreasing the number of enemies and hoping to narrow the 
sphere of adversaries.”539 
The same method is applied to the allies of Hamas. The political leadership of 
Hamas today resides in Damascus and is allied with its government, in spite of the 
bloody history between the ruling Syrian Ba’athist regime and the Syrian MB, a close 
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organizational and ideological relation to Hamas. Likewise, Hamas finds itself 
compelled to deal more closely with the Egyptian regime after its success in the 
Palestinian legislative elections. This became especially necessary since it defeated 
the security forces loyal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and took control of 
the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and what followed of Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. 
This comes despite the fact that Hamas in its early years warned “of the danger of the 
role of the Egyptian regime in the Arab arena. It put all the Arab regimes in the 
danger of Camp David and works now to win over the Palestinian people to 
extinguish the firebrand of the Intifada.”540 
  
Summary 
 
In summary, it is possible to contend that Hamas did not rebel against its religious 
frame of reference, rather it developed within it. The development that occurred in the 
ideology of Hamas and its belief in regards to the nature of the struggle, and the 
identity of the enemy, was achieved within the Islamic juristic treatise itself deriving 
from one of its currents. If not, it would not have succeeded in making such change. 
With that, it did not abandon the religious basis of the struggle, partly due to the 
reliance of Zionism on religious claims in justifying its occupation of Palestine. Just 
as Palestine is a distinguished part of the land of Islam, which non-Muslims cannot 
control, the jihad becomes an individual obligation on every Muslim to liberate it. 
This summary will aid us in the next chapter, that will examine the understanding of 
the MB and Hamas and their view of the nature of the solution to the conflict. 
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Chapter 4: The Religious and the Political in Approaching "Israel" 
 
In the last chapter we discussed the MB's and Hamas' understanding of the nature of 
the struggle in Palestine and the identity of the "enemy". As it discussed whether the 
animosity towards the "enemy" derives from the religious aspect of the Jewish 
"occupation" (i.e. Israel), or from the political transgression, as the MB and Hamas 
believe. The chapter concluded that the current MB and Hamas position is that the 
struggle with Israel stems from the idea of transgression (i.e. the occupation of 
Palestine) and not its specifically Jewish character. However they still argue that there 
are religious components to the struggle – this is the dialectic of Hamas' thought. We 
also discussed how this helped Hamas in its endeavour to present itself as a liberation 
movement. This chapter will investigate the MB's and Hamas’ view of the possible 
solutions to this impasse. In particular, it will consider their view of settlements and 
permanent peaceful solutions that do not secure the "liberation" of historical Palestine 
in its entirety, investigate their proposed alternatives and the ground on which they 
advance them. In the process, the chapter will show what role religion, the Prophetic 
experience, and the historical Islamic experience play in this context. 
As explained earlier the MB and Hamas consider that the land of Palestine has 
a special status; it is a Holy Land and it is an Islamic waqf (endowment), land that 
must not be sold or disposed of or waived in even the smallest proportion.541 We also 
stated, that Hamas views the Palestinian cause as the main issue for the Islamic 
nation, it does not only belong to the Palestinian people; rather it belongs to all 
Muslims. The same applies to Hamas' concept of the conflict on Palestinian land; it is 
                                                 
541 Hamas' charter. Ibid., Article 11.   
a conflict that has religious dimensions; and it is an elongated one, as we discussed in 
detail in the previous chapter.  
All these factors, one way or another, influence the attitude of Hamas on the 
question of negotiation with Israel and the possibility of recognition. These questions 
for Hamas seem to fall under the heading of the religious as well as the national 
political agenda (i.e. abandonment of the historic and legitimate rights of Palestinians 
to their land). Thus, Hamas believes that they fall within the taboos that should not be 
opened, at least up to this moment.542  
By extrapolating from Hamas' ideology and attitudes, it appears that the issue 
of recognizing Israel, or its right to exist (in this study, we will try to clarify the 
difference between recognizing Israel and recognizing its right to exist within Hamas' 
ideological system), is a clear contravention of what it believes to be religiously 
prohibited. What reinforces this position is that there are dozens of Fatwas (Islamic 
edicts)543 from leading Muslim scholars repudiating such a thing, considering it as 
religiously prohibited.544 In addition, Hamas, and Muslim scholars believe that the 
Palestinian people are not authorized to waive any inch of the Holy Land of Palestine, 
which is the right of generations of the whole Muslim Ummah, not only of the 
Palestinian people.545 This issue was previously stated and will be discussed again in 
the course of this chapter. For Hamas, the question of recognition is a gateway to 
                                                 
542 "About Hamas". http://www.palestine-
info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7YjyNYgnCrGxy9Lph
pYtjbpN10jo4ZpAEj22uHhDqul1JcP2sHDtgZlJCR3C2afNaApr%2bmcrhAOq3FNcmJIzvxLcU9gqB
HHcqmhfrDvamPtU%3d  
The Palestine Information Center is widely considered to be the official website of Hamas. 
543An Islamic edict rendered by Muslim scholars with the knowledge to make juridical conclusions.  
544 For more details and samples of these fatwas, See Abdallah Azzam, Hamas Aljuthur Altareekhiya 
wal Mithaq. Ibid., pp.111-128. Also, see Azzam Tamimi, Hamas Unwritten Chapters. Ibid., pp.157-
158.  
545 Mousa Abu Marzook the Deputy Chairman of Hamas' political bureau says that "Hamas does not 
posses the authority to recognize Israel because it unlawfully seized Palestine in which each Palestinian 
has a personal ownership in it". Written answers to the researcher's questions. Ibid. 
strike out the religious and historical right of the whole Muslim Ummah and the 
Palestinian people, and their national rights.546  
In its early years the position of Hamas tended toward rejection and 
intransigence on this issue, which could be found clearly in its charter as well as in its 
statements, specifically in the first six years of its inception. However, this does not 
mean that some of the statements of Hamas leaders during that era were not more 
flexible than its charter and official statements; and this does not mean that Hamas' 
ideology has not undergone significant development since then. Now, contemporary 
Hamas discourse – that refuses to negotiate with Israel and refuses to recognize it – is 
reasoned politically rather than ideologically in the first place.547 Today, there is 
absence of the loose language that marked this discourse in the early stages of its 
operation. However, all that stopped short of raising the issue of recognizing Israel or 
its right to exist, as we will show later.  
Even when some statements made by some Hamas leaders and figures were 
interpreted as if there is a possibility of recognizing Israel, the general and the overall 
position of Hamas, interfered and controlled the debate in favour of the dominant 
position which refused to recognize Israel or its right to exist.548 Today's refusal and 
intransient position of Hamas towards the question of recognizing Israel does not 
mean that it does not practically differentiate between negotiating with Israel on a 
clear basis in an attempt to find temporary solutions to the struggle between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, and the negotiation that leads to the recognition of Israel 
or the right of existence. This point will also be clarified in this chapter.  
                                                 
546Azzam Tamimi, Hamas Unwritten Chapters. Ibid., pp. 156-157.  
547 For more detailed discussion on this issue, see Jeroen Gunning, Hamas In Politics: Democracy, 
Religion, Violence. Ibid., pp. 203-206.  
548 This is something that will be explained later on in this chapter.  
The contemporary political discourse of Hamas has developed to the extent of 
accepting the two-state solution, on the basis of establishing a Palestinian state on all 
Palestinian territory occupied since 1967; i.e. all of the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in addition to the return of refugees. Although this 
means the implicit recognition of Israel, however, Hamas insists that this would not 
include recognition of the legitimacy of Israel or its right to exist.549  
Of course, these developments in the thought of Hamas are primarily due to 
the pressure of political reality, especially after Hamas entered the Palestinian 
legislative elections in January 2006, winning a parliamentary majority and forming a 
new Palestinian government, as well as the regional and international siege against 
Hamas. Some other factors have also squeezed Hamas into a tight corner and 
encouraged it to search for some more flexible Islamic juridical solutions. These 
include: the fact that Israel is a factual reality which one can not imagine being 
removed, at least under current circumstances, and being a considerable regional 
force, owing to the international support it receives, and the peace agreements signed 
between Israel and some Arab countries and the PLO. We have indicated before that 
the development in Hamas' ideological visions and its political positions do not 
necessarily mean a departure from the religious reference of the movement, as far as it 
means a development within the same system of religious reference. Islamic 
jurisprudence is expansive as well as being realistic. This research assumes that 
Hamas does not move from one vision to another or from one position to another, 
without securing rational Islamic jurisprudential cover.550  
                                                 
549 Mousa Abu Marzook says that "recognizing the Zionist Entity is a matter that will not be 
considered by Hamas." Ibid., Written answers to the researcher's questions. Also, Ahmad Yusuf, the 
Hamas deputy foreign minister says "recognizing Israel is completely unacceptable." 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1093692.html 
550 Mousa Abu Marzook. Ibid., Written answers to the researcher's questions.    
In the context of conciliation and harmonization between a relatively rigid 
ideology and a desire for political flexibility, we can say that the position of Hamas 
towards the peace process and negotiations with Israel went through four distinctive 
stages that sometimes overlap chronologically. These four stages, ranging from total 
rejection of all peaceful solutions to the conflict, through to the rejection of any 
Palestinian concessions resulting from any political agreement, to the acceptance of a 
conditional and temporary truce with Israel on condition of not recognizing it, and 
finally, Hamas' acceptance of a temporary calm "tahadiya = cease-fire" on conditions 
that are less than those of the truce.551 
  In all cases, the position of Hamas remains centered on achieving a limited-
time, or even open-ended truce in exchange for establishing a Palestinian state on all 
Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, but without recognizing Israel. This will 
be discussed in more detail later in this research. Once again it must be stressed that 
these developments in the ideology and positions of Hamas find their legitimacy 
within the heritage of Islamic jurisprudence, the Prophet’s mandate and the Islamic 
historical experiences as understood by Hamas and the parent MB school to which it 
belongs.  
This chapter seeks to discuss and explain all these issues, trying to understand 
their background in the ideology of Hamas through the Islamic religious, 
jurisprudential, and historical references, which deal with the existence of aggression 
or occupation and how to overcome them. In the course of this chapter, we will seek 
                                                 
551 In June of 2008, with Egyptian mediation, Israel agreed for the first time to enter into a six month 
cease-fire with Hamas. A decision taken after it failed to halt the barrages of home-made rocket attacks 
on its southern towns bordering the Hamas controlled Gaza Strip. The agreement called for the opening 
of the commercial crossings within hours of the cease-fire taking effect. In the meanwhile Egypt would 
work to extend the cease-fire to the West Bank. As for the methods of opening the Rafah crossing 
between the Gaza Strip and Egypt its outcome would be determined in a meeting hosted by Egypt to 
include the PA, the Hamas movement and European elements. Although, Israel and Egypt did not 
abide by their obligations, according to Hamas, the cease-fire lasted for six months and ended with an 
Israeli massive attack on Gaza "Operation Cast Lead". The attack started on 27 December, 2009 and 
ended on 18 January, 2010 killing more than 1450 Palestinians and injuring thousands more. 
to examine the accuracy of statements and convictions of Hamas with regard to this 
issue through Islamic jurisprudence, and the Islamic and Prophetic expertise and 
experience. This requires, first, a review of the Islamic concept of reconciliation, 
treaty, truce, negotiations, and political solutions based on the texts and the Prophetic 
experience, then to put Hamas ideology and political conduct in this context.  
However, prior to all this, we must briefly treat the general Islamic jurisprudential 
concept of the issues of war and peace.  
In the context of our endeavour to discuss all of these issues, we will divide 
this chapter into three sections. The first section will discuss the general Islamic 
jurisprudential concept of war and peace, and how Muslim jurists understand these 
two concepts through the Quranic teachings and the Prophetic experience. This 
discussion will take place through three main headings: 1) The Types of Treaties in 
Islamic Jurisprudence. 2) The Prophetic and the Islamic Historical Experience. 3) 
Peace and Hudna in Islamic Jurisprudence . 
 This section will help us in understanding, once again, the vast and rich nature 
of Islamic jurisprudence, which enabled the MB and Hamas to move from a rigid 
ideological position in dealing with Israel into a more flexible one. Also, such a 
jurisprudential, Prophetic, and Islamic historical review will help us to understand the 
background and the authenticity of some of the contemporary jurisprudential opinions 
that sought to find a way out for Hamas to recognize Israel. Such jurisprudential 
opinions took into consideration the complexities of reality as faced by the movement. 
These complexities led at some junctures to a confusion within some ranks of Hamas 
vis-à-vis the issue of recognizing Israel before the “central position” of the movement 
that rejects recognition intervened, and adjusts the pace of the political debate within 
it. 
The second section will discuss how the ideology and the discourse of the MB 
and Hamas was, and is still, impacted by such ongoing jurisprudential discussion in 
different stages of their presence (of the MB and Hamas). The MB and Hamas started 
by adopting the most radical jurisprudential opinions in the context of dealing with 
Israel. Thus they initially rejected any possible recognition of Israel or exploring any 
peaceful options with it even being provisional. But with the passage of time and with 
the realization of the complex reality, the MB, particularly the Egyptian branch and 
Hamas, started moving towards more flexible jurisprudential opinions to deal with the 
dilemma that the continuous existence of Israel poses to them by not being able to 
eliminate it. This flexibility, however, does not include, at least on the official level, 
up to this point, any indication that the MB and Hamas will be willing anytime soon 
to recognize Israel if certain conditions are to be met. Though some Hamas and 
Egyptians MB leaders do hint at the possibility that they could recognize Israel from 
within the “legitimacy” (i.e. the state institutions in Egypt and in the anticipated 
Palestinian state) if they become part of them, but not as movements. All of these 
issues will be clarified through 5 titles: 1) The General Position: No to Peaceful 
Resolutions ... No to Recognition. 2) The Interim Solution: A Palestinian State in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip Without Recognition of Israel. 3) Truce as an Islamic 
Jurisprudential Solution. 4) Hudna in the Doctrine of Hamas. 5) The Booster of Truce 
after the elections. 
As for the third section, it discusses briefly the possibility for the MB and 
Hamas to recognize Israel at one point given that certain conditions are being met. 
This will be discussed in part through the contemporary Islamic jurisprudential debate 
that sought to provide Hamas with a way out of the pressure and the siege that has 
been imposed on it after it won the legislative elections of 2006 and the constitution 
of its government. And then what followed in 2007 when it took over the Gaza strip 
after bloody clashes with forces loyal to the PA President, Mahmoud Abbas, and the 
consequent siege that was imposed on the Gaza Strip. Given these circumstances and 
the complex reality, the contemporary Muslim scholars differed over whether it is 
legitimate for Hamas in Islam to recognize Israel or not in order to ease the pressure 
and the sanctions on the movement and on the Palestinian people. This contemporary 
scholarly discussion is based on the presiding jurisprudential discussion that was 
discussed in this chapter earlier. Also, this section will try to delineate the difference 
between recognizing Israel as a reality or as a fact and its right of existence and why 
the latter seems to be impossible in Islamic jurisprudence and Hamas’ and the MB’s 
discourse.      
   
The General Islamic Jurisprudential Concept of War and Peace  
 
In the previous chapter, we mentioned the ongoing debate within Islamic 
jurisprudence about the origin of the relationship with the religious other, whether it is 
war or peace; and we addressed the scholars’ division about the origins of Muslim 
hostility to others: the question of belief or aggression. We explained, that, although 
Muslim scholars differ on both issues, they agreed that the (jihad of Defence) in 
respect of Muslims' land, honour and property is an individual duty of every Muslim, 
if the people of the invaded country were unable to stop the aggressor. "There is no 
disagreement among the scholars on this issue."552 The importance of this point, as we 
                                                 
552 Imam Abi Baker Ahmad bin Ali Alrazi Aljasas. Ahkam Al-Quran. [The Rulings of Quran] (Beirut, 
Lebanon: Dar Ehi'a Al Turath Al-Arabi, volume 4, no Edition info, 1992.), p. 312. 
The renowned Muslim commentator of Quran al-Qurtubi says "If  jihad becomes a must, as when the 
enemy defeated a (Muslim) country, or invaded it; if so, all people of that country shall assemble and 
go out to face it with or without weapons, young or old (without permission) and no one who can go 
out shall lag…  If people of this country were unable to defeat their enemy, all their neighbouring 
will see later, is that it is one of the justifications put forward by the MB, Hamas 
movement and the Islamists in general, to justify their resistance and refusal to 
recognize Israel.  
Since the life of Prophet Muhammad witnessed the establishment of an 
Islamic state in the phase of revelation, as Muslims believe, the Quran and the 
biography of the Prophet Muhammad dealt directly with some of the issues and 
challenges that this state faced. One of the major challenges that faced the Islamic 
state since its early inception is that it was established in a hostile environment. As a 
result the Quran and the traditions of the Messenger Muhammad were attentive to 
detail in the rules of warfare, as well as the rulings of peace. The Quran and the 
traditions of Prophet Muhammad continued in detailing the rulings of these two issues 
until the death of the Prophet and the cessation of Revelation.  
The Hijra [migration] of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions to 
Medina and the establishment of the Islamic state was a direct result, as the Prophetic 
biography and the Islamic history state, of the persecution suffered by the Muslims in 
Mecca. After the establishment of the state, Allah permitted Muslims, as they believe, 
to fight in defence of themselves.  
According to some Islamic scholars, Quran legislation on fighting has gone 
through three stages. The first stage allowed for the fight against injustice and 
aggression inflicted upon Muslims.553 Thus, it is fighting in response to aggression 
                                                                                                                                            
(Muslim) countries shall go out to the extent necessary [for the attacked country]." See Abu Abdullah 
Muhammad al-Qurtubi. Aljame'a Le Ahkam Al-Quran. [The Collection of the Rulings of Quran] 
(Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, volume 8, no Edition info, 2003.), p. 151. Other Scholars further add: "If they 
also fail it becomes necessary for all the people of Islam, east and west."  See: Kamal Eldeen bin 
Abdelwahed Ibn Alhumam. Fathul Qadeer. (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Ktub Al-Elmia, volume 5. First 
Edition, 2003.), p. 440. 
553 “To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged;- and 
verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid;- [They are] those who have been expelled from their homes 
in defiance of right,- [for no cause] except that they say, our Lord is Allah”. The Holy Quran. Ibid., 
Surat Al-hajj, chapter 22, verses 39-40. pp. 961-962.  
and for self-defense.553F554 After the status of the Islamic state was enhanced and 
intensified, the Muslims were ordered to fight those who fight them and leave alone 
those who left them alone (4: 90).554F555 Then the Muslims were ordered, according to 
some Islamic scholars, in Surah At-Tauba (9: 29), to fight all the infidels until faith in 
Allah prevailed universally. 555F556  
As we explained in the previous chapter, the Muslim scholars have different 
views concerning the third stage. Some of them believe that (9:29) verse abrogates 
 the previous verses, while others believe it does not do so pointing to the verses of 
(4:90), which emphasize that fighting is only legalized for defense. However, they 
agreed in their opinions about the first and second stages.  
As warfare has been an integral part of the establishment of the Islamic state, 
so has peace been associated with it as well. Peace is one of its necessities as it tends 
towards realism for no state can maintain a state of endless war. The newly 
established state was not willing, or even able, to engage in ongoing wars nor to open 
new fronts with all neighbouring infidels. The Prophetic biography witnessed 
negotiations as well as treaties of reconciliation, peace, and truce. Islamic 
jurisprudence detailed such issues under the heading of reconciliation, which includes 
                                                 
554 “Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not 
transgressors.” The Holy Quran. Ibid., Surat Al-Baqarah, chapter 2, verse 190. p. 79.    
555 “Except those who join a group between whom and you there is a treaty [of peace], or those who 
approach you with hearts restraining them from fighting you as well as fighting their own people. If 
Allah had pleased, He could have given them power over you, and they would have fought you: 
Therefore if they withdraw from you but fight you not, and (instead) send you (Guarantees of) peace, 
then Allah Hath opened no way for you (to war against them.” The Holy Quran. Ibid., Surat An-Nisaa, 
chapter 4, verse 90. p. 241.   
556 (Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been 
forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the 
People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.) 
The Holy Quran. Ibid., Surat At-Tauba, chapter 9, verse 29. pp. 506-507. For more details on the stages 
of fighting, see Ibn Qayim Aljawziya, Zad Almi’ad fi hadiyi khair al ibad. Ibid., Volume 3., pp. 70-71. 
Dhimmi pact, truce pact, trust pact, political coalition, economic exchange and 
arbitration, and others.557  
The legislative origin of peace is derived from the Quran, in two particular 
verses. First the verse which reads: “This is a declaration of disassociation from Allah 
and His messenger to those whom you have made a treaty among the polytheists.”558 
And, second, in the verse “And if they incline to peace, so you must predispose 
(yourselves) to it ...”559 In his interpretation of the second verse, Ibn Kathir, the 
famous commentator on the Quran says that if they "tended to peace, reconciliation, 
and appeasement, so do you, and accept it."560 Again, Muslim scholars have different 
opinions as about to whether this verse was abrogated by the verse of the Quran 
previously mentioned or not, and some scholars understood it as referring to the 
necessity of fighting all the infidels. However, the Muslim Scholar, al-Qurtubi, 
believes that this verse is not abrogated because the Prophet and his companions –
after he has passed away – made reconciliations with many nations.561  
Some researchers in Islamic jurisprudence see that the previous verse urges 
the Muslim to incline to peace after the other party inclines to it, provided that peace 
is in the interest of Islam, as in the treaty of Hudaibiya.562 However, this opinion is 
not agreed upon by all, as we will show later. According to the Muslim scholar, Ibn 
                                                 
557 Yusuf Hafouna al-Husaini. Alhudna Wa Ahkam Alsulh fi El Islam. [Hudna and the Rulings of 
Reconciliation in Islam]   
http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content-64577.html 
558 The Holy Quran., Ibid. Surat At-Tauba, chapter 9, verse 1. p. 496.  
559 Ibid., Surat Al-Anfal, chapter 8, verse 61. p. 487 .  
560 Ibn Kathir, Tafseer Al Quran Al Athim. Ibid. Volume 4 p. 83. 
561 Al-Qurtubi says that the Prophet and his companions, after him, made reconciliations with "many 
Persians countries leaving them unmolested, while they [Prophet and his companions] were able to 
eliminate them. The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) also made reconciliations with many 
nations in exchange for tribute. These instances include Khaibar, whose people were permitted to 
return after they were defeated provided that they would work and pay half of the fruits of their 
work. He also made a ten-year-truce with Quraish, until they invalidated the treaty. The companions 
and caliphs continued this practice (i.e. reconciliation)."  Al-Qurtubi. Aljame'a Le Ahkam Al-Quran. 
Ibid., p. 40. 
562 Khaled al-Fahdawi. Alfiqh Al-Siyasi Al Islami. [The Islamic Political Jurisprudence], (Damascus, 
Syria. 1st Edition, 2003.), pp. 185-186. 
Hajar: "This verse indicates the legality of reconciliation with the infidels, which is 
bound to whether the reconciliation is best for Islam. However, if Islam was stronger 
than the infidels, and there is no benefit in reconciliation, it will not be applicable".563  
It was the same opinion expressed by Ibn Kathir: "If the enemy was stronger, it is 
permitted to make reconciliation with as indicated by this verse."564 However if there 
was war and the Muslims were strong enough to defeat their enemy, the basic 
principle is that there is no peace or call for truce, as the Quran states: "Be not weary 
and faint-hearted, crying for peace, when ye should be uppermost: for Allah is with 
you, and will never put you in loss for your (good) deeds."565   
Hence, some scholars of Islamic jurisprudence argue that reconciliation and 
the peace treaties are not the opposite of jihad; they constitute a stage of the 
"preparing, empowerment and a way to invite to the way of Allah and the 
establishment of His justice on Earth".566  
   
Types of Treaties in Islamic Jurisprudence  
   
Through the extrapolation of the Quran and the biography of the Prophet Muhammad, 
Muslim scholars categorize treaties in Islam into three types: 
                                                 
563 Ibid., 186. 
564 Ibn Kathir, Tafseer Al Quran Al Athim. Ibid., Volume 4., p. 84. 
565 The Holy Qur'an. Ibid. Surat Muhammad, chapter 47, verse 35. p. 1570. Ibn Kathir said in his 
interpretation of this verse: "Do not be weak concerning the enemies and beg for peace (meaning do 
not compromise) or end hostilities between you and the disbelievers while you are in a position of 
power, i.e., both in great numbers and preparations. However if the disbelievers are considered more 
powerful and numerous than the Muslims then the Imam (general commander) may decide to hold a 
treaty if he judges that it entails a benefit for the Muslims. This is like what Allah's Messenger did 
when the disbelievers obstructed him from entering Mecca and offered him a treaty in which all 
fighting would stop between them for ten years. Consequently, he agreed to that." Ibn Kathir, Tafseer 
Al Quran Al Athim. Ibid., Volume 7., p. 323. Al-Qurtubi comments on this verse by saying:  
"concluding a treaty with the disbelievers is only permitted when necessary, and this would be if 
Muslims are unable to resist because of their weakness." Al-Qurtubi. Aljame'a Le Ahkam Al-Quran. 
Ibid. Volume 16., p. 265.  
566 Yusuf Hafouna al-Husaini. Ibid., Alhudna Wa Ahkam Alsulh fi El Islam. 
http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content-64577.html 
1. The safety Pact: a temporary pact granted by Imam (Prince / person in-charge) 
or any Muslim to a non-Muslim fighter(s) (who fight(s) Muslims, under which 
they become protected in the land of Islam until returning back to their 
homeland.567  
2. Dhimmi or Jizya Pact: A pact with non-Muslims, Jews and Christians in 
particular, in the Islamic state in return for a tribute. 568  
3. Peace / truce Pact: a treaty between the Dar al-Islam (countries that are under 
Muslims dominance) on the one hand, and Dar al-harb (countries where 
Muslim law is not in force) on the other hand.  There are other terms referring 
to reconciliation in Islamic jurisprudence, including truce. The Fiqh 
Encyclopedia defines truce as the following: "Truce is: to hold a treaty with 
the people of Dar al-harb to leave the fighting for compensation and without 
compensation. It is also called: reconciliation and Treaty".569  
The third type is what is mostly relevant to this study.570   
                                                 
567 In the Fiqh (Jurisprudence) encyclopedia: "Safety in Arabic: not expecting harm in the upcoming 
time. The origin of Safety is self-contentment and the demise of fear ... and jurisprudence scholars 
defined it as: excluding the fighters' blood-shedding, enslaving, and money while fighting them, when 
they are settled under the rule of Islam." Almawsoua'a Alfiqhiyia. Volume 6.  Ibid., p. 233. 
568 In the Fiqh encyclopedia: "Dhimma in Arabic: Security and covenant, Ahl Al-Dhimma are the 
people of the covenant, and Dhimmi: the one with whom the covenant is made. What is meant by Ahl 
Al-Dhimma in the terminology of the Juridical scholars is that Dhimmi is related to Dhimma, i.e., the 
covenant with Imam – or his designee - to be safe in one’s life, property and wealth in exchange for a 
commitment to pay Jizya and abide by the application of Islamic rule... a Jizya pact makes it obligatory 
to prohibit bloodshed, maintain wealth and honor, and preserve the other consequents." Ibid. 
569 Ibn Ahmad Ibn Qudamah. Al Mughni. Ibid., Volume 10., p. 509.  
570 However, it is necessary here to point out that when discussing this matter in Islamic fiqh and the 
biography of the Prophet some people confuse between Dhimmi and truce pacts. For example, the 
Prophet reconciled with the people of Najran (an area in south-western Saudi Arabia on its borders 
with Yemen) necessitating that they pay tribute (Jizya), not on the basis of reconciliation (truce), thus, 
it was not time-bound.   
See: Yusuf Hafouna al-Husaini. Alhudna Wa Ahkam Alsulh fi El Islam. Ibid. 
http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content-64577.html 
Some may also confuse the rulings of truce with the Constitution of Medina, (as discussed in the 
previous chapter) ratified by the Prophet with the people of Medina, including Jews. The Constitution 
of Medina was not a political treaty between Muslims and others as much as it was intended to be a 
constitution that regulates public life in the Islamic state, since it organized relations among Muslim 
Muhajirun (migrants) and Ansar (the Muslims of Medina), as well as regulating relations with the 
Jews." Aqeel Said. Almahdat Al Dawlia fi Al Islam. [International Treaties in Islam]  
http://www.dahsha.com/viewarticle.php?id=32283  
Most of the rulings with regard to the reconciliation and truce agreements in 
Islam were developed by classical and contemporary Islamic jurisprudence and 
devised from some Prophetic experiences. The most important one is the treaty of 
Hudaibiya that took place between the Prophet Muhammad and the pagan Quraish in 
the sixth year of Hijra (628 AD). Most of the jurisprudence debate, if not all of it, is 
about mainstreaming the concept of truce, its terms and rulings focus specifically on 
that treaty. Other incidents are brought to the debate, such as when the Prophet 
attempted reconciliation with the tribe of Ghatfan after the Meccan and the Arab 
tribes besieged Medina in the fifth year of Hijra (627 AD), in what is known in 
Islamic history as the "Battle of the Trench," or "Battle of Ahzab". The treaty of 
Hudaibiya remains the most important in this context. However, the treaty of 
Hudaibiya is distinguished from many peace treaties. "That its events and charter are 
well-documented in the correct books of traditions and biographical books, as well as 
in the Holy Quran. This documentation is characterized by mentioning each and every 
detail, which is rarely found in many treaties, not to mention its historical and 
religious significance".571  
The ongoing juridical debate on the issue of reconciliation and truce can not 
be understood without understanding the details of the treaty of Hudaibiya and the 
offer made by the Prophet to the tribe of Ghatfan. Contemporary Islamic 
jurisprudence on this issue is influenced to a large extent by these events and the 
debates surrounding it. Most importantly, this ongoing debate contributed and still 
contributes to the formulation of Hamas' perception and convictions on the issue of 
the reconciliation and truce.  
   
                                                 
571 Yusuf Hafouna al-Husaini. Alhudna Wa Ahkam Alsulh fi El Islam. Ibid. 
http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content-64577.html 
The Prophetic and the Islamic historical Experience 
  
At the end of the sixth year of his emigration to Medina, the Prophet had a vision of 
him and his companions entering Mecca in the state of Ihram performing Umrah.  
Muslims rejoiced at this vision, especially as the companions of the Prophet who 
emigrated from Mecca had not visit it since that time. Consequently, Prophet 
Muhammad decided to visit the Sacred House in Mecca and perform 
Umrah.572 Based on the biographies that chronicled Prophet Muhammad's life, he 
went not for fighting, with the sacrifices and accompanied by a number of 
companions of approximately one thousand and four hundred men and women.573 On 
their way, the Muslims entered the state of Ihram. They were not looking for war. At 
that time, the Arabs used not to prevent any one who seeks to perform Hajj or Umrah 
from visiting the Sacred House, even if there was enmity or war between their tribe(s) 
and the tribe of Quraish which oversees the Sacred House.  
As soon as the news reached the infuriated Quraish, they determined to 
prevent Muslims from entering Mecca, even if it led to war. Quraish was obsessed 
with the idea that Arabs would say that Muhammad and his companions entered 
Mecca to perform Umrah by force, in spite of the tribe of Quraish. In order to prevent 
Muslims from entering Mecca, the Quraish sent a force to encounter them on the road 
and obstruct them from entering Mecca. The Prophet and his companions took 
another course avoiding the Quraish forces, and encamped in the area named 
Hudaibiya on the outskirts of Mecca.574  
                                                 
572Ali Muhammad Al Salabi. Asahul kalam fi sirati Khair al anam: Al seerah al nabawiya. Ibid., Part 
2. p. 1028.   
573 Ibn Hisham, Alseerah Alnabawiya. Ibid., Volume 3. p. 256.  
574 Ibn Qayim Aljawziya, Zad Almi’ad fi hadiyi khair al ibad. Ibid., Volume 3., p. 289. 
Those Muslims encamped in Hudaibiya presented Quraish with a difficult 
choice: they either had to swallow their pride allowing Muslims to enter Mecca to 
perform Umrah, or to fight them to prevent them from entering Mecca. If the Quraish 
chose the last option, they would be scarifying their reputation and violating the Arab 
traditions.575After consultations between the Quraish clans and their allies, and some 
correspondence with the Muslims and the delegations of mediation, the Quraish 
settled on making the option of using force to prevent Muslims from entering Mecca 
as the last option. War would be detrimental to the reputation of the Quraish, and the 
possibility that they would be defeated would spell the end of Quraish's prestige 
among the Arabs.576  
Biographies show how the Prophet Muhammad was aware of Quraish's 
critical dilemma, and of the debate raging between its leaderships, and how he had 
employed all these factors for the benefit of Muslims, and to avoid a debilitating war 
with Quraish. Consequently, the Prophet presented an implicit initiative to Quraish 
through a mediator to invite them for a truce and if they refuse it he would fight 
them.577  
Some scholars used the Prophet's initiative to indicate that it is permissible for 
the imam to call for peace if it was in the interest of Muslims. This means that it is not 
conditioned by the request of the enemy, as some other scholars believe, and a view 
which we have previously mentioned.578  
                                                 
575 Ibn Hisham, Alseerah Alnabawiya. Ibid., Volume 3. pp. 258 – 259. 
576 For more details see Ali Muhammad Al Salabi. Asahul kalam fi sirati Khair al anam: Al seerah al 
nabawiya. Ibid., Part 2. pp. 1034-1055.   
577 The Prophet said: "We have not come to fight anyone, but to perform the 'Umrah. No doubt, the war 
has weakened Quraish and they have suffered great losses, so if they wish, I will conclude a truce with 
them, during which they should refrain from interfering between me and the people. If the people 
accept Islam, Quraish will have the option to embrace Islam as well, if they wish. But if they do not 
accept the truce, by Allah in Whose Hands my life is, I will fight with them defending my cause till I 
get killed, but (I am sure) Allah will definitely make His cause victorious." See Ibn Hisham, Alseerah 
Alnabawiya. Ibid., Volume 3. pp. 256-257. 
578 Ibn Qayim Aljawziya, Zad Almi’ad fi hadiyi khair al ibad. Ibid., Volume 3., p. 304. 
The negotiations were difficult and arduous between the two parties, but 
eventually they settled on the idea of reconciliation. Quraish sent Suhail bin Amr, one 
of its leaders, to negotiate with the Prophet on the terms of the agreement and the 
truce. The agreement shocked many Muslims, as it included terms and conditions 
which they saw as injustices to them.579 The majority of the companions did not 
approve this agreement, but they accepted it after Prophet Muhammad assured them 
that it was the command of Allah.580 On their way back from Mecca to Medina, the 
Prophet had a revelation supporting his move. The Quranic expression is: "Verily we 
have granted thee a manifest victory".581 Barely two years after the truce, Muslims 
controlled Mecca after Quraish breached the agreement.582  
This is the background and the context of Hudaibiya. Its importance in Islamic 
history and jurisprudence is that it is supported by the Quran, the prime source of 
Islamic legislation; and the practices of Prophet Muhammad and his traditions, the 
                                                 
579 The agreement stipulated that Muslims would go back without entering Mecca that year and come 
to perform Umrah in the following year. This shows the Prophet Muhammad's understanding of the 
sensitivity of Quraish to rumors that would say that the Muslims had entered Mecca by force. The 
agreement also stated that Muslims were obligated to return any person that came from Mecca 
converting to Islam, while Quraish was not mutually obligated to do the same. In addition to this, any 
tribe that wished to join the Quraish alliance was free to join, and any tribe wished to join the Muslims 
alliance was free to join. Consequently, Banu Khza'a joined the Muslims, and Banu Bakr joined 
Quraish. The agreement was time-bound for "10 years with no steal or treachery".  See Ibn Hisham, 
Alseerah Alnabawiya. Ibid., Volume 3. pp. 263-264. 
580 Ali Muhammad Al Salabi. Asahul kalam fi sirati Khair al anam: Al seerah al nabawiya. Ibid. Part 
2.  p. 1060.  
581 The Holy Qur'an. Ibid., Surat Al-Fat-h, chapter 48, verse 1. p. 1572. Commenting on this verse, 
Abdullah Ibn Masood, one of the companions of the Prophet said, "You consider the conquest as the 
conquest of Mecca, and we consider it as the Hudaibiya agreement." See Ibn Kathir, Tafseer Al Quran 
Al Athim. Ibid., Volume 7., p. 325. 
582 In fact, before that only one year had passed after this truce agreement when Quraish requested to 
drop the condition that required the Muslims to return whoever comes from Mecca converting to Islam. 
It was because the new Muslims from Mecca had avoided going to Medina knowing that the Prophet 
would return them back to their people according to the agreement. Instead, they encamped in the 
mountains and hindered the trade routes of Mecca and caravans to Al-Sham (greater Syria), which 
forced Quraish to drop this term and request the Prophet to accept all Muslims that come to Medina 
from Mecca.  
The tribe of Banu Bakr, the allies of the Quraish tribe attacked Banu Khza'a the allies of Muslims, and 
some men of them were killed. As Banu Khza'a invoked the Prophet’s obligation, he asked Quraish to 
dissolve their alliance with Banu Bakr, but they refused and violated the truce they agreed upon with 
him, according to the Islamic Sirah (biography) books, the Prophet prepared an army that conquered 
Mecca. 
For more details see: Ali Muhammad Al Salabi. Asahul kalam fi sirati Khair al anam: Al seerah al 
nabawiya. Ibid., Part 2. pp. 1059, and pp. 1069-1072, and p. 1159.  
second source of Islamic legislation. Therefore, it has great significance in Islamic 
jurisprudence, in trying to devise rulings and applying them on other occasions that 
the Muslims experienced or could encounter in the future after the Prophet 
Muhammad had passed away and revelation had ceased. 
In their discussion of the reconciliation or truce, scholars focused on its 
benefits for the emerging Islamic state at that time, citing the Quranic verse, which 
described it as a manifest conquest, and the affirmation of a number of companions 
that this conquest is the Hudaibiya truce. Ibn Qayim Aljawziya, the great Islamic 
scholar, says that the Hudaibiya "was an outset of the greatest conquest (the conquest 
of Mecca), that Allah glorified His Messenger and his soldiers with it, and people 
have entered into the religion of Allah in crowds. So, this truce was a gate and a key 
for [the conquest of Mecca] and calling between his hands." 583 
The second experiment in the Prophetic experience that Muslim scholars were 
interested in studying and eliciting its rulings in this context is the attempt of Prophet 
                                                 
583 He adds, "This truce was one of the greatest conquests. People were given safety by each others; 
Muslims contacted with disbelievers. They recited Quran to them debating on Islam openly. Those who 
were hiding their conversion to Islam showed up, and many entered Islam, whom Allah wills to do so, 
in the period of the truce. Thus, Allah called it a manifest conquest." See Ibn Qayim Aljawziya, Zad 
Almi’ad fi hadiyi khair al ibad. Ibid., Volume 3., pp. 309-310.   
Some Muslim scholars add other benefits of this truce. Among them are Quraish's recognition of the 
Muslim state entity, through dealing with it as a rival, which had an impact on the other Arab tribes that 
looked to Quraish for leadership and as a role model. Abdelhakeem al-Faitori. Sulh Alhudaibiya Wa 
Ab'adoho Al Siaiya. [The Truce Of  Hudaibiya and Its Political Dimensions] 
(http://www.almanara.org/books/alhudebeah/12.htm 
Also, the signing of this truce struck fear into the hearts of the polytheists, Bedouin, and hypocrites; 
who were certain by then of the predominance of Islam. This led many of them, including some leaders 
of Quraish itself to enter Islam, such as Khaled Ibn al-Walid and Amr Ibn al-Aas. In addition to this, 
Muslims were militarily safe from Quraish's harm, so they focused their attention on other threats such 
as the Jews of Khaibar. The period of peace which lasted for two years allowed the Prophet 
Muhammad to extend the message of Islam to the lands of the Romans, Persians, and the Copts in 
Egypt through sending letters and delegations inviting them to Islam. For more details see Ali 
Muhammad Al Salabi. Asahul kalam fi sirati Khair al anam: Al seerah al nabawiya. Ibid., Part 2. pp. 
1068-1069.  
The Muslim scholar, Imam al-Zuhri summarizes all this by saying, "In those two years (the period of 
the truce), people who entered Islam were as much as those who had been Muslims before."  See Al 
Salabi. Ibid. p. 1068. Ibn Hisham, one of the leading biographers of the Prophet Muhammad 
commented on this saying: "The evidence for the al-Zuhri statement is that the Prophet went out to 
Hudaibiya with one thousand and four hundred ... and then came out after two years in the year of 
conquest with ten thousand." Ibn Hisham, Alseerah Alnabawiya. Ibid., Volume 3. pp. 268 – 269. 
Muhammad to reconcile the tribe of Ghatfan. He offered to give them one third of the 
fruits produced in Medina if they left the alliance of Quraish and the other tribes that 
participated in the siege of Medina in the fifth year of Muhammad's migration to the 
City.  
Although this incident took place a year before Hudaibiya, it includes some 
other rulings that are not included in the Hudaibiya analysis. Scholars discussed these 
rulings at length. The significance of this reconciliation is also increased, as we will 
show later, as it is linked to today's debate amongst the Muslim scholars on the issue 
of the truce which Hamas is influenced by.  
The story in brief is as follows: As the long siege of Quraish and its allies of 
the Muslims of Medina was taking a toll, the Prophet decided to attempt to disband 
the alliance of the Arab tribes with Quraish by agreements with each of them to return 
to their homelands and end the siege of Medina. To this end, the Prophet sent a 
proposal to the two leaders of the tribe of Ghatfan offering them one third of the crops 
of Medina. The reconciliation was written on this basis, though it was not signed, 
ratified, or certified according to Muslim sources. When the Prophet wanted to sign 
the agreement, he sent a message to his companions Saad Ibn Mu'az and Saad Ibn 
Obadah, the two leaders of the Ansar (from Medina), to consult them on this issue. 
They both refused the proposal after the Prophet told them that he was doing it for 
them, and not because Allah commanded him nor because he liked it. 583F584 
                                                 
584 The Islamic sources mention the following dialogue between the Prophet, Saad Ibn Mu'az, and Saad 
Ibn Obadah: "They said to him, O Messenger of Allah, Is it something you wish, so we shall do; or 
something you are commanded by God, so we must do, or something you do for us? He said: 
something I do for you. I swear by Allah that I only do this because I saw the Arabs have allied to fight 
you and fought you from every where. I wanted to reduce this scourge. Saad Ibin Mu'az said to him,: O 
Messenger of Allah, we and these people had been polytheists and idol worshippers not worshipping 
Allah and not knowing Him. At that time they have not coveted to eat a date from us unless as a means 
of hospitality, or as a sale. So, when Allah blessed us with Islam, guided us to it, and made us proud 
with you and Him, and then we gave them our money? (by Allah) this is not what we are going to do 
and by Allah we give them only the sword until God judges between us and them. "The Messenger of 
Allah (peace be upon him) said, "it is you and that". Saad Ibin Mu'az was handed the paper, erasing the 
This incident is significant in two respects that influenced and still influence 
the ongoing jurisprudential debate about truce and reconciliation. First, on the 
Ghatfan incident, the Prophet offered to pay to non-Muslims in the hope of stopping 
their aggression on Medina. Second, this incident refutes the view of those who say 
that Hudaibiya was based on a balance of power between Muslims and infidels at that 
time. If it is possible to talk about the balance of power in Hudaibiya (in the sense that 
the Muslims were not the weaker party), the case is different in the Battle of the 
Trench, where Quraish and its allies were superior in numbers and arms.585 
In spite of the fact that this reconciliation had been opposed, and was not 
supported by a Quranic revelation, as in Hudaibiya, many scholars cite this incident to 
support their view that "it is permissible to pay money to the disbelievers to stop 
greater harm to the Muslims".586 The mere acceptance of the Prophet, if not objected 
by the Companions makes it legitimate, as long as there is no proof of the prohibition.  
Meanwhile, other scholars believe that the trench negotiation is not eligible for 
inference as it did not lead to reconciliation of which they can talk about its rulings.587  
We will later explain the implications of this debate among scholars, on the 
understanding of the issue of reconciliation and truce. 
                                                                                                                                            
written words, and said let them make every effort with us (fight us as much as they can)."  Ibn 
Hisham, Alseerah Alnabawiya. Ibid., Volume 3. pp. 74 – 175.  
585 Osama Abu-Irshaid. Ba'ad Entisarha Al-Modawi: Jadaliat Aldini wa Alsiyasi fi Fiker Hamas.. 
Eshkaliat Altfawad wa Eletraf bi Israel Ka Anmothazin. [After its Astonishing Victory, the Reasons 
and the Challenges: The Dialectic of the Religious and the Political in Hamas' Ideology.. The Dilemma 
of  Negotiations and Recognition of Israel as a two Examples] Published 19 February 2006. 
http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/mushrakat/b-mushacat-481.htm 
And 
Ibrahim Abu Alhija'a. Hamas: Alhudna fi Khidmat Almoqawama. [Hamas: Hudna in the Service of 
Resistance] Published 15 March, 2004. 
http://www.onislam.net/arabic/newsanalysis/analysis-opinions/palestine/84311-2004-03-15%2013-58-
19.html 
586 Yusuf Hafouna al-Husaini. Alhudna Wa Ahkam Alsulh fi El Islam. Ibid. 
http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content-64577.html 
587 Muhammad Al Bouti. Fiqh Al Sirah. [The Jurisprudence of the Prophet Biography], (Damascus, 
Syria: Maktabat Al Daoua Al Islamia. Seventh Edition, 1978.), pp.233-234. 
In the context of our study, the Prophet's negotiation with Ghatfan gains more 
significance because it is at the heart of the contemporary jurisprudential debate on 
the concept of a Palestinian truce and conciliation with Israel. The example of 
Ghatfan is also central to discussions of Hamas' vision. This is an issue that we will 
elaborate on further.   
As already stated, the successors of the Prophet amongst his companions, and 
Muslim princes who followed them, practiced reconciliation and truce. This was on 
the grounds that it was practised by the Prophet, and that it is within the Islamic 
jurisprudential restrictions established in this context,588 which will be discussed more 
later.   
However, the most important incident of reconciliation and truce in the 
Islamic history, after Hudaibiya and Ghatfan, which will be central to the 
contemporary Islamic jurisprudence in the context of the Palestinian issue, is the Ar-
Ramlah Treaty signed by the Muslim leader Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi with Richard I of 
England (the Lionheart). 
According to the Islamic historical sources, the Franks had been defeated in 
1187 by the Muslims, led by Sultan Salah ad-Din, at the Battle of Hattin (near Lake 
Tiberias in Israel today). This Islamic victory brought down the Crusader Kingdom of 
Jerusalem, and allowed the Muslims to regain the city of Jerusalem and many other 
Palestinian cities. Europe mobilized at the call of Pope Clement III to save Jerusalem 
from the hands of Muslims. 588F589 Thus began the Third Crusade, led by a number of 
kings and princes of Europe, including the Kings of England, and France and the 
Emperor of Germany. Owing to disagreements between the European allies, the 
                                                 
588 Yusuf Hafouna al-Husaini. Alhudna Wa Ahkam Alsulh fi El Islam. Ibid. 
http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content-64577.html  
589 Farouq Fawzi, Tareekh Filistin Alislami,[The Islamic History of Palestine], chapter 2/part 1 in 
Jawad El- Hamad (Editor), Al madkhal ila alqadiya alfilasteeniya. Ibid. pp. 87-88. 
campaign was led by the English King, Richard the Lionheart.590 After a number of 
battles, Lionheart succeeded in dominating a number of Palestinian coastal cities 
including Acre in 1191.591  
At the end of many battles in which Salah ad-Din and Richard shifted 
positions, the two leaders were forced to turn towards peace. They disputed about 
Jerusalem, as Richard wanted it to be handed over to the Franks, while Salah ad-Din 
insisted that it remain in Muslim hands.592 The Islamic historical sources indicate that 
Richard eventually realized that it was impossible to take Jerusalem from the 
Muslims. Thus, he accepted the truce.593 The treaty was signed in 1192. It stipulated 
that peace would prevail between the two opponents for three years and three months; 
while each side maintain the land they gained during the war.594 
The importance of Ar-Ramlah treaty can be summarized in three points. First, 
it is related to Palestine specifically which is the land disputed today. Second, it was 
signed from the Muslim side by Salah ad-Din, a leader who is perceived in the 
                                                 
590 Ibid., p. 88 
591 Ibid., p. 88  
592Ibid., p. 88   
593According to the same historical Islamic sources the causes of the truce between the two parties lie 
first in the inability of the two parties to resolve the battle, as the victory was alternating between each 
of them. Second, Richard called for Salah ad-Din to resume the negotiations, because "Muslims and 
Franks have perished and states were destroyed and went out of the hands of the two parties." Al-Qadi 
Bah'a Aldeen Ibn Shadad. Alnwadar Alslutania Wa Almahasen Alyosofiah. . [The Gleam of the Sultans 
and the Merits of Yusuf]  (Cairo, Egypt: Mutba'at Al-Adab Wa Almo'aiyad, No Edition info, 1899.), 
pp. 186-187. 
Third, the encamped soldiers were bored of the unending battles. News reached Richard that his throne 
was being threatened by his brother in England. Some historical Islamic sources indicate that the 
Muslim soldiers were getting tired of the many battles, signs of dissent in their ranks were shown and 
they started breaking the command which upset Salah ad-Din and led him to reconcile, though not 
completely satisfied with it.  Ibn Kathir, Al bidaya wal nihaya. Ibid., Volume 11- 12, volume 12., pp. 
372-373. 
594 The crusaders would have the coastal area from Tyre to Jaffa, including Caesarea, Haifa, Arsuf, 
leaving Sidon, Beirut and Byblos to the Muslims; the city of Ashkelon was to be unarmed in the hands 
Muslims; the cities of Lod and Ramla to be divided equally between Muslims and Crusaders; and 
Jerusalem would remain in the hands of Muslims, while the Christians would be allowed to perform 
pilgrimage to Jerusalem without requiring a tax. "Salah ad-Din declared that the truce was made, so, 
whoever from their country wishes to enter our country, they are allowed to, and whoever from our 
country wishes to enter their country, they are allowed to."  Taqiu Eldeen Ahmad Almaqrezi. Al Solouk 
fi Ma'arifat Dowal Al Molok. [Translation to English is not Possible], (Cairo, Egypt, Daru Al-Kutb, 
volume 1. 1st Edition, 1956.), p. 110. 
Muslim memory as the hero who freed Jerusalem –having been in the hands of the 
Crusaders for about 88 years (1099-1187)- and who is regarded as a committed 
believer, and therefore, a man above doubts. Hamas' charter itself quotes and glorifies 
Salah ad-Din's experience.595  Third, above all, Salah ad-Din recognized temporarily 
the suzerainty of the Crusaders over some Palestinian coastal cities, even though they 
were perceived as occupiers, contrary to the case of Quraish in Mecca at the time of 
Hudaibiya. This researcher did not find a single respectable scholar at that time, 
questioning the legitimacy of this truce. However, it should be noted here that the Ar-
Ramlah treaty was signed within the context of military balance between the Muslims 
and the Crusaders, after both parties failed to achieve a decisive victory. Moreover, 
the period of the truce did not include recognition by Muslims of the Crusaders' right 
to the lands in their hands, therefore, the truce was a pragmatic agreement and limited 
in time and scope. 
 
 
 
                                                 
595 Article thirty four of Hamas' charter states: "Expansionists have more than once put their eye on 
Palestine which they attacked with their armies to fulfill their designs on it. Thus it was that the 
Crusaders came with their armies, bringing with them their creed and carrying their Cross. They were 
able to defeat the Moslems for a while, but the Moslems were able to retrieve the land only when they 
stood under the wing of their religious banner, united their word, hallowed the name of Allah and 
surged out fighting under the leadership of Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi. They fought for almost twenty 
years and at the end the Crusaders were defeated and Palestine was liberated." Also, article thirty five   
states: "The Islamic Resistance Movement views seriously the defeat of the Crusaders at the hands 
of Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi and the rescuing of Palestine from their hands, as well as the defeat of the 
Tatars at Ein Galot, breaking their power at the hands of Qataz and al-Dhaher Bivers and saving the 
Arab world from the Tatar onslaught which aimed at the destruction of every meaning of human 
civilization. The Movement draws lessons and examples from all this. The present Zionist onslaught 
has also been preceded by Crusading raids from the West and other Tatar raids from the East. Just as 
the Moslems faced those raids and planned fighting and defeating them, they should be able to confront 
the Zionist invasion and defeat it. This is indeed no problem for the Almighty Allah, provided that the 
intentions are pure, the determination is true and that Moslems have benefited from past experiences, 
rid themselves of the effects of ideological invasion and followed the customs of their ancestors." 
Hamas' charter. Ibid. 
Peace and Hudna in Islamic Jurisprudence 
 
The purpose of our focus here in discussing the truce or hudna pact from among the 
other types of treaties in Islam, is that Islamic jurisprudence consider defensive jihad 
an individual obligation upon every Muslim, male and female.596 Since Islamic 
jurisprudence regulates the land of Palestine as occupied territory its decisions fall 
under this ruling. And because the inhabitants of Palestine and the Muslims as a 
whole are incapable of defeating Israel today, the only option available to them under 
Islamic juridical considerations is rendered into a truce or hudna as defined by Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
As we previously mentioned Muslim scholars define hudna as an agreement to 
cease hostilities with combatants for a period of time with or without mutual 
stipulations. Juridical texts describe it as peace and quiet, a calm, a truce, an armistice 
and at times a form of reconciliation.596F597 In addition, we previously discussed the 
source of its authenticity that it is derived from the Quran and the Prophetic tradition. 
The majority of Muslim scholars opine that hudna is to be sanctioned in battle 
only as a last resort, and as an exception to the rule. Nor does it suffice to eradicate a 
vice; they further necessitate a manifest interest for Muslims as a result of its 
implementation. There is expansive treatment in Islamic texts to pinpoint the meaning 
of this interest. It includes, among other considerations, the weakness of the Muslims, 
their small numbers, their lack of preparedness or their endeavour to convert the 
adversary.597F598 There are those however who view its permissibility without reason, 
                                                 
596 This is an issue that we clarified earlier in this chapter.  
597 Sheehab Aldeen Ibn Hajar Alhaithamy, Tuhfat al Muhtaj Bisharhi Alminhaj. [Translation to English 
is not Possible]. (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Alkotub Alelmia, volume. 4. 2nd Edition, 2005.), p. 230.  
598 Ibid., p. 230. 
even if Muslims are in a position of strength, given that it is in their interest, as we 
explained earlier.599  
Muslim scholars, prohibit hudna unless the following four conditions are met: 
1) the signatory to it must be the imam or his deputy; 2) there must be a manifest 
interest. If an interest is not apparent to the extent of giving Muslims a clear 
advantage over the other, it is not permissible: 3) it must be free of ill-conceived 
conditions such as Muslim captives remaining in enemy hands; and 4) it has to be 
time–limited. On this last point, scholars have differed over the duration of the 
hudna.600 However, the majority hold that it is permissible up to ten years, the period 
of time in which the Prophet engaged in a hudna with the Quraish at the Treaty of 
Hudaibiya. Still others have extended the hudna beyond ten years if there is a clear 
interest achieved outweighing the benefits of continued warfare.601 To be sure, the 
prominent Muslim scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah, permits the signing of a hudna without a 
prescribed time if it is determined by the imam to be in the best interest of the 
Muslims.602 Nonetheless, the majority of the Muslim jurists prohibit an open ended or 
                                                 
599 For more details see Yusuf Hafouna al-Husaini. Alhudna Wa Ahkam Alsulh fi El Islam. Ibid.  
http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content-64577.html 
600 For more details on the four conditions, see: Khaleel Bin Ishaq Almaliki, Hasheiat Alkharshi Ala 
Mukhtasar Sedi Khaleel. (Translation to English is not possible). (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Alkotub 
Alelmia. Volume 4. First Edition, 1997.), pp 90-91.   
 Some scholars hold that the duration of hudna may not exceed four months in accordance with the 
apparent Quranic verses “This is a declaration of disassociation from Allah and His messenger to those 
whom you have made a treaty among the polytheists. So go about in the land for four months and know 
that you cannot weaken Allah and that Allah will bring disgrace to the unbelievers.”. Others view its 
permissibility for one, two, three or four years. Ibid. 
601 Muhammad Bin Ahmad Ad-Dusuki Almaliki, Hashiyat Ad-Dusuki Ala Sharh Al Kabeer. 
(Translation to English is not possible). (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Alkotub Alelmia. Volume 2. First 
Edition, 1996.), p. 528  
602 “It is permitted to enter into it indefinitely and temporarily. The temporary (hudna) is incumbent on 
both sides. Adherence to the treaty is mandatory as long as it is not violated by the enemy. As for the 
open ended, it is a permissible treaty to be dealt with by the Imam based on the interest.” See a survey 
of the different opinions of the eminent Muslims scholars on this issue in:  Yusuf Hafouna al-Husaini. 
Alhudna Wa Ahkam Alsulh fi El Islam. Ibid. 
http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content-64577.html 
more specifically a permanent hudna.603 Their reasoning is that a hudna without a 
time limit will dictate the nullification of jihad.604 
The scholars have differed whether it is lawful for Muslims who are not weak 
to pay monetary tribute to the enemy in return for a treaty with them, and whether that 
is an invalidating factor or not. There are those who argue that it is permissible in a 
condition of weakness. They take their reasoning from the Prophet Muhammad’s 
offer to the tribe of Ghatfan.605 Others have rejected this opinion arguing “the ‘Treaty 
of the Ditch’ was not entered into. Since it did not take place it is not considered 
authoritative as a basis in any school of thought, classical or modern.”606 However, 
the majority of scholars permit it in circumstances of weakness and the existence of 
necessity or imminent danger from the polytheists.607 
The essence of this section is that the rulings on hudna and treaty in Islamic 
jurisprudence are very flexible. It revolves around repelling evil (or a vice) and 
bringing about an interest for Muslims. Even the four conditions contain many 
exceptions. For example, Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi was not the Muslim Caliph at the 
signing of Ar-Ramlah, (i.e. he was not the imam of the Muslims). Islamic 
jurisprudence dealt with him as the de facto deputy of the Caliph in the war and peace 
with the Crusaders. Similarly as we have seen, within an expansive definition of best 
interest, some scholars permit the refuge in a peace or hudna without a weakness or 
reason. Others differed in the definition of jus cogens (peremptory norms) thereby 
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607 The great scholar, Ibn Qudamah, summarizes this opinion “If he (the Imam) enters into a treaty 
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diminishing its standing in favour of best interest.608 It is the situation that availed 
itself to Salah ad-Din in permitting the Crusaders to maintain occupation of lands for 
three years without, however, recognizing their right to the occupation of those lands. 
This flexibility of the Islamic jurisprudence has provided Hamas with juridical 
and Islamic legal cover so that it can operate flexibly within the harsh reality it finds 
itself in today. Hamas' Deputy Chairman Mousa Abu Marzook, confirms this 
notion.609   
 
The Stand of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas  
   
The previous fiqhi, i.e. jurisprudential debate finds its way into the MB school of 
thought, which holds, as we have previously explained in chapter 1, that Islam is a 
universal religion regulating all areas of life.610 Since Hamas is an organizational and 
intellectual extension of the MB, as we have also explained in chapter 1, this debate 
has found its way in to its approach towards the controversial nature of peace with 
Israel and recognition.611 
Since Palestine occupies a special place in the general Islamic understanding, 
and that Islamic jurisprudence also views it as a land usurped by force and that it 
should be restored and liberated, no matter how long it will take, the MB announced 
from its inception that they rejected any recognition of Israel or legitimization of its 
existence on the land of Palestine. They put forward the idea of jihad as an alternative 
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to concession. At a later stage, after they realized that it was impossible to dismantle 
Israel, they put forward through Hamas the concept of the truce with no recognition, 
as a way out of the impasse, on the grounds that the truce is an episode of the 
continuation of jihad.611F 612 
 
The General Position: No to Peaceful Resolutions ... No to Recognition  
 
The general attitude of rejecting ‘peaceful’ resolutions and emphasizing the priority of 
jihad was clear from the early years of the MB and under the leadership of Imam 
Hasan al-Banna, its first Murshid, i.e. general guide. As noted previously in chapter 1, 
the MB, led by al-Banna, refused to recognize the November 1947 U.N. General 
Assembly resolution to partition Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab-Palestinian 
one. They also refused the UN Security Council resolution to hold a truce (May 1948) 
between the warring Arab and Jewish armies. 612F613   
Al-Banna's understanding of the jurisprudence of jihad, in the event of an 
attack launched on any part of the Islamic world, is consistent with the general line of 
the previous propositions. First, he believed that the Islamic world is one and 
indivisible. Second, it is an Islamic duty for the Muslims to be leaders in their 
homelands, masters in their home countries. He adds, "hence, the MB believes that 
each state that has invaded or is invading the homelands of Islam is an oppressive 
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country that must cease its aggression. Thus, Muslims should prepare themselves and 
work cooperatively to get rid of this invasion."614  
The previous quotation of al-Banna implies a clear reference to the jihad of 
Defense, which Muslim scholars agree is an individual duty of every Muslim in the 
case that the Muslims in the invaded country were unable to stop the aggressor, or the 
case of occupying a part of the Islamic land and its people were not able to liberate it 
by themselves. According to al-Banna, one of the first goals of jihad is "combating 
aggression, self-defense, defending family, money, home, and religion."615 In the 
event that this aggression occurred upon Muslim land, jihad becomes an individual 
duty for every male and female Muslim.616 From here, the cause of Palestine, as 
envisaged by al-Banna and the MB, brings together the concepts of the unity of the 
Islamic nation and the doctrine of jihad.617 Al-Banna made it clear in saying that 
resolving the Palestinian cause would be achieved through unity and jihad.618 
Days after the inception of the Hamas movement, its first statement (12 
December, 1987), declared a refusal to the "lean peace" and "useless international 
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From an early stage in the history of the Palestinian cause, specifically during the Great Palestinian 
revolution (1936-1939) against the British occupation and Jewish immigrants, al-Banna believed that 
"armed jihad" was the only way to deal with the realities of occupation in Palestine. For more details 
see: Ibrahim Al Bayoumi Ghanim, Al Fikr Assiyasi lil Imam Hasan al-Banna. Ibid .p. 485. 
 This was manifested in the Muslim MB's support and participation in this revolution. This concept was 
further reinforced by al-Banna and the MB in their active participation in the armed conflict in the 
stage that preceded the declaration of the state of Israel in May 1948, through the Arab-Israeli war 
(May 1948), then their rejection of a truce after this event, and to the formation of armed resistance 
groups against the newly established Jewish state. This attitude continued till 1954, the year in which 
the MB clashed with the Egyptian regime of President Gamal Abdel Nasser and ended up clandestine. 
For more details, see chapter 1 of this study. 
However, the general theoretical attitude of the MB remained adamant on refusing to recognize Israel. 
They also held that the liberation of Palestine would only be through jihad, and that any talk of a 
peaceful solution was a waste of time. This remained the official position of the group until the 
inception of the Hamas movement, which embodied these beliefs practically in the ideology of the MB. 
These beliefs were outlined in one of the communiqués of the Jordanian MB branch on 24 March, 
1993.    
conferences", stressing that "the path of martyrdom and sacrifice" is the authentic way 
to liberation.619 The same meaning was confirmed in the second statement of the 
movement; "the Muslim Palestinian people reject all submissive solutions and reject 
the international conference because it does not restore the rights of our people in 
their homeland and to their land. Liberation can only be achieved through sacrificing 
blood and continued jihad until victory".620 In its early years, Hamas statements 
towed  the same line, stressing that Israel "only understands the language of force, it 
does not really believe in negotiations nor peace, and it always attempts to 
deceive."621 Furthermore: "Any negotiations with the enemy are a retreat from the 
[Palestinian] cause, a waiver of principle, and a recognition of the murderers who 
usurped a right that is not theirs and a land that they were not born in."622 Hamas 
argued that "Palestine is a right that fully belonged to Muslims in the past, present and 
future and not exclusively to the Palestinians or the Arabs. Thus, it is not entitled to a 
generation of Palestinians or others to give up this land."623 In addition to this, the 
"Palestinian state is the fruit of long struggle and endless sacrifices."624 
During its first year, Hamas also announced their rejection of the UN 
resolution of November 29, 1947 concerning the partition of Palestine.625 With regard 
to the question of recognizing Israel, Hamas defined its position very clearly in 3 
August, 1989 in a letter to the Fifth Conference of the Fatah movement, saying:  
 
                                                 
619 Hamas' communiqué # 1. Issued 14 December, 1987. Wathaa'ek Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-
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The recognition of the void Jewish entity on the land of Palestine is a very 
serious issue, and it requires taking a serious and firm stand…  The 
recognition of the void entity on our land is not a subject to the discretion 
of a president (or all presidents) an organization (or all organizations)… 
because this issue is concerned with dignity and doctrine.626 
   
The charter of the Hamas movement paralleled these propositions. According 
to Article 13 of the charter "Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and 
international conferences to solve the question of Palestine, are in contradiction to the 
principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Abusing any part of Palestine is abuse 
directed against a part of religion."627 On that basis and according to the same article 
"There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through jihad. Initiatives, 
proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavours. 
The Palestinian people know better than to consent to having their future, rights and 
fate toyed with."628 The general framework of Hamas' refusal to any peaceful 
solutions stems from its conviction that: 
 
The land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Muslim 
generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: 
it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a single Arab country nor 
all Arab countries, neither any king nor president, nor all the kings and 
                                                 
626 Hamas' letter to the Fifth Conference of the Fatah movement. 3 August, 1989. Wathaa'ek Harakat 
Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya Hamas. Second year of Intifada. Ibid.,  p. 129. 
In this letter Hamas emphasized its ideological dogmas: "Palestine from the sea to the river is a 
Palestinian Arabic Islamic land… and it is indivisible". In addition to this, "the Jewish existence on any 
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627 Hamas' charter. Ibid., Article 13.  
628 Ibid. 
presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or 
Arab, possess the right to do that.629 
 
Because Hamas treats Palestine as an Islamic Waqf, it becomes a cause for the 
Islamic nation as a whole, in the sense that it is not limited to the Palestinian people 
and Arab nation only.630Accordingly, in its charter, Hamas warns against the 
Palestinianization of the cause and elimination of its Arab and Muslim dimensions, 
condemning all those who attempted this.631 Thus, Hamas and the Palestinian people 
become "the spearhead of the circle of struggle. Arab and Islamic Peoples should 
augment by further steps on their part; Islamic groupings all over the Arab world 
should also do the same, since all of these are the best-equipped for the future role in 
the fight with the warmongering Jews."632 
Based on all the above, and because Palestine is an occupied Holy Land, and 
because its Palestinian people are incapable alone of liberating it and stopping the 
aggression, then, Hamas cites the jurisprudential ruling saying that jihad in such case 
is an individual duty for every Muslim.  
 
Since this is the case, liberation of Palestine is then an individual duty for 
every Muslim wherever s/he may be. On this basis, the problem should be 
viewed. This should be realized by every Muslim. The day the problem is 
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dealt with on this basis, when the three circles mobilize their capabilities, 
the present state of affairs will change and the day of liberation will come 
nearer.633 
 
If "an enemy should tread Muslim land, resisting and quelling the enemy 
become the individual duty of every Muslim, male or female. A woman can go out to 
fight the enemy without her husband's permission, and so does the slave: without his 
master's permission."634 
Therefore, and since the first day, Hamas was organized on the basis of 
refusing Israel and its existence.635 
In this context, dozens of fatwas636 were issued by Islamic jurisprudence 
institutions and prominent Muslim scholars prohibiting the recognition of Israel or the 
ceding of an inch of the land of Palestine. Such fatwas contributed to the promotion of 
this strong ideology for Hamas and the MB.637 Once again, since both the MB and the 
Hamas movement declare their Islamic reference, it is difficult for them to overcome 
such fatwas without the existence of other opposing fatwas of the same qualitative, 
quantitative, and cumulative level of authority.638 This point will be discussed later, as 
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some Muslim scholars have approved, under certain conditions, and in very narrow 
circumstances the possibility of recognizing Israel, but these fatwas do not reach the 
qualitative, quantitative, and cumulative level of the prohibition fatwas. 
The international movement began in the late eighties and early nineties of the 
last century to hold peace conferences between the Arabs, including Palestinians, and 
Israel. Later, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) accepted to participate in 
the Madrid peace conference in October 1991. With these developments, the MB and 
Hamas increased their opposition to the idea of peaceful solutions. However, this 
time, their opposition to peaceful solutions was not confined to the established 
ideological motives, as they also provided some political reasons for their opposition, 
though the ideological discourse still remained as the general framework at that stage. 
At the ideological level, both the MB and Hamas stressed the sanctity of the 
Palestinian case. In a statement by the MB's General Guide, released months before 
the Madrid Conference, and published by the information office of Hamas it says: 
"We have never bargained and we shall never bargain over the land of Palestine. 
Palestine, all of Palestine, belongs to all the Muslims. The link between Palestine and 
the Muslims is derived from their Aqidah (Faith) and from Shari'a."639 In addition, 
"Neither the people of Palestine nor any Muslim governor has the right of disposal 
over Palestine, because Palestine does not belong to its inhabitants alone but belongs 
to all Muslims."640 The solution as offered by the statement of the General Guide was 
“jihad for the sake of God”, as peace does not end the conflict nor terminates it, and 
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639 Our Stand Toward The Settlement. Statement from the Al-Murshid Al-'Almm (Grand Guide) of the 
Muslim Brotherhood Regarding the Proposals to Settle the Palestinian Question. The Information 
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640  Ibid. 
the phase of weakness experienced by the Muslims will not continue forever.641 
Hamas also echoed the same objections.642  
At the political level, Hamas offered some reasons for its opposition to the 
peace process at that time. At the political level, Hamas posited some reasons for its 
opposition to the burgeoning peace process. On the one hand, Israel "wants a peace 
that ends the state of virtual war against it, and guarantees its engagement in the Arab 
region, without compromising one inch of land. The utmost offer by the Jews is the 
self-government for the population and not the land."643 On the other hand, Hamas 
believed then that the U.S. could not be trusted as a sponsor for the peace process, 
"neither is it qualified for that, because of its full bias on the enemy's side. It could 
even be considered as a party to the conflict shrouded in double standards."644 Hamas 
also considered that the conference was "held under circumstances that make the 
timing of participation the worst to enter into negotiations with the enemy. These 
circumstances are the American hegemony over the world, the weakness of the Soviet 
Union and its acknowledgement of the unipolar world order. An additional 
circumstance was the Arabs’ political and military weakness after the Gulf War and 
the Zionist entity’s emergence as a major beneficiary of the Gulf War."645 Based on 
all of the above, Hamas confirmed at the time that "any concessions by any party 
surrendering any part of Palestine, and any treaty to be signed that grants our enemies 
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any right in Palestine will be considered null and void and does not obligate any 
Palestinian, or any Muslim to any thing."646 
 And once again, because the conflict is a long one, Hamas identified "this 
phase as only one round that will not last for long as the battle between us and our 
enemies continues and does not end with a loss of one round."647 
As Hamas considers that any Palestinian concession to Israel is illegal, it 
rejected the Oslo agreement signed in Washington (13/9/1993), on the basis that this 
agreement contained "serious concessions, and a complete departure from the national 
and religious dogmas and a blatant violation of all redlines that were adopted by the 
Palestinian National Council in its consecutive sessions".648 
Hamas' objections to the Oslo accords, "though ideologically motivated",649 
included political and economic reasons. For Hamas, the Oslo agreement did not 
safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people at a minimum, which are 
recognised internationally. It did not guarantee the right of the Palestinians to 
establish an independent and viable state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with 
East Jerusalem as its capital. Also, the agreement did not address the right of the 
Palestinian refugees to return to their towns and villages from which they were driven 
out. Moreover, it criticised the agreement for not including a provision on the need to 
dismantle the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in 
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accordance with international resolutions, much less stop the expansion of these 
settlements. Also, Hamas objected that the agreement maintained Israel's control over 
the land and sea ports of the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to keeping the Israeli 
military checkpoints inside the Palestinian territories. It condemned the subjugation of 
the Palestinian economy to Israel dictates. Hamas complained that the agreement was 
not put to a Palestinian referendum.650 According to the movement the agreement was 
"only another face of occupation."651 
Some scholars on Hamas point to another reason that compelled the 
movement to oppose the agreement. According to them652 Hamas feared that this 
agreement would alter the balance of power in favour of its main rival in the occupied 
Palestinian territories, Fatah. Moreover, Hamas was concerned with the PLO 
strengthening its international legitimacy as a representative of the Palestinian 
people.653 
In 1994 Hamas' fears became a reality after the formation of the Palestinian 
Authority in the occupied Palestinian territories and its acquisition of regional and 
international support. With the formation of the PA, and its security apparatuses, the 
balance of power tipped in favour of Fatah. Hamas was aware of the changes in the 
Palestinian political landscape and that it "was no longer an alternative to the PLO, 
(rather it) became the main opposition force of the new Palestinian National 
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Authority."654 Thus the rules of the game between the PA and Israel on the one hand, 
and Hamas on the other were changed. According to the Oslo agreement, the PA was 
bound in security commitments with Israel, something that contradicted Hamas' 
insistence on continuing its armed resistance against Israel, and eventually led to a 
collision between the two, i.e. the PA and Hamas.655 
It is important to stress again, however, that the above mentioned reasoning 
did not undermine the centrality of the ideological framework in Hamas' discourse 
vis–à–vis the Oslo agreement. Indeed Hamas did invoke religion to further justify its 
opposition to the agreement. For Hamas the Oslo agreement "did not fulfill any of the 
conditions laid down in Islamic law (i.e. Shari'a)." 655F656 Hamas emphasized that "the 
present 'Jewish supremacy' was a 'dangerous period of time', but was 'limited in time'. 
It would definitively end 'when Allah wants it to' and would be followed by the defeat 
of the Jews whose ' existence is limited in time'."656F657   
 
The Interim Solution: A Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Without Recognition of Israel 
 
What was previously discussed represents the central position of the MB and Hamas, 
whether in terms of rejecting the principle of a peaceful solution with Israel or the 
recognition of Israel's right to exist on the land of Palestine.  However, the case on the 
ground is too complex to be included in this stance. Once again, today, Israel is a 
reality, as well as a regional superpower that is impossible to be erased from the map, 
at least in the current circumstances. Furthermore, Israel is no longer a reality only in 
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the region, it has also obtained significant legitimacy through the recognition it gets 
from many Arab and Islamic countries, including the PLO according to the Oslo 
Accords signed in Washington on 13 September, 1993.  
Thus, there is no doubt that, at the level of the central official position, the MB 
and Hamas want to fully liberate Palestine. However, neither the full nor even partial 
liberation have been yet achieved. Moreover, any liberation seems to be unrealistic 
considering today's balance of power. So, what is the solution? 
Here enters the flexibility of Islamic jurisprudence, as well as the long 
political experience of the MB school to which Hamas belongs in the adaptation of 
the Islamic and national rulings according to circumstances. This qualifies Hamas to 
deal with such challenges, giving it legitimacy for such a flexibility imposed on them. 
This makes Hamas a more realistic and flexible movement than some may think, 
though within an Islamic legal supportive system that is limited with a specific 
ceiling, at least until now, refusing to reach the stage of recognition of Israel or the 
right of its presence on the land of Palestine.658 
Hamas' view of the interim solution has developed within this context. The 
framework of the solution is to accept a Palestinian state on all territory occupied in 
1967, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, but 
it does not include the recognition of Israel. This view has developed and grew from 
within the Hamas mainstream position that calls for a Palestinian state from the sea to 
the river. Since the first months of Hamas’ inception, the declaration of its reluctance 
to accept an interim solution ran parallel to its central political position. The main 
reason for this is the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the movement in 
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the occupied territories, and the dilemmas faced by its leaders and figures in clearly 
declaring the central position, especially in the Israeli media.659 Israeli pressures and 
the policy of arrests for the ranks of the fledgling movement then, contributed in the 
movement's adoption of the interim liberation strategy, on the basis that it falls within 
the doctrine of necessity.660 
Since its first day, Hamas, which emerged as a resistance movement from the 
first Palestinian Intifada, as discussed in chapter 1 of this research, was faced with a 
main question related to their options after the Intifada.661 Before a year passed after 
the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in December 1987, it was clear that there were 
two different logics towards the Intifada. The first one was taken by the PLO and its 
factions who thought that the Intifada should be invested and employed politically.662 
The second was the approach of Hamas, and some of the other factions such as 
Islamic Jihad, which treated the Intifada as a "first step on the path of liberation, in 
addition to being a key factor in heating the atmosphere in the Arab and Islamic 
worlds to revolutionize the masses and rally the (Muslim) nation in the face of the 
Zionist project in Palestine".663 
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 In its response to the resolutions of the nineteenth session of the Palestinian National Council Hamas 
stressed the sanctity of Palestine, and its integration from the sea to the river. They also emphasized 
that Palestine belongs to generations of Muslims and nobody whosoever was authorized to give up an 
inch of it.  It also reiterated that jihad was the only way to liberate Palestine. Hamas also "emphasized 
its rejection of all peaceful drafts put forward to resolve the cause of Palestine” … This rejection is 
based on their belief “that all these drafts are in favour of the strategy of the Zionist enemy in the long 
run." Hamas' letter to the nineteenth session of the Palestinian National Council, 12 November, 1988.   
However, the dilemma of Hamas was doubling with such strong positions, 
especially that its political awareness of the surrounding circumstances, either 
willingly or unwillingly, was more advanced than its rigid ideology. For example, 
Hamas announced from the outset that the Intifada, and even its own organization is 
only an "episode of jihad against the Zionist invasion."664 In addition, while Hamas 
was opposed to any political employment of the Intifada,665 the PLO was taking steps 
in that path, participating in the Madrid peace negotiations in October 1991. Later on 
the PLO signed the Oslo Agreement in September 1993, which allowed the 
establishment of a limited Palestinian authority entity in some parts of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, without paying attention to the objections and condemnations of 
Hamas. Furthermore, the formation of the Palestinian Authority constituted a new 
pressure on Hamas, as it also launched a campaign of pressures and arrests parallel to 
the Israeli pressures and arrests in the ranks of Hamas.666 
In addition to what preceded, the era which witnessed Hamas’ inception and 
emergence imposed on the movement another reality that differs from the one which 
was experienced by the other Palestinian resistance factions. Most Palestinian national 
resistance factions, secular and leftist, arose in an era of international polarization 
between the Western camp and the Eastern camp, which is also known as the Cold 
War. They also emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, i.e., an era that precedes any Arab 
recognition of Israel, which gave their positions and struggle, at that time, 
considerable impetus. On the contrary, Hamas emerged in the late eighties of the last 
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This attitude was confirmed by one of its pioneer leaders at the time saying: "The Intifada is not the 
last stage of confrontation with Israel, it is only a stage. Therefore, we do not want to throw all the 
cards of the Islamic movement in a war with stones or a war which we know for sure will not eliminate 
Israel, though it affected Israeli existence, and wiped out the so-called impossibility of Israel’s demise 
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665 Hamas' communiqué # 51. Issued on 17 December, 1989. Wathaa'ek Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-
Islamiya Hamas. Third year of Intifada. Ibid.,  p. 19.    
666 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Ibid., p. 44. 
century. That is the time when the map of international powers was in a state of 
transformation, affected substantially by the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern Socialist bloc and the emergence of the United States as a global single pole 
and superpower. 
Further, in the period which witnessed the emergence of Hamas, a number of 
Arab countries had developed open or secret relations with Israel, as in the case of 
Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. Moreover, the military option in dealing with Israel was 
no longer an option for the Arab states. One of the turning points that affected the 
political map in the Middle East at that time was the defeat of Iraq militarily in the 
first Gulf War (1991) and the acceptance by most Arab countries of the U.S. call for 
holding peace negotiations with Israel in the Madrid Conference in October, 1991.667 
Had Hamas not emerged inside the Palestinian territories and benefited from the rise 
of the region’s trend toward political Islam as well as the Palestinian popular anger 
against the continued occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in that period, it 
would not have been possible for the movement, under the challenging status quo 
conditions, to emerge in the first place.  
All these factors created great pressures on the nascent movement. The solid 
ideology that was associated with the launch of the movement was not suited to the 
political climate in the region at the time. Therefore, Hamas found itself, from the first 
day, bound to be a politically flexible movement at the same time when it was 
ideologically stringent. As Mishal & Sela note: 
 
Since its very birth in late 1987, Hamas espoused a strategy of action that 
combines a long-term vision (to be fulfilled by a continuous Jihad) for the 
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liberation of Palestine and establishment of an Islamic state in all of its 
territory, from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean sea, with a commitment 
to the community's well-being, which requires pragmatism and a quest for 
temporary arrangements in the form of a Palestinian state in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip alone. As an Islamic movement that boasts an alternative 
outlook, Hamas cannot shake off its radical image. Yet as a social movement, 
Hamas must take into account the everyday needs and priorities that require 
coming to terms with the reality of political arrangements.668  
 
Two factors which we mentioned before benefited Hamas in this context. The 
first is the expansive nature of Islamic jurisprudence and its richness, providing a 
cover of legitimacy for Hamas to adopt flexible policies in light of the difficult and 
challenging reality. Second, Hamas is an extension of the decades-long experience of 
flexibility and ideological adaptation with the reality imperatives, embodied in the 
Muslim Brothers’ modus operandi. 
Nevertheless, at that point in time, Hamas had maintained its main discourse 
that emphasized the integration of Palestine, the priority of jihad for the liberation, 
and the rejection of peaceful solutions as well as the recognition of Israel. However, 
recognizing the difficult and complex reality, new terminology including a more 
flexible vocabulary began to develop and added to the discourse of Hamas to express 
their opposition to the peaceful drafts of resolving the conflict. In this context, the 
most prominent development was Hamas' declaration of its refusal of the outcomes of 
any political draft or agreement, what it sees as, a waiver of the Palestinian people's 
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rights,669 in addition to the development of a new official position which includes the 
acceptance of an interim solution unless it implies the renunciation of what it 
considers as established Palestinian rights, such as the Hamas refusal to recognize 
Israel's legitimacy or right to existence. It means that the new discourse was fully 
developed within the broader framework of Hamas' position, which emphasized the 
wholeness of Palestine and the illegality of any recognition of Israel. 
 
Flexibility from within Rigidity 
 
To return to the four stages of evolution that Hamas went through towards the peace 
process and negotiations with Israel. We indicated that these four phases overlap in 
many cases, in the sense that it is difficult to consider and arrange them merely 
chronologically. Hence, in the first phase of Hamas’ history, which is generally 
characterized by total rejection of any peaceful solutions and the recognition of Israel 
(the main position), another position, evolved that aimed at providing a phased 
programme, reflecting the movement's understanding of the difficult reality, as 
discussed previously. 
Therefore, it is important to note here that the description of the first and 
second stages especially (the principled position of refusing political settlement 
without elaboration; and refusing the implications of any political settlement that 
entails a waiver of any rights or entitlements of the Palestinian people) cannot be 
specifically and accurately established in that particular manner. As previously stated, 
Hamas has succeeded since its early years to combine both its stringent ideological 
                                                 
669 Ahmad Abdelaziz, Harakat Hamas wa Altafawad wa Altaswia ma'a Israel, [The Hamas Movement 
and the Negotiations and Settlement with Israel], Part three, chapter 1 in Dirasa Fil Fikr Alsiyasi 
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convictions and relative political flexibility in its political modus operandi, though the 
political flexibility was not clear and comprehensive, at the time, in the mind of the 
movement. At a time when Hamas, via its charter and communiqués, used to 
announce its principled opposition to the peace process and negotiations with Israel, 
we find that the positions of a number of Hamas’ political leaders were more flexible 
and realistic and laid the foundation of the interim solution in the movement's 
discourse. The chronological context "for the development of Hamas' political 
position continued to be overlapped and moving between a number of positions, in 
which one is more prominent depending on the political circumstances and successive 
developments."670 
Afterward the statements of Hamas’ leaders would reiterate what shall be later 
called the ‘phased solution,’ i.e., a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
with Jerusalem as its capital, on the proviso of no recognition for Israel, leaving the 
task of liberating historic Palestine for future generations. For instance, Muhammad 
Nazzal, a member of Hamas’ political bureau said in January, 1993: “We are for any 
‘phased solution,’ but without recognizing the Israeli enemy or its existence … That is 
we do not oppose any Israeli withdrawal from any part of Palestine provided that 
there is no recognition of Israel.”671 It was the same notion that was frequently used 
by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and other Hamas leaders.672 
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For instance, consider the plan proposed by Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, a prominent Hamas leader in the 
Gaza Strip today, submitted in March 1988 to the then Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. In that 
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As for Hamas’ rejection of negotiations and peaceful settlements with Israel, 
the charter itself (The most prominent document that expresses Hamas' central 
position) indicates that the reason for Hamas’ opposition to such negotiations and 
resolutions is the lack of faith in the sponsors and their bias in favour of Israel against 
the Palestinian people.673 This statement alone highlights the time interference 
between the different stages in Hamas' thinking.674  
Since Hamas believes that the sponsors of the Palestinian - Israeli peace 
process are biased in favour of the latter, it believes that jihad and armed resistance 
are the best ways to liberation.675 
 
Truce as an Islamic Jurisprudential Solution 
 
What would Hamas offer Israel in return for accepting a ‘phased solution’? The 
answer to this is a truce for a specific time whose estimates range, according to 
Hamas leaders, from ten to twenty years. For Hamas, truce means here the freezing of 
its military operations against Israel in the time period to be agreed upon between the 
parties in return for a Palestinian state on the land occupied in 1967, without Hamas' 
recognition of Israel.676 
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Indeed, by presenting the truce with Israel in this context, Hamas is attempting 
to doctrinally and realistically extricate itself from a dilemma. Also, it wants to 
demonstrate that it can adapt to disparate circumstances.677 Islamic jurisprudence as 
understood by Hamas, makes it an imperative to liberate all of Palestine "from the sea 
to the river", but the reality is greater than Hamas; even greater than all Arabs and 
Muslims, who are entrusted with this liberation. However, the Islamic jurisprudence 
that prevails today, and which is adopted by Hamas, does not allow for recognition of 
Israel and its right to exist. This is on the basis that this will be judged an invalid 
jurisprudential condition as indicated earlier. Thus, the solution would be in the 
religiously accepted truce as practiced by the Prophet Muhammad, his companions, 
and the early Muslims. According to the senior Hamas leader, Dr. Mousa Abu 
Marzook, "there is a way of accepting an interim solution that is consistent with the 
shariah, namely, an armistice (hudna). This differs from a peace agreement in that the 
armistice has a set duration, and it does not require acceptance of the usurpation of 
(our) rights by the enemy."678 
In his letters sent from prison in October 1993, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was the 
first to put forward the option of a truce with Israel. Sheikh Yassin proposed, in his 
offer, a truce for ten years or twenty years, provided that Israel withdraws from the 
West Bank, [East] Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip without conditions, and the 
Palestinian people shall be at full liberty to exercise their own self- and future-
determination.679 Since that time, the truce has become an official choice of the 
movement if Israel agrees to the conditions posed by Hamas.680 
                                                 
677 Beverley Milton-Edwards & Stephen Farrel, Hama: The Islamic Resistance Movement. Ibid., p. 8.  
678 Interview in Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Ibid., p. 75. 
679 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Ibid., p. 82. 
680 Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid. Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility. Ibid., p. 
8.  
The truce option would gain further impetus with the introduction of Mousa 
Abu Marzook’s political initiative in 1994 that put forward a truce with Israel; Abu 
Marzook was then the chairman of Hamas’ political bureau. The significance of that 
initiative is that it came in the form of almost an integrated programme. In that 
initiative, Abu Marzook offered a truce on four terms: (i) an unconditional Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and (East) Jerusalem; (ii) the dismantling 
and removal of settlements and the removal of settlers from the West Bank, Gaza 
Strip, and [East] Jerusalem; (iii) compensation for the Palestinian people for loss and 
victimization resulting from the occupation; and (iv) free elections for the Palestinian 
people at home and abroad to choose their leadership and representatives. This elected 
leadership alone shall be empowered to express the will of the Palestinian people.681 
A few days after the initiative, the movement’s political bureau issued an 
illustrative communiqué, emphasizing once again the central position of the 
movement. It declared that the initiative by its chairman does not include recognition 
of Israel nor of UN Security Council resolution no. 242, nor does it mean a 
compromise on the Islamic character of Palestine or the prohibition on territorial 
concession.682 Israel rejected it out of hand; and also rejected other truce offers in 
1995, 2002, 2003, and 2004,683 but accepted to enter into a mutual ceasefire 
agreement in June 2008. The latter ceasefire lasted only for six months and came to an 
end in late December, 2008 when Israel launched a major military operation 
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(Operation Cast Lead 27 December, 2008 – 18 January, 2009) against the Hamas 
controlled Gaza strip.684 
The reason Hamas insists on the notion of truce can be attributed directly to its 
Islamic reference system. Hamas believes, according to the tenets of Islamic Shari'a, 
it is unlawful to recognize Israel, on the grounds that it is a manifestation of 
aggression, injustice, and usurpation of Muslim homeland which is Palestine. This 
sense is broadly underlined, as indicated previously, by dozens of fatwas, by Muslim 
scholars who have prohibited the recognition of Israel under any circumstance.685 
Moreover, in case of Muslims’ vulnerability, the Messenger Muhammad’s career and 
the Islamic historic and jurisprudential expertise provide, as we discussed before, an 
alternative to “total concession;” that is the mechanism of truce or hudna, waiting for 
circumstances to change and the Muslims’ position to improve. Therefore, we may 
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In June of 2008, with Egyptian mediation, Israel agreed for the first time to enter into a six month 
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However, can the calm (cease-fire), in Islamic jurisprudence, be considered synonymous with the 
hudna? Yes from a technical standpoint, if we expand the definition of a hudna, we can say they are the 
same. Hudna includes a reconciliation of a long term like the Treaty of Hudaibiya or a mid-term cease 
fire like in the Treaty of Ar-Ramlah, or in a short term treaty as supported by some jurists who say that 
it should be limited just to four months. 
Similarly, they are interchangeable given that there are numerous terms to express the meaning of 
hudna as mentioned previously, and that the definition of an abrogating condition is flexibly 
interpreted. For example some jurists consider financially compensating the enemy as an ill conceived 
condition abrogating the hudna, while others view such a condition as permissible relying on an action 
of the Prophet that he intended although it was not executed in the end. Consequently, the cease-fire 
between Hamas and Israel, from a technical approach, is implicitly included in the sphere of hudna. 
Thus one finds that Islamic jurisprudence is flexible. 
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not mean an end to this phase of the stages of conflict according to its dogma. 
685 Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid. Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility. Ibid., p 
9.  
assume that Hamas’ central position remained the same since its inception until today 
regarding the issue of its general and overall objective which is the total liberation of 
historic Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River. If it talked about a 
‘phased solution,’ i.e., accepting a Palestinian state solution in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, with Jerusalem as its capital, the underlying reason is the impossibility of 
realizing the notion of total liberation. But, out of loyalty to its central ideological 
conviction regarding the entirety of Palestine, and due to the Islamic historic and 
jurisprudential expertise, Hamas refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist in the 
context of any ‘phased solution;’ instead, it offers a pro tem truce.686 
In an official position of Hamas that came after it put forward the idea of a 
truce, Hamas proves once again the opinion that it will continue to default to its 
central position. Thus, it will refuse any recognition of Israel, even if the Palestinians 
get a state on all the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, in the context of a 
long-term truce. In a remarkable statement of the position of Hamas towards peace 
and how it defines it, there is a recent statement published in a website that is believed 
to belong to the Hamas movement in 15 September, 2006, i.e. after the movement 
participated in the Palestinian parliamentary elections and formed its first 
government. This statement emphasized that the central position of Hamas remains 
adamant, even within the interim solution "just peace", as well as staying true to the 
concept of "Palestine, all Palestine", in addition to remaining faithful to the 
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Hence we can understand the reason behind Hamas' refusal of the settlement agreements signed by 
Israel and the PLO, such as the case of the Oslo Accords. Hamas does not accept the requisite of 
recognizing Israel, as it is of the view that the Palestinian-Israeli accords gave the Palestinians less than 
their entitlements in the international resolutions related to the conflict. Therefore, Hamas is not against 
negotiation as a mechanism to resolve the conflict, but is against the terms of this negotiation and its 
potential outcome. Negotiation by itself is not prohibited in Islam as it is viewed by Hamas; but it 
considers Islamic prohibition to implicate its consequences of omission and concessions. This is an 
opinion that was expressed by Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, a prominent leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 
and the then foreign minister of its government. A press conference in Gaza. Reuters, 23 January, 2006, 
 http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/news/2006-01/24/article01.shtml 
jurisprudential approach to Palestine as a land usurped by force that the Muslims 
should restore and liberate by force if necessary. 
 
Hamas has repeatedly said that it is not against the principle of peace, it is for 
peace, calling for it, and trying to achieve it. Nevertheless, Hamas wants a just 
peace that will restore the rights of the Palestinian people, a peace under which 
they can exercise their right to freedom, return, independence and self-
determination. Hamas believes that the agreements reached so far do not meet 
the aspirations of the Palestinian people and do not even meet their minimum 
aspirations. These agreements are not fair and are unjust and harm our people 
while rewarding the aggressor acknowledging its right to what it usurped from 
the other. They are attempts to dictate and impose the conditions of the victor 
while asking the oppressed to waive their rights. An unjust peace as such is 
not expected to be successful or to survive for a long time. 
Furthermore, the principle of political settlement, whatever its source is, and 
whatever its terms are, involves acknowledging the Zionist enemy's right to 
exist in most of the land of Palestine, and the consequent deprivation of 
millions of Palestinian people from their right of return, self-determination, the 
establishment of an independent state, on the entire land of Palestine and the 
establishment of national institutions. This is not only contrary to international 
and humanitarian values, norms and conventions, but it also falls within the 
prohibited in Islamic jurisprudence, and may not be accepted. Palestine is a 
blessed Islamic land that the Zionists forcibly usurped, and jihad is the duty of 
Muslims in order to retrieve it and expel the occupier from it.687 
 
Hudna in the Doctrine of Hamas 
 
It has been previously mentioned that hudna in the thought of Hamas relates back to 
the first year of its establishment. On one hand Hamas realized at an early stage of its 
inception that it was incapable of defeating Israel or bringing about its abolition.687F688  
The reality of the Arab, Islamic and international state of affairs was not conducive in 
that regard. The precipitous change that gave rise to the idea of a hudna came from 
another quarter as well: as a reaction to the Oslo accords signed between Israel and 
the PLO in Washington on 13 September, 1993. 688F689 The initiative was the movement’s 
Islamic alternative to the recognition of the legitimacy of Israel by a treaty or an 
agreement. Hamas was of the view that the leadership of the PLO was forced into 
these agreements under pressure of regional and international balances of power, the 
very situation that was rejected Islamically according to Hamas’ convictions. 689F690 
Sheikh Hasan Yusuf, one of the prominent leaders of Hamas in the West Bank 
disseminates an important reading in the understanding of hudna in the doctrine of 
Hamas. He clearly distinguishes it from signing accords and peace agreements with 
Israel.   
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The term hudna is one of expressions in Islamic jurisprudence. It is a 
formulation that articulates the status of conflict with the enemy or a depiction 
of that status at a certain stage of the conflict. It expresses the continuity of 
conflict with the enemy but with altering depictions and modes and does not 
convey an end to the conflict. Hence hudna is a political and military endeavor 
linked to an appraisal of the situation and the realistic facts, and is buttressed 
by calculation of the lofty interests of the umma (the Muslim nation) and the 
people.  Hudna does not appear in Islamic history and jurisprudence in the 
context of capitulation and surrender to the enemy. Nor does it appear in the 
context of concessions of land, holy sites and legitimate rights. 
The initiative prompted by the martyred Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, (May Allah 
have mercy on him) was in the context of providing an answer to the future 
prospect on the nature of the relationship with the enemy in the event that the 
occupation is rolled back from a portion of our land. The conflict with the 
Zionist enemy may take the form of a temporary hudna in the context of 
managing the conflict without recognizing the enemy and its occupation of our 
land, nor by conceding any of our national rights.691 
 
Based on such advancements the concept of hudna in Hamas’ ideological 
thought has become a permanent fixture and a constant feature of its political 
platform. Hamas relies on a group of present-day fatwas which provides it with the 
religious cover it needs. The movement’s antagonists have attempted to cast doubts 
on its credibility by claiming that it has turned its back on its ideological principles.  
A number of its detractors have questioned whether there is a distinguishable 
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difference between the accords signed by the PLO with Israel on one hand and what 
Hamas proposes in its idea of a hudna on the other.692 
Juridical edicts relied upon by Hamas focus on the hudna as an Islamic 
mechanism based on specific conditions rendering it permissible under the 
circumstances. These conditions will distinguish the hudna from the agreements 
signed by the PLO.693 1) No recognition of Israel or historical concessions.  
Recognition as espoused by Hamas' adopted juristic view is an ill conceived provision 
rendering any accord null and void. 2) Hamas is of the opinion that the hudna is 
restricted to a time certain in direct contrast to the agreements signed by the PLO with 
Israel as a permanent lasting settlement. 3) Hamas does not view a situation where it 
would relinquish its right to the rest of historical Palestine. In this regard the hudna is 
viewed more like a cease fire or cessation of violence for a period of time. In contrast 
the Palestinian and Israeli peace accords conceded, according to Hamas' view, 78 
percent of historical Palestine upon which the state of Israel exists today. 4) Hamas is 
adamant that the hudna is conditioned upon the Palestinians’ continued ability to 
prepare for a future stage of the conflict.694 
The Muslim scholar, Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi gives a major boost to this 
understanding. Al-Qaradawi, as noted in previous chapters, is one of the major 
Muslim and MB scholars, whose opinions contribute to Hamas' jurisprudential and 
religious positions. Al-Qaradawi says in his jurisprudential approach to the concept of 
reconciliation and peace with Israel the following: 
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Israel invaded a Muslim land in which it does not have any right to, thus, they 
must be expelled. For the (Muslim) countries that have concluded 
reconciliation with it, if it meant recognizing the legitimacy of this invasion 
then, their agreement is not acceptable. However, if the reconciliation was in 
the sense of a truce, it would be acceptable for a period of time that takes 
shorter or longer, in which both sides stop their warring, saving their blood, 
and where security prevails. As for the land for peace principle, it is really a 
weird principle, imposed by the logic of brute force of the enemy, and no 
more; because the land is ours not theirs so that they waive it to us in exchange 
for their security…  There is a difference between being overwhelmed by the 
reality so that we accept the fait accompli, and to recognize Israel granting it 
legitimacy. I believe that, irrespective of the passage of time, the Zionists will 
always be labeled as invaders, occupiers, colonizers. The passing of years does 
not change the facts, does not turn what is permitted in Islam into what is 
forbidden, does not justify the crime, and in no way gives the invasion 
legitimacy under any circumstances. The battle between us and them will 
continue as long as its reasons continue to exist. The reconciliation will 
continue to be rejected if it was established on the idea that the 
misappropriated land is their right, since no one has the right to give up the 
land of the nation.695  
 
These ideas will continue to interplay within the MB and Hamas' thinking. 
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In important statements for senior leaders in Hamas, Dr. Abdul Aziz Ar-
Rantisi696 said “Hamas has come to a conclusion that it is difficult to liberate all of 
Palestinian land at this juncture. Thus it will accept liberation in stages.” In a further 
clarification he notes: “Hamas proposes a ten year hudna in return for an Israeli 
withdrawal. The establishment of a Palestinian state to include the West Bank, 
Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.”697 However, Ar-Rantisi said “Whatever new proposal 
along these lines does not mean that Hamas recognizes Israel or the end of the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict.”698 Ar-Rantisi reiterated in other statements “It is forbidden in 
Islam to concede any part of our land thus we will never recognize Israel.”699 
 
The Booster of Truce after the elections 
 
From the previous review, we can conclude that Hamas' official position on the 
question of Israel's legitimacy and recognizing it, as well as its position on the peace 
process has settled on considering the option of a limited-term truce with Israel as the 
best current option. According to Hamas leader, Khalil Abu Leila, first, the truce is a 
legitimate Islamic mechanism that does not legalize what Hamas considers as 
aggression and occupation. Thus, it avoids what Hamas considers as an invalid 
condition in the truce agreement; the condition of recognizing Israel or its right to 
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 One may ask at this point what of the first condition stated that renders a hudna enforceable, i.e., the 
signatory to it must be the Imam or his deputy. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920’s, 
considered the last Islamic state, there has not been a legitimate leader agreed upon by all. In practical 
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this context. In fact, this is precisely what the Muslim leader, Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi did; he was not 
the Caliph of Muslims when he gave himself the authority to sign Al-Ramla Agreement, in a period 
when the Abbasid Caliphate was very weak, and the post of Caliph in Baghdad was no more than a 
ceremonial post.  
exist, as explained in detail in the jurisprudence discussion. Secondly, according to 
Abu Leila, the truce option in the understanding of Hamas is in line with the historic 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, who consider the recognition of Israel as a 
gross injustice to them. Abu Leila concludes by saying, "those who say that Hamas' 
resistance approach is only based on the ground of national liberation are short-
sighted and do not understand Islam correctly. Islam is a comprehensive religion that 
includes all the issues that are faced by the Muslim Ummah till Doomsday".700 
Of course, such truce, according to Hamas will not be offered for free; there 
are conditions as we mentioned before, which Hamas describes as "minimal". These 
conditions, according to Mousa Abu Marzook, include a fully sovereign Palestinian 
state in the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem as the capital. In 
addition, they include the right of return for Palestinian refugees (without specifying 
the range, meaning whether this right is to return to the Palestinian state only, or also 
to Israel), as well as the release of all of the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons and 
detention centers.701 
The value of this truce offer takes on a new and enhanced meaning after the 
success of Hamas in the Palestinian legislative elections, and formation of its first 
government in 2006. In January 2006, Hamas achieved a rate that exceeded 58% in 
the Palestinian parliamentary elections in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East 
Jerusalem.702 Thus, practically, Hamas is no longer just a Palestinian opposition 
faction; it has rather become, at least legally, the representative of the new Palestinian 
legitimacy and a movement that has a popular majority. "The problem of combining 
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the bomb and the ballot – politics and resistance – bedevilled the Hamas leadership 
after it won the 2006 election and became accountable not just to the Hamas 
membership but to the entire Palestinian electorate."703  
The importance of Hamas' decision to participate in the Palestinian legislative 
elections is that it marks one of the most significant milestones in the ideology of 
Hamas and its tendency to adopt more flexible Islamic juridical views, on the 
condition that they are considerable views and have been widely debated in the 
Islamic fiqhi sphere. This is in line with the assumption of this research that Hamas 
always strives to secure a credible Islamic jurisprudential cover for any new position 
it adopts. 
Thus, there were jurisprudential and Islamic studies, as well as political and 
pragmatic studies, that support Hamas' participation in these elections and their 
importance. This was totally incompatible with the position that the movement 
adopted in 1996 elections.704 In 1996, after a heated debate within its institutions, 
Hamas refused to participate in the legislative elections on the pretext that it was done 
under the umbrella of the Oslo agreement and that it confers legitimacy on Israel, 
including a waiver of the waqf land of Palestine to the generations of Muslims, as well 
as including security protocols to suppress the resistance of the Palestinian people and 
discredit the principle of jihad, etc.705 However, the important point in this debate was 
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that it did not include a religious prohibition of the participation in the legislative and 
parliamentary councils as the position of Hamas then was based on its estimation for 
the "higher interests of the Palestinian people".706 
In fact, we can agree with the previous opinion, regardless of whether Hamas’ 
estimate of the "higher interests of the Palestinian people" is true or not. The MB 
school does not reject the participation in legislative and parliamentary elections, not 
even the participation in non-Islamic ministries.707 Therefore, the position of Hamas 
on participating in the Palestinian legislative elections has changed dramatically in the 
2006 elections, despite the fact that these elections fall practically within the Oslo 
agreement, which is rejected by the movement. Hamas justified its decision to 
participate this time saying that the Oslo agreement has breathed its last breath with 
the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. In addition, Israel itself, 
according to Hamas, has announced the death of the Oslo agreement by failing to 
comply by its terms.708 Indeed the internal power struggle within Fatah after the 
passing of its Chairman Yasser Arafat in November 2004, and the weakening of the 
PA due to Israeli policies during the Aqsa Intifada, compelled Fatah to negotiate with 
                                                 
706 Ibid.  
707 Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the MB, ran for parliamentary elections in Egypt more than once. 
Thus, the branches of the MB in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait and Algeria, etc., participated in 
parliamentary elections, and in some countries they participated, and still participate, in some 
ministries. Therefore, the principle of Hamas’ participation in the parliamentary elections is not outside 
of the MB’s context of thinking and practice. However, in the case of Hamas, the difference is that its 
participation would be under the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and that is the 
root of the problem.   
Nevertheless, Hamas was not the first MB movement to participate in legislative and parliamentary 
elections under foreign occupation. The Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi branch of the MB, preceded 
Hamas’ parliamentary elections. The Iraqi Islamic Party has participated in the Iraqi Governing 
Council since 2003, under American occupation, despite the objections, which have been raised by 
other branches of the MB. All of this indicates the jurisprudential flexibility of the MB, which has 
accompanied the emergence of the group since its inception. Hasan al-Banna himself ran twice in the 
Egyptian parliamentary elections (in 1942 and 1944) at a time when Egypt was under the British 
mandate. 
708 According to the chief of the political bureau of the movement, Khaled Meshaal, after the decision 
of his movement to participate in the elections, Hamas would show others (i.e. Palestinians), a new 
style of political action based on the refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Israel. Khaled Meshaal's 
speech on the 18th anniversary of the inception of his movement. Damascus, Syria 30 December, 2005.  
http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic/?c=129&a=30477  
Hamas to enter "into the PLO, and, more generally, into mainstream politics."709 For 
the pragmatists within Hamas, this changed the political opportunity structure in away 
that did not exist in 1996 when Arafat and the PA were not very interested in sharing 
power with Hamas. "With Arafat gone, Fatah in disarray, and Hamas scoring only 
marginally less than Fatah in opinion polls, the chances of securing a significant 
percentage of the vote had increased drastically. At the time these discussions took 
place, regional support for continued resistance was moreover looking shakier than 
ever, with both Syria and Iran weekend by a variety of factors."710    
Evidently, however, the significance of Hamas’ participation in these 
legislative elections, on the one hand, is that it implied an implicit involvement with 
an outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, which Hamas has constantly 
opposed and condemned. On the other hand, such a decision is considered a 
significant shift in Hamas’ approach to the political situation. The participation of 
Hamas in the municipal elections a year earlier (2005) did not raise many questions 
about the real positions of the movement, as municipalities deal with the daily matters 
of life in the Palestinian territories. However, the legislative elections require Hamas 
to deal, regardless of its preferences, with Israel, which it refuses to recognize, and the 
international community. That matter cannot be realized while attaining the same 
discourse of yesterday that Hamas used to adopt.711 
Hamas understood that its decision to participate in the legislative elections 
required a new political idiom and terminology. Therefore, Hamas’ elections 
programme, issued in 14 January, 2006, was by and large a detailed plan, as it does 
not use expressions such as “destruction of Israel” or call for its elimination, as in the 
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case of Hamas’ charter.712 However, it is noteworthy here that the election 
programme of Hamas remained faithful to the principles of the movement that it 
considers Islamic and in line with Palestinian rights, such as talking about “the full 
liberation of Palestine,” and that historic Palestine is a “part of the Islamic and Arab 
homeland, it belongs to the Palestinian people and this right may not be voided by any 
temporal limitations.” However, the language of these [ideological] constants 
(dictums) was relatively marginal in campaign agendas in favour of the programmes 
that Hamas intends to accomplish in the areas of economy, education, housing, health, 
etc.; if it wins over the Palestinian voters.713 
The pattern of flexibility in Hamas’ discourse continued to rise. In its efforts to 
form a national unity government Hamas presented, in 12 March, 2006, a political 
programme to the Palestinian national and Islamic factions to be approved within the 
framework of the anticipated government. The programme talked of ceasefire, its 
conditions, and phased solution. The programme’s most important part is Hamas’ 
reference that the “issue of recognizing (Israel) does not concern a single Palestinian 
faction alone, nor any government alone, but it is the decision of the Palestinian 
people, wherever found.”714 Hamas also signaled, in the programme, its willingness to 
change its point of view regarding the agreements signed between the PLO and Israel, 
saying: “our position on previous agreements is linked to the interests of the 
Palestinian people and we retain the right of reconsidering them in accordance with 
these interests.”715 As noted in the programme, Hamas does not reject negotiation as a 
means, but refuses negotiation in its current form, as it does not meet the minimum 
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demands of the Palestinian people.716 Should anything in the interest of the 
Palestinian people be offered, it shall be considered at the appropriate time.717 No 
doubt, these points represent a significant change in Hamas' stances, a change no one 
could have expected a few years earlier.718 
After failing to convince Fatah and the other national Palestinian factions to be 
partners in a national unity government, Hamas formed a government alone in late 
March 2006. The first striking thing in the proposed programme of the Hamas 
government was shunning the language of ideological generalities, where we do not 
find even a single reference to “historic Palestine.” The programme speaks of working 
to establish an independent Palestinian state with full sovereignty and Jerusalem as its 
capital. It also talks about ending the occupation, removing settlements and 
comprehensive withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, including East 
Jerusalem, and removing the separation wall in the West Bank.719 Moreover, it very 
clearly indicates, perhaps for the first time, that Hamas’ government was ready to deal 
“with the signed agreements with a high sense of responsibility so as to protect the 
vital interests of our people and safeguard their rights without compromising their 
established fundamental entitlements ... and the government's handling of the relevant 
international resolutions with national responsibility, including the protection of our 
people’s established rights.”720 
As Hamas formed its first cabinet (government) in March, 2006, Western 
states and Israel started to apply economic and political sanctions against it and the 
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Palestinian Authority in general. The international Quartet (consisting of the United 
States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations), overseeing Palestinian-
Israeli negotiations placed three conditions on Hamas for the lifting of the sanctions 
and inclusion in the Palestinian-Israeli political process. These conditions were: 
1. Recognition of the right of Israel to exist; 
2. Repudiation of violence and “terrorism” (terms that Hamas considers 
legitimate resistance); and 
3. Recognition of previously signed agreements between the Palestine Liberation 
Organization and Israel which Hamas long opposed.721 
Since then and until this day Hamas has refused to accept the three conditions. 
It maintained this position despite the Israeli siege of the Gaza Strip since Hamas’ 
decisive control of the Strip in June of 2007, and despite the massive Israeli military 
operation (Operation Cast Lead) against Gaza (Dec 2008-Januray 2009). The refusal 
of Hamas to comply can be explained to a large extent, in addition to other political 
reasons,722 by its adherence to Islamic jurisprudence which judges such conditions to 
be invalid or illegitimate.723 
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However, the continuing Israeli and Western pressures on the Palestinian 
Authority had caused the deadliest internal Palestinian clashes between Fatah’s and 
the PA's security apparatus, on one hand, and Hamas and its Government on the other. 
The resentment of some Arab regimes and the Fatah movement that an Islamic 
movement form a Palestinian government are also factors that contributed as well to 
the split in the Palestinian society. In that atmosphere, a number of detained leaders 
from Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in Israeli 
prisons, issued the “Palestinian Prisoners Paper for National Reconciliation” in May 
2006. Despite Hamas’ early reservations regarding many items at the outset, the 
movement approved it after some amendments were carried out. Later it became 
known as “The Palestinian National Conciliation Document” in June 2006.724 
The most important thing in the paper is that it pointed to the "need for a 
Palestinian plan for comprehensive political action and the unification of the 
Palestinian political discourse on the basis of Palestinian national goals, Arab 
legitimacy, and ‘fair’ international resolutions, regarding our people, so as to maintain 
their rights".725 Adding ‘fair’ is the major reason behind Hamas’ approval of this item, 
as it gives the movement the option of avoiding any ideological predicament or 
concession in this context.726 However, the most prominent part in this document, is 
Hamas’ consent to the item that stipulates that:  
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The negotiation management is the prerogative of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and the President of the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) on the basis of upholding the Palestinian national 
objectives as contained in this document. Any negotiated agreement shall 
be submitted to the new Palestinian National Council (PNC) for approval 
and ratification or a general referendum shall be held at home and in exile, 
organized by law.727 
 
The importance of the last item was a clear, unmistakable signal by Hamas 
that it would accept any agreement reached with Israel by President Abbas if it was 
approved by the new Palestinian National Council, or through a referendum of the 
Palestinian people in occupied territories and places of refuge.728 Hamas has also 
restated and stressed the same notion in its reply paper presented to President Jimmy 
Carter April 2008. In its responses, Hamas clearly indicates that it “will accept the 
decision [choice] of the Palestinian people through a referendum under international 
monitoring if President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin) manages to reach an 
agreement with Israel through the final status negotiations.”729 The Movement 
emphasizes the right of the Palestinian people to establish a Palestinian state with full 
sovereignty within the borders [of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip in 
June 4,] 1967.”730 
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From this point on, we will be seeing significant ‘progress’ in Hamas’ political 
thinking, it now implicitly accepts the recognition of and coexistence with Israel, not 
directly though, i.e. from within the Palestinian regime of ‘legitimacy,’ that Hamas is 
part of now. In some sense, Hamas seeks to balance between its refusal, as an Islamic 
movement, to officially and openly adopt such an approach, that on the basis of its 
ideology cannot be justified; but it does not mind to live with this approach, at least at 
the present time, from within the Palestinian political system, without bearing the 
political and ideological burden of those concessions, as a movement.731 This means 
that Hamas' official stand as a movement will continue to be the notion of truce 
according to Mousa Abu Marzook the deputy chairman of Hamas' political bureau.732 
Hamas would enhance this new turn in its political behaviour. That is, as a 
movement, Hamas maintains its solid ideological positions; but as a government 
within the Palestinian political ‘legitimate’ regime, it espouses a flexible and 
pragmatic political discourse. Evidence for this orientation can be found in the 
Hamas-led national unity government programme (March 2007- June 2007), based on 
which Hamas managed to encompass the participation of Fatah and other Palestinian 
factions in its government and under its leadership after signing the Mecca agreement 
in February 2007.733 
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In that programme submitted in March 2007 the Hamas-led government reconfirmed its ‘respect,’ but 
not its commitment, for “the resolutions of international legitimacy and agreements signed by the 
Palestine Liberation Organization.” It also “respects the agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation 
Organization as the political reference to the Palestinian National Authority so as to protect the higher 
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National Conciliation Document that the management of negotiation is the prerogative of the Palestine 
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However, this amount of relative flexibility supplemented by Hamas to its 
political discourse after the success they achieved in the Palestinian legislative 
elections and their formation of a new Palestinian government will continue to be 
governed by the firm positions of the movement. This means that they will remain 
within the framework of the main Hamas position that rejects the recognition of the 
legitimacy of Israel and its right to exist. Hamas will seek, time after time, to exercise 
this firm official position.734  
Once again, from the core of the main position of Hamas that stresses the 
wholeness of Palestine and the illegality of the state of Israel, the interim solution 
discourse is highlighted. This is in an effort to ensure that Hamas is committed to its 
Islamic jurisprudential reference, as it understands them today, they are also aware of 
the complex reality for them and for the Palestinian cause and also for other parties in 
this conflict such as Israel, some Arab official regimes, and the West led by the 
United States. For example, after the speech of the American President Barack Obama 
in Cairo in June 2009, in which he called for a peaceful solution to ensure the 
establishment of a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish state living in peace and 
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security, the head of Hamas' political bureau, Khaled Meshaal, made a speech in 
response confirming that, "the programme, which is the minimal for our people and 
which we accepted in the National Reconciliation Document as a common political 
programme for all Palestinian forces, is a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its 
capital with full sovereignty on the borders of June 4, 1967 after the withdrawal of 
occupation forces, the removal of all settlements, and the achievement of the right of 
return."735 
However as always, the movement's positions retract and stresses, "we will 
not agree to any wording that recognizes the right of Israel to exist".736 Since such 
recognition would mean: 
  
(d)epriving the owners of the land of their right to return. Neither we nor the 
previous generation nor the coming one or any generation would be authorized 
to make such a decision. There is also another dimension that we have to 
emphasize; that is the religious dimension, as Palestine, among all countries, is 
owned by all Muslims. It is an Islamic Waqf, that is not to be bought, sold, nor 
would it be subject to a statute of limitation. Thirdly, for those who recognized 
the Zionist entity in 1988, what did they get? What did Israel give them?  
Therefore, neither the moral or political position, nor the past or the 
contemporary experiences would possibly be accepted as grounds for the 
recognition of the state of Israel.737 
                                                 
735 For the full text of the response: http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic/?c=129&a=93566 
736 Ismail Redwan. He is one of Hamas senior leaders in Gaza.  
http://www.palestine-
info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7%2fjs8Pvf7sfEElRRA
c1ctAbQEDRyDefKu9JDyivnSjIu0VlWOscb3myGzfHNDxguzIK%2b00DUDasrEloAMJj3PnhYIkE
NI7GGdXpI5eAyfVSg%3d  
737 Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar. Interview with Alarabiya.net on 15 March, 2009. Ibid., 
http://www.alarabiya.net/programs/2009/03/15/68495.html 
 Is It Possible for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas to Recognize Israel? 
 
Immediately after Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections, and before it 
started to form its first government, Khaled Meshaal, the movement's leader, declared 
that the movement would never recognize Israel, and renewed the truce offer as an 
instantaneous way out of the conflict. 
 
We shall never recognize the right of any power to rob us of our land and deny 
us our national rights. We shall never recognize the legitimacy of a Zionist 
state created on our soil in order to atone for somebody else’s sins or solve 
somebody else’s problem. 
But if you are willing to accept the principle of a long-term truce, we are 
prepared to negotiate the terms. Hamas is extending a hand of peace to those 
who are truly interested in a peace based on justice. 737F738 
 
Based on the previous review and in spite of the movement's principled 
(central) position, we can say that Hamas sought, in parallel, with the utmost effort to 
look like a flexible movement after its success in the Palestinian legislative elections 
and forming the new government. Hamas tried to find solutions to the problem of 
recognition of Israel, such as the allusion to the recognition from within the 
Palestinian legitimacy. 
However, these attempts were rejected by the West and Israel, who demanded 
a clear and explicit recognition of Israel by the movement and its right to exist. When 
                                                 
738 Khaled Meshaal. "We shall never recognize" 
 An Op ed in the American Lose Angles Times.1 February, 2006. 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/01/opinion/oe-meshal1   
Hamas refused, the West and Israel intensified their boycott of Palestinian Authority 
institutions under Hamas control. The Pressures doubled after Hamas' military 
takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, following clashes with security forces loyal 
to the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas. Immediately afterwards, Israel laid a 
crippling siege on the Gaza Strip and its inhabitants. All these pressures contributed to 
confusion in the discourse of Hamas. Hamas was looking for a solution for its 
predicament in the Gaza Strip, and the state of siege, in which they are trapped, not 
only by Israel, the USA, and the West; but also by some Arabs such as the case of 
Egypt. 
Thus, consistent with Hamas' previous predicament, and the Israeli military 
escalation against the Gaza Strip under Hamas' control, some statements attributed to 
leaders of Hamas spoke of some kind of equivocation about the possibility of 
recognizing Israel. However, this recognition is conditioned on Israel's recognition of 
Palestinian rights and allowing for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the entire 
West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, in addition to restoring 
other Palestinians rights. Nevertheless, even these equivocating statements about the 
possibility of Hamas' recognizing Israel were denied by Hamas as soon as they were 
released. The central position of Hamas that insists on the refusal to recognize Israel 
always intervened to control the political debate that is affected by the intense 
pressures of reality. 
For instance, Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas' Prime Minister, indicated, in an 
interview with the American Newspaper, The Washington Post, before becoming 
prime minister, that Israel must first recognize the rights of the Palestinian people, 
before talking about any recognition of Israel by Hamas. He also wonders: which 
Israel shall we recognize? Where are the borders of the Israeli state that should be 
recognized?!739 However, Haniyeh, in the same interview, indicates the possibility of 
recognizing Israel if it gives the Palestinians a state and returns their rights;740 but a 
few days later, he denied that he had referred to the possibility of recognizing 
Israel.741 In fact, all his answers in the interview, clearly show reservations about the 
possibility of recognizing Israel, and his determination to talk of a long-term truce.742 
Hamas is not alone in confronting the dilemma of Israel's recognition. The 
parent movement in Egypt faces the same dilemma. In two press statements separated 
by almost a year attributed to two senior leaders of the MB in Egypt, there was a hint 
of the possibility of recognition of Israel by the MB in Egypt if it came to power. The 
first statement was in October 2007 by Dr. Essam El-Erian, who was then the head of 
the MB's political bureau. In his statement, El-Erian said that, "if the Brotherhood 
came to power, they will recognize Israel and respect previous treaties; however the 
Camp David Accords would be modified according to what we estimate. It does not 
mean we would declare war; however, we will revise the agreements and treaties to 
be in line with Egypt's interests."743 The second statement was in October 2008, this 
time attributed to the first deputy of the MB's General Guide at the time, Dr. 
                                                 
739 "We say: Let Israel recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians first and then we will have a 
position regarding this. Which Israel should we recognize? The Israel of 1917; the Israel of 1936; the 
Israel of 1948; the Israel of 1956; or the Israel of 1967? Which borders and which Israel? Israel has to 
recognize first the Palestinian state and its borders and then we will know what we are talking about. 
A Conversation with Ismail Haniyeh: 'We Do Not Wish to Throw Them Into the Sea'” Washington 
Post, 16 March 16, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/24/AR2006022402317.html 
740 "If Israel declares that it will give the Palestinian people a state and give them back all their rights, 
then we are ready to recognize them." Ibid. 
741 http://www.aljazeera.net/News/archive/archive?ArchiveId=312684 
A similar incident was attributed to Meshaal in an interview with Reuters news agency, 10 January, 
2007. In that interview Meshaal was quoted as saying that Hamas will consider a formal recognition of 
the state of Israel only if a Palestinian state has been created on 1967 borders, and that Israel should 
accept the right of Palestinian refugees to return to homes lost in the 1967 war and before. In the same 
interview, however, Meshaal, insists that Hamas will never recognize the legitimacy of the existence of 
Israel, though it would recognize the reality of its existence as a fact.       
Yet, this interview was followed a day later by a press release by Hamas, reaffirming the central 
position of the movement, denying that Meshaal mentioned any possibility of recognizing Israel if a 
Palestinian state is created. Hamas' clarification communiqué on Thursday, 11 January, 2007.  
742 “A Conversation with Ismail Haniyeh: 'We Do Not Wish to Throw Them Into the Sea'”. Ibid.  
743 Dr. Essam El-Erian. Interview with Alahyat Newspaper (London). 13/10/2007 
http://international.daralhayat.com/archivearticle/168995 
Muhammad Habib, who said that the MB will recognize Israel if it withdraws to the 
1948 borders.744 
Immediately after the release of these two statements, which raised fierce 
debate and much resentment within the ranks of the MB, the group intervened to 
resolve the controversy, and to reaffirm the official position of its refusal to recognize 
Israel. Commenting on El-Erian's statement the MB's General Guide at the time, 
Muhammad Mahdi Akef, said that there is no such thing called Israel in the dictionary 
of the MB. He stressed that the MB would never recognize it, and that El-Erian was 
expressing his personal opinion, not the opinion of the MB.745  
A few days later, El-Erian himself retracted his statement saying, "the Muslim 
Brotherhood will never recognize Israel; because we can not recognize the seizure of 
land by force; this is consistent with the religious opinion and international 
conventions."746 El-Erian stressed that if he became the General Guide of the MB, he 
would never recognize Israel, saying that "our position on this issue is firm.”747 
However, he borrowed the previously mentioned Hamas' position, hinting the 
possibility of accepting Israel through the "Palestinian legitimacy", as an elected 
Palestinian government, not as an Islamic movement which will maintain its position 
of refusing to recognize Israel.  
 On this basis, El-Erian differentiated between the MB as a group, and the 
MB-led government. He said, "any government that inherits legal status is not 
permitted to change it from the constitutional mechanisms, and it has to resort to the 
Egyptian people as represented by the elected parliament and public referendum".748 
The same thing applies to his statement about the revision of the Camp David 
                                                 
744 http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=492155&issueno=10924  
745 http://international.daralhayat.com/archivearticle/146218. 10/18/2007 
746 http://international.daralhayat.com/archivearticle/156998. 10/20/2007  
747  Ibid. 
748 Ibid. 
Accords signed between Egypt and Israel in case the MB came to power "in line with 
Egypt's interests." The same point was expressed by Hamas, as we pointed out earlier 
with respect to the agreements signed between Israel and the PLO. 
As for Habib, he categorically denied the possibility of the MB's recognition 
of Israel, saying that the statement reported in a Turkish newspaper included in an 
interview with him was neither true nor accurate. Habib re-emphasized the position of 
the MB on this issue, saying: "The Muslim Brotherhood considers the Zionist enemy 
as an occupying entity that seized the land of Arabism and Islam.  It must be resisted 
to remove the occupation and for the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland 
which is a nonnegotiable right".749   
Indeed, the pressures and complexities of the reality play a major role in the 
confusion that took place in such statements of the leaders of Hamas and the Egyptian 
MB. And such confusion required the intervention of the central position to control 
the matter and set it back to its main position of denying any legitimacy of Israel. 
However, this does not mean that there is no Islamic jurisprudential dimension for this 
confusion; as some believe that there are considerable Islamic jurisprudential opinions 
that would allow for the recognition of Israel based on the extent of the complexity of 
the reality. As already noted, Islamic jurisprudence is very flexible. 
Immediately after the success of Hamas in the election and the beginning of 
the pressures on Hamas from the West, Israel, official Palestinian institutions, as well 
as some Arab and Islamic countries, some voices started calling on Hamas to 
                                                 
749 He added, "We want a Palestinian state where Muslims, Christians and Jews can live side by side, 
and there is no place for Zionist racism in Palestine." He also emphasized that Palestine is from the 
land to the sea, and Jerusalem is its capital. Habib even went further by insisting that "Hamas' 
acceptance of a state on 1967 borders is an interim acceptance, but it does not include the recognition 
of the Zionist entity as a state." He stressed that, "this right is not owned by Hamas alone, not even the 
Palestinian people; because the Palestinian cause is the cause of all Arab and Islamic peoples until this 
occupation comes to an end". As "Islam imposes on its followers the resistance to end the occupation." 
 http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=492155&issueno=10924. 10/25/2008. 
reconsider its approach to Islamic jurisprudence which it adopts with regard to its 
view of the issue of recognition of Israel. These calls were based on the provisions of 
jurisprudential "necessity" that would provide such cover.750 Some saw that Hamas' 
arrival to power, theoretically, requires different discourse from the one it adopted 
while being in the opposition ranks as the circumstances have changed.751 
Yet, a question as critical as the recognition of Israel by Hamas, needs a highly 
credible Islamic jurisprudential cover in the first place; such discourse was not 
available then. From this point, and because of the pressures exerted on Hamas, some 
Muslim scholars attempted to provide Islamic Jurisprudential cover for Hamas, but 
these attempts did not find sustenance by the great majority of Muslim scholars; they 
even were largely criticized and rejected. 
Perhaps the most significant and important attempts, in this context, is the one 
of the Moroccan Muslim scholar, Dr. Ahmad Ar-Raisouni. In one of his articles,752 
which raised a lot of debate among Muslim scholars, Ar-Raisouni said that it is 
possible for Hamas to recognize Israel and sign a peace accord instead of lingering 
talk of a long-term hudna. Ar-Raisouni promoted a number of arguments to support 
his rationale. He began by asserting that necessity is governed by certain diktats, and 
that things forbidden become permissible out of necessity. He goes on to claim that 
                                                 
750 Osama Muhammad al-Moaseri. "Aleteraf be Israel…… Alfiqh wa Alwaqie'a" [The Recognition of 
Israel… The jurisprudence and the Reality]. 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&pagename=Zone-Arabic-
Shariah%2FSRALayout&cid=1193049191608 
And, Osama Abu-Irshaid. Ba'ad Entisarha Al-Modawi: Jadaliat Aldini wa Alsiyasi fi Fiker Hamas.. 
Eshkaliat Altfawad wa Eletraf bi Israel Ka Anmothazin. Ibid. 
http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/mushrakat/b-mushacat-481.htm 
751 Osama Muhammad al-Moaseri. "Aleteraf be Israel…… Alfiqh wa Alwaqie'a". Ibid. 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&pagename=Zone-Arabic-
Shariah%2FSRALayout&cid=1193049191608 
And Osama Abu-Irshaid. Ba'ad Entisarha Al-Modawi: Jadaliat Aldini wa Alsiyasi fi Fiker Hamas.. 
Eshkaliat Altfawad wa Eletraf bi Israel Ka Anmothazin.  
http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/mushrakat/b-mushacat-481.htm  
752 See Ahmad Ar-Raisouni, “Qadiat Filsteen Alyawm. Roaia Fiqhia Siyasia” [The Palestinian 
Question Today: A Jurisprudential and Political Approach],  
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/3E4D7B06-8C5B-427C-850B-072FFE432044.htm  
even if this type of accord were to be concluded that it would be a kind of contract 
consummated under duress and out of coercion; or out of necessity not conviction. It 
does not confer on the oppressor any right or legitimacy nor carry any weight 
religiously or legally speaking. The agreement is breachable and open to nullification 
at any time. He further postulates that this is a generational issue. Thus future 
generations among the Palestinians and Muslims will have their own say with 
changing balances of power, as inalienable rights are not abrogated with the passage 
of time.  
Furthermore, he argues that, if need be, Muslim jurists have even permitted 
the payment of currency and the disbursement of resources to rebels and brigands for 
the purpose of safeguarding the public and ridding it of their mischief. Ar-Raisouni 
relied on the previously mentioned Treaty of Hudaibiya and the Prophet 
Muhammad’s endeavor to give the Arab tribes laying siege to the city of Medina in 
the Battle of the Trench a third of the crops of the city if they quit the siege. And this 
is an issue that we discussed before. Some Hamas leaders make the same analogy to 
justify the hudna but without going as far to justify the recognition of Israel. 752F753  
Even though Ar-Raisouni attempted to provide religious cover for Hamas to 
recognize Israel, and provide an exit from the dilemma of the siege imposed on it and 
the Palestinians, he reiterates and emphasizes that this dispensation is unique to the 
Palestinians only, and out of necessity. It is not acceptable for other Arabs and 
Muslims, who are prohibited from recognizing Israel and to consent to what he terms 
its aggression. He argues that necessity is not applicable in their case. 753F754  
                                                 
753 Ahmad Yusuf. Hamas' deputy foreign minister. Written answers to the researcher's questions. 
754 Ar-Raisouni agrees with the common Islamic jurisprudential opinion about the state of Israel, as 
"the establishment of Israel from the perspective of Islamic Shari'a is a major process of grabbing with 
countless criminal acts.. Thus, Israel from the Islamic viewpoint and from any correct religious view is 
but a series of false actions and outrageous crimes that first require elimination. Second, they require 
punishment of the perpetrators. Third, the victims should be compensated." 
It has already been pointed out that the majority of the scholars, including 
some prominent MB,755 rejected this fatwa, and ruled that Hamas is religiously 
obligated to relinquish control of the government if it had to choose between it and 
between recognition. One of these scholars, Dr. Ali al-Qurrah Daghi, opined that:  
 
Analogizing the recognition of Israel to the actions of the Prophet 
Muhammad in the Treaty of Hudaibiya and his endeavor to offer a third of 
the crops of Medina are faulty analogies in contravention of the text and 
the fundamentals.  Today a full fledged treaty is not merely a hudna, 
rather it is implemented and guaranteed within an international system, 
and signifies definite ramifications.756  
                                                                                                                                            
(http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/3E4D7B06-8C5B-427C-850B-072FFE432044.htm) 
755 Dr. Hammam Said, a Muslim scholar and the leader of the Jordanian branch of the MB says: 
"Recognition is prohibited in Islam because as the (Prophet) peace be upon said 'There is no right to an 
oppressor's adverse possession (no matter how long.)' There is no right to recognition of one who 
benefits from the ownership of someone else without his consent. The lapse of time (no matter how 
long) can not legitimize the usurpation (adverse possession) and it is not permissible to recognize the 
ownership of the usurper and what he has usurped. If that is the case then what if the situation is tied to 
Palestine and its holy sites? This is First.  
Second, who has legal standing to compromise away the rights of the refugees and the 
Palestinians? That is the content of the Balfour Declaration, i.e., someone who has no legal standing to 
give to someone who does not deserve." 
He adds: "necessity does not unconditionally permit concession of rights to the violator. Necessity can 
be interpreted into a hudna and it is not permanent. Recognition is a compromise (in religion) and is 
official. It is not encompassed in the rules of necessity. The principle of necessity is based on 
powerlessness and the incapacity to change the status quo. In Palestine they are not powerless. They 
confounded the Israeli army in Gaza. Therefore, there is no room to utilize necessity to justify 
recognition. Whoever does that has gone beyond the bounds of Islamic teachings, even if it was Hamas 
itself." A personal interview. Amman, Jordan. 11 March, 2009.   
756 The Muslim scholar Dr. Ali al-Qurrah Daghi stresses that, "the treaty of Hudaibiya did not result in 
recognition of the legitimacy of the polytheists. It was a truce that included certain terms and 
conditions; it even included recognition by the polytheists (Quraish and its allies) of the Prophet (peace 
be upon him) and his companions, treating them as a force that Quraish could make contract with". 
Daghi also pointed out another difference saying, "on the other hand, Mecca was in the hands of 
Quraish; they inhabited it. It was not conquered Muslim land; when the treaty was signed, Mecca was 
not Muslim Land waived by the Prophet (peace be upon him)." Moreover, Daghi rejected Ar-
Raisouni's comparison of any recognition of Israel by Hamas, to what the Prophet Muhammad did 
when he offered the tribe of Ghatfan one third of the fruits produced in Medina if they left Quraish's 
alliance laying siege to Medina. "Concerning comparing this case to what the Prophet (peace be upon 
him) offered to Ghatfan, it was only a financial agreement; there was neither recognition nor waiver of 
a right or land. It was immediate payment of a certain amount of money to ward off evil". See: Daghi, 
"Alqeiyas Alfased wa Fatawa Alolama'a Altheqat" [The incorrigible Analogy and the Fatwas of the 
Authentic Scholars],  
http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/contemporary/politics/2006/06/01c.shtml  
 The rejection by most of the Muslim scholars of the fatwa of Ar-Raisouni; or at 
least there disagreement with his opinion to find a religious way out for the 
recognition of Israel, limited the possibility of providing a collective and considerable 
fatwa to support such an attitude. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Hamas, as we 
clarified before, has not adopted Ar-Raisouni’s fatwa of recognizing Israel. As a 
movement it is still openly committed to its position of non recognition. However, it 
accepts implicit recognition by way of the institution of “Palestinian legitimacy,” of 
which it has become a major part today.  
In fact, the contribution made by Ar-Raisouni and Muslim scholars who 
supported his view in this context is worth contemplation and reflection. Once again, 
they started from the perspective that Islamic jurisprudence is expansive and flexible, 
as well as being realistic and contemporary to the challenges. Perhaps the previous 
review for the Prophetic and Islamic historical experiences, as well as the 
jurisprudential concept of the truce, would be enough to demonstrate how expansive 
this concept is and the legitimate origin of Ar-Raisouni's fatwa. 756F757  
And because the concepts of peace and war are largely based on objective 
circumstances and special conditions, such as, "necessities", "interest", and "warding 
off evil takes precedence over achieving benefits", the scope of Shari'a opinion is 
wide enough to include such diversity of opinions. Indeed, some of the Muslim 
scholars include the act of the Prophet in Hudaibiya within the framework of what 
they call "the jurisprudence of compromise". 757 F758  
                                                 
757 For example, it is permissible to give money to the enemy in case of weakness, or asking for peace, 
or even making an open-ended truce. Although, the majority of Muslim scholars object to such matters, 
considering some of them as having an invalid condition, as in the open-ended truce; there are other 
respected major Muslim scholars who accepted them as Ibn Taymiyyah noted before. 
From their perspective this depends on "what happened in the Hudaibiya as well as what will happen in 
the case of recognizing Israel is making concessions, even though in the space allowed by the Islamic 
The logic of the last analysis leads us to an important conclusion with regard 
to how the Prophet Muhammad dealt with such issues. According to the belief of 
Muslims, the Prophet is commanded by God and directed by his Knowledge, 
however, this does not negate the fact that the Prophet also acted, in the examples of 
the Hudaibiya and Ghatfan, as a political leader who takes into account the interest of 
his message and nation. The evidence for this is that there was no revelation and 
divine guidance in the case of Ghatfan.759  
 
Critique and Conclusion 
 
The previous conclusion leads to another important one through reviewing the 
ongoing jurisprudential debate in the issues of war and peace, as well as other issues.  
There is a big difference between the pure religious text and between its 
understanding and relative implication. There is also a difference between what 
                                                                                                                                            
jurisprudence". The evidence provided is the incident when the Quraish delegation during the 
Hudaibiya negotiations refused to write "In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Gracious"; 
instead, they wanted to write "In your name, O God". Although the Muslims refused this, Prophet 
Muhammad Himself approved it erasing "In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most 
Gracious". These scholars also provide further evidence for their opinion, when the Quraish delegation 
refused to write "that is what Muhammad, the messenger of Allah agreed on", saying, "if we know that 
you are the messenger of Allah, we would not have prevented you from visiting Mecca, and we would 
not have fought you. You rather write Muhammad Ibn Abdullah". The Prophet replied, "I am the 
messenger of Allah even though you disbelieve me, so, write Muhammad Ibn Abdullah", accepting 
what they wanted. Accordingly, these scholars wonder, "Is not that a concession and recognition of 
their existence in reality?" To substantiate their opinion, these scholars quote the well-known Muslim 
scholar Ibn Qayim Aljawziya in his saying, "Among the lessons learned from the incident of the 
Hudaibiya, that the reconciliation with the polytheists, though somehow unjust to Muslims is 
permissible in the case of probable interest and to ward off what is worse, as it is warding off the worst 
by the possibility of the less worse". Thus, "the jurisprudence of compromise is based on achieving the 
greater good even though a less evil takes place. How much we need this jurisprudence! Which Ibn 
Qayim Aljawziya said about, "this is one of the most sensitive and difficult matters, and the most 
troubling for the human being." For more details see: Osama Muhammad al-Moaseri. "Aleteraf be 
Israel…… Alfiqh wa Alwaqie'a". Ibid. 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&pagename=Zone-Arabic-
Shariah%2FSRALayout&cid=1193049191608 
759 Mohammad Emara. Mohammad Sala Allah Alaihi Wa Salam: Alrasoul Alseiasi. [Muhammad Peace 
and Blessing be Upon Him: The Politician Prophet] (Cairo, Egypt: Al-Azhar Magazine. First Edition 
2012.) pp. 47-50. Also, Osama Abu-Irshaid. Ba'ad Entisarha Al-Modawi: Jadaliat Aldini wa Alsiyasi fi 
Fiker Hamas.. Eshkaliat Altfawad wa Eletraf bi Israel Ka Anmothazin. Ibid. 
http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/mushrakat/b-mushacat-481.htm 
should be the case, and what is reality. According to Muslim belief, the religious text 
is absolute and unquestionable. However, its implication is neither absolute nor 
infallible; it is relative, could be true or false, and adapts to reality and its challenges.  
The Islamic religious text is not static data in a dynamic space; it is rather dynamic, 
responsive to the practical challenges through the mechanism of implication, and not 
by questioning the absoluteness and infallibleness of the text.760 Therefore, it may be 
true from the religious perspective that Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land, and that it is 
prohibited to waiver any inch of it, but the implication mechanism of these two rules 
in the space of factual reality is another issue that requires flexibility and 
understanding of the challenges of this reality. Again, this does not mean 
compromising a religious text, as far as it means the relativity of the implications of 
the absolute text on the reality and its flexibility on the horizon of changing the 
conditions of the existing reality.761 
Therefore, the inability of the Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims to liberate 
Palestine, as well as the huge pressures and challenges faced by the Palestinians, are 
good reasons for searching for a jurisprudential way out of the dilemma in which they 
live. In the case of Hamas, there is also the change of their legal and political status 
from opposition movement to the movement that leads the Palestinian Authority - in 
theory- and thus, the jurisprudence that regulates its positions as an opposition 
                                                 
760 Osama Abu-Irshaid. Ba'ad Entisarha Al-Modawi: Jadaliat Aldini wa Alsiyasi fi Fiker Hamas.. 
Eshkaliat Altfawad wa Eletraf bi Israel Ka Anmothazin. Ibid. 
http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/mushrakat/b-mushacat-481.htm 
For more information about this opinion, see: Ali Gomaa, the Gran Egyptian Mufti. Alnisbi wa 
Almutlaq. [The Absolute and the Relative] 
http://www.alygomaa.com/article.php?id=47     
761 Osama Abu-Irshaid. Ba'ad Entisarha Al-Modawi: Jadaliat Aldini wa Alsiyasi fi Fiker Hamas.. 
Eshkaliat Altfawad wa Eletraf bi Israel Ka Anmothazin. Ibid. 
http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/mushrakat/b-mushacat-481.htm 
movement, must be changed to adapt to its positions as a governing movement, again 
in theory.762  
Thus, the issue of recognizing Israel, even if it does not have considerable 
jurisprudential approval as the majority of Muslim scholars have rejected it, is still a 
considerable issue within Islamic jurisprudential debate and contexts. Such debate 
may have contributed to one degree or another in influencing the hesitant attitudes of 
some leaders of Hamas, regarding the issue of recognizing Israel. However, there is 
still one last important issue. Some statements by Hamas leaders indicate that the 
movement recognizes Israel as a fait accompli,763 but refuses to talk about the 
recognition of Israel's right to exist. This is similar to what Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi 
did in Al-Ramla Agreement. The question is: Why? 
The answer lies again in Islamic jurisprudential understanding of Palestine. As 
we discussed before, it is a holy Islamic Land, as it is an Islamic Waqf, as Muslims 
believe, and it is prohibited to waiver any inch of it. The holiness of Palestine within 
the Islamic context goes beyond that, according to Islamic belief, as explained in 
chapter 2 of this study. It is related to the notion of pioneering the nations and 
inheriting the preceding messages and messengers. It is also an occupied land that 
                                                 
762 "As positions that are suitable in the phase of organization or prior to the state, may not be suitable 
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should be liberated no matter how long it will take. The holiness of Palestine is an 
issue of complete consensus between those who approve a conditional recognition of 
Israel for the "necessity" and those who refuse. Thus, none of the respected Muslim 
scholars mentioned the recognition of Israel's right to exist, because such recognition 
establishes historical, religious, and future obligations that would emphasize the 
historical and religious allegations of the Jews in Palestine; and this issue is totally 
rejected by Muslims. Meanwhile, the proposed or required recognition from Hamas is 
recognition of a fait accompli, as provided for in international resolutions, which will 
not establish any religious, historical or future obligations.764 
Within the context of Islamic jurisprudence for its two sides; those who accept 
to recognize Israel as a fait accompli, and those who rejected such recognition, the 
wording of the right to exist in any future recognition of Israel would mean challenge 
to the holiness of Palestine as determined by the Quran and the traditions of the 
Prophet Muhammad, as Muslims believe. 
Thus, it might be possible one day, to imagine that the MB and Hamas would 
recognize Israel (though this is unlikely), but the unthinkable, according to 
conclusions reached by this research, is their recognition of its right to exist on the 
land of Palestine. 
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Conclusion 
 
This study sought to understand the religious and the political interaction and its 
mechanisms in the ideology and practice of the MB and Hamas, with regard to their 
understanding of the nature of the conflict with Israel. As becomes clear in the 
introduction and chapter 1 of this study, the MB, the mother organization of Hamas 
sees no boundaries between the religious and the political on the ground: they are 
convinced that Islam is a comprehensive religion that establishes a framework for all 
walks of life. And because Hamas emerged as a resistance movement, rather than an 
intellectual one, as explained in the introduction of this study Hamas has always relied 
on the MB school of thought in formulating their positions. 
The central contribution of this research to the existing literatures on Hamas is 
that it is the first study of its kind to analyse the ground on which Hamas’ ideological 
convictions are based, and how they developed. No other study has gone as far as this 
thesis in attempting to understand the role of religion in the formulation of the 
convictions of the MB – and therefore those of Hamas - in their comprehension of the 
conflict with Israel. This research has sought to fill this void by trying to explain the 
mechanisms of religious and political interaction and the role this interaction has 
played in shaping the ideological convictions of the two movements in the context of 
their conflict with Israel. The few studies that have examined the religious and the 
political dimensions of Hamas' thinking have tended to treat Hamas' ideology - as 
described in its charter - as the movement’s religious frame of reference, without 
attempting to investigate the source of these ideological convictions, their 
authenticity, and how they were formed. 
  Misconceiving or confusing the ideological and religious dimensions of Hamas' 
convictions, leads us to false conclusions. One of these false conclusions is the claim 
that Hamas has retreated from its religious frames of reference, in understanding of 
the nature of the conflict with Judaism / Zionism, and Jews / Zionists (a point 
explained in  chapter 3 of this study). Reviewing the religious reference of Hamas 
helps us to understand that any change in one of Hamas’ positions does not imply the 
abandonment of its religious reference, but rather a shift from one considerable 
Islamic fiqhi (jurisprudential) opinion to another. "Hamas cannot step outside a 
religious frame of reference in its political practice. Hamas therefore needs fatwas 
when it is faced with political choices that seem to extend outside the confines of the 
accepted religious framework."765 As was explained in chapters 3 and 4 in the 
discussion of Hamas' view of the basis of hostility and its refusal to recognize Israel, 
the adoption of these fatwas required quantitative and qualitative backing. Hamas 
cannot move from one position to another and from one ideological conviction to 
another without a considerable fiqhi and religious cover.  
Of course, this does not mean that the fiqhi and religious debate within Hamas 
and the MB are always conducted in the public domain, sometimes they are 
concluded behind closed doors. Either way, they are present in the background. 
However, in many cases, this fiqhi and religious debate does become public, 
particularly with regard to the position of Hamas concerning the issues of truce and 
recognition of Israel, which were discussed in chapters 3 and 4. This debate, when it 
is in the public sphere, is mostly conducted by scholars and specialists -  either 
members of the MB or close to the MB and Hamas. As noted above, Hamas does not 
adopt usually the conclusions resulting from internal discussions unless they have the 
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required quantitative and qualitative support, precisely because the movement cannot 
adopt them without otherwise being accused of abandoning its religious reference and 
framework. This is what actually happened on the issue of the nature of conflict, and 
the stance towards the truce.  
Because there were fatwas characterized by quantitative and qualitative 
backing, Hamas was able to clearly declare its transition from the fiqhi opinion saying 
that the conflict with Israel is an eternal historical and religious conflict between truth 
and falsehood, and between Judaism and Islam, to another fiqhi opinion saying that 
the conflict is based on aggression (i.e. occupation) and not belief, which was 
explained in chapter 3. The same thing applies to the issue of the truce with Israel on 
condition of non-recognition. The quantitative and qualitative accumulation in the 
fiqhi and religious discussions and fatwas issued by scholars whom Hamas and the 
MB consider respectable, has allowed Hamas to adopt this position comfortably and 
again without fear of being accused of abandoning its religious reference. This was 
explained in chapter 4 of this study. Of course, the Islamic Prophetic and historical 
experiences contributed in strengthening the stance of the MB and Hamas towards 
these two issues. This was also detailed in chapters 3 and 4. By comparison, the 
recognition of Israel, even on temporal basis, does not have the quantitative and 
qualitative accumulation in the context of the fiqhi and religious discussions. 
Therefore, the MB and Hamas as foundations were unable – until now - to adopt such 
a stance of recognizing Israel, although some leaders in the two movements indicated 
their adoption of this position as individuals, as explained in chapter 4. 
Thus, Hamas remained and will remain compliant with the religious 
framework of reference that governs it and its ideological convictions. And if it is 
possible to imagine that Hamas would one day shift some of its ideological 
convictions, this would only be through a considerable fiqhi and religious cover, as 
this research indicated. If an alternative course is taken, Hamas will not be the same 
movement that exists today. 
Throughout this research, it is clear that the development of some of Hamas’ 
ideological convictions is due to two main reasons. The first is the development of 
Hamas' political and ideological awareness (i.e. maturity). And the second is due to 
the pressure of local, regional and international circumstances on the movement to 
soften some of its convictions, as indicated in the previous chapters. However, all this 
– in the opinion of the researcher – was not enough to make such a shift and such a 
development in the ideology and politics without the existence of extended and 
expansive Islamic fiqhi sphere that allowed Hamas to make safe shifts.   
Therefore, it is true that the establishment of Hamas in the late 1980s was in a 
way an expression of the ideological convictions of the mother organization at that 
period of time. This is reflected in the Hamas charter, issued in 1988. However, it is 
not correct to say that the rigid attitudes towards Jews, Judaism, and the nature of the 
conflict, etc, that were outlined in the charter reflected only the prevailing ideological 
climate within the MB at the time. That ideology had historical origins and its fiqhi 
legitimacy, and was not merely arbitrary ideas and reactions, as was previously 
indicated. When Hamas found itself facing a real dilemma that hindered its path and 
its political relations because of its rigid ideology, it had no choice other than 
resorting to the rich and expansive realm of Islamic fiqh in an attempt to get out of its 
predicament. The mechanism for this was through fiqhi and religious discussions and 
reviews conducted by scholars who are considerable and respected by Hamas and the 
MB, as well as by the Arab and Muslim masses. 
 
The Realm of Religion 
 
Thus, the launching of Hamas and the formulation of its initial ideological convictions 
were strongly influenced by the historical era that witnessed a heated debate within 
the MB about the arguments of both liberation and empowerment, and the concepts of 
detachment and Jahiliyyah766 of communities (chapter 1), and the eternal battle 
between right and wrong (chapter 3). However, with the passage of time and the 
development of its political and ideological awareness, Hamas tended to adopt more 
flexible ideological arguments from within the same religious reference and without 
violating it. This is one of the key points that this study sought to stipulate; namely 
that the ideological and the political interaction within the MB and Hamas movement 
in particular only interplays within their comprehensive understanding of Islam. 
These issues were discussed briefly in the introduction and chapter 1. As was 
mentioned then, the concept of the comprehensiveness of Islam is the prevailing 
Islamic view, not only within the MB. This issue will be further detailed later on in 
this section. 
In this study, the failure to understand the last point is a weakness in some of 
the existing studies on Hamas. For example, Jeroen Gunning, the author of Hamas in 
Politics, argues that:  
 
Religion helps to shape Hamas' overall worldview, although more research is 
needed to establish how exactly this dynamic works. Religion provides the 
discursive framework within which the conflict with Israel is framed. It 
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provides justifications for Hamas' political positions – including significantly, 
its adoption of certain democratic principles.767 
 
However, his study, according to the conclusions of this research, is hindered 
by the misunderstanding of the nature of the concept of the comprehensiveness of 
Islam as understood by Hamas and the MB; and thus the nature of the role it plays in 
formulating their ideological convictions. 
 
But, beyond that, much of Hamas' political behaviour cannot be explained 
solely with reference to religion. The bulk of its election manifesto (i.e. the 
2006 legislative elections) is shaped by non-religious concerns or by its socio-
economic or political position. Its behaviour towards the peace process and the 
patterns of its violence appear similarly to be driven more by secular than by 
religious calculations.768  
 
The argument of this research is that the abovementioned not only represents a 
misunderstanding of Hamas and the MB's concept of the comprehensiveness of 
religion, but that it also represents a misunderstanding of the nature of Islam itself as a 
religion, and what is religious, and how it is comprehended by the Muslim 
mainstream since Prophet Muhammad founded the state of Medina. It seems that this 
is a problem in most Western studies that attempt to understand the role of religion 
and its scope in the consciousness of Muslims.  
The Quran clearly indicates the concept of the comprehensiveness of Islam to 
frame thereof all walks of life. "Say: "Truly, my prayer and my service of sacrifice, 
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my life and my death, are (all) for Allah, the Cherisher of the Worlds."769 Also, "And 
this (He commands): judge thou between them by what Allah hath revealed, and 
follow not their vain desires, but beware of them lest they beguile thee from any of 
that (teaching) which Allah hath sent down to thee."770 So, "Islam, decreed by Allah, 
did not leave any aspect of life without legislation and guidance. By its nature, Islam 
covers all aspects of life: physical and spiritual; individual and social. Allah addressed 
His Messenger, saying, “and We have sent down to thee a Book explaining all things, 
a Guide, a Mercy, and Glad Tidings to Muslims.” (16: 88)."771 
The Muslim Scholar, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, stresses, "When one reads the books 
of Islamic shari'a, i.e. books of Islamic fiqh in various doctrines, one will discover 
that they include all affairs of life: fiqh of Tahara (Purification), fiqh of the family, 
fiqh of the society, fiqh of the state. This is clear to any freshman, not to mention a 
well-versed scholar."772 Unlike the Western Christian concept of religion and the 
relationship between religion, government, and society, that emphasizes "render unto 
Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's", Islam 
does not recognize such boundaries. "During Muhammad's lifetime, the Muslims 
became at once a political and a religious community, with the Prophet as head of the 
state. As such, he governed a place and a people, dispensed justice, collected taxes, 
commanded armies, waged wars and made peace."773  
The concept of the comprehensiveness of Islam of all walks of life and the 
non-recognition of any boundaries between religion and politics was reinforced after 
the death of the Prophet. As his first successor Abu Bakr, was not only a spiritual 
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successor of the Prophet, but was also the head of the state. He led the prayer, 
governed people, and applied the provisions of Islamic shari'a in all areas of life. 
Indeed, one of the first acts of Abu Bakr after his succession to the Prophet was 
fighting those among Muslims who withheld Zakat774 "alms" on the basis that it was a 
religious duty on which the state oversees.775 This approach was followed by the 
Muslim caliphs and rulers for more than thirteen centuries.  
What we conclude here is that any attempt to project the Western 
understanding of the role of religion on the Islamic understanding of the same issue 
would lead us to a lack of understanding and reaching erroneous results. As Talal 
Asad correctly notes: 
 
(T)his separation of religion from power is a modern Western norm, the 
product of a unique post-Reformation history. The attempt to understand 
Muslim traditions by insisting that in them religion and politics (two essences 
modern society tries to keep conceptually and practically apart) are coupled 
must, in my view, lead to failure.776 
 
 The role of religion in the Islamic context is present in all areas, as already 
indicated, and this is the understanding of the MB and Hamas that agrees with the 
Islamic mainstream fiqhi and historical opinion, as noted in the introduction of this 
study. In the absence of the Quranic text or hadith on any issue, the role of religion 
remains present and the criterion for achieving the purpose of shari'a is seeking the 
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legitimate interest of an individual, group or the nation, or achieving Justice, of 
course, with no violation of a shari'a text.777 
Going back to the MB and Hamas who affirm their adoption of the 
comprehensiveness of Islam. For them, anything they do, whether civil or religious, is 
a matter of religion in the broad definition. Thus, the question of the truce and the 
war, and participation in the elections, for example, although they have to do with 
politics, however, they are within the broad definition of religion and its role in the 
lives of Muslims.  
The same logic also applies to the concept of nationalism and the struggle for 
the national rights in the perspective of the MB and Hamas. Hamas’ discourse on the 
inalienable legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, and its presentation of 
itself as a national liberation movement, does not mean that it has abandoned its 
religious reference at all. Patriotism and the human rights in the discourse of Hamas 
today falls also within what is religious for it, as indicated above, and as we explained 
in the introduction and in chapter 3 of this study. In the logic of Hamas and the MB, 
and mainstream Islamic opinion, there has never been conflict between what is 
national and what is religious since the mission of Muhammad. The reason is that 
national issues are part of the religious, a matter in which this research dealt with in 
detail in chapter 4, when we discussed the issue of Jihad and the defense of the land 
of Islam in Islamic fiqh. Thus, the clear reduction in the religious vocabulary in 
Hamas’ official discourse today does not mean it abandoned its religious reference 
which is always present in the background of the discussion and the formulation of 
attitudes. Without doing so, Hamas risks losing its public base, and even losing itself 
as well. 
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The latter is clearly demonstrated in Hamas’ criticism of the basis on which 
the chairman of the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, headed to the United Nations to present a 
bid for the membership of "Palestine" on 23 September, 2011. Hamas considered that 
this move took place without a national consensus and included recognition of Israel 
and renunciation of armed resistance.778 The political reasons submitted by Hamas to 
justify its criticism of this move will be introduced later. However, what is relevant in 
this context is the emphasis on the central religious reference that always exists in the 
background of the scene. Days after the Abbas-led statehood bid at the UN, the senior 
leader of Hamas and its prime minister in the Gaza Strip, Ismail Haniyeh said: 
 
The Palestinian people have fought and struggled for more than 60 years to 
liberate their land and establish the Palestinian state with its capital Jerusalem. 
This is the objective of all of the Palestinian people. But we cannot accept to 
have a state in exchange for a single inch of our land or to give up one of our 
inalienable rights, especially the right of return.779 
 
He added, “We support the establishment of a Palestinian state on any 
liberated land, but without recognizing the occupation or giving up an inch of the land 
of Palestine, because it is a land of Islamic waqf that no one can renounce.”780 
                                                 
778 Hamas: "An important statement regarding the request of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah to 
the U.N to accept Palestine as a member state." 17 September, 2011. 
http://www.palestine-
info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7r8QkL1MjnnGVIYP4
zRR2zNbq0hw%2b%2fIVjj%2b%2f2T%2fvTkohhKyIXBhj4CV2k2aPonb9BdrfJDHK%2fszTFSbtVl
hCn8jxDrhtscnrwJX%2futFzUmg8%3d  
779 http://www.palestine-
info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7EdQV27s3mhj68LsC
Kd3EFc%2b2eAaLF5MsmkiRV87%2f6PVQ1MmYOgV24%2bS0dTp1PN3dPRmUVEbKVNLhbJKe
gFeshZ356%2bW0qtHqr%2fL39rRayuc%3d 
780 Ibid. 
It is true that Haniyeh's speech and the vocabularies that he used  were not part 
of an official statement of Hamas, which clearly reduced the religious content in its 
statements, but this does not diminish the value of the speech of Haniyeh and other 
Hamas leaders. Haniyeh’s statement gives us further evidence on how the religious 
and the political interact in the background of the Hamas scene and the impact of such 
interaction on the formulation of the Movement’s attitudes. Once again, it also assures 
that the holiness of the Occupied Palestinian land and its endowment will always 
remain present in the consciousness of Hamas and in its calculations, and that 
nationalism in this regard does not conflict with the holiness as discussed extensively 
in chapters 2 and 4.   
The Islamic position remains Hamas' main determinant in the formulation of 
its political positions, even if we do not find that explanation in many of the 
movement’s discourse and official statements today. For Hamas, it is enough that the 
fiqhi and the religious debate are present during the formulation of its political 
positions and determining its direction, before they are introduced to the world into a 
discourse that is easy to understand. 
In confirmation of this point, it is clear that Hamas today seeks to alleviate the 
tone of the religious language in its official statements that are directed to sectors 
outside its public base; however, it is keen to keep its stated positions within the same 
fiqhi system that it has always adopted. Evidence of this might be found in the 
previous example of the PLO urging the UN to recognize Palestine as the 
state. Hamas provided a political explanation for its criticism of this move; however, 
this explanation was within the frame of the fiqhi positions, discussed in chapter 4, 
which limit the ability of Hamas to make substantial concessions in the context of the 
conflict with Israel. 
  
Proceeding from the national political program that has been agreed upon by 
all the Palestinian national forces, that includes: the establishment of a 
Palestinian state with real sovereignty on the lines of the fourth of June 1967, 
with Jerusalem as its capital; the return of the refugees; the dismantling of 
settlements and without recognizing the Zionist entity; We in the Hamas 
movement support any effort or political movements that afford international 
support and solidarity for the right of our people to liberation and self 
determination; the establishment of a fully sovereign state; the achievement of 
Palestinian national rights; and that result in the condemnation of the Zionist 
entity, the rejecter of our rights, and reveal its true position. But this political 
movement cannot be at the expense of any of our national rights.781 
 
In this statement, Hamas again emphasizes that the ceiling of its current 
interim solution is a Palestinian state on the lines of the fourth of June 1967, with 
Jerusalem as its capital, without recognizing Israel, and without giving up the right of 
a single inch of the historic Palestine land or the right of refugees to return. The 
ideological and political background of this position was discussed in chapter 4. It is 
also related to the concept of Palestine being a waqf and a holy land in the Islamic 
thought and the thought of the MB/ Hamas (chapter 2). If Hamas stance is to be 
properly understood, none of these issues can be separated from one another.   
However, the previous Hamas stance raises an important question about what 
may seem as a contradiction with what was indicated in chapter 4: that Hamas has 
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previously approved authorizing Abbas to negotiate with Israel. This stance was 
included in the letter that the movement gave to President Carter in 2008.782    
In fact, there is no contradiction here, for many reasons. First, in that letter, 
Hamas stipulated that this authorization will be based on a Palestinian national 
reconciliation after the split, which resulted from the clashes of June 2007 in the Gaza 
Strip. Second, the outcome of any negotiations should be endorsed through a 
Palestinian referendum. Third, this solution should include the establishment of a 
fully sovereign Palestinian state on all Palestinian territory occupied in 1967, with 
East Jerusalem as its capital. Chapter 4 indicated that Hamas as a movement insisted 
on non-recognition of Israel, even if these demands have been achieved, but gave an 
implicit reference that it would implicitly accept the existence of Israel from within 
Palestinian legitimacy. So, what has changed now? 
The changes are that the Palestinian reconciliation has not practically achieved 
until now, and that the presidential mandate of Mahmoud Abbas has ended 
constitutionally in early 2009. He also headed to the UN without consultation with the 
Palestinian forces that have strong presence in the Palestinian arena, Hamas in 
particular.  Moreover, some steps have been supposed to be taken, namely, rebuilding 
the PLO and the inclusion of Hamas and other Palestinian forces in it, and conducting 
elections for a new Palestinian National Council in the occupied Palestinian lands and 
the Palestinian diasporas.783 In addition, Abbas seems to ignore the need to put any 
final solution to a Palestinian referendum. However, most important of all is that the 
Arab Spring revolutions seem to be present in the calculations of Hamas in its 
opposition to such a move; Hamas feels that these revolutions have strengthened the 
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Palestinian position and weakened the Israeli position. Therefore, this must be taken 
into account, and this is an issue that will be discussed in more details later in this 
section.  
Again, as explained before in chapter 4, the Hamas acceptance of the interim 
solution does not mean abandoning its stance that resistance and jihad are the most 
effective way to liberate all of Palestine. This stance has remained constant since the 
establishment of Hamas until now, as explained in chapter 1. To demonstrate that, we 
only need refer to the statement of the movement issued on the eleventh anniversary 
of Al-Aqsa Intifada on 28 September, 2011, in which Hamas confirmed again its 
adherence to resistance as the mean of liberation. "Our path to liberation, return, and 
the regaining our national rights is the resistance in all forms. This option is chosen by 
the Palestinian people throughout their struggle and it has proven efficacy in shaking 
this usurper Zionist entity."784 
The same thing applies to the issue of truce, which was investigated in chapter 
4.  The fact that Hamas does not, anymore, mention the truce officially in its 
statements after the Israeli war on Gaza 2008-2009, does not mean that Hamas has 
given it up.  
Hamas is still practically maneuvering within the framework of the truce. 
Evidence of this is Hamas' previous statement criticizing the PLO’s bid at the UN and 
its emphasis that the ceiling of the interim solution that would be accepted is a 
Palestinian state on lands occupied in 1967 without recognition of Israel. As 
explained before during the discussion of the concept of truce from Hamas' 
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perspective, it includes the above-mentioned interim solution, without recognition of 
Israel at all. 
Thus, the vocabulary in the official discourse of Hamas may have changed to 
give the impression of political flexibility and in order to deal with the difficult 
reality. However, the religious contents and dimensions that control the formulation 
of the beliefs and attitudes of Hamas have not changed until today. The notion of the 
sacredness of Palestine still exists in the ideology of Hamas and the MB. And their 
aspiration to establish an Islamic state and to liberate Palestine did not diminish in 
their ideological project. Also, their conviction of the religious dimension to the 
conflict always exists on the basis that the aggression on the land of Islam still 
continues to this day, as they believe, through the continuation of the State of Israel 
(chapters 3 and 4). 
 
Obstacles and Achievements 
 
During the journey of writing this study, which continued for more than six years, the 
researcher faced many difficulties related to family, financial circumstances, work 
commitments; as well as other constraints that made it difficult to travel to the U.K to 
meet with the supervisors etc. I have thought several times of giving up and to cut off 
this long and difficult journey in order to be devoted to my family and professional 
life, and investing in them. Also, choosing Hamas as subject for research compounded 
the problems of my residence in the U.S, as Muslim activists experience a lot of 
harassment after 11 September, 2001. Because Hamas is a sensitive issue in the 
United States, I found myself the subject of an unfair and fiercely hostile media 
campaign. This campaign amounted to the accusation by the Zionist lobby in the U.S 
that I was a member or close to Hamas, especially after I and an American Jewish 
friend coauthored an academic research paper on Hamas, published by the U.S. 
Institute of Peace in June 2009. Since that campaign, I have been the subject of other 
harassment in my life in the United States. In the introduction to this study, it was 
mentioned that the sensitive security climate experienced by Muslims in America 
limited my ability to conduct interviews necessary for the research with leaders of 
Hamas, though I have been able to overcome this at the end by asking questions via e-
mail. 
But, despite all the difficulties, my resolve and determination to finish this 
research has led me to the stage where I hope to harvest the fruits of the hard 
work. And because the value of any work is not only measured by the efforts placed 
in it, but also by how good it is, I think that this research, to a large extent, has 
answered the questions posed at its beginning, however not at the best way I wished 
to. 
This research demonstrates, to a large extent, in the introduction and in chapter 
1, as well as in this conclusion, the MB and Hamas’ understanding of what is 
religious, and what is political, and the framing of the first to the latter, and how they 
interact. This interaction, in which the formulation of the ideology of the MB and 
Hamas is based, was also investigated in chapters 2, 3, and 4. Moreover, this research 
highlights the great diversity and richness within Islamic fiqh, which is much broader 
than the ideology of Hamas and the MB, and their understanding of Islam. Also, this 
study indicated the factors and circumstances that led to the establishment of Hamas 
from within the MB, as well as the ideological and political development of the 
movement. This was investigated in chapter 1. Chapter 2 looked into the origins of the 
sacredness of Palestine in Islam and in the ideology of the MB. The concept of 
Palestine as a land of Islamic waqf, the debates on this subject, and their projections 
on Hamas' understanding and its tackling of the Palestinian cause were also discussed 
and explained. 
Chapter 3 indicated clearly the identity of the enemy in the perspective of the 
MB/Hamas, and how their ideology concerning this matter developed within the 
broad scope of the rich Islamic fiqh. As indicated before the MB and Hamas 
resolution to the causes of hostility as based on aggression (occupation), and not on 
religion, would have never been without a fiqhi and religious cover, and a 
considerable Prophetic experience in this regard. In discussing the concept of the 
solution envisaged by Hamas with regard to the Palestinian issue, chapter 4 explains 
in great detail the areas of the religious and the political interaction. This chapter 
reaffirmed the abundance and richness of Islamic fiqh, as it reaffirmed one of the 
central hypotheses in this research that the MB and Hamas do not shift from one fiqhi 
opinion to another, unless they ensure the existence of a considerable religious fiqhi 
cover in that context. In this chapter, It was mentioned that Hamas adoption of more 
flexible policies and of interim options, such as a Palestinian state with full 
sovereignty in the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, with no recognition of Israel, 
does not mean overthrowing its religious reference, as far as it has to do with the 
development within the ideology of the MB that is based on its understanding of the 
teachings of the Islamic religion in the matter under discussion. 
Also, the convictions of the MB and Hamas, with regard to their 
understanding of the sacredness of Palestine, the identity of the enemy, and the nature 
of the conflict, were all investigated for accuracy (or lack thereof), in relation to the 
Islamic shari'a and fiqh, as well as in relation to the Prophetic experience and Islamic 
history. 
 The Future 
 
On 17 December, 2010, the Tunisian young man, Muhammad Bouazizi, set himself 
on fire in Sidi Bouzid. He was a street vendor when his wares by which he supports 
himself and his family were confiscated. And when he tried to object to the 
confiscation, he was humiliated by the policewoman who confiscated his merchandise 
and by the municipality of the city. Bouazizi then set himself on fire in protest.   
By setting himself on fire, Bouazizi, not only revealed the scope of popular 
resentment in Tunisia of the ruling dictatorial regime, but also the overall Arab 
resentment of their totalitarian and repressive regimes. Thus, since 18 December, 
2010, what has become known as the Arab Spring blossoms, launched through 
massive popular protests starting from Tunisia. In less than a month (14 January, 
2011), the regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown, followed by 
the regime of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak after less than two months (11 
February, 2011) since the Arab spring began. The next was the Libyan President, 
Muammar Gaddafi in August 2011 after a fierce war in which NATO provided 
support for the rebels. However, the regimes of Yemen and Syria are still, at this time 
of writing, facing huge peaceful mass demonstrations, and responding with repression 
and force of arms, although the signs of exhaustion are evident on both regimes. In 
Bahrain, the ruling family was able to suppress popular demonstrations by demanding 
the intervention of the GCC Peninsula Shield forces. Though this does not mean the 
end of the story, there is still a tense situation there.  
The repercussions of the Arab Spring reached the heart of every Arab capital. 
 And as some regimes were overthrown under popular pressure, and others fought or 
are still fighting for survival; there are others which hastened to modify their positions 
to avoid the similar enormous popular waves of protests. These attempts, as in Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Morocco etc., have not yet met the demands of their 
people, thus, the regimes in those countries remain in the eye of the storm. 
It is true that it is still too early to predict the future outputs of the Arab 
Spring, and whether it will actually bring democratic regimes into existence, or the 
old regimes will succeed in regenerating themselves through new faces and policies. 
However, the only thing certain is that the era of repressing the Arab peoples had 
come into an end, and that these peoples will not tolerate any repressive regime seeks 
to rule with a rod of iron again. 
The Palestinian cause is present in the heart of the Arab Spring. Not only 
because the MB, and the Islamists in general, were strongly present in the Arab 
revolutions; but also because the Arab peoples have always sympathized with the 
Palestinian cause for religious, nationalistic and humane reasons. Moreover, some of 
these peoples hold vendettas against Israel, as a result of many wars, as in the case of 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Also, the Arab spring was not a revolt only against the 
internal repression, it was also in protest and rage for the national pride wounded by 
what the Arab people view as dependence of their regimes upon the outside, 
especially the Western powers. 784F785 
In the midst of this raging Arab tornado, Israel found itself in a strategic 
dilemma that it had never faced before. The overthrow of regimes it considered as 
                                                 
785 Dependence on the West, was, and remains, one of the charges brought by some of the Arab peoples 
to their regimes. The former U.S President, George W. Bush seemed to touch upon this issue when he 
said: "Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle 
East did nothing to make us safe -- because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense 
of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a 
place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can 
bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo." 
Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. United 
States Chamber of Commerce. Washington, D.C. 6 November, 2003, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html 
allies, or close to it, as in Egypt and Tunisia, exacerbated its fears of being 
threatened.786 These fears were strengthened after angry Egyptian demonstrators 
stormed the Israeli embassy in Cairo on 9 September, 2011. This was as a response to 
the killing of five Egyptian solders on 19 August, 2011, by the Israeli forces inside the 
Egyptian boarders during a hunt of a squad of militants that carried out an operation 
inside Israel, killing a number of Israeli soldiers.787 The feeling of being threatened 
was further exacerbated after Israel was forced to evacuate its ambassador in Amman 
on 14 September, 2011, for two days fearing that the Jordanians would copycat the 
same scene of forcibly entering its embassy. This followed an announcement by some 
Jordanians that they will protest in front of the Israeli embassy.788 
Of course, the seriousness of a potential decline and tension in the Israeli 
relations with Egypt and Jordan, comes from the fact that these were the only two 
Arab countries to have signed peace agreements with Israel. If we add to this, Israel's 
growing strained relationship with its most important Muslim ally in the region, i.e. 
Turkey, since the war on Gaza (2008/2009); and then later, when the Israeli forces 
killed nine Turkish activists (31st May, 2010) who were on board of the ship 
"Marmara" that was carrying humanitarian aid destined for the besieged Gaza Strip, 
the Israeli strategic concerns become legitimate.  
                                                 
786 In his address to the U.S Congress on 24 May, 2011, the Israel's prime minister, Benjamin 
Netanyahu seemed to confirm these fears. "In an unstable Middle East, Israel is the one anchor of 
stability. In a region of shifting alliances, Israel is America's unwavering ally. Israel has always been 
pro-American. Israel will always be pro-American."  
http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/assessing-bush-strategy-winning-war-terror 
Also, Some news reports indicated that Israel tried to convince the United States and a number of 
European countries to curb their criticism of the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the name 
of preserving stability in the region. 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-urges-world-to-curb-criticism-of-egypt-s-mubarak-
1.340238 
787 http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/09/world/la-fg-egypt-israeli-embassy-20110910 
788 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44525743/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/israel-evacuates-
embassy-jordan-ahead-protests/ 
However, the Israeli dilemma can be viewed as a gain for the Palestinians, 
although morally at this stage. There is no doubt that Hamas, specifically, is aware of 
these developments and takes them into consideration. It is true that the wave of the 
Arab flood tides reached the stronghold of its closer Arab ally, i.e. Syria. Hamas' 
refusal to support the Syrian regime against its own people put its leadership abroad in 
an unenviable position, as well as resulting in the loss of Iranian financial support, as 
Iran raged at Hamas because of its refusal to support the Syrian regime.789 However, 
this did not mean, at least until now, that Hamas would lower the ceiling on its 
political demands; on the contrary, it raised that ceiling. This was evident in its 
abovementioned stance towards Abbas-led statehood bid at the UN. The weakening 
status of Hamas in Damascus is offset by the strengthening of its status in Cairo, 
Amman, Tunis and Tripoli, where Hamas have the support from the Islamists who are 
returning to the political arena in those capitals, let alone, the Arab public embrace of 
the Palestinian cause. In addition, Hamas' faltering relations with Iran is compensated, 
to an extent, by the improved relationship with Turkey under its moderate Islamic 
government. This could provide some of the Islamic depth that Hamas seeks; but this 
does not mean giving up entirely the relationship with Iran.  
In any case, there is no doubt that the Arab Spring boosted the confidence of 
Hamas that the future holds the promise of good on the Palestinian front. In the 
estimation of Hamas, the Arab peoples seeking to acquire control of their own affairs 
will strengthen the stance of Palestinian rights, as it will strengthen its stance of 
refusing to recognize Israel. This estimation that was openly expressed in Hamas’ 
                                                 
789 http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/22/163561.html 
 
 
 
 
 
criticism of Abbas statehood bid at the UN, because it involves recognition of Israel, 
among other reasons, indicated before. But that does not mean that Hamas would 
retreat from its suggested interim solution in its conflict with Israel, at least in the 
foreseeable future. 
The Arab Spring has not reached yet the end that Hamas and the Islamists 
hope for; also Israel is still a large military force in the region and is still supported by 
the West; and the Arabs are still unable to defeat Israel militarily in the foreseeable 
future.   
Thus, it is too early to talk about any radical or fundamental shifts in Hamas' 
political ideology at this stage, i.e. returning to the explicit discourse of removing 
Israel totally from the map of the region, or the opposite, i.e. recognizing Israel. 
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